Hegel and the Problem of the Multiplicity of Conflicting Philosophies by Peters, Matthew M.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects
Hegel and the Problem of the Multiplicity of
Conflicting Philosophies
Matthew M. Peters
Marquette University
Recommended Citation
Peters, Matthew M., "Hegel and the Problem of the Multiplicity of Conflicting Philosophies" (2017). Dissertations (2009 -). 726.
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/726
 
 
 
HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF CONFLICTING 
PHILOSOPHIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Matthew Peters, B.A., M.A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, 
Marquette University, 
in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
August 2017 
 
 
  
Abstract 
HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF CONFLICTING  
PHILOSOPHIES 
Matthew Peters, B.A., M.A. 
Marquette University, 2017 
 As Hegel notes in his long Introduction to the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, the problem of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies presents a 
particularly urgent problem to the very discipline of philosophy itself. For, from the 
viewpoint of what Hegel would refer to as “ordinary consciousness”, the fact that there 
are so many different philosophies which seem constantly to disagree can only lead to 
one conclusion: philosophy itself is a futile enterprise. 
 Hegel, perhaps more than any previous philosopher, was sensitive to this charge 
of futility levelled against philosophy. In response, he provided an explanatory account of 
the multiplicity of philosophies. This dissertation seeks to explicate Hegel’s effort in this 
regard. 
 Hegel’s basic argument is that the multiplicity of philosophies is to be explained 
as expressions of the dialectical and polymorphic development of the mind. The mind 
advances through stages, each one of which is capable of expressing itself in some 
determinate philosophy. Insofar as this is the case, however, philosophy can be shown to 
be not merely a haphazard succession of conflicting viewpoints but rather the 
manifestation of the mind in its historical development. 
 The chapters of this dissertation each examine crucial elements to Hegel’s overall 
theory of the development of the mind. They also demonstrate how Hegel thereby 
explains the very emergence of, and intelligible correlations among, the various 
philosophies. 
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Introduction 
 Despite the grandeur that might justly be ascribed to the collective achievement of 
the philosophers, from its inception philosophy has been hounded by a particularly 
vexatious problem, one which continually threatens to undermine belief in the very 
viability of philosophy as a discipline. That problem is the history and ongoing existence 
of a multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. 
Few philosophers have been as sensitive to the problem presented to philosophy 
by the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting philosophies as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel.1 The primary task of the present dissertation will be to recover and explicate 
Hegel’s explanatory account of philosophical differences.  
Regarding Hegel’s effort to explain philosophical differences, it is likely to be 
asked: why does the existence of philosophical differences constitute a problem worthy 
of the sustained philosophical examination Hegel devotes to it? Why, indeed, should it be 
a major philosophical concern that there exists a multiplicity of philosophies and 
philosophers seem constantly to disagree? Granting the reasonableness of such questions, 
the rest of the present introductory chapter will be directed towards clarifying in greater 
detail the case for why the problem of philosophical differences is a fundamental problem 
                                                          
1 There will, of course, be ample occasion in this dissertation to discuss at length many of the vast number 
of instances in which Hegel discusses the problem of philosophical differences. In order to give an initial 
indication of the topic’s significance, however, it would be worth pointing out that his first published work, 
the Differenzschrift (DZ), not only takes as its overriding theme a clarification of the difference between 
Fichte and Schelling’s respective philosophical systems, but begins with a section entitled “Historical View 
of Philosophical Systems” whose opening line states “An age which has so many philosophical systems 
lying behind it in its past must apparently arrive at the same indifference which life acquires after it has 
tried all forms” (DZ 86). The effort to address the indifference and a sense of futility experienced in the 
face of the history of ongoing and seemingly incessant philosophical dispute is thus operative from the 
outset of Hegel’s philosophical career. It might be added further that in only the second paragraph of the 
Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) we are alerted to the fact that that work will be expressly 
concerned to dispel the naïve preconceptions of merely “conventional opinion” on the fact and nature of the 
“diversity of philosophical systems” (PhG 2). 
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calling for a thoroughgoing philosophical explanation. Fortunately, Hegel himself 
provides a rather strong case for why the problem of philosophical conflict demands the 
kind of sustained philosophical response which he devotes to it. Thus, the rest of this 
Introduction will unpack and expand upon the most relevant set of points Hegel makes in 
motivating the significance of both the problem of philosophical conflict and his response 
to it. In pursuing this task the following points will be established: 
1) The perennial character of philosophical differences has provided the basis for 
a particularly damning criticism of philosophy as a meaningful practice. 
2) The aforementioned damning critique levelled against philosophy has become 
enormously exacerbated by certain unprecedented social and cultural 
developments in modernity, the result of which has been an increasing 
marginalization of philosophy’s cultural status. 
3) From philosophy’s inception philosophers have been fundamentally motivated 
by the desire to respond to the challenge of intellectual conflict. 
4) Developing an explanatory account of the existence of the multiplicity of 
conflicting philosophies such as is found in Hegel is necessary for the 
attainment of the level of self-knowledge required to solve the problems that 
philosophy has set for itself. 
A fifth section of this Introduction will be dedicated to clarifying more precisely the 
actual goals of the dissertation itself. 
Let us proceed to section 1 in order to begin to establish why the problem of 
philosophical differences is itself a major philosophical problem. 
1. The Conflict of Philosophies Revealing the Futility of Philosophy 
 Exactly why is the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting philosophies itself a 
major philosophical problem? Hegel addresses this question in myriad ways throughout 
his corpus. One of his most direct and sustained response to this question occurs in the 
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Prefatory Note as well as Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
(LHP). It should be noted that in these sections of the LHP Hegel often provides a 
surrogate voice to the viewpoint of “common sense” or “ordinary consciousness”2. For, it 
is ordinary consciousness that is most distinctly troubled by the ongoing existence of a 
multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. Why should this be so? 
 The answer, according to Hegel, is that when confronted with the history of 
philosophy ordinary consciousness derives a singularly demoralizing lesson, to wit: 
“from the History of Philosophy a proof of the futility of the science is mainly derived” 
(LHP xliv). Upon examining – however cursorily – the history of philosophy, ordinary 
consciousness concludes that the science of philosophy itself is futile. Why does ordinary 
consciousness draw this dispiriting conclusion?  
                                                          
2 Although this nest of related terms – “ordinary conception,” “ordinary consciousness,” “common sense” 
and so on – which typically translate the German phrase “gesunder Menschenverstand” plays a very 
important role in Hegel’s larger philosophical project, Hegel nevertheless does not always make clear the 
specific meaning he wishes to ascribe to them. Thus, while a more detailed treatment of the meaning and 
role of these terms will be delayed until a subsequent chapter, it would still be useful to give a very brief 
summary indication as to their general import. In general, these terms refer to an orientation or form of 
consciousness that is pre-philosophical and pre-scientific. One aspect among others that marks the 
transition from a pre-scientific form of consciousness to a more properly scientific or philosophical form is 
that, upon this transition, universal determinations become ever more explicitly objectified for 
consciousness. Thus, for example, in charting some of the most significant cultural and political shifts that 
preceded and conditioned the emergence of philosophy in Greece, Hegel notes how, in introducing his 
notion of universal law to the Greeks, Solon thus brought “to the ordinary conception for the first time this 
same universal in the form of universality” (LHP I 161). The implication being that in the sphere of law 
prior to Solon the universal was not present to the Greek ordinary consciousness “in the form of 
universality,” which is to say, it was not yet for the Greek ordinary consciousness as universal; it was at 
best implicit in such consciousness. Thus, a major deficiency of ordinary consciousness for Hegel is that it 
fails to grasp things according to their proper universality. Such a shortcoming is, as will be discussed, 
especially pernicious insofar as ordinary consciousness spontaneously arrogates to itself the task of 
adjudicating the value and intelligibility of, among other things, philosophy and its history. For, as a result 
of its limited or non-universal horizon, ordinary consciousness is strictly speaking unable to discern the 
universal principle organizing the multiplicity of philosophies. Finally, it should be noted that pre-scientific 
orientations or forms of consciousness including ordinary consciousness can be and in fact are operative 
within highly advanced scientific cultures including Hegel’s and our own. In fact, as will also be discussed, 
pre-philosophical ordinary consciousness can be operative in those who would otherwise consider 
themselves to be philosophers. 
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On Hegel’s account, the basis for ordinary consciousness’s charge of futility 
against philosophy lies in the apparently quite desolate cumulative result of the history of 
philosophy with its incessant conflicts and disputes. For, when looked at merely from the 
“superficial view”  of ordinary consciousness, according to Hegel, 
The whole history of philosophy becomes a battlefield covered with the bones of 
the dead; it is a kingdom not merely formed of dead and lifeless individuals, but 
of refuted and spiritually dead systems, since each has killed the other. (LHP I 16-
7) 
 
For ordinary consciousness the history of philosophy reveals that the different 
philosophies have collectively nullified one another leaving in their wake nothing but a 
senseless tableau of intellectual corpses. Upon witnessing such a scene the conclusion 
that ordinary consciousness draws is that philosophy is a futile enterprise and that all 
philosophers “have erred, because they have been contradicted by others” (LHP I 16). 
Clearly, this damning indictment against philosophy is of major concern. Insofar 
as ordinary consciousness represents the form of consciousness most commonly 
operative amongst people in a given culture, the ongoing history of perpetual 
philosophical conflict and dispute presents a significant problem for the cultural viability 
of philosophy. For, due to that ongoing history of conflict the ordinary consciousness 
inhabited by the majority of people in a given culture will be convinced of the futility of 
the practice of philosophy as a whole. 
 Indeed, the charge that the history of philosophy reveals the futility of philosophy 
is an issue of serious importance on a variety of fronts, not the least of which is the effect 
it has on prospective philosophers. As Hegel states, “[T]his diversity in philosophical 
systems is far from being a merely evasive plea. It has far more weight as a genuine 
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ground of argument against the zeal which philosophy requires” (LHP I 16). Hegel is 
here calling attention to the discouraging effect the perpetual and unresolved disputes 
among philosophers can have upon the desire to pursue philosophy at all, especially 
among beginners. For, it seems reasonable enough to expect that few people would be 
especially inclined to practice a discipline whose cumulative result is commonly held to 
be little more than a particularly grisly intellectual No Man’s Land. 
 Thus, a first indication as to why the problem of philosophical differences is of 
major philosophical importance is that the history of philosophical differences and 
conflicts provides the basis for the charge levelled by ordinary consciousness that 
philosophy is a futile endeavor. The dissemination or otherwise common acceptance of 
this charge, moreover, is likely to enervate the serious dedication that is required to learn 
the discipline of philosophy.  
2. Intensifications in Modernity of the Charge of Futility Levelled Against 
Philosophy 
Philosophers themselves have long been aware of how the incessant and 
apparently irresolvable conflicts among philosophies frequently undermines the patience 
and zeal necessary to undertake the difficult labor of learning to philosophize. In fact, 
philosophers themselves have taken measures to overcome this problem and admonish 
those contemplating practicing philosophy not to become discouraged by the apparent 
futility of the philosophical endeavor.3 Indeed, despite the severity of the charge of 
futility brought against it by ordinary consciousness, philosophy has managed to survive 
                                                          
3 Cf. Diogenes Laertius reporting Stoics like Chrysippus and Posidonius were already declaring “one 
should not give up philosophy because of disagreement [among the philosophers] since by this argument 
one would give up one’s whole life” (Hellenistic Philosophy 202). 
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and even experience periods of significant cultural prestige and influence. Thus, it might 
be asked why the problem of philosophical differences calls for the kind of sophisticated 
and comprehensive response that Hegel develops and which this dissertation will seek to 
explicate.  
For, it is true that the problem of philosophical differences and conflict has 
continually threatened to undermine belief in the worthwhileness of philosophy. 
Philosophers have likewise been keenly aware of this problem and have attempted to 
respond to it. Why should it now be of such special concern that nothing short of the 
monumental effort of Hegel to respond to it will any longer suffice? In order to address 
this question it will be useful again to note some important points Hegel makes in the 
early sections of the LHP. 
2.1 Futility and the Presentation of the History of Philosophy  
 A first factor contributing to the intensification of the charge of the futility of 
philosophy, according to Hegel, is the manner in which the history of philosophy has 
often come to be presented. For Hegel, “the view very usually taken of the history of 
philosophy […] ascribes to it the narration of a number of philosophical opinions as they 
have arisen and manifested themselves in time” (LHP I 11). The history of philosophy is 
thus very often reduced to an “accumulation of opinions” and the only relation that is 
acknowledged among these various opinions is their “contingency in time-succession” 
(LHP 11). Plato said this; then, Aristotle held this opinion; then, came Plotinus who 
affirmed this, and so on.  Yet, “What could be more useless than to learn a string of bald 
opinions, and what more unimportant?” (LHP I 12) 
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 To be sure, since Hegel’s time the task of providing a more critical and scientific 
account of the history of philosophy has been taken up by a number of highly 
sophisticated and erudite philosophers and historians. It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that Hegel is expressing the viewpoint of ordinary consciousness. When 
ordinary consciousness confronts the history of philosophy the basic lesson it draws is 
that philosophy is futile. Hegel is now identifying the manner in which ordinary 
consciousness commonly presents the history of philosophy, namely, as a more or less 
haphazard succession and agglomeration of opinions or even “senseless follies” (LHP I 
11).4 The result is that by being exposed to such histories of philosophy, ordinary 
consciousness finds itself all the more confirmed in its negative view of philosophy. 
Indeed, even the “erudite investigation” into the history of philosophy, when it fails to do 
more than give an “enumeration of various opinions,” can actually reach a point of 
diminishing returns (LHP I 11). For the excavation and mere enumeration of an ever 
increasing number of conflicting viewpoints can often simply provide fuel to the flames 
of perdition into which ordinary consciousness would just as soon see works of the 
philosophers cast.5 
                                                          
4 Hegel is clear that to grasp the intelligibility immanent in the history of multiplicity of philosophies 
demands that the historian transcend the viewpoint of mere ordinary consciousness: “[A]s in so many 
histories of Philosophy, there is presented to the vision devoid of idea, only a disarranged collection of 
opinions. To make you acquainted with this Idea, and consequently to explain [emphasis mine] the 
manifestations, is the business of the history of Philosophy […] Since the observer must bring with him the 
Concept of the subject in order to see it in its phenomenal aspect and in order to object the object faithfully 
to view, we need not wonder at there being so many dull histories of Philosophy in which the succession of 
its systems are represented simply as a number of opinions, errors and freaks of thought. They are freaks of 
thought which, indeed, have been devised with a great pretension of acuteness and of mental exertion, and 
with everything else which can be said in admiration of what is merely formal. But, considering the 
absence of philosophic mind in such historians as these, how should they be able to comprehend and 
represent the content, which is reasoned thought?” (LHP I 31) 
5 The allusion here is of course to the famous passage from the end of Hume’s Enquiry regarding the 
futility of at least certain types of philosophical inquiry. 
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 In summary, an initial factor which Hegel identifies as responsible for 
intensifying the charge of futility levelled against philosophy is the increased awareness, 
both within and without academic philosophy, of the sheer number of different 
philosophies that have emerged throughout history, combined with the tendency in 
ordinary consciousness to present the history of these differences as a mere haphazard 
succession of opinions. The effect of this is to produce an even greater strain on the 
cultural viability of philosophy than in previous times. 
2.2 The Futility of Philosophy in Modern Culture 
 A second and more significant factor that has increased the pressure on 
philosophy to demonstrate that it is not a futile endeavor is the major cultural shifts that 
have occurred in the rise of modernity. Hegel of course lived during the period in which 
modernity was coming into full swing. As a deeply sensitive and insightful observer of 
his time he was keenly aware of the rapid changes in interests and values that were taking 
hold in modern European cultures. Thus, for example, in his Inaugural Address delivered 
at the University of Heidelberg in 1816, after referring to philosophy as an “almost dead 
science,” Hegel indicates what has been responsible for placing philosophy in such a dire 
state: 
The necessities of the time have accorded to the petty interests of everyday life 
such overwhelming attention: the deep interests of actuality and the strife 
respecting these have engrossed all the powers and forces of the mind – and also 
the necessary means – to so great an extent, that no place has been left to the 
higher inward life, the intellectual operations of the purer sort; and the better 
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natures have thus been stunted in their growth, and in great measure sacrificed. 
(LHP I xli) 
On Hegel’s view, the realm of mere “actuality”, the realm that does not pause to question 
and discern the complex principles that govern the actualities that happen to exist, or, in 
other words, the realm of petty political and economic interest, has arrogated to itself the 
lion’s share of the intellectual powers and “practical” resources available in modern 
culture (LHP I xlii). As a result, the patient cultivation of the life of the mind necessary 
for the proper practice of philosophizing has been thoroughly neglected. 
 To be sure, this is an only too familiar narrative of the deleterious effects which 
many of the major cultural shifts in modernity have wrought upon philosophy. 
Philosophy demands a sustained withdrawal from the mere practical interests or 
“externalities” of the immediately present moment (LHP I xliii). The unremitting demand 
of the constantly expanding market economy for short-term results and immediate 
practical application as conditions for any significant investment of resources has led to 
the rapidly decreasing cultural, not to say, economic, standing of philosophy. The further 
question as pertains to this dissertation, however, concerns precisely what role the 
problem of philosophical differences has played in this progressive consignment of 
philosophy to cultural irrelevance. In order to respond adequately to this query it will be 
necessary to take note of one of the most significant cultural developments in modernity: 
the emergence of modern science. 
2.2.1 The Futility of Philosophy and Modern Science 
 Hegel indicates his sensitivity to the problem posed to philosophy by the 
emergence of modern science when he notes that in the “European countries in which the 
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sciences and the cultivation of the understanding have been prosecuted with zeal and with 
respect, Philosophy, excepting in name, has sunk from memory” (LHP I xlii). Without 
entering at present into an examination of the merits of Hegel’s larger critical appraisal of 
modern science, however, it can still be observed what it is about modern science, 
especially as it has come to be viewed by ordinary consciousness, which casts philosophy 
in a particularly unfavorable light. 
 The peculiar characteristic of modern science that is so damaging to the relative 
value of philosophy, at least from the viewpoint of ordinary consciousness, is the success 
of science in routinely and methodically overcoming initial conflicts and disagreements 
and arriving at more or less universal agreement over its various problems.6 As is often 
the case, Galileo can be used to illustrate this point. Prior to Galileo, philosophers 
notoriously disagreed over whether or not heavier bodies fell faster than lighter bodies. 
Galileo, however, deliberately prescinded from the principles traditionally invoked by 
philosophers to explain kinematic and dynamic motion. Instead, on the basis of empirical 
investigations he generated a hypothesis which he proceeded to test and verify by means 
of an ingenious series of techniques. Thus, by applying what has come to be called the 
“scientific method” Galileo was able entirely to eschew the ancient and hitherto futile 
debates among the philosophers and proceed rigorously to a single, verified answer to the 
question of the nature of the free fall. 
                                                          
6 Examples of this kind of view of the difference between philosophy and science, of course, abound. Cf. 
A.C. Crombie in his otherwise quite sophisticated study, Medieval and Early Modern Science, vol. 1: 
Science in the Middle Ages: V-XIII Centuries: “The art of understanding the scientific thought of the past is 
for the same reason no less delicate, but its terms of reference are made somewhat different from those of 
philosophy because of a characteristic possessed preeminently by science, though also to some extent 
shared by history. Unlike other disciplines dealing with the world, the solutions to problems in science, past 
and present, can be judged by criteria that are in most cases objective, universally accepted, and stable 
from one period to the next” [emphases mine] (2).  
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 For ordinary consciousness, the discovery of the law of the free fall provides an 
all-encompassing image: modern science triumphantly succeeding in settling questions 
that had previously been the source of much futile controversy among philosophers.7 
Thus, as a result of the unprecedented success and influence of modern science, 
philosophy has come to be viewed as not a science or source of “real” knowledge 
precisely to the degree that it is ever embroiled in the same unresolved and seemingly 
fruitless disputes. Unlike pre-modern times, then, ordinary consciousness now possesses 
a rather compelling phenomenon to which it can appeal in order to vindicate its perennial 
charge of futility against philosophy. The task of developing a scientific account of why 
there should exist a multiplicity of philosophies which find themselves in constant 
disagreement has thus become exceedingly more exigent. 
2.3 Summary of Preceding Points 
 The charge of futility levelled against philosophy by ordinary consciousness has 
intensified enormously in the modern period due to a confluence of changes, both cultural 
and otherwise. One problem stems simply from the manner in which the history of 
philosophy is often conceived and presented, namely, as a more or less haphazard 
                                                          
7 Voltaire was of course at the forefront of promulgating this view of the history of philosophy vis-à-vis the 
emergent modern science. Cf. Crombie: “Led by Voltaire the Rationalists of the 18th century discounted 
any possibility of a connection between medieval philosophy and the triumph of scientific reason which 
they located in the period of Galileo, Harvey, Descartes and Newton” (Medieval and Early Modern Science 
3-4). Cf. Peter Gay: “‘True philosophy,’ wrote Voltaire […] ‘began to shine on men only with the end of 
the sixteenth century’ – with Galileo” (The Enlightenment: An Interpretation 228). More proximate to 
Hegel was the influence of the German philosopher, G.E. Schulze. As Hegel notes in his early and 
important essay, “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy”, Schulze locates the “subjective 
source” of his skeptical view of philosophy in the fact that philosophers “are in constant contradiction with 
one another […] and every new effort to endow this cognition with the stability of science comes to grief; 
[…] then the conclusion can be drawn with considerable plausibility that at the  basis of the quest for 
cognition of this kind […] there must lie an unachievable goal, and an illusion shared by all who work for 
it” (Between Hegel and Kant 314).  Importantly, Schulze contrasts the futility of all hitherto philosophy 
which grounds his skeptical doubt with the success of modern physics and astronomy “which now set all 
reasonable urge to doubt at defiance” (Between Hegel and Kant 322). 
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succession of distinct positions or arguments with no discernible set of principles 
governing their relations and process of unfolding. A second factor is the socio-economic 
changes in modernity whose increasingly unquestioned demands for immediate practical 
results undermine the zeal necessary to undertake the kind of sustained reflection and 
withdrawal from immediate practical concerns required to cultivate a truly philosophical 
consciousness. Lastly, there is the emergence of modern science and the technologies to 
which it has given rise whose apparent success at routinely solving the various problems 
they encounter casts such an unfavorable light on philosophy which seems ever to be 
embroiled in the same old controversy and confusions. These are three major factors 
motivating the significance of Hegel’s effort to provide an explanatory account of 
philosophical differences. 
3. Historical Responses to the Problem of Philosophical Differences  
 In order to establish more firmly the significance of the problem of philosophical 
differences along with its enormously increased significance in modernity it will be 
useful briefly to examine how intellectual and philosophical conflict has motivated 
philosophy throughout its history. An exhaustive treatment of the history of philosophical 
responses to the problem of intellectual and philosophical conflict extends well beyond 
the scope of the present work. Instead, Hegel’s treatment of four important historical 
instances of philosophical response to intellectual and philosophical conflict will be 
discussed:  
1) The Socratic response to the emergence of intellectual and moral discord in 
the ancient Greek world. 
2) The Skeptical response to the proliferation of conflicting philosophies that 
immediately succeeded the Socratic effort. 
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3) The Early Modern and Enlightenment response to the incessant disputations 
among the philosophical schools.  
The Socratic response to the problem of intellectual and moral conflict in ancient Greece 
will be discussed because it shows how philosophy itself emerged in great measure as a 
response to this problem. The Skeptical response is worth mentioning because it is 
perhaps the first instance in which the charge of futility is levelled against philosophy as 
a whole due to the constant conflict among the various philosophies. The Early Modern 
and Enlightenment response is worth discussing because Hegel himself comes on the 
scene at perhaps the zenith of the Enlightenment’s violent rejection of the notoriously 
disputatious Scholastic tradition. As such it will prove extremely useful in understanding 
Hegel’s own effort at responding to the problem of philosophical differences to compare 
and contrast it with that of the Early Modern and Enlightenment thinkers.  
3.1 The Problem of Disagreement in Ancient Greece  
For Hegel, philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the sublation of an 
apparently contradictory or irreconcilable manifold of elements into higher, more 
universal unity.8 Thus, according to Hegel, “with Thales we, properly speaking, begin the 
History of Philosophy” 9 (LHP I 171). For, Thales was the first to attempt to reduce the 
                                                          
8 A point that will become increasingly important to develop, however, is that, for Hegel, the differences 
obtaining among the multiplicity of apparently conflicting elements are not simply inexplicably “given” but 
have in fact been posited in and through Spirit. Consequently, for Hegel, in the last analysis, the ultimate 
philosophical task of the sublation of apparently conflicting multiplicity into unity is inextricably linked 
with the task of discerning the self-differentiating movement of Spirit in and through which that 
multiplicity has been constituted – hence, the essentiality of discerning the genesis of the conflicting 
philosophies for the full coming to fruition of philosophy itself. 
9 At this point it would be well worth noting that, for Hegel, philosophy properly so-called emerges 
specifically in ancient Greece and its historical development is confined more or less strictly to western 
societies and cultures. Thus, in the LHP Hegel states “Philosophy proper commences in the West” (99). 
Unless otherwise indicated, and for the mere sake of exegetical convenience, I will retain Hegel’s restricted 
scope when referring to philosophy and especially to its historical development. Needless to say, Hegel’s 
restriction is disturbingly Eurocentric. Equally needless to say, traditions of philosophy that did not 
historically emerge in the West are now recognized and practiced all over the globe. Thus, without 
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“conflict of an endless quantity” of cosmological principles operative in the pre-
philosophical Homeric universe to a “simple unity” or “universal.”10 Thales, as the first 
philosopher, however, was evidently searching on the largely speculative or metaphysical 
level for the unifying principle operative in and governing the distinct and apparently 
conflicting elements constitutive of the entire cosmos. Yet, along with an enduring 
speculative interest, what especially motivated the emergence and continued development 
of philosophy in Greece was the search for the principle of unity within the specifically 
intellectual and moral sphere. 
 On Hegel’s showing, the period in ancient Greece immediately preceding the 
emergence of philosophy was marked by a fundamental breakdown of intellectual and 
moral agreement and cohesion. An especially important development that led to 
intellectual and spiritual conflict in Greece was the ongoing displacement of large 
portions of the Greek population whether as the result of Persian military incursions in 
Asia Minor, the colonial and mercantile expansion of major Greek city-states like Athens, 
or increased internal economic and political differentiation within the city-states 
themselves.11 Prior to these geographical and cultural shifts, as Michael Forster points 
out, Greek Ethical Life was, for Hegel, characterized by “complete and automatic 
                                                          
question, a comparative study of the role of intellectual and philosophical conflict in the historical genesis 
of non-Western philosophical traditions could prove highly instructive in terms of challenging, confirming 
or otherwise qualifying Hegel’s more general account of how philosophy itself emerges and develops. Such 
an enterprise, however, falls well outside the scope of the present project. 
10 Cf. The “Skepticism” Essay: “Diogenes Laertuis remarks on it in his own way, saying that some people 
name Homer as the founder of skepticism, because he spoke of the same things differently in different 
relationships” (Between Kant and Hegel 322) 
11 Cf. Hegel: “According to Thucydides, the Ionic colonies in Asia Minor and the islands proceeded 
principally from Athens, because the Athenians, on account of the over-population of Attica, migrated 
there. We find the greatest activity of Greek life on t coasts of Asia Minor, in the Greek islands, and then 
towards the West of Magna Graecia; we see amongst these people, through their internal political activity 
and their intercourse with foreigners, the existence of a diversity and variety in their relations, whereby 
narrowness of vision is done away with and the universal rises in its place” (LHP I 169). 
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agreement on fundamental principles” (Hegel and Skepticism 76). Forster states further 
that, for Hegel, “it is only by going beyond the confines of their own communities and 
considering views of alien communities that individuals can come to recognize the 
actuality or even possibility of conflicts between fundamental principles” (Hegel and 
Skepticism 76).  
Through being exposed to a multiplicity of distinct cultures, the Greeks gradually 
discovered the relativity of their own customs and common sense.12 The shock of 
discovering the relativity of ethical customs and common sense created a crisis that 
eventually called forth a pair of distinct but related intellectual and spiritual responses: 
the Sophistic and the Socratic responses, respectively.13 
 Hegel’s overall estimation of the Sophists is far from merely critical.14 The 
intellectual attitude expressed and cultivated by the Sophists was, for Hegel, an important 
                                                          
12 Cf. Hegel: “The natural man has no consciousness of the presence of opposites; he lives quite 
unconsciously in his own particular way, in conformity with the morality of his town, without ever having 
reflected on the fact that he practices this morality. If he then comes into a foreign land, he is much 
surprised, for through encountering the opposite he for the first time experiences the fact that he has these 
customs, and he immediately arrives at the uncertainty as to whether his point of view or the opposite is 
wrong” (LHP II 355); “What counts for the race as absolutely One and the same, and as fixed, eternal and 
everywhere constituted in the same way, time wrenches away from it; most commonly [what does this is] 
the increasing range of acquaintance with alien peoples under the pressure of natural necessity” (Between 
Kant and Hegel 333). 
13 Cf. Hegel: “Just because this [Ionian] world of beauty which raised itself into a higher kind of culture 
went to pieces, Philosophy arose” (LHP I 155). The first sections of Forster’s book treat at length Hegel’s 
account of the breakdown of the spontaneous unanimity of ethical customs in Greece that preceded the 
emergence of philosophy. Bruno Snell, in his classic, The Discovery of the Mind, provides an independent 
but complementary account of this same process. Worth noting, also, is that, for Hegel, the Greek discovery 
of the relativity of common sense is, in the last analysis, an entirely salutary, not to say, necessary, 
development since it serves as a prelude to the eventual discovery or recognition on the part of Mind that 
the laws, customs and so forth that govern it are in fact its own productions and (self-) determinations. The 
recognition on the part of Mind that it is self-determining is coincident with its recognition of itself as 
intrinsically free. Cf. Hegel: “If we say that consciousness of freedom is connected with the appearance of 
Philosophy, this principle must be a fundamental one with those with whom Philosophy begins; a people 
having this consciousness of freedom founds its existence on that principle seeing that the laws and the 
whole circumstances of the people are based only on the Concept that Mind forms of itself, and in the 
categories which it has” (LHP I 95). 
14 Cf. in particular chapter 2 of LHP I: “First Period, Second Division: From the Sophists to the Socratics” 
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cultural development; in fact, it was a necessary precondition for the emergence of 
philosophy. For, as a result of their familiarity with a plurality of cultural and ethical 
customs, the Sophists were able to detach themselves from an unquestioned commitment 
to the validity of any particular common sense view. They were consequently ready to 
consider a multiplicity of positions or viewpoints on a given matter.15 Speaking of the 
Sophists’ much reputed eloquence, Hegel thus states,  
The particular characteristic of eloquence is to show the manifold points of view 
existing in a thing, and to give force to those which harmonize with what appears to 
me to be most useful; it thus is the art of putting forward various points of view in 
the concrete case, and placing others in the shade.16 (LHP I 358) 
 
Indeed, for Hegel, this familiarity with and willingness to consider a multiplicity of 
viewpoints represents a stage in which thought begins to pass from the “particular to the 
universal” (LHP I 365). As such, the cultured detachment of the Sophists represents an 
important preliminary stage through which consciousness must pass on its way to 
becoming at home in the universal determinations proper to philosophy. 
The limitation of the Sophists according to Hegel, however, was that despite their 
detachment from the content of any particular common sense, they nevertheless failed to 
pursue and discern the universal principle that would organize and sublate these relative 
viewpoints into a higher, more concrete unity. Instead, the Sophists left it to the more or 
                                                          
15 Cf. Hegel: “The Sophists thus knew that on this basis nothing was secure, because the power of thought 
treated everything dialectically. That is the formal culture which they had and imparted, for their 
acquaintanceship with so many points of view shook what was morality in Greece (the religion, duties, and 
laws, unconsciously exercised), since through its limited content, that came into collision with what was 
different” (LHP I 369-70). 
16 By contrast, Hegel notes, “the uncultivated man finds it unpleasant to associate with people who know 
how to grasp and express every point of view with ease” (LHP I 359). 
17 
 
 
less arbitrary inclinations of the individual to select from among the plurality of 
conflicting views which they brought forth for consideration. Thus, Hegel states, “to the 
Sophists the satisfaction of the individual himself was now made ultimate”17 (LHP I 370-
1). Not only was this offensive to traditional culture,18 more importantly it failed actually 
to satisfy the philosophical impulse to sublate multiplicity into unity. It was left to 
Socrates and Plato to take up the more properly philosophical task of searching out the 
universal principle permeating and governing the multiplicity of conflicting common 
senses operative in Greece. 
3.2 The Socratic Response to the Problem of Disagreement and the Birth of Philosophy 
The Socratic effort and achievement is well known, but it is worth emphasizing 
the significance of the role intellectual and moral disagreement had in motivating it. 
Socrates and Plato after him were dissatisfied with the Sophistic response to the 
discovery of the relativity of common sense. Rather than being content to allocate all 
normative intellectual and moral criteria to the particular inclinations of the individual 
will, Socrates and Plato chose to pursue the task of searching out universal normative 
criteria that would transcend the relativity of common sense viewpoints.19  
Several dialogues, such as the Meno and Euthyphro, explicitly identify and 
attempt to respond to the problem of intellectual and moral disagreement. It is the 
                                                          
17Cf. Hegel “Thus the Sophists are reproached for countenancing personal affections, private interests, etc. 
This proceeds directly from the nature of their culture, which, because it places ready various points of 
view, makes it depend on the pleasure of the subject alone which shall prevail, that is, if fixed principles do 
not determine” (LHP I 371) 
18 C. Hegel: “For because the Sophists wandered about the towns, and thus youths, deserting fathers and 
friends, followed them in view of improving themselves through their intercourse with them, they drew 
upon themselves much envy and ill-will – for everything new is hated” (LHP I 360). 
19 “In this regard Socrates is opposed to the Sophists, for the proposition that man is the measure of all 
things, to them still comprehends particular ends, while to Socrates the universal brought forth through free 
thought is thereby expressed in objective fashion.” (LHP I 406). 
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dialogue form itself, however, which perhaps most profoundly bears witness to Plato’s 
keen and subtle awareness of the problem of intellectual and moral conflict, not to 
mention the difficulty of responding to it effectively. For the dialogues portray the 
dramatic encounter of a multiplicity of often radically conflicting viewpoints, but to that 
extent they themselves manifest a distinct sensitivity to the existence of such conflict. As 
Hegel notes, “[In] the dialogues of Plato… the divergency of opinions which comes out 
is examined, and a conclusion arrived at as to the truth; or, if the result is negative, the 
whole process of knowledge is what is seen in Plato” (LHP II 12-13). Within the 
dialogues, then, the conflict between the viewpoints articulated by the interlocutors is 
either resolved through the discovery of a higher, more comprehensive viewpoint, or at 
least brought into clearer focus through the production of an aporia. Thus, for Hegel, the 
dialogue form itself manifests the awareness on Plato’s part of the problem of intellectual 
and moral conflict.20 
As evidenced by both the content and form of the Platonic dialogues, philosophy 
from its inception has been motivated by the exigency to respond to and in some way 
overcome the problem of intellectual and moral conflict. Socrates and Plato responded to 
the problem of intellectual and moral conflict by searching for universal principles that 
would transcend the limited or relative horizons of the conflicting common senses 
operative in ancient Greece as well as overcome the relativism of the Sophists.  
As far as the present dissertation is concerned, however, what is of especial 
importance regarding the Socratic breakthrough into the realm of universal intellectual 
                                                          
20 Hegel, however, ultimately finds the dialogue form to be philosophically deficient since it does not 
permit of a fully systematic development and presentation of the ideas treated therein. Cf. Hegel: “The 
philosophical culture of Plato, like the general scientific culture of his time, was not yet ripe for really 
scientific work” (LHP II 17). 
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and moral principles is that, despite its monumental impact on subsequent philosophical 
and scientific thought, it nevertheless decidedly did not resolve or otherwise overcome 
the problem of intellectual and moral conflict. Rather, the problem would now be 
transposed into the history of the conflicting philosophies themselves. As Hegel notes, 
“The most varied schools and principles proceeded from the doctrine of Socrates”21 (LHP 
I 449). Indeed, disputes emerged about the very nature of the universal principles or 
forms themselves: what they were, where or how they existed, whether or not they 
existed at all, and so on. Thus, the Socratic search for the universal ironically gave rise to 
a splintering into several different schools each with a particular conception of the 
universal. 
3.3 The Skeptics 
 The ancient Skeptics mark an important occurrence in the history of responses to 
philosophical differences. The Socratic search for the universal did not succeed in 
overcoming the problem of intellectual differences; rather, the entire problem was 
transposed into the history of the conflicting philosophies. The Skeptics were perhaps the 
first to level the charge of futility against philosophy specifically on the basis of the 
discord obtaining among the philosophies themselves. Thus, as Hegel notes, the “Later 
Tropes” of Sextus Empiricus, the very first trope invoked in order to induce the desired 
skeptical attitude of “suspended judgment” (ataraxia) is the diversitude in opinions” 
(LHP II 357). Sextus, as Hegel notes,  
                                                          
21. Although there will be occasion to discuss this at much greater length later on, it is worth mentioning 
that, for Hegel, the ultimate inadequacy of  the Socratic and Platonic endeavor does not mean that it was 
merely futile and contributed nothing to the task of responding adequately to the problem of intellectual, 
moral and now philosophical conflict. 
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Adduce[s] the manifold nature of dogmas, and from this the conclusion is drawn 
that the one has just as much support as the other. Philosophers and others still 
make copious use of this sceptical trope, which is consequently in great favor: on 
account of the diversitude in philosophies, the say, Philosophy has no value, and 
truth is unattainable because men have thought about it in ways so contradictory. 
This diversitude in philosophic opinion is said to be an invincible weapon against 
Philosophy. (LHP II 357-8) 
For what appears to be the first time, at least to any sustained and methodical degree, the 
Skeptics cite the conflicting views of the philosophers as grounds for denying the 
viability of philosophy.  
Worth noting, however, is that, similar to the Sophists with their cultured 
detachment from commitment to any particular common sense, Hegel is far from merely 
critical of the ancient Skeptical inculcation of suspended judgment with respect to the 
conflicting philosophies. For Hegel, the ability to detach or abstract from the immediate 
attachment to a particular viewpoint or position is an essential moment on the way to a 
more properly philosophical, which is to say, universal, viewpoint. Not surprisingly, 
however, for Hegel, the merely detached or abstract universality of the Skeptical 
consciousness is inadequate since, among other things, it takes all particular 
determinations – including the philosophies themselves – and merely abstracts from 
them, rather than demonstrating the laws in and through they have emerged and thereby 
determining them concretely.22 
                                                          
22 Cf. Hegel: “Sceptical self-consciousness, however, is this divided consciousness to which on the one 
hand motion is a confusion of its content it is this movement which annuls for itself all things, in which 
what is offered to it is quite contingent and indifferent; it acts according to laws which are not held by it to 
be true, and is a perfectly empiric existence. On another side its simple thought is the immovability of self-
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3.4  The Early Modern and Enlightenment Response to Philosophical Disagreement 
 Perhaps the key difference that separates the Early Modern and Enlightenment 
response to intellectual and philosophical differences from that of the Ancients is the fact 
that the Early Modern and Enlightenment thinkers could and did increasingly appeal to 
the unprecedented successes of modern science and its routine overcoming of 
disagreements as grounds for denouncing philosophy, at least as had been hitherto 
practiced, as a fundamentally futile enterprise. Since the immediately received 
philosophical tradition – Scholasticism – was so utterly characterized by incessant and 
seemingly fruitless disputations while, simultaneously, the new science appeared to hold 
out the promise of doing away once for all with the entirety of the old Scholastic 
confusions and controversies, there emerged the new conviction that all traditional 
learning should be left behind to make room for the full flowering of the new science. 
Tradition, history and even “mere” nature, beset as they had hitherto been by incessant 
conflict or even a war of all against all, were thus to be shed like dead skin or else 
mastered and possessed by the new scientific techniques.  
This new attitude towards the history of intellectual and philosophical differences 
emergent in this period lasts right up until the time of Hegel, and of course beyond.23 
Hegel’s own response to the history of intellectual and philosophical conflict, however, is 
notably different from than that of the Early Modern and Enlightenment thinkers that 
                                                          
identity, but its reality, its unity with itself is something that is perfectly empty, and the actual filing in is 
any content that one chooses. As this simplicity, and at the same time pure confusion, Scepticism is in fact 
the wholly self-abrogating consciousness” (LHP II 371). 
23 In The Anatomy of Misremembering, Cyrl O’Regan chronicles how this kind of historical amnesia 
promoted by the Enlightenment, of which Hegel was an early critic, has continued into the present. 
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precede him. It will thus be worth recalling some of the more salient views put forward 
by these prior thinkers in order better to understand and appreciate Hegel’s contribution. 
3.4.1 Montaigne 
 Montaigne explicitly revives the Skeptical charge of the futility of philosophy 
based upon the conflicts obtaining among the philosophies (Essays 318ff.). Indeed, in an 
argument that will be a major point of interest for Descartes, Montaigne states that since 
there is no philosophical position that has not been subject to dispute, all the philosophies 
are dubious and as good as false. Montaigne also revives the older Sophistic insight into 
the relativity of common sense viewpoints as a further basis for denying the viability of 
philosophy. Just as the Greek colonial expansion helped precipitate the discovery of the 
relativity of common sense, Montaigne specifically cites the discovery of the vastly 
different customs and traditions among the people of the New World as providing 
unmistakable evidence of the relativity of common sense including, if not especially, the 
philosophies that had been assimilated into the common heritage of Europe (Essays 150-
9). Montaigne, however, does not align himself with the emerging view that the new 
science will be able to succeed where philosophy had previously failed. Instead he 
counsels a certain kind of detached or perhaps ironic cultural conservatism in which one 
maintains the views of one’s tradition while simultaneously acknowledging the validity 
of conflicting views. 
3.4.2 Bacon 
 Bacon, setting the tone for so many of his successors, maintained a “polemical 
attitude towards scholastic methods as they had hitherto existed” (LHP III 44). Especially 
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noteworthy is that of the Four Idols of the mind that he lists and critiques in the Novum 
Organon, the entire fourth Idol – the Idols of the Theater – specifically deals with the 
problem of philosophical differences. Bacon states, “the Idols of the Theatre are not 
innate, nor do they steal into the understanding secretly, but are plainly impressed and 
received into the mind from the play-books of philosophical systems and the perverted 
rules of demonstration” (Novum Organon LXII) In contrast to this “theater” or ceaseless 
parade of conflicting philosophical systems and Scholastic disputations, Bacon of course 
famously advocates the “experimental method.” Through the application of the 
experimental method the history of all the conflicting philosophies will become obsolete 
and a new era will be ushered in. In conclusion to his discussion of the Four Idols, Bacon 
thus writes, 
So much concerning the several classes of Idols, and their equipage: all of which 
must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination, and the 
understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the kingdom of 
man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the 
kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child (Novm 
Organon LXVIII). 
Despite their shared antipathy for the disputatious Scholastics, Bacon differs from 
Montaigne in thus advocating for the embrace and vigorous development of the new 
science. For the new science promises, among other things, to extirpate once for all the 
nefarious influence of the Idols of the Theater or, in other words, the problem of 
philosophical differences. 
3.4.3 Descartes 
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 Treatment of Descartes is usually confined to discussion of his method, his first 
application of that method in the Meditations in which he deduces the Cogito, or his 
subsequent proof for the existence of God. It is worth recalling, however, that the primary 
motivating factor for Descartes in the development of his method was the fact that 
philosophers are in constant conflict and disagreement. In an explicit invocation of 
Montaigne’s skeptical argument mentioned above, Descartes affirms that since there is no 
issue that the philosophers have treated which has not been subject to dispute, all of the 
historical philosophical teachings are doubtful and to that extent worthless (Discourse 5). 
Descartes, however, is not content with the skeptical detachment of Montaigne and 
instead launches a quest for an indubitable foundation upon which to erect all 
philosophical and scientific knowledge. Descartes thus sets about constructing a method 
that will not be susceptible to doubt and, therefore, to disagreement or dispute. 
 Importantly, Descartes identifies the influence of mere nature and tradition as the 
underlying cause for all the disputes and confusions among the philosophers. The 
teachings of the philosophers are like the tangled streets of ancient cities or the confused 
agglomeration of laws and statutes characteristic of traditional jurisprudence. They have 
all emerged haphazardly in accordance with the non-rational whims of custom and 
natural process. Accordingly, the first step in the Cartesian method is to raze the whole 
edifice of previous learning by submitting it in one fell swoop to universal doubt 
(Discourse 6-9). Thus, perhaps even more emphatically than Bacon, Descartes calls for 
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jettisoning all previous learning consisting as it has of such futile conflict and dispute and 
erecting a whole new edifice of knowledge based on the method of the new science.24 
3.4.4 Locke 
 Importantly, Locke’s epistemology is constructed with a view to responding to the 
disputes and extravagancies of the Scholastics. Locke develops the position that was 
already articulated by Montaigne and which will be taken up again by Hume and Kant, 
namely, that it is essential to establish the limits of human knowledge in order 
preemptively to circumvent the vain and futile speculations of the philosophers generally 
since such activity has given rise to so much controversy and violence.25 Thus, in the 
Introduction to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke states that a primary 
motivation for the work is to establish 
The grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, 
different and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such 
assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of opinions of mankind, 
observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion 
wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are 
maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing 
                                                          
24 Importantly, Descartes could appeal not only to the success of Galileo in overcoming disputes about the 
nature of the free fall but also to his own success in resolving ancient puzzles in geometry. 
25 Cf. Greg Forster, John Locke’s Politics of Moral Consensus: “The Essay devotes a great deal of attention 
to a critique of the scholastics […] The scholastics saw themselves as engaged in an ongoing project to 
construct a comprehensive body of Christian knowledge. For Locke, the scholastics represented a serious 
obstacle to moral consensus because of their convictions that they possessed a special, privileged access to 
knowledge, in that they were the only ones who understood the enormous and extremely complex body of 
thought they had built up over the previous four centuries. Locke had to refute this claim in order to build a 
moral consensus, which is based on the premise that no one has special access to knowledge […] Locke 
proved that the scholastic body of thought was not the achievement the scholastics held it to be […] he 
showed that, because of the limits of the human mind, no one could possibly claim to achieve the kind of 
knowledge the scholastics claimed to have achieved” (71).  
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as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain 
knowledge of it […] It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between 
opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in things whereof we 
have not certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our 
persuasions. 
Hegel famously critiques the Locke’s and Kant’s respective attempts to establish the 
limits of knowledge on strictly phenomenological grounds. Yet, it is important to note 
that motivating the development of Locke’s position is the desire to respond to 
intellectual and philosophical differences and conflict. 
 Worth noting as well is the reason why Locke rejects the position of the 
Rationalists who argued in favor of innate ideas. Locke’s argument is, as Hegel points 
out, that with respect to the putatively innate ideas “universal consent is not to be found” 
(LHP III 301). Locke’s point here is that if such ideas were in fact innate then they would 
automatically generate universal consensus; yet, as a matter of empirical fact, no such 
consensus is to be found; therefore, the ideas are not innate.26 Locke thus appeals to 
philosophical conflict as a further reason for rejecting the Rationalist and Scholastic ideal 
of science as a deductive system proceeding from self-evident first principles. Along with 
his rejection of at least certain aspects of the more Rationalist ideal of knowledge 
espoused by Descartes, however, Locke nevertheless continues the line of Early Modern 
                                                          
26 Cf. Locke: “[T]his argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems 
to be me a demonstration that there are none such because there none to which all mankind give an 
universal assent” (Essay Book I, Chapter 1, section 4 of). 
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and Enlightenment thinkers who seek to move beyond or at least marginalize the 
disputatious Scholastic tradition in favor of the new science.27  
3.4.5 Hume 
Hume also sets out to determine the limits of human knowledge. He pursues his 
effort, moreover, in order to diffuse the philosophical disputes and subsequent violence 
that seem to erupt as result of philosophers and theologians claiming knowledge of 
realities which as a matter of fact lie beyond human ken.28 Thus, in An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, immediately after articulating his basic distinction 
between impressions and ideas, Hume states that a primary purpose for drawing such a 
distinction will be the quashing of philosophical discord: 
Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and 
intelligible, but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute 
equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon which has so long taken possession 
of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them […] When we 
entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without 
any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what 
impression is that supposed idea derived? […] By bringing ideas into so clear a 
light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning 
their nature and reality. 
                                                          
27 Cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Locke’s great epistemological contribution to philosophy is a 
conception of human knowledge suitable for the experimental science of his day, one that in natural 
philosophy at least will replace the old, Aristotelian conception.” 
28 Gay: “David Hume denounced Scholasticism as ‘false philosophy’ and ‘spurious erudition’; the 
philosophers of the Middle Ages, he charged, ‘were universally infected with superstition and sophistry’” 
(The Enlightenment 227). Cf. Hume’s “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm” for his account of how the 
superstition of which he accuses the Scholastics gives rise to overt violence. 
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Along with his deflationary epistemology, Hume also makes use of the same 
argument adopted by the ancient Skeptics as well as Montaigne in order to quell the 
pretensions of the philosophers regarding moral questions. As Hegel notes, “Hume, like 
the sceptics of former days, appeals to the various opinions of various nations: amongst 
different nations and in different times various standards of right have been held” (LHP 
III 373). 
Hume is thus clearly motivated by the problem of intellectual and philosophical 
differences. He is to be distinguished from many of his contemporary Enlightenment 
thinkers, however, in being far less sanguine than they regarding the possibility of such 
differences being definitively overcome through the advance of scientific technique. 
Similar to Montaigne, he seems to advocate a detached acceptance of the “common rules 
of reason, morality, and prudence” of the culture in which he happens to find himself as 
the surest way of overcoming or at least avoiding intellectual and philosophical 
conflict(“Of Superstition and Sophistry ). 
3.4.6 Kant 
 Kant continues along the trajectory of Montaigne, Locke, Hume, et al. for whom a 
chief task of philosophy was to establish the limits of knowledge in order thereby to 
circumvent the conflict and violence that seems to arise from speculation about realities 
that lie beyond human ken. The underlying assumption to this deflationary effort seems 
to be that since such disputes, by definition, do not admit of any possibility of rational 
resolution, they can only be resolved through some form of violence, be it intellectual, 
military or otherwise. Thus, Kant’s famous phrase early in the Critique of Pure Reason 
that he needed to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” can be understood as 
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directed primarily against the excessive speculation not only of the Rationalists but also 
the disputatious Scholastics and indeed ultimately against the entirety of the confused 
philosophers (CPR Bxxx). 
 Kant contributes something new, however, to the response to the problem of 
philosophical differences by subjecting it to a dialectical critique. Thus, the 
Transcendental Dialectic is dedicated to revealing the source of the confusion and 
conflicts among the philosophers and, in turn, to revealing how such disputes can be 
resolved or, rather, dissolved. As Hegel points out, one of Kant’s crucial points is that 
confusion and conflict among philosophers arises from applying the finite categories of 
the Understanding to the realm of infinite or unconditioned: “If […] for the determination 
of the infinite we employ these categories which are applicable only to phenomena, we 
entangle ourselves in false arguments (paralogisms) and in contradictions (antinomies)” 
(LHP III 445). 
Thus, for Kant, philosophical conflict emerges from the illicit extension of the 
categories beyond the realm of possible experience. Accordingly, the solution to the 
problem of philosophical differences lies largely in the recognition of the futility of 
reason in its quest to grasp the unconditioned by means of the categories of the 
Understanding. It is true that, for Kant, reason spontaneously is driven beyond the realm 
of possible experience in search of the unconditioned. Yet, this spontaneous desire of the 
unconditioned immanent in reason can be educated and made aware of the futility of its 
metaphysical aspiration. Such recognition on the part of reason can circumvent the 
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quixotic and potentially violent quest of the philosophers to settle questions regarding the 
nature of the unconditioned in-itself.29 
3.5 Summary of Preceding Section 
 From the inception of philosophy, philosophers have been concerned to respond 
to the problem of intellectual and philosophical conflict and disagreement. The Socratic 
effort was fundamentally motivated by the desire to respond to the discovery on the part 
of the ancient Greeks of the relativity of their customs and common sense by discerning 
and promulgating a universal principle that would transcend such relativity. Importantly, 
however, the problem of pre-philosophical intellectual conflict was not thereby 
transcended or overcome but was rather transposed into the ongoing history of conflicting 
philosophies. The ancient Skeptics took such conflict and disagreement among the 
philosophers as evidence of the futility of philosophy and thus became perhaps the first 
group to level such a charge against the entire discipline of philosophy. The early Modern 
and Enlightenment thinkers turned to promoting or attempting to justify the legitimacy of 
the emergent science with its promise of generating universal intellectual consensus not 
to say progressive technological mastery over nature. Several of these thinkers also 
sought to delimit the proper scope of possible human scientific knowledge in order 
thereby to circumvent the tendency among philosophers to engage in the kind of futile 
                                                          
29 In critiquing Scholastic and other pre-modern philosophies, Kant, like is his predecessors, is also 
concerned to help usher in the new science. As Heiner Bielefelt notes, “With his systematic criticism of 
dogmatic metaphysics, Kant attempts to define the scope and limitations of objectifying human cognition in 
order to foster epistemological and methodological clarity in the sciences. Hence the critical refutation of 
the dogmatic metaphysics that ignores the limits of the human understanding and thereby undermines the 
integrity of scientific research” (Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy 10). 
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metaphysical speculations that seem invariably lead to conflict and dispute and ultimately 
to overt violence. 
 We thus return to the original factor motivating the significance of providing an 
explanatory account of philosophical differences, namely, philosophical multiplicity and 
conflict is thought to provide sufficient evidence for the futility of philosophy. Such a 
demoralizing critique of philosophy, as it turns out, becomes more or less programmatic 
among Early Modern and Enlightenment philosophers themselves. Significantly, the 
Early Modern and Enlightenment philosophers, unlike their skeptical forbears, could 
appeal to the new science and its attendant technologies as providing eminent 
justification for their own deflationary critique of the erstwhile pretensions of philosophy. 
For, in contrast to philosophy, these institutions seemed to hold out the promise of a truly 
effective and progressive resolution to intellectual disputes. 
 Hegel comes on the scene as this new orientation towards philosophy and its 
apparent futility was beginning to reach the height of its intensity. His response to the 
problem of philosophical differences, however, stands in marked contrast to that of his 
immediate predecessors.30 Unlike them, Hegel asks a set of new and more radical 
questions, namely, “What is the source of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies? 
Why do they exist in the first place? What are the laws governing their emergence, 
differentiation and development?” Providing a response to these questions constitutes, for 
                                                          
30 Interestingly, at one point Hegel turns the charge of futility against those very philosophers who would 
establish the limits of knowledge and thereby ostensibly save philosophy from embroiling itself in futile 
speculation: “The talk about the limitations of human thought is futile” (LHP I 73). Cf. Hegel: “The man 
who speaks of the merely finite, or merely human reason, and the limits to mere reason, lies against the 
Spirit, for the Spirit as infinite and universal, as self-comprehension, comprehends itself not in a ‘merely’ 
nor in limits, nor in the finite as such. It has nothing to do with this, for it comprehends itself within itself 
alone, in its infinitude” (LHP I 74). 
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Hegel at least, a necessary step towards responding effectively to the charge of futility 
levelled against philosophy. 
4. Self-knowledge and Philosophical Differences 
 A final factor motivating the significance of pursuing an explanatory account of 
philosophical differences is more directly concerned with the internal efforts of 
philosophy itself. For Hegel, the multiple philosophies are expressions of different forms 
of the mind.31 The different philosophies thus manifest differentiations within the mind 
itself. The history of philosophy with its successive emergence of distinct and conflicting 
philosophies is therefore the history of the mind’s own ongoing self-differentiation.32  
 The fact that the mind itself is responsible for the multiplicity of conflicting 
philosophies is no small matter; rather, it is fraught with consequences for the actual 
practice of philosophy. For Hegel, the history of philosophy as the history of the mind’s 
self-differentiation is thus the history of the mind’s development and ultimate coming-to-
itself.33 The stages that are traversed by the mind in the course of its development, 
                                                          
31 Cf. Hegel: “Through knowledge, Mind makes manifest a distinction between knowledge and that which 
is; this knowledge is thus what produces a new form of development. The new forms at first are only 
special modes of knowledge, and it is thus that a new Philosophy is produced” (LHP I 55). 
32  Cf. Hegel: “But those who believe the principle of diversity to be one absolutely fixed, do not know its 
nature or its dialectic; the manifold or diverse is in a state of flux; it must really be conceived of as in the 
process of development, and as but a passing moment. Philosophy in its concrete Idea is the activity of 
development in revealing differences which it contains within itself; these difference are thoughts, for we 
are now speaking of development in Thought” (LHP I 34); “A complete form of thought such as is here 
presented, is a Philosophy […] But everything hangs on this: these forms are nothing else the original 
distinctions in the Idea itself, which is what it is only in them […] The manifold character of the principles 
which appear, is, however, not accidental, but necessary: the different forms constitute an integral part of 
the whole form” (LHP I 34-5; “The Concept in its reality freely emits its determinations from itself” (LHP I 
108). 
33 Cf. Hegel: “The development of Mind lies in the fact that its going forth and separation constitutes its 
coming to itself. This being-at-home-with-self, or coming-to-self of Mind may be described as its complete 
and highest end. Everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all the 
deeds of time simply are the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective to itself, to find 
itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself; it is alienated and divided, but only so as to be able thus 
to find itself and return to itself. Only in this manner does Mind attain its freedom, for that is free which is 
not connected with or dependent on another. True self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found in 
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however, are not simply discarded upon its completion. Rather, the mind retains the 
lower stages of development within itself as differentiated moments of the complete 
whole.34 For Hegel, moreover, the end of philosophy is the mind’s knowledge of itself.35 
What this means is that a conditio sine qua non of the mind’s self-knowledge is the 
knowledge of how it itself has and continues to be the source of conflicting philosophies. 
Stated negatively, unless one can provide an explanatory account of the multiplicity of 
conflicting philosophies one will eo ipso lack the self-knowledge which is the goal of all 
philosophy. For, the various philosophies are themselves but expressions of the mind’s 
own self-differentiation. Thus, full self-knowledge demands knowledge of the mind 
precisely as the source of the multiplicity of philosophies. 
 The different stages of development of the mind also call forth or posit different 
philosophical questions and problematics. Prior to the emergence of such forms of the 
mind certain philosophical problematics simply do not become explicitly thematized for 
the mind.36 For example, according to Hegel, it was only with the development of a later 
                                                          
this, and in nothing else but Thought does Mind attain this freedom” (LHP I 23); “Thus the Idea as concrete 
in itself, and self-developing, is an organic system and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of 
moments in development. Philosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this development; and 
as conceiving Thought, is itself this development in Thought” (LHP I 27). 
34 Cf. Hegel speaking of latest developments in philosophy, states “To this the World-mind [Weltgeist] has 
come, and each state has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles are 
preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms” (LHP III 546,); “the final philosophy 
of a period is the result of this development, and is truth in the highest form which the self-consciousness of 
spirit affords of itself. The latest philosophy contains therefore those which went before; it embraces in 
itself all the different stages thereof; it is the product and result of those that preceded it” (LHP III 552-3); 
“[T]he history of Philosophy has not do with what is gone, but with the living present” (LHP I 39); “From 
this it follows – since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination, and this means 
further immersion in and fuller grasp of the Idea itself – that the latest, most modern and newest philosophy 
is the most developed, richest and deepest. In that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and 
gone must be preserved and retained, and it must itself be a mirror of the whole history” (LHP I 41). 
35 Cf. Hegel: “The final end is to think the Absolute as Mind” (LHP I 108); “The activity of the Mind is to 
know itself” and “as Mind I am only in so far as I know myself”( LHP III 32). 
36 Cf. “We must know in ancient philosophy there is before us a definite stage in the development of 
thought, and in it those forms and necessities of Mind which lie within the limits of that stage alone are 
brought into existence. There slumber in the Mind of modern times ideas more profound which requires for 
their awakening other surroundings and another present than the abstract, dim, grey thought of olden times. 
34 
 
 
form of the mind that the modern problematic of distinguishing and reconciling the 
realms of subjectivity and objectivity was explicitly posited as a problem.37 Thus, like the 
philosophies themselves, philosophical problematics do not simply emerge haphazardly; 
rather, they emerge concomitant with the various forms of the mind that also give rise to 
the different philosophies.  
What this fact entails is that in order to make progress towards resolving different 
philosophical problematics it is ultimately necessary to grasp how they are grounded in 
certain forms of the mind. For, often problematics that emerge at a certain stages of the 
mind’s development can only be resolved through the attainment of a higher viewpoint. 
Such resolution can take the form of a solution to the problem. It is also possible, 
however, that the resolution will involve a dissolution of the problem; that is to say, what 
appear to be true and perhaps vexing problematics from a lower viewpoint are often 
revealed to be mere pseudo-problems upon the emergence of a higher viewpoint.38 
 Thus, for Hegel, in order to avoid getting bogged down in continually belaboring 
pseudo-problems it is ultimately necessary to understand their origin in the self-
differentiation of the mind itself. Indeed, for Hegel, in order for philosophy to be able 
truly to refute the charge of futility, philosophers must reach the level of self-knowledge 
adequate to the problems which they pose for themselves. Essential to such self-
                                                          
In Plato, for instance, questions regarding the nature of freedom, the origin of evil and of sin, providence, 
etc., do not find their philosophic answer […] The case is similar with regard to questions regarding the 
limits of knowledge, the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity which had not yet come up in 
Plato’s age” (LHP I 48). 
37 “We thus have really two Ideas, the subjective Ideas as knowledge, and then the substantial and concrete 
Idea; and the development and perfection of this principle and its coming to the consciousness of Thought, 
is the subject treated by modern Philosophy” (LHP I 106). 
38 This point is returned to in the Appendix vis-à-vis the Paradox of Learning discussed in the Meno and the 
fact that the solution to this paradox demands that the mind move out of the viewpoint of Representation 
and into a more speculative view of knowledge and truth. 
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knowledge will be knowledge of the mind as the source of the philosophical problematics 
themselves and such self-knowledge goes hand in hand with an explanatory account of 
philosophical differences. 
5. The Goals of this Dissertation 
 Before moving on, it will be helpful briefly to clarify the precise set of goals that 
this dissertation seeks to achieve. Broadly speaking, there are essentially two goals of this 
dissertation: one exegetical and one systematic. 
 5.1 The Exegetical Goal 
 The exegetical goal is to show that, in writing the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(hereafter, PhG), Hegel himself is essentially engaged in pursuing two related goals: 1) 
demonstrating that, despite appearances to the contrary, there in intelligible unity among 
the different philosophies in order thereby to refute the charge of futility levelled against 
philosophy by common sense and 2) mediating the development of self-knowledge 
within the reader. These two goals are, indeed, related in fundamental ways since, as just 
discussed, self-knowledge is ultimately dependent upon the mind recognizing itself as the 
source of the multiplicity of philosophies and that the various philosophies correspond to 
stages in its own development. Yet, in recognizing this about the multiplicity of 
philosophies one is thereby able to discern that the multiplicity of philosophies form an 
intelligible unity since that unity is isomorphic with the unity of the mind itself. 
Moreover, just as self-knowledge, for Hegel, fundamentally includes knowledge of one’s 
mind as dialectically developing towards ever higher viewpoints, so through such self-
knowledge one can discern the dialectical development among the various philosophies. 
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One is thereby able to recognize that development or progress within philosophy is 
possible and, in fact, actual and that therefore philosophy is not merely a futile enterprise. 
 The reason why this exegetical effort is needed is because these two central goals 
motivating Hegel’s effort in the PhG have not been articulated with sufficient precision 
and detail by commentators. This point is readily evidenced by a pair of lacunae in the 
secondary literature. First, one can study reams of articles and monographs on Hegel’s 
effort in the PhG and not come across a single mention of the charge of futility against 
philosophy and Hegel’s insistence on the need to respond to it. Yet, the issue of the 
potential futility of philosophy was a central concern to Hegel throughout his career 
beginning with his earliest works.  
To mention some notable instances in Hegel’s corpus in which he directly treats 
the problem of philosophical multiplicity and the threat of futility to which it gives rise as 
well as the need for a response to this threat, the early essay, On the Relation of 
Skepticism to Philosophy (hereafter, “Skeptizismus”), discusses at length the charge of 
futility against philosophy brought by the ancient skeptics due to the fact of philosophical 
multiplicity and conflict as well as the need for true philosophy to respond to this charge 
(Di Giovanni 313-62). The early essay, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy (hereafter, DZ), opens by observing that an age with so many 
philosophical systems lying behind it would seem invariably to give rise to a general 
sense of indifference or futility with respect to the very viability of philosophy as a 
meaningful discipline; it then proceeds to discuss the need for responding to this 
discouragement and disillusion (DZ 85ff.). The Introduction to the LHP spends over sixty 
pages discussing the problem of the charge of futility against philosophy as well as the 
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need to respond to it with a comprehensive theory of development, in general, and of the 
development of the mind – which would be manifested in the history of philosophy – in 
particular. The Introduction to Encyclopedia Logic (hereafter, EL) discusses at length the 
problem of philosophical multiplicity and the demand to discern the intelligible unity 
present therein (EL 37-9). Finally, in just the second paragraph of the Preface to the PhG 
Hegel announces that a central aim of the work will be to “comprehend the diversity of 
philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth” (2). 
 Second, along with and connected with this first lacuna in the scholarship, another 
lacuna is strikingly manifested in the fact that countless commentators observe at some 
point throughout their respective discussions of Hegel that Hegel has been the source of 
perhaps the most variegated array of conflicting interpretations in the history of 
philosophy, yet, not a single one of these commentators, as far as I have found, has once 
mentioned that Hegel himself might provide the very means for explaining this conflict. 
For, as will be shown throughout the course of this dissertation, the mind, according to 
Hegel, relates to its object according to the level of development it has attained. The fact 
that different individuals are operating on different levels of development thus explains 
why they fall into philosophical disagreement. For, as a result of this discrepancy in 
levels of development, they will be relating to qualitatively different objects even though 
perhaps they think they are talking about the same thing. In the case of commentators on 
Hegel, then, if two commentators are operating on different levels of development, then 
the object to which each would be referring in speaking or writing of “Hegel” would be 
qualitatively different. As a result, disagreement between such commentators about, for 
example, the meaning of “Hegel’s” philosophy would be inevitable.  
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This basic phenomenon would thus explain the vast panoply of conflicting 
interpretations of Hegel. For, there are as many possible interpretations of Hegel as there 
are forms of the mind. As noted, however, no commentator of which I am aware has ever 
even alluded to the possibility that this would be the way Hegel would explain the 
philosophical disagreement surrounding his own philosophy. This fact suggests, then, 
that the nature of Hegel’s effort to explain the ground of philosophical multiplicity and 
conflict has not been adequately understood. 
 There are thus two major reasons for the current exegetical project of clarifying 
with greater precision the motivation for, and nature of, Hegel’s effort to explain 
philosophical disagreement. First, scholars have overlooked the role of philosophical 
disagreement as motivating and specifying the nature of Hegel’s effort in myriad of his 
central works including the PhG. Second, scholars have entirely neglected the fact that 
Hegel provides the means for explaining the disagreements and conflicts which surround 
his philosophy. Beyond the exegetical goal for this dissertation, however, there is also a 
modest systematic goal. 
5.2 The Systematic Goal 
 Hegel is, of course, not only keenly aware of the charge of futility against 
philosophy; he also provides a response to it. The response which Hegel provides will be 
discussed throughout the course of this dissertation. As noted, in the most general terms, 
Hegel explains the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies in terms of the polymorphism 
of the mind. Different philosophies correspond to and express different developmental 
forms or stages of the mind. Insofar as two philosophers are operating within different 
levels of development they will invariably fall into conflict. Still, progress in philosophy 
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is possible, and philosophy is therefore not futile, inasmuch as development of the mind 
is possible. For Hegel, such progress does indeed take place, and in the PhG he sets out 
his account of its basic dialectical structure. 
 The systematic argument of this dissertation is not that Hegel supplies the correct 
explanation for the multiplicity of philosophies. Rather, it is simply to show that it is an 
intelligible way to respond to problem of philosophical multiplicity, one worth seriously 
grappling with. 
 A further point to make in this respect is that Hegel’s effort is also original in both 
its precision and comprehensiveness. Prior philosophies, most notably Kant’s and 
Fichte’s, provided nascent efforts to provide an explanatory account for philosophical 
disagreement. Their efforts, however, were enormously restricted in comparison to Hegel 
for at least two reasons. 
 First, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, in which he, 
indeed, attempts to provide an explanation for the fact of philosophical multiplicity and 
conflict, Kant only invokes two factors in order to explain the emergence of different 
philosophies (A310/B366ff.). These two factors are the transcendental categories and 
empirical intuition or experience. According to Kant, philosophies differ inasmuch as 
some illicitly employ the categories with respect to putative objects beyond the realm of 
empirical experience, thus treating them as not merely transcendental but as transcendent 
categories, while others fail to recognize that the categories are, indeed, valid for objects 
of empirical experience. Philosophies that illicitly employ the categories beyond the 
realm of possible experience are rationalist or otherwise dogmatic. Philosophies that 
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refuse to accept that the categories do, in fact, apply to objects of experience are 
empiricist. 
 In comparison to Hegel, the weakness of Kant’s transcendental dialectic lies, first 
of all, in its lack of comprehensiveness. For, through this technique Kant is only able to 
explain the emergence of just two very general types of philosophy.39 The history of 
philosophy, however, is composed of a vast range of positions whose details cannot be 
exhaustively accounted for merely on appeal to the relative validity and applicability each 
ascribes to the categories. For example, what explains the difference between the 
“dogmatism” of Plato versus that of Aristotle since both of them treat of objects beyond 
what Kant considers to be the bounds of experience?40 Kant has no way to answer to this 
question.  
Hegel, then, is original in his comprehensiveness and precision. For, Hegel 
attempts to account for the whole range of philosophies including all of their relevant 
details. 
Hegel also adds an element which is simply not present in Kant’s analysis. For, on 
the basis of Kant’s analysis there is no way in which to explain why any given individual 
might opt to become an empiricist, dogmatist or transcendental idealist. One simply as a 
matter of fact winds up in one of these positions. By contrast, Hegel can explain why 
individuals opt for the philosophies which they do. For, individuals adopt certain 
philosophies according to their level of development. Thus, Hegel can explain why there 
                                                          
39 Fichte, too, restricts his attempt to explain philosophical disagreement to just two philosophies: 
dogmatism and idealism. Cf. Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre pp. 20-5, et passim. 
40 Chapter Four of this dissertation discusses at length Hegel’s explanation and critique of the restrictedness 
of Kant’s conception of experience. 
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is this whole range of differing philosophies and why individuals adopt and perpetuate 
them.  
Thus, along with the exegetical goal, the systematic goal of this dissertation is to 
show that Hegel presents, not necessarily the best, but at least an intelligible response to 
the problem of philosophical disagreement, a response that is original in its 
comprehensiveness, precision and explanatory power. 
5.3 On the Need for a Detailed Analysis of the PhG 
A final note should be made regarding the space dedicated in this dissertation to 
examining parts of the PhG in detail. As is well known, the PhG is a dense and not only 
systematically but organically ordered text. Thus, in order to understand one part, it is 
often necessary to explicate several others. Besides this commonly made point, however, 
there is a further exigence peculiar to this dissertation for examining parts of the PhG in 
such detail. For, as was noted, certain key elements of the very motivation and nature of 
Hegel’s effort in the PhG have hitherto gone unnoticed or at least underemphasized. 
Thus, the detailed analysis of the parts of the PhG provided in this dissertation will often 
depart in small but important ways from the more traditional exegeses of this classic 
philosophical tome. Thus, despite the fact that some well-trod ground will be covered, 
this will function at the service of a larger and unique set of goals peculiar to this 
dissertation. 
6. Summary of the Chapter 
 To summarize this introductory chapter, let us recall the major factors motivating 
the significance of recovering and explicating Hegel’s response to the problem of 
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philosophical differences. First, for ordinary consciousness, the ongoing history of 
philosophical differences provides sufficient grounds for dismissing philosophy as a 
fundamentally futile enterprise. Second, in modernity the charge of futility levelled 
against philosophy has been dramatically intensified by the emergence of modern 
institutions, modern science in particular. For, from the viewpoint of ordinary 
consciousness in modernity at least, philosophy is to be distinguished from “real” science 
precisely to the degree that the latter, unlike the former, routinely succeeds in overcoming 
initial disagreement and conflict to arrive at more or less universal consensus regarding 
the various problems it sets for itself. Moreover, the practical efficacy of the technologies 
which have emerged as a result of or alongside modern science contrast rather markedly 
for ordinary consciousness with the apparently meagre results of philosophical reflection. 
Third, philosophy from its inception has been concerned to respond to the problem of 
intellectual and philosophical conflict. Moreover, with the emergence of modernity it was 
philosophers themselves who increasingly brought, or at least capitulated to, the charge 
of the futility of philosophy. Yet, it was not until Hegel that the question of generating a 
science of that history of conflict was first posed. Lastly, the source of the multiplicity of 
philosophies, for Hegel, lies within the self-differentiation of the mind itself. Thus, 
attaining the self-knowledge that Hegel identifies as the true end of philosophies demands 
developing an explanatory account of philosophical differences. Moreover, in order for 
philosophy to move forward and make genuine progress on the problematics it sets for 
itself – and thereby be able truly to deny the charge of futility – philosophers must attain 
the level of self-knowledge involved in explaining philosophical differences. 
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 Given these motivating factors, let us now turn to a critical examination of 
Hegel’s method of explaining philosophical differences. 
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Chapter I: 
Hegel’s Theory of Development 
Famously, for Hegel, the mind develops. Thus, in order to understand the nature of the 
mind according to Hegel it is necessary to understand his account of the development of the 
mind. Yet, in order to understand Hegel’s theory of the development of the mind it is 
necessary to understand Hegel’s overall theory of development. Unfortunately, despite 
the fact that the notion of development figures so heavily throughout his entire corpus, 
there are only rare instances in which Hegel issues clear and detailed statements about the 
basic terms and relations constitutive of his overall theory. Chief among these few 
occasions are the sections in the Introduction to the LHP entitled “The Notion of 
Development” and “The Notion of the Concrete” (20ff.).41 In these sections Hegel 
identifies and articulates a closely related series of terms and relations that form the basis 
of his theory of development. He also employs some instructive images and analogies for 
aiding in grasping his technical terms and distinctions. 
 The present chapter will be dedicated to explicating central elements in Hegel’s 
technical account of his theory of development. The LHP will provide the basic point of 
departure for explicating Hegel’s larger theory. Other texts in Hegel’s corpus will be 
drawn upon in order to supplement this analysis. 
 As will quickly become evident, Hegel’s theory of development owes an 
enormous debt to Aristotle. Thus, there will be immediate occasion to examine Hegel’s 
appropriation of key elements of Aristotle. Space does not permit, however, a detailed 
                                                          
41 It is of utmost importance that Hegel launches into this rare extended discussion of his explicit theory of 
development precisely in the context of responding to the problem of philosophical differences. Thus, for 
Hegel, as will continue to be discussed throughout the present dissertation, the problem of philosophical 
differences is inextricably linked to the problem of development. 
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examination of the Aristotelian science of change; neither does it permit a critical 
evaluation of the philosophical validity of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle. Focus will 
instead be restricted to discussing the specific parts of Aristotle’s theory that Hegel 
means to appropriate and the way in which he happens to appropriate them. 
 Again, this chapter will be concerned to examine Hegel’s overall theory of 
development, leaving it to the following chapters to work out in detail Hegel’s theory of 
the development of the mind in particular. That being said, there will be several and ever-
increasing occasions upon which it will be necessary to discuss elements of Hegel’s 
theory of consciousness. The simple reason for this fact is that, for Hegel, the mind and 
its development represents the highest and truest instance of the phenomenon of 
development as such. Thus, in order to explicate Hegel’s theory of development in 
general it will at times be necessary to make recourse to an analysis of what for Hegel is 
the quintessential instance of development. 
 The examination of Hegel’s theory of development will proceed as follows: 
 Section 1 will provide an initial examination of the main terms and relations of 
Aristotle’s theory of change which Hegel appropriates for his own theory of 
development. Again, the analysis will focus strictly on the terms and relations in Aristotle 
that Hegel explicitly means to appropriate and on the manner in which Hegel intends to 
appropriate them. 
 Section 2 will examine an especially helpful analogy Hegel draws between 
biological development, on the one hand, and the development of the mind, on the other. 
This part of the examination will demand making greater recourse to discussing Hegel’s 
theory of the mind. In order to avoid introducing too much complexity too soon, 
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however, the discussion in these sections will not extend into the specifics of Hegel’s 
technical discussion of the development of the mind as it occurs in the PhG. Instead, any 
discussion of the mind in these sections will be restricted to unpacking certain basic 
structural elements of the mind whose explication will help illuminate Hegel’s overall 
theory of development. 
 Section 3 will examine Hegel’s furtherance of his theory of development through 
his addition of the “Concept of the Concrete”. In particular what will be examined is how 
when Hegel combines his notion of development with his notion of the concrete he 
thereby articulates the basic contours of a theory of development that is not only 
teleological but, as I will call it, “vertically teleological”. The full import of Hegel’s 
theory of development as a vertical teleology, or what will eventually be called 
“sublation”, will not become apparent until the next chapter since it is only with the 
development of consciousness that Hegel’s overall theory of development comes into its 
own. Yet, it will prove useful to unpack some of the basic aspects of this notion of 
vertical teleology in the discussion of Hegel’s theory of development in general. 
 Section 4 will examine Hegel’s basic theory or concept of development as it is 
manifested in perhaps its quintessential instance, namely, the development of the Concept 
which turns out to be coincident with the mind itself. An account of the development of 
the Concept will provide, among other things, a useful point of focus and application for 
the ideas discussed in the preceding sections.  
 Having established the basic layout of the chapter let us turn to the first task of 
examining Hegel’s appropriation of central aspects of Aristotle’s theory of change. 
1. Dunamis and Energeia 
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Hegel begins his technical discussion of his notion of development by stating 
In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different 
states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I 
call being-in-itself (potentia, dunamis); the second principle is that of being-for-
self, actuality (actus, energeia). If we say, for example, that man is by nature 
rational, we would mean that he has reason only inherently or in embryo: in this 
sense, reason, understanding, imagination, will are possessed from birth or even 
in the mother’s womb. But while the child only has capacities or the actual 
possibility of reason, it is just the same as if he had no reason; reason does yet 
exist in him since he cannot yet do anything rational, and has no rational 
consciousness. Thus what man is at first implicitly becomes explicit, and it is the 
same with reason. If, then man has actuality on whatever side, he is actually 
rational. (LHP 20-21) 
A great deal of information regarding Hegel’s theory of development is packed into this 
passage. It will be useful to begin by examining the central technical distinction it draws, 
namely, between being-in-itself versus being-for-itself, and to do that we must first 
examine the Aristotelian background to the distinction that Hegel explicitly invokes. 
 Hegel fairly equates his distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself 
with the Aristotelian distinction potency (dunamis) and act (energeia). Development 
then, for Hegel, as for Aristotle, is a matter of actualizing potency. Hegel also employs a 
standard Aristotelian image of an embryo or seed contrasted with a fully mature organism 
for illuminating this notion of development. On the Aristotelian account, an acorn is an 
oak tree in potency; that is to say, while it possesses the nature of an oak tree, it has yet to 
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become fully what it is by nature. In the passage above, Hegel makes a similar point 
when he speaks of man as rational by nature; but insofar as a man is merely a child “it is 
as if he had no reason” since he is only potentially rational. It is only through actualizing 
its potentiality that an acorn becomes a tree, or a child becomes a truly rational being. 
Thus, in most general terms, development for Hegel consists in the transition from 
potency to act. 
 In appropriating the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act to his own 
distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself, however, Hegel is in fact 
performing a radical philosophical maneuver. The full extent and import of this maneuver 
will only be slowly unpacked throughout the course of the present dissertation. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful to call attention to some of its most fundamental aspects. 
 The radical character of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle in this particular case 
concerns the fact that it very deliberately alludes to and evokes the Kantian notion of the 
thing-in-itself. Without at present launching into a detailed explication of the 
complexities of Kant’s doctrine of the thing-in-itself, it is still possible to appeal to fairly 
well-established aspects of that doctrine in order to generate an initial sense of the radical 
character of Hegel’s maneuver.  
Thus, according to Kant, the thing-in-itself is just that: the thing as it exists truly 
or actually in-itself.42 The thing-in-itself is thus to be distinguished from the thing-for-us, 
which is the thing as it appears in experience insofar as the thing has been subjected to 
the conditions of possible experience. Moreover, it is only in being subjected to the 
                                                          
42 I prescind here from taking any stand on the “two worlds” versus “two aspects” controversy surrounding 
Kant’s doctrine of the thing-in-itself. For commentary on this issue, see Henry Allison’s Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism. 
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conditions of possible experience that the thing can become an object of knowledge. 
Thus, for Kant, we do not know or otherwise experience things as they are in-themselves; 
rather, we only know or experience them insofar as they appear to us, which is to say, 
insofar as they have been conditioned by the conditions of possible experience.43 
 In correlating being-in-itself with potency and being-for-itself with act Hegel 
radically problematizes the neat, if controversial, Kantian distinction between the thing-
in-itself and the thing-for-us. For, whereas according to Kant the thing-in-itself is the 
thing as it really or actually is, for Hegel being-in-itself, at least in the first instance, is not 
anything at all; it is merely potency.44 By implication, then, in order to become actual the 
in-itself must become for-itself. In other words, there is not a ready-made, complete and 
self-sufficient reality of thing-in-themselves set out over against human knowledge and 
experience; rather, being-in-itself itself comes to be; it transitions from potency to act. 
Reality in-itself is thus fundamentally dynamic, for Hegel. The in-itself is not reality as it 
actually is; rather, it is simply potency.45 
                                                          
43 The conditions of possible experience are, of course, the subjective forms of intuition – to wit, space and 
time – and the transcendental categories: “It is therefore indubitably certain, and not merely possible or 
even probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions for all (outer and inner) experience, are 
merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere 
appearances and not things given for themselves in this way; about these appearances, further much may be 
said a priori that concerns their form, but nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may 
ground them” (Critique of Pure Reason A48-9, B66). 
44 Cf. Hegel: “The situation is, more precisely, that if we halt at objects as they are merely in-themselves, 
then we do not apprehend them in their truth, but in the one-sided form of mere abstraction. Thus, for 
instance, ‘man-in-himself’ is the child, whose task is not to remain in this abstract and undeveloped [state 
of being] ‘in-itself,’ but to become for-himself what he is initially only in-himself, namely, a free and 
rational essence […] In the same sense the germ, too, can be regard as the plant-in-itself. We can see from 
these examples that all who suppose that what things are in-themselves, or the thing-in-itself in general, is 
something that is inaccessible to our cognition are very much mistaken” (EL 194). 
45 In a striking convergence of insight, Bernard Lonergan suggests a virtually identical conclusion. Thus, 
regarding the Aristotelian doctrine of the Analogy of Matter (i.e. matter is to form, as the sensible is to the 
intelligible), Lonergan notes, “One might even say that by anticipation it puts in its proper place and 
perspective, that of prime matter, what Kant thought was the thing-in-itself” (Verbum 155).  
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1.1 Three Senses in which Reality Transitions from Potency to Act 
Importantly, there are three distinct but closely related senses in which a given 
reality could be said to transition from in-itself to for-itself, and thus from potency to act. 
First, a reality such as a flower transitions from a state of in-itself to for-itself inasmuch 
as what was enclosed in the seed gets unfolded and appears in full display and 
articulateness – in other words, inasmuch as what is implicit becomes explicit. Indeed, in 
a further problematization of the Kantian distinction between things-in-themselves and 
mere appearances, to say that the implicit becomes explicit is just to say that what was 
hidden or enclosed in potentiality comes to appearance. There is no flower-in-itself 
lurking behind appearances or our “representations”.46 The in-itself was merely the seed 
which, as potential, was no actual flower at all. It is only in becoming explicit, in coming 
to appear in full, determinate display, that the flower actually exists.47 
In thereby rendering itself explicit and actual the flower becomes for-itself in a 
second a sense of the term, as well. For, through this process of self-articulation and self-
actualization the flower thus becomes self-determining; in other words, it begins act on 
its own behalf or, indeed, for-itself. For example, it differentiates its various organs and 
biological functions such as photosynthesis, the Krebs cycle and so on. It also begins to 
                                                          
46 Hegel famously criticizes such a notion of the thing-in-itself as a “mountainpeak under snow” 
(“Skepticism” 318). Cf. the Appendix for an extended discussion of Hegel’s critique of the viewpoint of 
Representation according to which objects are distinct from out “representations” of them. 
47 G.A. Magee gives substantially the same account of Hegel’s maneuver in this respect: “Essentially, what 
Hegel has done is to interpret the Kantian appearance/thing-in-itself distinction in terms of Aristotle’s 
distinction between actuality and potentiality. For Aristotle, when something is merely potential its true 
being is implicit (‘in itself,’ as Hegel puts it). When that potentiality is actualized the being of the thing is 
manifest (becomes ‘for itself). To use the classic example, the acorn is the oak tree in-itself. Though we 
might say that the acorn is the oak tree at an early stage of development, it is also legitimate to say that 
when it is merely an acorn the oak tree is not. When the implicitness or potentiality of the oak tree is 
overcome and the oak tree comes to true manifestation (and, thus, being), we may say that it has become 
for itself” (The Hegel Dictionary 120). 
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exert a degree of control upon its surrounding environment, setting down roots, for 
example, so that it ceases to be entirely at the mercy of external forces such as wind or 
erosion. Thus, in an initial sense, the transition from the implicit to the explicit, is a 
process of coming to appearance, of self-articulation and thus of self-determination or, in 
other words, of becoming for-oneself. 
  Third, a reality such as a flower can also be said to transition from in-itself to for-
itself inasmuch as it posits or objectifies itself. In one sense, in coming to an articulate or 
determinate appearance the flower thereby posits itself into existence, for it thereby 
becomes an actually existing flower. Yet, there is a further sense of self-positing 
manifested in the plant’s bearing of a fruit in which there is contained a further seed. For, 
in producing a seed the plant exemplifies a tendency that Hegel detects to be working 
throughout reality, namely, an ever-intensifying tendency towards self-positing and self-
objectification – in other words, the self becoming explicit for-self. In bearing fruit 
carrying a seed that shares its nature, the plant thus posits itself into existence in a 
profound way. 48  
This process of self-determination as simultaneously self-objectification also 
opens up the possibility of a reconciling moment in which the in-itself that has become 
for-itself ultimately becomes in-and-for-itself. The examination of the precise nature and 
meaning of this further stage in development must wait until after further preliminary 
issues have been explored. For now, it is enough to have given an initial description of 
                                                          
48 Cf. Hegel on these two moments of becoming for-self in the development of the human: “The child is in 
itself a human being; it has reason only in itself, it is only the potentiality of reason and freedom, and is 
therefore free only in accordance with its concept. Now what exists as yet only in itself does not exist in its 
actuality. The human being who is rational in himself must work through the process of self-production 
both by going out of himself and by educating himself inwardly, in order that he may also become rational 
for himself” (EPR 45). 
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how Hegel intends to appropriate the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act.  
Development for Hegel is a transition from potency to act. Such a transition can be 
described as a movement from being-in-itself to being-for-itself as well as from the 
implicit to the explicit. Moreover, there are three distinct but intimately related senses in 
which a given reality transitions from being-in-itself to being-for-itself, from implicit to 
explicit. 
1.2    Brief Clarification of Aristotle’s Notion of “Nature”  
 In the context of drawing upon the Aristotelian distinction between potency and 
act, Hegel also draws upon the Aristotelian notion of “nature” in order to articulate his 
notion of development. While there are several aspects of the specifically Aristotelian 
notion of nature that extend well beyond the scope of the present work, it will still be 
useful to give some specification of that notion before continuing with the explication of 
Hegel’s employment of potency and act; the reason being that to different natures 
correspond different potencies and eo ipso different acts. 
For Aristotle, nature is an immanent principle of motion and rest.49 As an 
immanent principle of motion, nature is a dynamic principle of “coming-to-be” or “innate 
impulse to change” (193b13, 192b18). Thus, as a dynamic principle, nature in one sense 
is potency.50 As an immanent principle of rest, nature is a dynamic impulse as purposive 
or ordered to an end. Thus, Hegel states in the PhG, “Aristotle, too, defines Nature as 
                                                          
49 “Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the animals and their parts 
exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water) – for we say that these and the like exist 
by nature. All the things mentioned plainly differ from things which are not constituted by nature. For each 
of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness. (in respect of place, or of growth and 
decrease, or by way of alteration)” (192b9-15).  
50 “For nature also is in the same genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement – not, however, in 
something else but in the thing itself qua itself” (1049b7-10). 
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purposive activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest” (PhG. 12). As an immanent 
principle of motion and rest nature is a principle dynamically ordered to a proportionate 
end which, once attained, will give rise to a state of rest which, as will be discussed 
below, may also be identified as a kind of act. 
Nature is evidently teleological for both Aristotle and Hegel.51 For, nature is an 
immanent and dynamic principle of motion or change ordered to a proportionate end. It 
remains unclear, however, how the end of a given nature can be both a state of rest and 
activity. Clarifying this ambiguity will help in understanding how Hegel can appropriate 
the Aristotelian notion of nature while simultaneously maintaining his own doctrine 
according to which the end of the development of the mind is an infinite activity. The key 
to clarifying this ambiguity lies in the distinction Aristotle draws between two distinct 
kinds of act, namely, motion (kinesis) and operation (energeia). 
1.2.1 Kinesis vs. Energeia 
 For Aristotle, nature is an immanent principle of motion and rest. Hegel, 
moreover, clearly means to appropriate this notion of nature for his own theory of 
development. Yet, a tension arises inasmuch as throughout his corpus Hegel calls 
attention to the ceaseless labor of mind or Spirit and insists that the culminating moment 
of the mind’s development is not a state of restful inertia but one of vigorous, even 
infinite, activity. How is it possible, then, to square the Aristotelian account of nature 
according to which the end of nature is a state of rest with Hegel’s insistence that infinite 
activity is the proper and culminating end of the mind? An at least partial solution to this 
                                                          
51 Cf. Hegel: “This notion of end was already recognized by Aristotle, too, and he called this activity the 
nature of the thing” (Philosophy of Nature paragraph 245 Z). 
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difficulty lies in clarifying the Aristotelian distinction between motion (kinesis) versus 
operation (energeia). 
 Bernard Lonergan provides a concise summary of the distinction: 
A movement becomes in time; one part succeeds another; and a whole is to be 
had only in the whole of the time. On the other hand, an operation such as seeing 
or pleasure does not become in time but rather endures through time; at once it is 
all that it is to be; at each instant it is completely itself. In a movement one may 
assign instants in which what now is is not what will later be. In an operation 
there is no assignable instant in which what is occurring stands in need of 
something further that will make it specifically complete. A similar contrast 
occurs in the Metaphysics. There is a difference between action (praxis) distinct 
from its end and action coincident with its end. One cannot at once be walking a 
given distance and have walked it, be being cure and have been cured, be learning 
something and have learned it. But at once is seeing and has seen, one is 
understanding and has understood, one is alive and has been alive, one is happy 
and has been happy. In the former instances there is a difference between action 
and end, and we have either what is not properly action or, at best, incomplete 
action – such are movements. In the latter instances action and end are coincident 
– such are operations (Verbum, 112). 
For present purposes, the first point to notice is that, in contrast to operations, the activity 
of motion is distinct from its end. Once the end of a motion is reached the activity ceases. 
For example, one cannot be simultaneously engaging in the activity of walking and have 
reached the end of one’s walk. Aristotle also includes activities such as healing and 
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learning as instances of “motion” since they, too, are activities which are distinct from 
their ends. One cannot be both engaging in the activity of learning some topic, for 
example, and have understood it. 
 In contrast to motion, Aristotle specifies operation or energeia. Operations are 
activities which are coincident with their ends. In the activity of seeing, the end of the 
activity – to-be-seeing – is coincident with the activity itself – seeing.  Similarly, when 
one understands, the end of the activity – to-be-understanding – is coincident with the act 
of understanding itself. In other words, upon understanding one does not thereby cease to 
understand; rather, one is actively understanding. Thus, unlike the case of motion, in 
operations the attainment of the end of the activity does not entail its cessation; rather, the 
end and the activity are coincident. 
 For Aristotle, therefore, the end that is achieved or actualized in and through 
operations, while it may involve a kind of repose and a release from the strain of effort, 
nevertheless does not entail the cessation of all activity.52 Rather, such activities as these 
which are coincident with their ends are in fact higher or more perfect forms of activity 
than such actions as motion or mere study prior to understanding. Thus, to the extent that 
operation is distinguished from motion, we have our first indication as to how to 
reconcile Hegel’s appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of nature with his own 
insistence on the infinite activity as the proper end of Spirit. For the “rest” that is attained 
by a given nature through such operations as living, understanding or happiness is in fact 
a reposeful activity, and the highest activity is in fact coincident with the profoundest 
rest. 
                                                          
52 Thus, in the Metaphysics Aristotle speaks of the “self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness” of the 
activity of contemplation, which is the highest activity attainable by human nature (983a5-6). 
56 
 
 
1.2.2 Natures Specify Corresponding Potencies and Acts 
 The second aspect of Aristotle’s theory of development the clarification of which 
will help in understanding how it can be reconciled with, and in fact support, Hegel’s 
insistence that the ultimate end of the mind is infinite activity is Aristotle’s discussion of 
how specific natures possess distinct potencies which specify proportionate acts.  
Generally speaking, for Aristotle, all natures seek to fulfill their natures; that is to 
say, they are dynamically oriented towards actualizing what they are initially in potency. 
As Aristotle says in the Physics, “nature in the sense of a coming-to-be proceeds towards 
nature”; and, again, “the nature is the end or that for the sake of which” (193b13, 
194a29).53 Each nature, moreover, possesses certain potencies which specify the acts that 
will actualize those potencies. In the De Anima Aristotle discusses the nature of the three 
different kinds of soul – the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational – and hence their 
potencies as well as the acts proportionate to those potencies. The vegetative soul 
possesses potencies for nutrition, growth and decay (413a25-34). These potencies when 
actualized would, strictly speaking, constitute motions. They also contribute to the overall 
development of the plant or its coming-to-be what it truly is, namely, a fully developed, 
mature and flourishing living organism. Indeed, Aristotle does at times speak of living 
itself as a species, not of motion, but of operation.54  
In addition to the potencies possessed by the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul 
possesses the potency for locomotion and sensation (413b1-5 et passim.). As already 
                                                          
53 The fact that, for Aristotle, natures qua potency act in order to fulfill their natures should be borne in 
mind when the discussion turns to the ‘I = I’ or ‘I therefore I’ of Self-consciousness in Chapters Three and 
Four of this dissertation. 
54 Cf. Aristotle: “Being is choiceworthy and lovable for all, and we are insofar as we are actualized, since 
we are insofar as we live and act” (1168a6-8). 
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discussed, acts of sensing are operations, and so the sensitive soul when fully actualized 
would consists in a developed, awake, sensing and flourishing animal.55 
 Aristotle’s discussion of the rational soul is of greatest interest for understanding 
Hegel’s theory of development since the potencies characterizing the rational soul are 
quite remarkable. The rational soul or Nous is potens omnia facere et fieri: it can make 
and become all things.56 In other words, since Nous stands in potency to making or 
becoming all things, its objective horizon is unrestricted – the totality of all things.57 
Moreover, the activity proper to Nous is the operation of understanding. The operation 
which would actualize the unrestricted potency of Nous can be nothing other than an 
unrestricted act of understanding. For Aristotle, the unrestricted act of understanding 
ultimately consists in the divine Nous’s self-understanding.58 Thus, the rational soul is 
naturally ordered to the end of understanding the divine Nous itself and thus to imitate or 
participate in its unrestricted act of self-understanding or perfect self-knowledge.59 
                                                          
55 Cf. Aristotle: “But the waking state is the goal, since the exercise of sense-perception or of thoughts is 
the goal for all beings to which either of these appertains; inasmuch as these are best, and the goal is what 
is best” (455b22-24). 
56 “Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, a matter which his 
potentially all the particulars included in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that makes them 
all (the latter standing to former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be 
found within the soul. And in fact thought [Nous], as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of 
becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things” (430a10-15) 
57 “Everything is a possible object of thought” (429a18). 
58 “It must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of all things), and its thinking is a 
thinking on thinking” (1074b32-34). 
59 “The activity of intellect, which is contemplative, seems both superior in worth and to aim at no end 
beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-
sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes 
ascribed to the blessed man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the 
complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness 
is incomplete)” (1177b17-26).  Such a contemplation or theoria ultimately has the divine Nous or God as it 
object: “For the most divine science is also the most honourable; and this science alone is, in two ways, 
most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any 
science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has these qualities; for God is thought to be 
among the causes of all things and to be the first principle, and such a science either God alone can have, or 
God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better” (983a4-11).  
Cf. Mure: “As final cause God is the supreme Good, and the essential nature of all things is, according the 
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 There can be little doubt that Hegel means to appropriate the Aristotelian notion 
of the rational soul as well as the view that the ultimate end of the rational soul or mind is 
the perfect and unrestricted activity of self-knowledge. For example, the PM opens with a 
declaration and extended comment upon the Delphic enjoinder to know thyself and 
culminates with a long passage from Metaphysics XII, 7 on the self-knowledge of the 
rational and divine Nous. Later, in the PM, Hegel explicitly identifies his conception of 
the soul with “the passive Nous of Aristotle, which is potentially all things” (PM 29). In 
the culminating paragraph of the PhG, Hegel asserts that the goal of Spirit’s development 
is “Absolute Knowing” which he identifies as perfect self-knowledge or “Spirt that 
knows itself as Spirit” (PhG 808). In the Introduction to the LHP Hegel asserts that self-
knowledge or “this being-at-home-with-self, or coming-to-self of mind [Geist] may be 
described as its complete and highest end: it is this alone that it desires and nothing else” 
(LHP 23). In the Aristotle section in the LHP Hegel affirms that there is no “higher 
idealism” than the Aristotelian notion of God as actus purus or pure operation and he 
heaps praise upon “the Absolute of Aristotle, which in its quiescence is at the same time 
absolute activity” (LHP II 143-144). 
 Thus, we would seem to have at least partially eliminated the difficulty of 
understanding how Hegel can both appropriate Aristotle’s notions of nature and 
development while at the same time insisting upon the absolute activity of the mind as its 
ultimate end. For, while it is true that, for Aristotle, nature is a principle of motion and 
                                                          
degree of their reality, a tendency, a nisus, or a conscious striving to assimilate themselves to the goodness 
of God, which is one with his intelligence. In philosophic man it may perhaps be even a self-identification” 
(Introduction to Hegel 45). Cf. Ferrarin: “Since Hegel interprets the noesis noeseos as the supreme dignity 
of thinking […], he understands absolute thinking as active in finitude […] He therefore concludes that for 
Aristotle the same relations holds between finite spirit and absolute spirit” (Hegel and Aristotle 312). 
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rest, the culminating act of the fully developed rational nature or soul for Aristotle is both 
an unrestricted act of self-knowledge and a quiescent reposing in such knowledge. 
 For Hegel, then, development, generally speaking, is a transition from potency to 
act. In the case of the mind, development consists in the transition of the mind from 
initially a potentia omnia facere et fieri to the absolute activity of perfected self-
knowledge.60 Thus, in the “Concept of Development” section of the LHP, Hegel asserts, 
“Everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all 
the deeds of time simply are struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective to 
itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself” (LHP 23). 
From this last passage, moreover, we can derive a clearer indication as to how and 
why Hegel means to appropriate and assimilate the Aristotelian notion of development as 
a transition from potency to act to his own technical formulation of that process as a 
transition from being-in-itself to being-for-itself. 61 For, on the Aristotelian account, the 
proper end of the dynamic development of the rational soul is a sharing in the perfected 
self-contemplation of the divine Nous. In other words, it consists in the full 
objectification of rational mind for itself; such knowledge of self is the complete 
actualization of its potency for knowledge. Thus, the becoming for-itself of what it is in-
itself just is the complete actualization of the rational soul62. Properly grasping Hegel’s 
                                                          
60 Cf. Hegel’s essentially Aristotelian reinterpretation of the Platonic doctrine of Anamnesis as a process of 
development, or movement from potency to act, implicit to explicit: “The claim in the Platonic philosophy 
that we remember the Ideas means that Ideas are implicitly in the human mind and are not (as the Sophists 
maintained) something alien that comes to mind from the outside. In any case, this interpretation of 
cognition as ‘reminiscence’ does not exclude the development of what is implicit in the human mind, and 
this development is nothing but mediation” (EL 116). This point will be returned to in the Appendix. 
61 Cf. Hegel: “Nature does not bring the Nous to consciousness for itself; only man reduplicates himself in 
such a way that he is the universal that is [present] for the universal” (EL 57). 
62 Cf. Hegel: “The defect of life consists in the fact that it is still only the Idea in-itself; cognition, on the 
contrary, is the Idea only as it for-itself, in the same one-sided way. The unity and truth of these two is the 
Idea in and for itself, and hence absolute. – Up to this point the Idea in its development through its various 
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view of development as a transition from potency to act and therefore as a series of self-
objectifications of mind leads us into the next section. 
2. Biological Analogy for the Development of Consciousness   
In transitioning from “The Notion of Development” to “The Notion of the 
Concrete” section of the Introduction to the LHP, Hegel provides an analogy intended to 
illuminate both his notion of development in general and of the mind in particular. The 
analogy is quite instructive as it sheds light on several central, if occasionally elusive, 
elements of Hegel’s theory of the mind and its development. It will thus be worthwhile to 
unpack the analogy in detail in order both to flesh out the immediately forgoing 
discussion and to prepare the ground for subsequent discussions of Hegel’s notions of 
development and of the concrete. 
The analogy that Hegel draws is that between the biological development of a 
plant and the development of the mind. Regarding the development of the plant, Hegel 
states, 
Because that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly passes into 
change, yet it remains one and the same, for the whole process is dominated by it. 
The plant, for example, does not lose itself in mere indefinite change. From the 
germ much is produced when at first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of 
what is brought forth, if not developed, is yet hidden ideally and contained within 
                                                          
stages has been our object; but from now on, the Idea is its own object. This is the noesis noeseos, which 
was already called the highest form of the Idea by Aristotle” (EL 303). Cf. the comparable notion of the 
mind as a potential totality and as developing through the positing and thus actualizing of that potency in 
Fichte: “There is initially only one substance, the self; within this one substance, all possible accidents, and 
so all possible realities, are posited” (WL 137). Thus, for Fichte, substance has already become self or 
subject. 
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itself. The principle of this projection into existence is that the germ cannot 
remain merely implicit, but is impelled towards development, since it presents the 
contradiction of being implicit and yet not desiring to be. But this coming without 
itself has an end in view; its completion fully reached, and its previously 
determined end is the fruit or produce of the germ, which causes a return to the 
first condition. The germ will produce itself alone and manifest what is contained 
in it, so that it then may return to itself once more thus to renew the unity from 
which it started. (LHP I 22) 
Hegel’s discussion of the development of the plant of course demonstrates his ongoing 
appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of development. The germ or seed as possessing 
the nature of the plant is thus a dynamic potency ordered to an end. All changes and 
developments within the plant are anticipatorily or implicitly contained in this potency 
and are governed by the end towards which the germ is impelled, or rather, towards 
which it impels itself.63  
Especially worth nothing, however, is the end towards which the germ develops. 
For, there is twofold end, that is to say, a twofold raising of the plant from being-in-itself 
to being-for-itself: the germ produces both itself and its fruit in which another germ is 
contained. Thus, in one sense, the germ is ordered towards the end of attaining full 
maturity such that it might “manifest what is contained in it”, which is to say, 
differentiate and construct the various biological organs, process and systems whose 
                                                          
63 Cf. Hegel: “The buds have the tree within them and contain its entire strength, although they are not yet 
the tree itself” (EPR 25). 
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successful operation will constitute it as a fully developed organism. Yet, it is also 
ordered towards the bearing of fruit as its culminating moment of development.64 
 To be sure, the processes by which the plant matures and by which it bears fruit 
constitute a unitary process. For, in order to bear fruit the plant must mature; and in 
developing itself such that it can bear fruit the plant eo ipso matures itself.65 This overall 
process of development, moreover, Hegel importantly identifies as a “projection into 
existence”; it is, in other words, a self-positing of the plant from its germinal potency to 
its fully actualized maturity. Yet, it is also important to recognize how at its culminating 
moment of development the plant posits a fruit. For, it is here that Hegel identifies a quite 
instructive dis-analogy between merely biological development and the development of 
the mind. 
2.1    Dis-analogy between Biological Development and the Development of 
Consciousness  
Regarding the very significant dis-analogy between merely biological 
development and the development of consciousness as such, Hegel states, 
With nature it certainly is true that the subject which commenced and the matter 
which forms the end are two separate units. The doubling process has apparently 
the effect of separating into two things that which in content is the same. Thus in 
animal life the parent and the young are different individuals although their nature 
is the same. In Mind [Geist] it is otherwise: it is consciousness and therefore it is 
                                                          
64 Cf. Fichte: “the highest and final – the most developed – stage of the organizational force in the 
individual plant is the seed” (Foundations of Natural Right 73). 
65 Cf. Aristotle: “Now the product is, in a way the producer in his actualization [energeia]; hence the 
producer is fond of the product, because he loves his own being. This is natural, since what he is potentially 
is what the product indicates in actualization” (1168a6-9). 
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free, uniting in itself the beginning and the end. As with the germ in nature, Mind 
indeed resolves itself back into unity after constituting itself another. But what is 
in itself becomes for Mind and thus arrives at  being for itself. The fruit and seed 
newly contained within it on the other hand, do not become for the original germ, 
but for us alone, in the case of Mind both factors not only are implicitly the same 
in character, but there is a being for the other and at the same time a being for self. 
That for which the “other” is, is the same as that “other;” and thus alone Mind is 
at home with itself in its “other.” The development of Mind lies in the fact that its 
going forth and separation constitutes its coming to itself. (LHP I 22-23) 
Like the plant, the mind “goes forth” from itself qua potency to posit itself as actually 
existing. It heads towards the end of constituting itself as fully self-differentiated and 
mature organic unity. Also like the plant, there is a culminating moment in the 
development of the mind: the positing of an “other”. In the case of the plant, this positing 
of an “other” is in fact a return to unity with itself inasmuch as the “other” which it posits 
– the fruit which contains another germ – shares the same nature as the original germ; the 
original germ, of course, existing now as a fully matured plant. Yet, herein lies the crucial 
dis-analogy to which Hegel means to draw our attention.  
For, the plant achieves a unity or “coming-to-itself” through positing an “other” 
inasmuch as the “other” shares the same nature with itself. Yet, this self-doubling does 
not occur for the plant itself, but only for “us”, that is to say, we phenomenologists of 
development and readers of the LHP. Once the fruit ripens and falls from the tree, it, 
along with the seed contained within it, ceases to constitute an aspect of the self-
differentiation and self-determination of the plant itself. It now falls outside of the plant 
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and exists in a relation of mere externality to it. At the culminating moment of its self-
differentiation the plant fails to preserve unity with itself. Stated differently, unity is 
preserved inasmuch as the original plant and the germ contained in fruit share the same 
nature – yet, that unity is not preserved for the plant. For the plant, the germ it has posited 
now merely stands over against it as something entirely alien and external. 
Hegel sharply contrasts this final state of alienation characteristic of merely 
biological development with the culminating moments of self-differentiation through 
which the mind develops. Like the germ of a plant, the mind begins in an embryonic state 
of potency.66 The mind develops through a process of self-differentiation through which 
it constitutes its various functions and operations into an organic unity.67 There is finally 
a culminating moment in the development of the mind wherein it, like the plant, bears 
fruit. In other words, consciousness, too, posits an “other”, something distinct from itself, 
namely, the object of knowledge. Yet, unlike the plant, the mind preserves itself in this 
difference. For when the mind posits its fruit the object does not thereby fall “outside” of 
consciousness and stand over against the mind in a merely external relation. Rather, the 
mind preserves its unity with itself in positing its object such that the distinction that the 
mind draws between itself and its object remains internal to consciousness.68 
                                                          
66 “If we say, for example, that man is by nature rational, we would mean that he has reason only inherently 
or in embryo” (LHP 21).  
67 Indeed, Hegel will harshly critique the faculty psychologies of Locke, Kant, Schulze, et al. for failing to 
recognize the mind as a self-differentiating organic structure. Cf. Hegel: PM 5 and EPR 35, 53. 
68 Cf. Hegel: “The germ of the plant, this sensuously present concept [Begriff], closes its development with 
an actuality like itself, with the production of the seed. The same is true of mind; its development, too, has 
achieved its goal when the concept [Begriff] of the mind has completely actualized itself or, what is the 
same thing, when mind has attained to complete consciousness of its concept. But this self-contraction-
into-one of the beginning with the end, this coming-to-itself of the concept in its actualization, appears in 
mind in a still more complete form than in the merely living thing; for whereas in the latter the seed 
produced is not identical with the seed that produced it, in self-knowing mind the product is one and the 
same as that which produces it” (PM 7). 
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In order to grasp more precisely why Hegel maintains that the object of the mind 
does not, like the fruit of the plant, fall outside of the mind but rather is preserved as 
internally constitutive of the mind itself, it will be necessary to discuss two distinct but 
related aspects of Hegel’s larger account of the nature of the mind and its development. 
First, it will be necessary to examine some general aspects of the object of consciousness, 
according to Hegel. Second, it will be necessary to discuss some general aspects of 
Hegel’s appeal to phenomenological fact in grounding his account of the nature of 
consciousness. 
2.2 Important General Aspects in Hegel’s Account of the Object of Knowledge 
 In the LHP Hegel specifies in helpful, if still fairly general terms, the nature of the 
object that the mind posits for itself as the fruit of its self-differentiating development. 
That which is in itself must become an object to mankind, must arrive at 
consciousness, thus becoming for man. What has become an object to him is the 
same as what he is in himself; through the becoming objective of this implicit 
being, man first becomes for himself; he is made double, is retained and not 
changed into another. For example, man is thinking, and thus he thinks out 
thoughts. In this way it is in thought alone that thought is object; reason produces 
what is rational: reason is its own object (21). 
Initially, rationality exists merely potentially or in-itself. The mind of the child, for 
example, is potentially rational. Yet, as Hegel indicates here, the mind develops precisely 
insofar as it manages to objectify its own immanent rationality. As Hegel goes on to note, 
“All knowledge, and learning, science, and even commerce have no other object than to 
draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective” (LHP 22). 
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Consciousness develops by becoming rational, but this development is mediated by the 
ongoing objectification of rationality by and for itself – in other words, through the 
constitution of a rational object. Like the germ which in developing to maturity finally 
issues forth an object whose nature corresponds to itself, so the mind through the course 
of its development produces an object which corresponds to itself: 
The human soul does not merely have natural differences, it differentiates itself 
within itself, separates its substantial totality, its individual world, from itself, sets 
this over against itself as the subjective. Its aim here is that what the mind is in 
itself should become for the soul or for the mind, – that the cosmos contained, in 
itself, within the mind should enter into mind’s consciousness (PM 86). 
The plant produces a fruit containing a seed whose nature corresponds to that of the 
original germ. Yet, as already discussed, this self-doubling and self-objectification is not 
preserved within the plant. In contrast, the rational object that rational mind posits for 
itself remains for consciousness.69 The objects of knowledge, learning and science which 
the mind posits for itself do not stand over against consciousness as an alien existence 
like the fruit separated from the plant. Rather, consciousness inhabits that world as its 
very own; it recognizes itself in the object it has posited and the object thus continues to 
exist for it.70  
                                                          
69 Hegel repeatedly notes that it is a testament to the strength of mental, as opposed to merely biological, 
development that it is able to preserve itself in this uttermost self-differentiation. Cf. “[T]he life of Spirit is 
not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that 
endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself” 
(PhG 32); “The more intensive is the Mind, the more extensive is it, hence the larger is its embrace. 
Extension as development, is not dispersion or falling asunder, but a uniting bond which is the more 
powerful and intense as the expanse of that embraced is greater in extent and richer. In such a case what is 
greater is the strength of oppositions and of separation; and the greater power overcomes the greater 
separation” (LHP I 28).  
70 Thus we see reaffirmed the important connection between Hegel’s notion of the end or goal of the 
development of consciousness as the production of an object in which consciousness can know and 
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Thus, we have a first indication as to why Hegel maintains that the object of the 
mind is different than the fruit of mere biological development, namely, inasmuch as the 
object, even after being posited into existence, nevertheless remains for and thus in 
consciousness. 
2.3 Hegel’s Appeal to Phenomenological Fact 
 There is an important sense in which Hegel is appealing to phenomenological fact 
in noting that when consciousness posits its object the object does not thereby fall outside 
of consciousness. Take, for example, the learning of some science like geometry or 
Newtonian mechanics. In the analogy with a plant, the phase of learning for the student 
would correspond to the period in which the plant is growing to full maturation. Unlike 
the plant and its final relation to its fruit, however, when the student has finally learned 
geometry or Newtonian science the object of knowledge does not at that instant fall 
“outside” her mind.  Rather, in positing it object the mind is eo ipso conscious of that 
object. The fruit of intellectual labor is thus preserved within the mind, and the presence 
of the object of knowledge in the mind is given as a phenomenological fact. Thus, Hegel 
states, “consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, 
consciousness of itself” (PhG 85).  
 The distinction between the mind and its object, a distinction which the mind 
itself posits,71 is preserved within consciousness. As Hegel states, “the essential point to 
                                                          
recognize itself and the perfect self-contemplation of Aristotle’s divine Nous. Cf. Hegel: “Though the 
embryo is indeed in itself a human being, it is not so for itself; this it only is as cultivated Reason, which 
made itself into what it is in itself. And that is when it is for the first time actual” (PhG 21). “Spirit 
becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to 
itself, and suspending this otherness” (PhG 36). 
71 “Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to 
it, or, as it is said, something exists for consciousness” (PhG. 52, sec. 82). 
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bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two moments, ‘Concept’ 
and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself’ both fall within that knowledge 
which we are investigating” (PhG 84). Again, the distinction that the mind draws 
between itself and its object but which it preserves within itself is indeed given in 
consciousness as a phenomenological fact: 
[T]he distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in the 
very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is for it the in-
itself; and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness is, for it, 
another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination 
rests [Emphases mine]. (PhG 85) 
Thus, PhG Hegel bids heed to the point that he will rearticulate in the LHP, namely, that 
unlike the development of a plant, the mind at its culminating moment of development 
and self-differentiation preserves itself in this difference such that its object remains for 
it; moreover, this positing, distinguishing and relating is given in consciousness as a 
phenomenological fact. Indeed, as noted, Hegel identifies this point as “the essential 
point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation” of the PhG, for it is upon this 
point that the entire “examination rests”. 
 A number of difficulties and confusions often emerge surrounding Hegel’s 
discussion of the immanence of the object of knowledge to consciousness as well as his 
appeal to phenomenological fact in order to ground his account of the structure of 
consciousness.72 While a more thorough treatment of some of these issues will have to 
wait for subsequent chapters, it would be well to address promptly one of the more salient 
                                                          
72 An distinctly misguided interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the nature of the relation between 
consciousness or the mind and its object by Michael Forster is dealt with at length in the Appendix. 
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difficulties that tend to arise: the confusion arising from the use of spatial prepositions in 
describing the relationship of consciousness to its object. 
2.3.1 The Problem of Spatial Prepositions Vis-à-vis the Object of Knowledge  
 In the earlier section on the difference between motion (kinesis) and operation 
(energeia) it was noted that, unlike movements, operations are not temporal realities, at 
least not in the sense that movements are temporal. Movements occur over time; 
operations endure through time. Similarly, operations, unlike movements, are not spatial 
realities, either. Hegel, due perhaps in large part to his close reading of Aristotle, and 
especially the De Anima, is keenly aware of this aspect of operations. Indeed, in the 
section on the De Anima in the LHP Hegel affirms his appreciation and appropriation of 
Aristotle’s account of energeia as it applies to acts of sensation and understanding or 
“thinking”, declaring that it contains “many clear and far-reaching glimpses into the 
Nature of consciousness” (LHP II 191). In order to understand more clearly how these 
“clear and far-reaching” elements in Aristotle’s conception of sensation and 
understanding help clarify what is meant by the immanence of the object of knowledge to 
consciousness, it will be necessary to examine a few more details of Aristotle’s account 
of the nature of energeia. 
According to Aristotle, the reality of an act (energeia) is received in the patient of 
the act, as he states: “for it is in the passive factor that the actuality of the active or motive 
factor is to be realized” (426a4-5) In the case of sensation, the patient of the act is the 
sense-organ. Thus, for Aristotle, the reality or actuality (energiea) of sounding is in the 
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hearing, just as the energeia of color(ing) is in the seeing.73 In other words, sense in act is 
sensed in act.74 Hearing and sounding, seeing and color, respectively, do not constitute 
two distinct realities; rather each pair constitutes a single actuality. There is no actual 
color outside of seeing, just as there is no actual sound outside of hearing.75 “Subject” 
and “object” are one in act: ““For the acting-and-being-acted-upon is to be found in the 
passive, not in the active factor, so also the actuality of the sensible object and that of the 
sensitive subject are both realized in the latter” (426a9-11).76 
 The further point regarding the use of spatial prepositions to discuss the relation 
between the object of sensation and the conscious act in which it is experienced is that 
one must be careful not to imagine or “picture-think” the manner in which an object is 
thus “in” consciousness.77 Insofar as sense and sensed are one in act, the object of 
sensation – the sensed – is “in” the mind since it is one with the conscious operation of 
sensing. Yet, it is not spatially “in” the organ of sense. The ear is spatially distinct from 
the guitar amp generating the sound waves, just as the eye is spatially distinct from the 
painting reflecting the light wavicles. However, sound is not spatially distinct from 
hearing, nor is color spatially distinct from seeing. Sounding is “in” hearing, and 
color(ing) is “in” seeing, in the sense that each respective pair constitutes a single reality.  
                                                          
73 “Both the sound and hearing so far as it is actual must be found in that which has the faculty of hearing” 
(426a3-4). 
74 “The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the same activity” (425b26-7). 
75 There may of course be sound waves or light wavicles outside of or distinct from the ears or eyes, but 
their actions would of course be motions, not operations. We do not hear sound waves; we hear sound. We 
do not see light wavicles; we see color. This distinction, moreover, need not presume any vulgar distinction 
between “primary” and “secondary” qualities as found in much modern philosophy post-Galileo. 
76 Cf. Mure: “The perceptible is only and necessarily actualized in being perceived: its actual, though not 
its potential, esse is percipi. Therefore there can be no inference to the nature of any sort of physical thing 
in a world supposed indifferent to a subject’s consciousness; Aristotle clearly excludes any naively realist 
view of the object of the perceptive act” (Mure, 20). 
77 This point is discussed at length in the Appendix vis-à-vis Forster’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of 
consciousness or mind. 
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Hegel accedes to this aspect of Aristotle’s “clear and far-reaching” account of the 
structure of consciousness: 
There is a body which sounds and a subject which hears; they are twofold 
in the aspect they present, but hearing, taken by itself, is intrinsically an 
activity of both. In like manner, when I have by sense the perception of 
redness and hardness, my perception is itself red and hard: that is, I find 
myself determined in that way, even though reflection says that outside of 
me there is a red, hard thing, and that it and my finger are two; but they 
are also one, my eye is red and the thing. It is upon this difference and this 
identity that everything depends; Aristotle demonstrates this in the most 
emphatic way, and holds firmly to his point. The later distinction of 
subjective and objective is the reflection of consciousness. (LHP II 192) 
Thus, for Hegel sense and sensed are one in act. Hegel goes further and clarifies that the 
distinction between “subject” and “object” is only subsequently constituted “reflectively” 
by and “in” consciousness. In other words, for Hegel, as for Aristotle, the duality between 
“subject” and “object” is not a primordial or “brute fact” which is simply “given” to 
consciousness. The distinction is the result of the mind’s own deed of positing and 
distinguishing. 
 In Aristotle’s account, the rational soul is initially a potentia omnia facere et fieri: 
it can make and become all things. As Hegel would say, it is the entire cosmos in-itself.78 
Through its activity, the rational soul both makes things intelligible and becomes one 
with those things in act. Thus, as with sense and sensed, knower and known are one in 
                                                          
78 Cf. Ferrarin: “’That the world, the universe in itself, is rational, this is the nous pathetikos’ reads the note 
of an auditor of Hegel’s 1820 class” (Hegel and Aristotle 311). 
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act: “Actual knowledge is identical with its object” (430a20).79  The actuality of the 
intelligible, or what Hegel will call the “determinate”, “in” rational consciousness is 
knowledge. Just as there is no sounding “outside” of hearing, there is no intelligibility 
“outside” of intelligence, no thought outside of thinking; the two are one in act. While the 
known object may be spatially distinct from one’s body it is not spatially distinct from 
one’s act of understanding it. Thus, as Hegel indicates, any distinction between knower 
and known is the result of the “reflection” of consciousness. 
A further point to notice regarding the way in which the object of knowledge is 
“in” consciousness is that, unlike sensation, the intelligibility or determinateness of all 
objects is contained potentially “in” the rational soul. As Aristotle states, referring to the 
Platonic doctrine of Anamnesis according to which the knowledge of all things is “in” the 
soul and simply needs to be “recollected”: “It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place 
of the forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the 
forms only potentially” (429a27-29). Thus, unlike sensation, in principle nothing is 
“outside” of the scope of the rational soul, for it is a potential totality (omnia). As Hegel 
states, 
[W]hat [Aristotle] says of thought is explicitly and absolutely speculative, 
and is not on the same level with anything else, such as sense-perception 
[…] This fact is moreover involved, that reason is implicitly the true 
totality.80 (LHP 2, 200-1)   
                                                          
79 Cf. Mure: “Fully actual knowledge is identical with what is known, and in this knowing reason knows 
itself” (Introduction to Hegel 41). 
80 Cf. Findlay, in his Foreword to the PhG: “The mind for Hegel, as for Aristotle, is thus the place of the 
forms” (ix). 
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As thus “containing” the totality of all knowledge potentially “within” it, the 
development of knowledge “in” the rational soul is not a matter of “gaining access” to the 
“world” “out there”, but of actualizing its own immanent potentiality.81 
 Hegel thus criticizes the common view according to which the “passivity” 
involved in Aristotle’s account of knowledge is supposed to make the latter an 
“empiricist” and/or “realist” when compared, for example, to Kant’s critical idealism. As 
Hegel points out, such “passivity” does not entail a “receptivity” of objects, or their 
forms, “into” the soul. Rather, the passivity refers simply to the fact that in moving from 
ignorance to knowledge the soul moves from potency to act and therefore undergoes 
change: 
Thought is implicitly the content of the object of what is thought, and in 
coming into existence it [i.e. thought] only coincides with itself; but the 
self-conscious understanding is not merely implicit, but essentially 
explicit, since it is within itself all things. That is an idealistic way of 
expressing it and yet they say that Aristotle is an empiricist. The passivity 
of understanding has therefore here only the sense of potentiality before 
actuality, and that is the great principle of Aristotle.82 (LHP II 196) 
                                                          
81 Cf. Hegel: “The actual is not something spatial” (PhG 45). Needless to say, the upshot of this position is 
that spatial distinctions and relations are not primordially given “brute facts” of experience but are 
constituted in and through the operations of consciousness: “It is the Notion which divides space into its 
dimensions and determines the connections between and within them” (PhG. 45). 
82 Cf. Hegel: “With this moment of passivity Aristotle does not fall short of idealism; sensation is always in 
one aspect passive. That is, however, a false idealism which thinks that the passivity and spontaneity of the 
mind depend on whether the determination given is from within or from without, as if there were freedom 
in sense-perception, whereas it is itself a sphere of limitation” (LHP II 188). In other words, on Hegel’s 
reading, for the Kantian there is passivity in cognition insofar as the object is “received” from “outside” the 
mind, whereas there is spontaneity and thus freedom insofar as the mind can act upon the object it has 
received on the basis of resources contained a priori “within” itself. For Hegel, the point is moot since 
sensation tout simple is the realm of finitude and limitation and thus un-freedom. Again, Hegel’s point is 
that sensation, like knowledge, is passive, not in the sense of “receiving” an influence from the “external 
world” or the “thing-in-itself,” but simply in the sense that it moves from potency to act: “The reaction of 
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Knowledge is thus in the first instance, not a “gaining access” to or “receiving influence” 
from an object “out there”, but a development of the knower; it is the rational soul in act, 
for the rational soul is potentially all things.83 
Thus, according to the Aristotelian identity theory of knowing which Hegel 
appropriates, just as sense in act is sensed in act, so knower in act is known in act. 
Moreover, unlike sensation, nothing whatsoever stands “outside” the scope of the rational 
soul or mind. All knowledge for Aristotle is an actualization of the dynamic potency that 
is “in” or rather is the rational soul or mind itself. All of these points must be borne in 
mind in order to appreciate what Hegel means when he says that the object of knowledge, 
unlike the fruit of the plant, is preserved “in” consciousness.84  
3. The Concept of the Concrete 
From Hegel’s “Concept of Development”, let us turn to his account of the 
“Concept of the Concrete”. The concept of the concrete, for Hegel, is a continuation of 
the concept of development. Stated simply, for Hegel, “the concrete is the unity of 
diverse determinations and principles” (LHP II 13). Development, therefore, is a process 
of concretization, for it entails the positing of diverse elements and the simultaneous 
                                                          
sense-perception consists therefore in this active receiving into itself of that which is perceived; but this is 
simply activity in passivity, the spontaneity which abrogates the receptivity in sense-perception. Sense-
perception, as made like to itself, has, while appearing to be brought to pass by means of an influence 
working it, brought to pass the identity of itself and its object” (LHP II 189). 
83 Cf. Hegel: “A host of other forms used of the intelligence [Verstand], that it receives impressions from 
outside, admits them, that representations arise through influences of the external things as the causes, etc., 
belong to a categorical standpoint which is not the standpoint of the mind or of philosophical inquiry” (PM 
173). 
84 Needless to say, failure to bear these points in mind often provides the basis for anxieties that Hegel’s 
philosophy – not to mention any number of other philosophies – would ultimately consign knowledge to 
epistemological immanence or to a state of being trapped “in” one’s own mind. This point will be broached 
again in Chapter Four. 
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preservation of the unity of those elements. In the specific case of the mind, the mind 
posits for itself an object; yet, it preserves its unity with itself in this very act of positing.  
Furthermore, complete self-knowledge will constitute the highest instance of the 
concrete, for Hegel, since it will involve the full objective positing of the mind by the 
mind in a perfected concrete act.85 For, the mind is initially a potency or something that 
exists merely in-itself, but “it is its interest that what is in itself should be there for it” 
(LHP I 24). Such a conscious act or operation of objectification in turn “is the retention 
of these diverse elements within itself,” namely, the mind and the object it has posited for 
itself; “the act thus is really one, and it is just this unity of differences which is the 
concrete” (LHP I 24).86 
3.1 Development as Vertical Teleology in Hegel     
In combining his concept of development with his concept of the concrete Hegel 
adds an important element to his overall theory of development, one that will prove quite 
useful in understanding his account of the development of the mind. The element that 
Hegel adds is a discussion of how development is ultimately a cumulative process in 
which later advances presuppose earlier achievements. Thus, Hegel states  
The fruit of development, which comes third, is a result of motion, but inasmuch 
as it is merely the result of one stage of development, as being the last in this 
stage, it is both the starting point and the first in order in another such 
                                                          
85 Cf. Hegel: “The difficulty of the philosophical cognition of mind consists in the fact that here we are no 
longer dealing with the comparatively abstract, simple logical Idea, but with the most concrete, most 
developed form achieved by the Idea in its self-actualization” (PM 3). 
86 Cf. Mure: “Thought which is possessed of its own full nature – philosophic thought – is in essence self-
development from abstract to concrete. It is a process upwards, if we hold to the spatial metaphor” 
(Introduction to Hegel 128). 
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stage…Matter – which as developed has form – constitutes once more the 
material for a new form…The application of thought to this, supplies it with the 
form and determination of thought. This action thus further forms the previously 
formed, gives it additional determinations, makes it more determinate in itself, 
further developed and more profound. As concrete, this activity is a succession of 
processes in development which must be represented not as a straight line drawn 
out into vague infinity, but as a circle returning within itself, which, as periphery, 
has very man circles, and whose whole is a large number of processes in 
development turning back within themselves (LHP I 27). 
Clearly, Hegel is again invoking the Aristotelian context. For, learning is a kind of 
motion that issues forth a fruit. Such fruit, however, may be enjoyed, and such enjoyment 
would constitute an operation or energeia, for the activity and the end would then be 
coincident. Thus, the rational mind or nature, like all natures, is an immanent, teleological 
principle of motion and rest. 
 Hegel adds a further element, however, one that is certainly anticipated in 
Aristotle but which still calls forth a further specification on Hegel’s part. In effect, Hegel 
is taking what might be called the “horizontal teleology” of Aristotle and transforming it 
into a “vertical teleology”. By “horizontal teleology” would be meant the process 
whereby a given nature moves toward an end proportionate to itself and rests in the 
enjoyment of that end. Thus, for example, a merely biological organism – or “nutritive 
soul” – will differentiate its various organs such that it can engage in the activities 
proportionate to its nature, namely, a flourishing biological existence. Such a process of 
self-differentiation and immanent perfection would constitute an instance of horizontal 
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teleology since biological development would be ordered to the end of biological activity 
and fulfillment. 
 Hegel’s points out, however, that along with the horizontal teleology in which a 
given nature pursues a proportionate end, development also involves a process whereby a 
preceding moment of development provides the conditions for the pursuit and attainment 
of a higher end, thus giving rise to vertical teleology.87  
As Hegel states, the fruit of development of a given level, which is already a 
certain actualization of the potency immanent in a given nature, can provide the 
proximate “matter” or potency for a subsequent development. The standard Aristotelian 
examples which at least suggest this process of vertical teleology are instances in which it 
is observed how water and earth form the matter for tin as well as copper, while tin and 
copper when combined in turn form the matter for bronze, which in turn forms the matter 
for a statue, and so on. In such cases, the initial matter has a proportionate end, namely – 
at least in the Aristotelian universe – resting in its proper location. Yet, the attainment of 
each end functions in turn as an instrument for the attainment of a higher end, namely, the 
production of a beautiful work of art and the contemplative energia by which such beauty 
is appreciated.88  
 Hegel goes further, however, and points out that there can be instances in which a 
given phenomenon such as biological organism, or, even more conspicuously, the 
developing mind, does not have to wait for some external factor to bring together the 
                                                          
87 Hegel thus refers to the “going forth of the more perfect from the imperfect”, as in the emergence of 
higher orders of being from lower orders (EL 233). Cf. Mure on the eventual structure of the development 
of consciousness in the PhG: “The principle will be this. Each phase will be a proximate matter to the 
phase above it. The total concrete attitude of subject to object, the whole unity of the two related terms in 
which any given phase consists, will become the object or content of the proximate higher phase, which 
will accordingly exhibit a fresh attitude of the subject to a fresh object” (Introduction to Hegel 63). 
88 Cf. Aristotle: “matter is a relative thing – for different forms there is different matter” (194b8-9). 
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matter out of which will emerge a higher form as, for example, the tin and copper must 
wait for the metalsmith to smelt them into bronze, which in turn must wait for the 
sculptor to transform it into a work of art, and so on. In contrast, the animal, like the 
plant, differentiates its biological organs in order that it may pursue its proportionate 
biological ends.89 Yet, in achieving that proportionate end, the animal simultaneously 
produces through itself the conditions or matter necessary for the emergence of a wholly 
new set of operations with their own respective proportionate ends, namely, the 
operations of sensation. In turn, the processes of sensation which the animal has 
differentiated and constituted within itself can provide the matter from which intelligent 
operations might emerge, and so on. 
 For Hegel, development, properly speaking, should therefore be understood, not 
as a kind of line extending out into a vague infinity, but as a constant return to, 
enrichment and elevation of previous achievements through the placing of them in the 
service of ever higher ends. In other words, nature is a principle of motion and rest not 
only horizontally but vertically, with each “resting station” serving at least potentially as 
the instrumental matter for a still higher stage. Indeed, as will soon be discussed at 
greater length, consciousness goes through a series of these stages in which the 
achievements of the prior stages form the concrete “matter” for the succeeding stage. 
Thus, development as concrete entails the preservation of the diverse elements of what 
has gone before, although these previous elements will now function in the service of a 
higher end.90 
                                                          
89 Cf. Hegel: “It is only the living and mental [Geistig] which internally bestirs and develops itself” (LHP I 
27). 
90 Cf. Hegel: “Thus the Idea as concrete in itself, and self-developing, is an organic system and a totality 
which contains a multitude of stages and of moments in development” (LHP I 27). 
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4. The Concept of Development and the Development of the Concept 
 Ultimately, in order to understand Hegel’s theory of development it is necessary 
to clarify what he means by the “Concept”.91 To be sure, the Concept in Hegel has a 
variety of distinct but related meanings, and as such it impossible to provide a univocal 
definition of the term.92 Present purposes, however, require that an explication of the 
Concept proceeds only so far as it contributes to understanding Hegel’s theory of 
development. 
 As a first approximation, Hegel’s Concept corresponds closely to Aristotle’s 
“nature”.93 For, the Concept is a principle of motion and rest. Indeed, the Concept just is 
the very dynamic principle which drives any and all instances of development, including 
the entirety of universal historical process.94 As such, it is possible provisionally to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the Concept as the principle of motion and rest of 
universal process, including human history, and, on the other hand, the vast multiplicity 
of more particular concepts which propel and govern the development of the more 
particular aspects of universal process. The distinction can at best be provisional, 
however, since it is ultimately the same Concept which operates in and through the 
particular concepts such that the particular concepts can be rightly be declared to be but 
                                                          
91 Cf. Hegel: “The movement of the Concept is development, through which only that is posited which is 
already implicitly present” (EL 237). 
92 Cf. Mure: “The term Concept [Begriff] can only become clear as its phases develop in the Logic” 
(Introduction to Hegel 137). 
93 Cf. Hegel on: “This ‘nature’ of the Concept, which shows itself in its process to be a development of 
itself” (EL 238). 
94 Cf. Hegel: “As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the 
self, so that the absolute truth of being is the known Concept and the Concept as such is the absolute truth 
of being” (SL 49). 
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“moments” of the all-embracing Concept.95 The particular concepts as governing the 
development of particular aspects of the universal nevertheless function in a generically 
similar manner to the Concept.96 
4.1 The Concept’s Tripartite Scheme of Development 
The Concept, and therefore all particular concepts, develops according to a 
tripartite scheme. First, there is an initial state of undifferentiated unity. This moment 
could be further specified as the Concept existing in potency, in-itself and implicitly. 
Second, the Concept negates its initial unity and posits for itself a difference in the form 
of an object. In positing an object for itself the Concept thereby attains to a degree of 
actuality and begins to exist explicitly for-itself. Third, there is culminating moment of 
reconciliation in which the Concept negates the initial negation and overcomes the 
difference it had posited for itself by sublating it into a higher, differentiated and more 
concrete unity. At this highest stage, the Concept is fully actualized; indeed, it explicitly 
recognizes not only its object as manifesting itself but also that it is responsible for 
positing the object; thus, it comes to exist in-and-for-itself. Let us unpack each of these 
basic moments of the development of the Concept in greater detail. 
4.1.1 The Concept’s Initial State of Potency, Implicitness and Indeterminateness 
 First, while the Concept’s initial state of undifferentiated unity evidently lacks any 
explicit determinations, Hegel routinely insists that it is not a state of mere lifeless inertia. 
                                                          
95 Cf. Hegel: “It is false to speak of concepts of diverse sort, for the Concept as such, although concrete, is 
still essentially one, and the moments contained within it must not be considered to be diverse sorts of 
concepts” (EL 245). 
96 Cf. Hegel: “This happens when each particular concept is derived from the self-producing and self-
actualizing universal concept or the logical idea” (PM, 6) 
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Rather, it is a fecund state of potency ordered to its ultimate fulfillment and 
actualization.97 
 Second, the Concept in-itself, while lacking explicit determinacy, nevertheless 
contains within itself all the objective determinations that it will eventually posit for 
itself. As Hegel says, reverting to organic analogy, “A plant develops from its germ: the 
germ already contains the whole plant within itself” (EL 237). In similar fashion, the 
Concept contains all its eventual objective determinations within itself.  
 Third, while the Concept in-itself constitutes a kind of unity, it is nevertheless 
unstable and cannot long preserve itself. It is important to see why this is the case. In 
terms of greatest generality, the reason why the Concept, or any concept, in-itself is 
unstable is that it contains a contradiction. For Hegel, the Concept in-itself, despite its 
initial unity, nevertheless contains a contradiction, and it is due to this immanent 
contradiction that Concept is driven beyond its initial state towards its successive stages 
of development.98 
4.1.2  Contradiction as Impelling the Concept’s Development 
 It might be asked in what, more precisely, the contradiction immanent in the 
Concept in-itself consists. This question can be answered both from a more strictly 
logical perspective and from the perspective of concrete experience. To be sure, these 
two realms – the order of logic and the order of experience – are intimately connected in 
                                                          
97 Cf. Hegel: “The Concept as such does not abide within itself, without development (as the understanding 
would have it); on the contrary, being the infinite form, the Concept is totally active” (EL 245). 
98 Cf. Hegel: “The concrete must become for itself or explicit; as implicit or potential it is only 
differentiated within itself, not as yet explicitly set forth, but still in a state of unity. The concrete is thus 
simple, and yet at the same time differentiated. This, its inward contradiction, which is indeed the impelling 
force in development, brings distinction into being” (LHP 25). 
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Hegel. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter Four, Hegel so generalizes his conception of 
experience that the logical determinations of thought are recognized to be constitutive of 
conscious experience.99 Nevertheless, it is possible, and at times helpful, provisionally to 
distinguish these two orders. 
From a logical perspective the contradiction within the Concept is that between 
the universal and the particular. For, at its initial stage, the Concept is universal. As Hegel 
states, “The beginning, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first immediately enunciated, 
is only the universal” (PhG 11). Of course, a traditional view of concepts is that they are 
indeed universals, but universals which merely subsume particular instances “under” 
them. Hegel’s view of concepts, not to say, of the Concept, is fundamentally opposed to 
this traditional, subsumptive view of concepts.100 A very brief comparison and contrast 
between the traditional view and Hegel’s of concepts, however, will help clarify the 
nature of the contradiction between the universal and the particular that Hegel affirms to 
exist within the Concept in-itself. 
4.1.3 Hegel’s Concept of Concept versus the Traditional Concept of Concept 
 A first contrast obtains insofar as, for Hegel, the universal is present at the 
beginning of development, including, as we will, intellectual development, whereas for 
                                                          
99 Cf. Hegel: “This concept of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the knowing truth, the logical with the 
meaning that it is the universality verified in the concrete content as in its actuality. In this way science has 
returned to its beginning, and the logical is its result and the mental [Geistig]” (PM 275). 
100 Cf. Hegel: “When people speak of the Concept, they ordinarily have only abstract universality in mind, 
and consequently the Concept is usually also defined as a general concept. We speak in this way of the 
‘concept’ of colour, or of a plant, or of an animal, and so on; and these concepts are supposed to arise by 
omitting the particularities through which the various colours, plant, animals, etc., are distinguished from 
one another, and holding fast to what they have in common. This is the way in which the understanding 
apprehends the Concept, and the feeling that such concepts are hollow and empty, that they are mere 
schemata and shows is justified. What is universal about the Concept is indeed not just something common 
against which the particular stands on its own; instead the universal is what particularizes (specifies) itself, 
remaining at home with itself in its other, in unclouded clarity” (EL 240). 
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the traditional view, the universal emerges, if it ever emerges, only at the end of a process 
of logical abstraction. As a result, for the traditional view the universal is dependent upon 
the particulars whence the former was abstracted.101 
Second, since for the traditional view the universal emerges as a result the 
“subjective” activity of abstraction, the universal itself is therefore viewed as something 
“merely subjective”, an “item” merely “in” the mind, and thus not constitutive of 
objective reality. This aspect of the traditional view for which Hegel has little patience 
will become more relevant in later portions of this dissertation. Needless to say, however, 
for Hegel the Concept qua universal is not merely abstracted from an already existent 
reality “out there”, but instead constitutes that very reality.102 
Lastly, on the traditional view the universal and particular confront each in an 
insoluble contradiction. For, by its very definition the universal on this view abstracts 
from particular differences. As the saying goes, all humans are the same insofar as you 
abstract from their differences. For Hegel, however, the problem is that a universal which 
abstracts from differences is not worthy of the name. For, to be universal ultimately 
means to encompass the universe with all its manifold of particular differences and 
determinations. It is precisely this fact, namely, that the universal, to be worthy of its 
name, must not abstract from particularity, but must somehow encompass it, penetrate it 
                                                          
101 Cf. Hegel: “Instead, the Concept is what truly comes first, and things are what they are through the 
activity of the Concept that dwells in them and reveals itself in them” (EL 241). 
102 Cf. Hegel: “It is a mistake to assume that, first of all, there are objects which form the content of our 
representations, and then our subjective activity comes afterwards to form concepts of them, through the 
operation of abstraction that we spoke of earlier, and by summarizing what the objects have in common. 
Instead, the Concept dwells within the things themselves, it is that through which they are what they are” 
(EL 245); “The Concept (or even, if one prefers, subjectivity) and the object are in-themselves the same” 
(EL 269); “Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere 
concepts. On the contrary, it shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and that it is the 
concept alone (not what is so often called by that name, but which is merely an abstract determinations of 
the understanding) which has actuality, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself” (EPR 25). 
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and constitute it, that Hegel sees as responsible for the contradiction obtaining within the 
Concept in-itself at its initial stage of development.103  
For, again, the Concept in its initial stage is the universal, but it is the universal in 
a still abstract form. It is universal since it contains all the differences and determination 
within itself. Yet, it is abstract since these differences and determinations exist only in 
potency; they do not yet constitute an objective world with a manifold of concrete, 
particular determinations.104 Logically, however, the universal cannot abide this 
contradiction. For, logically, any universal worthy of the name cannot remain abstract but 
must become the concrete universal; it must not simply express one aspect common to 
every instance; rather, it must encompass, penetrate and constitute everything about 
everything.105 
                                                          
103 Cf. Hegel: “It is a common prejudice that the science of Philosophy deals only with abstractions and 
empty generalities, and that sense-perception, our empirical self-consciousness, natural instinct, and the 
feelings of every-day life, lie, on the contrary in the region of the concrete and the self-determined. As a 
matter of fact, Philosophy is in the region of thought, and has therefore to deal with universals; its content 
is abstract, but only as to form and element. In itself the Idea is really concrete, for it is the union of 
different determinations […] It is the business of Philosophy […] to show that the Truth or Idea does not 
consist in empty generalities, but in a universal; and that is within itself the particular and determined” 
(LHP I 24). 
104 Cf. Hegel: “Indeed the Concept is in-itself already the particular, but the particular is not yet posited in 
the Concept as such; it is still in transparent unity with the universal there. So […] the germ of the plant, for 
instance, already contains the particular: root, branches, leaves, etc., but the particular is here present only 
in-itself, and is posited only when the germ opens up” (EL 245). 
105 Cf. Hegel: “The immanent development of a science, the derivation of its entire content from the simple 
concept – and without such a derivation it certainly does not deserve the name of a philosophical science – 
has the following distinctive feature. One and the same concept […] which begins by being abstract 
(because it is itself the beginning), retains its character yet [at the same time] consolidates its 
determinations, against through its own exclusive agency, and thereby acquires a concrete content” (ERP 
317); “The first thing which the expression ‘universality’ suggests to representational thought is an abstract 
and external universality; but in the case of that universality which has being in and for itself, as defined 
here, we should think neither of the universality of reflection – i.e. communality or totality – nor of that 
abstract universality which stands outside and in opposition to the individual, i.e. the abstract identity of 
the understanding. The universality in question is concrete within itself and consequently has being for 
itself, and it is the substance of the self-consciousness, its immanent generic character or immanent idea; it 
is the concept of the free will as the universal which extends beyond its object, which permeates its 
determination and is identical with itself in this determination. – The universal which has being in and for 
itself is in general what is called the rational, and it can be understood only in this speculative way” (ERP 
55). 
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4.1.4 The Experience of the Concept’s Contradiction 
Moving from the logical order to the experiential order will further clarify the 
nature of the contradiction obtaining within the Concept in-itself. The contradiction 
between the universal and particular emerges into consciousness, in the first instance, in 
the experience of need [Not] and drive [Trieb].106 These are “the felt contradiction, as it 
occurs within the living subject itself” (EL 281). Need, drive and desire [Begierde] just 
are the initial experiential manifestations of the logical contradiction between the 
universal and the particular.107 
 To take the example of the plant, the germ is a kind of universal in that it contains 
within itself all the determinations that will eventually characterize the whole mature 
plant. Yet, it contains them merely in abstract potency. They lack, in other words, 
determinate, concrete existence or actuality. Need and drive just are the felt experience of 
this lack or contradiction in which the universal is not yet truly universal.108 
 Needless to say, need, drive and desire are not merely the experience of this lack, 
this contradiction, but they are of their nature ordered to an end. Thus, need, drive and 
                                                          
106 Cf. Hegel: “The subjective Idea is in the first instance an urge [Trieb]” (SL 783). 
107 This point will be discussed at much greater length in Chapter Three. 
108 Cf. Hegel: “Everything that is at all is concrete, and hence it is inwardly distinguished and self-opposed. 
The finitude of things consists in the fact that their immediate way of being does not correspond with what 
they are in-themselves. For instance, in inorganic nature, acid is at the same time in-itself base, i.e., its 
being is totally and solely in its relatedness to its other. Hence also, however, acid is not something that 
persists quietly in the antithesis, but is rather what strives to posit itself as what it is in-itself. Generally 
speaking, it is contradiction that moves the world, and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction cannot be 
thought. What is correct in this assertion is just that contradiction is not all there is to it, and that 
contradiction sublates itself by its own doing. Sublated contradiction, however, is not abstract identity, for 
that is itself only one side of the antithesis” [Emphases mine] (EL 187); “The Concept needs no external 
stimulus for its actualization; its own nature involves the contradiction of simplicity and difference, and 
therefore restlessly impels it to actualize itself, to unfold into actuality the difference which, in the Concept 
itself, is present only in an ideal manner, i.e., in the contradictory form of undifferentiatedness, and by this 
sublation of its simplicity as a defect, a one-sidedness, to make itself actually the whole, of which it initially 
contains only the possibility” [Emphases mine] (PM 7).  
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desire are teleological. As Hegel says, “Need and drive are the readiest examples of 
purpose” (EL 281). As purposive, however, need, drive and desire represent the transition 
point between the merely in-itself to the for-itself for the Concept. Thus, it will be 
apposite ourselves to transition to this next stage in the tripartite development of the 
Concept. Before doing so, let us briefly recall what has been established thus far 
regarding the Concept as it is in-itself. 
4.1.5  Brief Summary of the First Stage of the Concept’s Development 
 In its first stage, the Concept in-itself is an abstract, indeterminate, implicit 
universal. Yet, precisely to that extent it exists in a state of contradiction, since for Hegel 
to be universal means to encompass, penetrate and constitute the universe in all of its 
particularity, which is to say, in its totality. This contradiction is experienced in the first 
instance as need and drive. Need, drive and eventually desire are the positive experience 
of a lack, they are the Concept’s experience of itself as both universal and not universal, 
as universal in potency and abstraction, but not yet universal in determinate act and 
concretion. It is in Hegel’s view of need and drive as experiential manifestations of the 
Concept’s initial internal contradiction that we see in a more illustrative fashion how the 
Concept drives itself towards ever higher stages of development. 
4.2 The Second Stage of the Concept’s Development 
 The second stage of Concept’s development is its becoming for-itself. The 
Concept for-itself is the Concept in its experience of need and drive, and these as ordered 
to an end, as purposive, as teleological. Thus, Hegel states, “the Concept that now exists 
for itself is purpose” (EL 279). The question that immediately arises here regards what 
87 
 
 
exactly is the end towards which the Concept drives itself. The deceptively simple answer 
is that the end towards which the Concepts drives itself is the positing of an existence 
adequate to itself in order that it might thereby recognize and be at home.109 The moment 
of the Concept’s existing for-itself corresponds primarily to the moment of positing, 
whereas the moment of recognition, reconciliation and rest corresponds to the Concept 
qua in-and-for-itself. Let us accordingly focus first on the moment of the Concept’s 
positing. 
4.2.1 The Concept’s Self-positing 
 In the case of the plant there is a kind of twofold self-positing of an existence 
adequate to the plant’s concept. For, in concept, the plant is the fully developed, 
flourishing plant. Thus, in developing, the plant, driven by perhaps the most primitive 
form of need and drive,110 posits the various concrete determinations that together come 
to constitute its concrete functioning. Upon attaining maturity the plant thereby exists in a 
way that is adequate to its concept.  
Here we have, moreover, a first indication of Hegel’s theory of truth. Space does 
not admit of a lengthy discussion on this point. Briefly, however, we can note that truth 
for Hegel is a matter of existence becoming adequate to its concept.111 Thus, a plant that 
                                                          
109 Cf. Hegel: “The Idea is the certainty of the implicit identity of this objective world with it. Reason 
comes to world with absolute faith in its ability to posit this identity and to elevate its certainty into truth, 
and with the drive to posit the antithesis [between itself and the world], which is in-itself null and void, for 
it as null and void” (EL 295). 
110 Hegel refers to a “nisus” even at the level of inorganic nature (PN 45-6). 
111 Cf. Hegel: “Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality” (EPR, 53); “What is 
required by the definition of truth, namely, the agreement of the Concept and its object (SL, 595); the 
definition of truth as agreement of cognition with its object is “a definition of great, indeed of supreme, 
value” (SL, 593); “The Idea is what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity” 
(EL, 286); “Only when we consider mind in this process of the self-actualization of its concept, do we 
know it in its truth (for truth just means agreement of the concept with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind 
is not yet true, has not yet made its concept an object for itself, has not yet transformed what is present in it 
in an immediate way, into something posited by itself, has not yet converted its actuality into an actuality 
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has become adequate to the concept of a plant is a true plant. Needless to say, Hegel’s 
view of truth thus seems to entail a potentially scandalous inversion of the traditional 
correspondence theory of truth according to which truth is a matter of the concept 
becoming adequate to existence or the object. A discussion of the details of this point of 
controversy, however, will have to wait for Chapters Two through Four. 
 Along with positing an existence adequate to its concept by developing into a 
fully mature organism, the correlative end towards which the plant drives itself is the 
positing of a fruit. This aspect of the plant’s process of development reveals instructive 
aspects about the limitation of the very concept of the plant. 
As already discussed, in producing its fruit the plant posits into existence an 
object whose nature corresponds to itself. Yet, when the plant posits its fruit and it falls to 
the ground it ceases to function as a concrete determination of the plant. Thus, in one 
sense the plant, in developing itself to full maturity, has posited for itself an existence 
adequate to its concept. Yet, in another sense its culminating moment of development 
points to an insurmountable lack, an incompleteness, an alienation endemic to the very 
nature of the plant. This intrinsic incompleteness and alienation characteristic of the 
culminating moment of the plant’s self-development thus reveals the intrinsic limitation 
of its very concept. 
                                                          
appropriate to its concept” [Emphases mine] (PM, 7). Thus, Michael Forster is misguided in his view that 
Hegel rejects the “correspondence theory of truth” in favor a view of truth as “enduring communal 
consensus” (Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, 193ff.). The profound aspect of Hegel’s 
conception of truth is not that he rejects the correspondence theory in favor of, say, a “pragmatic” or 
“enduing communal consensus” view of truth, but rather that he reconceives , or dialectically inverts, the 
view of correspondence according to which the Concept or Mind learns to conform to the object “out 
there”, and replaces it with a view according to which the object itself progressively becomes adequate to 
the concept which posits it. Recall, for Hegel, “it is the concept alone […] which has actuality, and in such 
a way that it gives actuality to itself” (ERP 25). Cf. SL, 44ff.  
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The limitation of the concept of a plant – to put it perhaps a bit tautologically – is 
its finitude. It is of the very nature or concept of a mature plant that its existence be 
restricted to a rather finite portion of space and time. Moreover, the concrete 
determinations of a plant are restricted to a very limited range of organs, functions and 
processes. At best, organisms like plants participate in the spurious infinity of one 
generation succeeding the next ad infinitum. No actually existing plant, however, can be 
actually infinite, for the concept of a plant is finite.  
As such, the concept of a plant is not universal in the most radical sense of the 
term. It is at best universal in a qualified sense. The concept of a plant, existing as it does 
in-itself in the germ, does contain all the determinations that will eventually characterize 
the plant. Yet, the totality of these determinations is intrinsically limited. In other words, 
the plant is determined throughout or “universally” by its concept. Yet, the concept itself 
is restricted and nowhere is this restriction more evident than in the fact that at the 
culminating moment of its own development the plant posits a difference for itself that it 
cannot preserve within itself. The abstract genus preserves itself in this difference, but not 
the concrete, actual plant. 
 It is otherwise, however, with the concept of mind. The concept of mind posits for 
itself an existence adequate to itself by developing out of itself a fully mature, rational 
adult. At the culminating point of its development the mind posits a fruit in analogous 
fashion to the plant. The difference, however, is that mind preserves itself in this 
difference. The ultimate reason for this is that the concept of mind is infinite, 
unrestricted: potentia omnia facere et fieri.  
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 The important point to note is that since we have learned that need and drive and 
their higher manifestations are what drive the development of any given concept, the 
development of the mind must be driven by an unrestricted or infinite desire. Hegel will 
also refer to this desire as a desire for the Absolute or even Absolute desire. It is a desire 
for the absolute or unconditioned, not in the sense of that which lacks conditions, but for 
the totality of conditions – in other words, the infinite, the concrete universal, everything 
about everything.112  
 Thus, the concept of mind seeks to rest in an existent mind that has posited for 
itself an absolute, infinite universe. As such, the Concept reveals itself to be the mind.113 
It is ultimately mind from beginning to end that has driven the totality of universal 
process.114 Noting this fact, however, immediately raises questions regarding the proper 
way to interpret mind in its most radical sense. For, as concretely existing, mind only 
appears at the last stages of universal historical development. Thus, it becomes unclear in 
what sense Hegel could mean that mind nevertheless has driven the entirety of universal 
                                                          
112 Cf. Hegel: “[The Concept] is therefore not only the highest force or rather the sole and absolute force of 
reason, but also its supreme and sole urge to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything” (SL 
826). Cf. also the DZ in which Hegel already speaks of the aim of philosophy as involving a state in which 
“the split between the Absolute and the totality of limitations vanishes” (90). 
113 Cf. Hegel: “It is the Concept, that nature of the subject-matter, that moves onwards and develops, and 
this movement is equally the activity of cognition. The eternal Idea, the Idea that is in and for itself, 
eternally remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind” (PM 276). 
114 Cf. Hegel: “Mind is always Idea; but initially it is only the concept of the Idea, or the Idea in its 
indeterminacy, in the most abstract mode of reality, i.e. in the mode of being. In the beginning we have 
only the wholly universal, undeveloped determination of mind, not yet its particularity; this we obtain only 
when we pass from one thing to something else, for the particular contains a One and an Other; but it is just 
at the beginning that we have not yet made this transition. The reality of mind is, therefore, initially still a 
wholly universal, not particularized reality; the development of this reality will be completed only by the 
entire philosophy of mind” (PM 20-1); “Mind, it is true, is already mind at the beginning, but it does not yet 
know that it is” (PM 21). 
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process from beginning to end.115 For example, is mind God?116 Does He providentially 
work throughout all of universal historical process, directing things to their ultimate 
completion?117 Yet, if He himself, being mind,118 is not actual until the end of this 
process, how could He be directing it from the beginning? These are all questions that 
would lead into a discussion of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, a topic which falls well 
outside of the scope of this dissertation. For now it will be sufficient to summarize what 
has been covered regarding the Concept in its moment as for-itself.  
4.2.2 Brief Summary of the Concept in its Second Stage of Development 
Qua for-itself, the Concept is, in the first instance, a species of need and drive 
which is itself the felt contradiction of being at once universal yet lacking concrete 
existence and determination and thus not being universal in a more radical sense. The 
concept of mind is the only properly universal and infinite drive or desire. It thus drives 
itself to posit for itself a universe adequate to its own universality and infinity. In this 
sense, what is for-itself – the concept of mind qua universal and infinite desire – become 
for-itself, that is to say, it becomes objective for-itself what it is in-itself, namely, the 
unrestricted, infinite totality of concrete determinations. Once this moment is achieved 
                                                          
115 Cf. Hegel: “Everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all the 
deeds of time simply are the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective to itself, to find 
itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself” (LHP I 23) 
116 Cf. Hegel: “Logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This 
realm is truth as it without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the 
exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind” (SL 50). 
117 Cf. Hegel: “When we say that the world is governed by Providence, this implies that, being 
predetermined in and for itself, purpose is what is at work generally, so that what is to come corresponds to 
what was previously known and willed. In any case, the interpretation of the world as determined by 
necessity, and the faith in a divine Providence, do not have to be considered reciprocally exclusive at all. 
What underlies divine Providence at t level of thought will soon provide to the Concept” (EL 222). 
118 Cf. Hegel: “God, because he is mind…” (PM 24). 
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the conditions are thereby set for the ultimate moment of development when the Concept, 
which is to say, the mind, becomes in-and-for-itself. 
4.3 The Third Stage of the Concept’s Development 
 The final moment of the development of the Concept is the becoming of mind in-
and-for-itself. As noted, this moment entails the Concept positing for itself an existence 
that is adequate to what it is in itself. It also entails that the Concept recognizes the 
objective existence it has posited as indeed itself. The Concept must finally overcome the 
semblance or illusion that the objective reality of which it is aware and which it inhabits 
is something other than its own self.119 For, at the for-itself stage the Concept does 
gradually succeed in positing an objective existence adequate to itself. Yet, at this stage 
the Concept does not recognize this fact. Rather, it takes the objective universe which it 
has posited for itself as something alien and found “out there” and thus standing over-
against it.  
In other words, while still in the merely for-itself stage the Concept is in a 
position analogous to that of the plant after it has posited its fruit. Like the plant, the 
Concept has posited an objectivity for itself. Yet, unlike the plant, the object that the 
Concept has posited for itself does not ultimate fall “outside” it. The Concept, however, 
                                                          
119 Cf. Hegel: “But in the realizing of the purpose of what happens in-itself is that the one-sided subjectivity 
is sublated, along with the semblance of an objective independence standing over against it. In taking hold 
of the means, the Concept posits itself as the essence of the object” (EL 285); “It is within its own process 
that the Idea produces that illusion for itself; it posits an other confronting itself, and its actions consists in 
sublating this illusion” (EL 286); “The semblance of mind’s being mediated by an Other is sublated by the 
mind itself, since mind has, so to speak, the sovereign ingratitude of sublating, or mediating, that by which 
it seems to be mediated, of reducing it to something subsisting only through mind and in this way making 
itself completely independent” (PM 15). 
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does not yet know this.120 As Hegel will repeatedly note, the Concept forgets the path of 
its development and that of its object and so takes the object as it appears immediately to 
it, namely, as a kind of brute fact standing over-against it.  It takes the object, in other 
words, to stand in a relation to it like that of the fruits relationship to the plant. The 
Concept overcomes this illusion through a two-pronged recognition. 
First, the Concept recognizes that the object it has posited for itself is not in fact 
“outside” of it, not something different or other than it which stands over-against it. It 
recognizes instead that the object is constitutive of its very self as mind. Second, in the 
same moment the Concept also recognizes that it itself has posited this objective 
existence. It takes responsibility for its deed and thus recognizes itself for what it is: a 
world-constituting, universal totality. 
In achieving these culminating moments of recognition the Concept thus comes to 
exist in-and-for-itself. It knows itself and its world and recognizes them for what they are. 
It is at home with itself and thus attains to that elevated rest which is at once an infinite 
activity. The Concept thereby has also become the Truth, for it has posited an existence 
adequate to itself. It is true both in the sense of a perfect correspondence between 
Concept and existence, thought and being, and in the sense of being absolute or 
unconditioned, for the existence that the Concept has posited for itself is the concrete 
universal which encompasses, penetrates and constitutes all particular determinations. As 
Hegel states, “The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
                                                          
120 Cf. Hegel: “Finite cognition does not yet know itself as the activity of the Concept” (EL 296); “Finite 
cognition presupposes the distinct as something found already in being and standing over and against it” 
(EL 296). 
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consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is 
essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is” (PhG 11). 
As a final note regarding this culminating moment of development, it can be 
noted that insofar as something succeeds in positing an existence adequate to its concept 
it becomes Idea, and the absolute or infinite Concept, when it posits an existence 
adequate to itself, becomes Absolute Idea. Hegel often appears to use Concept, Idea and 
Mind interchangeably, but Idea refers more specifically the Concept as realized in 
existence.121 
5. Summary of the Chapter 
 It is now time to turn from Hegel’s general theory of development to his theory of 
the development of consciousness in particular. Before doing that, however, it will be 
useful to summarize the major points of Hegel’s theory examined thus far. 
 First, Hegel’s theory of development owes a major debt to a number of core 
Aristotelian notions. Foremost among these notions would be 1) the distinctions between 
potency and act 2) the teleological conception of nature(s), 3) the rational nature or mind 
as a potens omni facere et fieri and 4) the view that the highest end and energeia is the 
perfection of self-knowledge. Thus, for Hegel all development is a transition from 
                                                          
121 Cf. Michael Inwood in A Hegel Dictionary: “Idee in Hegel has a variety of applications and 
significances. This reflects the complexity of his notion of a concept: The concept is an initial plan (in a 
seed), an inner determining force (the soul, both literal and metaphorical, of a body), a normative ideal, a 
conceptual system and the cognizing I. The significance of the contrasting term (‘reality’, ‘objectivity’, 
etc.), and of the ‘realization’ of the concept, varies accordingly” (The Hegel Dictionary); “An idea is the 
full realization or actualization of a concept […]: an idea is thus true or the truth” (The Hegel Dictionary). 
Cf. Hegel: “The Idea is what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity” (EL 
286); “The Idea is the adequate Concept, that which is objectively true, or the true as such” (SL, 755); 
“Mind is the infinite Idea” (PM 22); “The Concept of mind has its reality in the mind. That this reality be 
knowledge of the absolute Idea and thus in identity with the Concept, involves the necessary aspect that the 
implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its concept, in order to be the shape worthy of the 
Concept” (PM 257). 
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potency to act.122 Yet, as Hegel learned from Aristotle, acts can either be motions or 
operations. Operations are acts which are coincident with their ends. Thus, the attainment 
of the end of certain natures entails a continual activity that does not occur over time but 
endures through time. Moreover, since the rational nature is a potential positing and 
understanding of all things, the fulfillment of its nature would be the nothing less than a 
perfected grasp of the totality of all things which would itself be identical with perfected 
self-knowledge. 
 Hegel’s employment of the analogy and dis-analogy of the biological 
development of the plant to illuminate the development of consciousness was also 
instructive. Hegel notices even in plant life the teleological tendency towards self-
differentiation which culminates in a moment of positing in which what is in-itself seeks 
to become for-itself. Thus, the plant differentiates its various organs, thereby bringing 
itself to full maturation, and in a final instance bears fruit.  Yet, in this final moment of 
development the plant fails to preserve its identity with itself: the fruit falls outside plant 
and takes up a merely external relation over-against it. The relation between the fruit and 
the plant is not concrete. In contrast, in the final moment of development of the mind – 
the positing of the object of knowledge – is a concrete energeia in which the various 
moments are preserved within the act itself. For, on the Aristotelian identity theory of 
knowledge, knower and known are one in act. 
 Indeed, each new stage in the development of the mind with its proportionate 
object will in turn provide the concrete material conditions out of which a subsequent 
                                                          
122 Indeed, it must already be emphasized that the Hegel identifies the distinction between potency and act 
and the mind’s developmental transition from one  as the explanatory ground for the multiplicity of 
philosophies. As Hegel states: “The whole variation in the development of the world in history is found on 
this difference [i.e. between potency and act, the implicit and the explicit]” (LHP, 21). 
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stage will emerge. The term “vertical teleology” was introduced to describe this process 
whereby the attainment of lower ends comes to serve as instruments for the attainment of 
still higher ends. 
 The discussion of the development of the Concept helped to clarify further details 
of Hegel’s concept of development. It was noted how development qua transition from 
potency to act can be further specified as a transition from the in-itself, to the for-itself, to 
the in-and-for-itself. 
  Having established these fundamental points regarding Hegel’s overall theory of 
development, we are now prepared to examine in closer detail Hegel’s account of the 
development of the mind itself.  
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Chapter II 
Consciousness 
 Hegel’s account of the polymorphic development of the mind in the PhG provides 
the basis upon which he explains the emergence, and critiques the multiplicity, of 
conflicting philosophies. In moving to an examination of this account we thus enter into 
the heart of this dissertation.  
 The present chapter will consist of three main sections each of which will 
examine one of the three sections of “Consciousness”, the opening chapter of the PhG. 
The names of these sections of Consciousness are: “Sense-certainty”, “Perception” and 
“Force and Understanding”. 
 The first section of this chapter will track Hegel’s phenomenology of the 
experience of Sense-certainty as a form of the mind. The details of Hegel’s analysis are 
quite complex and often require extended examination and commentary. Still, the 
overriding goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how Hegel provides an explanatory 
account for the fact of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. Thus, a special effort will 
be made to draw out more precisely just how Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty 
in fact provides the means for explaining the very existence of determinate philosophical 
positions. 
 As will be shown, one philosophical position the existence of which is explained 
in and through Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty turns out to be that of the 
naïve realism/skepticism manifested in the thought of Hegel’s contemporary, G.E. 
Schulze. It is worth noting that, starting perhaps with Jean Hyppolite’s The Genesis and 
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Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, there has been a tendency among 
commentators to view the initial stages of Hegel’s analysis of Sense-certainty as 
providing an explanatory account of the nature and emergence of the Parmenidean 
philosophy, particularly its conception of Being.123 There is perhaps some warrant to this 
view given 1) that there seems to be correlation between the immediate Being which is 
the initial object of Sense-certainty and the indeterminate Being analyzed at the 
beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic (SL), and 2) that the Being analyzed at the 
beginning of the SL would seem to correspond to the Paremindean conception of Being. 
Still, it will hopefully become clear that the philosophy whose emergence is explained via 
the phenomenology of Sense-certainty much more closely corresponds to the naïve 
realism typified by Schulze.124 
 The next section of this chapter will examine Perception. A particular 
philosophical position which is provided with an at least initial explanation in Perception 
is the distinction between appearance and reality. To be sure, this fundamental 
distinction in the history of philosophy will receive an even fuller explanation in the 
subsequent section of the PhG, Force and Understanding. Nevertheless, important 
                                                          
123 As will be discussed at length in the Appendix, Michael Forster locates the historical reference of Sense-
certainty even further back, specifically, in ancient Persian Zoroastrianism. It will be shown that Forster’s 
argument in this context is misguided. 
124 See Hyppolite’s The Genesis and Structure 88-93.  Cf. SL 82ff. There is an argument to be made that the 
Being which is examined at the beginning of the SL corresponds not at all to Parmenides’ Being. For, 
among other things, Parmenides’ Being is determinate, as it lacks nothing, including a limit. By contrast, 
the Being with which the SL starts is pure indeterminacy. As such, it would correspond much more closely 
to Aristotle’s primary matter or pure potency, which, as G.R.G. Mure points out, consists in 
“determinability in general” (Introduction to Hegel 132). This would make sense inasmuch the dialectical 
determinations which unfold throughout the SL correspond ultimately to the dialectical development of the 
mind, and, for Hegel, the mind itself is, in the first instance, pure potency, which is to say, determinability 
in general. In other words, the pure potency or pure indeterminacy with which the SL begins winds up just 
being the pure potency that is the mind itself in its initial stage. Cf. Hegel’s reference to “the element of 
pure indeterminacy or of the ‘I’’s pure reflection into itself” (EPR 37). 
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elements in Hegel’s larger effort to explain this crucial distinction will be unpacked in 
this section. 
 The section examining the Perception will also include a special sub-section in 
which it will be shown how the phenomenology of the viewpoint of Perception provides, 
not only the basis for an explanatory account of certain historical philosophies, but also 
the grounds for explaining the existence of the ordinary conception of the history of 
philosophical multiplicity itself which was discussed in the introductory chapter to this 
dissertation. For, views on the history and nature of philosophical multiplicity and 
disagreement are de facto philosophical positions. As such, they require an explanation 
for their very emergence. Perception provides some truly astounding insights into how it 
ever came about that the history of philosophy should be conceived of as a mere 
haphazard succession of externality related and mutually exclusive positions. 
 The last major section of this chapter will examine the Force and Understanding. 
This section will continue to draw out Hegel’s explanatory account for the emergence of 
the appearance/reality distinction. The viewpoint of Force and Understanding is also 
quite important inasmuch as it marks the point of transition from “mere” consciousness to 
self-consciousness, which latter will be the subject of the next chapter of this dissertation. 
Thus, it will be necessary to track those aspects of Hegel’s phenomenology of Force and 
Understanding that will prove salient to grasping the nature of self-consciousness. 
Brief Prelude on an Important Methodological Technique Employed by Hegel  
 Before moving to the beginning of the PhG it will be helpful first to explicate an 
all-important technique Hegel employs in aiding the reader in the very interpretation of 
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his text. Throughout the course of the PhG Hegel draws a distinction between what the 
form of the mind or “viewpoint” under phenomenological investigation takes or 
interprets itself to be experiencing or doing, on the one hand, and what we, the 
phenomenological observers, know the form of the mind to be actually experiencing or 
doing. In fact, properly drawing and maintaining this distinction turns out to be 
indispensable to understanding the true import of the PhG’s argument concerning the 
source of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. 
 The basis of the distinction lies in the fact that lower forms of the mind lack self-
knowledge. Therefore, they undergo experiences and engage in activities but they do not 
understand these experiences or activities. More specifically, lower forms of the mind do 
not adequately understand either themselves, their objects or their relations to their 
objects and thus do not recognize the role they have in developing and constituting 
themselves and their objects.125 Lower forms of the mind thus routinely mis-take 
themselves, their objects and their relations to their objects as being and doing things 
other than what they are or do. 
 In contrast, we, the phenomenologists, that is to say, the readers of the PhG, are 
granted privilege to a higher viewpoint by means of which we are enabled to understand 
both what actually occurs in the experience or activity of a lower form of the mind and 
also what that form of the mind interprets or takes itself to be experiencing or doing. To 
be sure, this is a privilege not lightly bestowed and comes with a host of responsibilities. 
                                                          
125 Cf. the clear articulation of this point from the “Reason” chapter of the PhG: “Consciousness will 
determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various ways according to the precise stage it has 
reached in the development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it immediately finds and 
determines itself and its object at any time, or the way in which it is for itself, depends on what it has 
already become, or what it already is in itself” (234). 
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First and foremost, it places a burden on the reader of the PhG to transpose herself 
imaginatively into the viewpoint of the form of the mind currently under investigation. 
One must phenomenologically rehearse within one’s own experience the experience of 
another viewpoint. One must envisage, not just what the form of consciousness 
experiences and does, but also what it takes itself to be experiencing and doing. In other 
words, one must understand the viewpoint’s self-interpretation. At the same time, 
however, one must maintain a reflective distance from this form of mind in order thereby 
to understand what it is actually experiencing and doing, its self-interpretation 
notwithstanding. The point of course being that there is a difference between what occurs 
within the experience of a given form of mind and what that form of mind takes to be 
occurring.126 
 The significance of this phenomenological technique for the present dissertation 
can hardly be overstated. For, as it turns out, the different philosophies can be understood 
as expressions of the self-interpretations of the various forms of the mind. In other words, 
different philosophies emerge inasmuch as different forms of the mind 1) undergo certain 
experiences 2) interpret those experiences and 3) express those interpretations in more or 
                                                          
126 The proximate source of the methodological-phenomenological distinction between the form of 
consciousness under investigation and the phenomenological observer would seem to be Fichte: 
“‘Intellectual intuition’ is the name I give to the act required of the philosopher: an act of intuiting himself 
while simultaneously performing the act by means of which the I originates for him. Intellectual intuition is 
the immediate consciousness that I act and of what I do when I act. It is because of this that it is possible 
for me to know something because I do it. That we possess such a power of intellectual intuition is not 
something that can be demonstrated by means of concepts, nor can an understanding of what intuition is be 
produced from concepts. This is something everyone has to discover immediately within himself; 
otherwise, he will never become acquainted with it at all. For anyone to demand that we establish this by 
means of argument is far more extraordinary than it would be if someone who was blind from birth were to 
demand that we explain to him what colors are without his having to see” (Introductions to the 
Wissenschaftslehre 46); “The Wissenschaftslehre contains two very different series of mental acting: that of 
the I the philosopher is observing, as well as the series consisting of the philosopher’s own observations” 
(WL 37). 
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less philosophical terms. Thus, drawing the distinction between the self-interpretation of 
a certain form of the mind, on the one hand, and our phenomenologically detached 
interpretation of that form, on the other, turns out to be a conditio sine qua non for 
understanding Hegel’s philosophy of philosophies. For, different and conflicting 
philosophies turn out to result from varying degrees of deficiency in self-knowledge, and 
these deficiencies cannot be diagnosed unless one consistently draws and maintains the 
distinction between the viewpoint of the form of the mind under phenomenological 
investigation, on the one hand, and the viewpoint of we, the phenomenologists, on the 
other. 
 Having noted this fundamental methodological distinction, let us now turn to 
examining Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty in which he concretely employs it. 
1. Sense-certainty 
 The PhG begins with the section “Sense-certainty: Or the ‘This’ and ‘Meaning’” 
within the larger chapter entitled “Consciousness”. Consciousness is a form of the mind 
and Sense-certainty is a sub-form or sub-specification of that form. The terms “This” and 
“Meaning” mentioned in the subtitle refer to the dialectic between the particular and 
universal that will drive this section forward.127 For, the word “This” would seem 
invariably to refer to or mean some particular object. Yet, as Hegel will attempt to show, 
                                                          
127 In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Robert Stern maintains that the dialectic between the universal and 
particular is the driving force which pushes the PhG forward. While this is not exactly incorrect it should 
be specified that the principle of development for Hegel is contradiction inasmuch as the existence of the 
Concept is not adequate to itself. As such, the dialectic can be understood to develop according to a series 
of distinct but intimately related tensions – for example, between the finite and the infinite, the conditioned 
and the unconditioned, the particular and the universal – all of which manifest this basic contradiction 
between the Concept and its existence (19-21, 31-37). 
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it is impossible to say what is thus apparently meant, namely, the particular in its 
particularity. Before examining this point, however, let us first establish the basic 
structure of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. 
 Sense-certainty is constituted by two poles: the ‘I’ and the object, or the ‘This’. 
From the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, the object, or the ‘This’, is present in immediately 
sensuous experience. Sense-certainty, moreover, is certain indeed that the object is, that 
the object is “really there” for it, and that all the ‘I’ must do is simply be receptive to the 
absolute presence of the object. Thus, for Sense-certainty the object is the absolute, the 
true, the essential; for, it is, whereas the ‘I’, as the principle of awareness correlative to 
this object, is entirely dependent upon the object if it – the ‘I’ – is going to be what it is. 
As Hegel states, “But the object is: it is what is true, or it is the essence. It is, regardless 
of whether it is known or not; and it remains even if it is not known, whereas there is no 
knowledge if the object is not there” (PhG 59). Certainty is a quality of the ‘I’. Yet, from 
the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, its very certainty is dependent upon the object, for there 
would be no ‘I’ unless there was an object existing independently of the ‘I’. 128 Therefore, 
given the fact that the ‘I’ is aware of the object, it can be certain in its knowledge that the 
object exists independently of itself, that it is “really there”. For, there would be no ‘I’ if 
there was no object.  
 As Hegel quickly notes, however, a question arises as to whether or not “in sense-
certainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sense-certainty proclaims it to 
be; whether this notion of it as the essence corresponds to the way it is present in sense-
                                                          
128 As Hegel states, “The ‘I’ [is] a knowing which knows the object only because the object is, while the 
knowing may either be or not be” [later emphases mine] (PhG 59). 
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certainty” (PhG 59). In other words, a question immediately arises as to whether or not 
Sense-certainty’s interpretation of its own experience corresponds to what is actually 
given or undergone in that experience.  
The way Hegel begins to drive a wedge between Sense-certainty’s self-
understanding and an understanding of Sense-certainty that can be generated by us, the 
phenomenologists, is simply to pose the question: “What is the This?” (PhG 59) It is 
important to note that Hegel does not specify who is asking this question: Sense-certainty 
itself, or we, the phenomenologists. Given the fact that immediately after posing the 
question Hegel refers to how “we” might take the ‘This’ according to it shape of being 
‘Now’ and ‘Here’, it would seem that this kind of questioning is an operation performed 
by the phenomenological observer. Yet, the fact that it is posed as a question would also 
seem to suggest that Hegel is providing an invitation for Sense-certainty to transcend its 
present viewpoint. In other words, although in pursuing the question we, the 
phenomenologists, will indeed discover that Sense-certainty’s self-interpretation is 
flawed, Sense-certainty is nevertheless not excluded from posing the question itself and 
thereby gaining the critical distance vis-à-vis its own experience necessary for 
transcending its flawed perspective. As Hegel famously notes in the Preface, the PhG is 
intended to be a ladder by means of which individuals might transcend their lower 
viewpoints and attain the highest standpoint of Science (PhG 14). Hegel is thus perhaps 
revealing that that “ladder” is at least partially constituted by a certain method of 
questioning and the willingness to pursue that method all the way through.  
 Be that as it may, we, the phenomenologists, along with Hegel, do certainly take 
up the question that Hegel poses. Again, Hegel’s point is that despite its certainty that its 
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object – the immediate, sensuous ‘This’ – is the absolute, the essential, the true, Sense-
certainty has never in fact investigated in any seriousness sense what the ‘This’ is. Sense-
certainty says of the ‘This’ “It is!” Hegel asks “What is it?” 
1.1 The ‘This’ qua ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ 
 Hegel suggests that we begin by examining the ‘This’ according to its two aspects 
or “shapes”: ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. Hegel does not provide any reason as to why the 
examination should proceed in this way, nor does he make clear exactly why the aspects 
‘Now’ and ‘Here’ should be taken without any further ado as obvious characteristics of 
the ‘This’. Presumably Hegel is taking it for granted that since the object of Sense-
certainty is something by definition sensuous then it must be spatially and temporally 
determined since all sense-experience would seem to be qualified thusly. Moreover, since 
the object of Sense-certainty is, from the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, experienced 
immediately, it must therefore be experienced according to the immediate temporal and 
spatial determinations ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. 
 Hegel thus proceeds to his famous analysis of the determinations ‘Now’ and 
‘Here’ in which he reveals these two determinations not to be what Sense-certainty took 
them to be. Sense-certainty took its object to be the absolute, the essential, the true. Hegel 
shows, however, how this presumption gets inverted. Yet, Hegel would insist that this 
inversion of the original presumption or self-interpretation of Sense-certainty is not the 
result of an artificial technique imposed from without by Hegel himself; rather, the 
inversion results merely from a thinking-through of what is already contained in the 
‘This’ and its two determinations ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. 
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Hegel’s procedure thus bears certain potential similarities to Kant’s procedure in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, a great deal of 
secondary commentary on this section of the PhG has attempted to sort out the precise 
nature of Hegel’s debt, if any, to Kant in this context.129 Space does not permit, however, 
wading into this point of dispute presently. Suffice it to say that Hegel will at times speak 
of his general philosophical procedure as a kind of deduction. Yet, he is always quick to 
insist that it is not a deduction in any ordinary or “formally” logical sense of the term130 – 
hence, the temptation to construe it as a species of transcendental deduction. For present 
purposes, however, perhaps the most felicitous way to characterize Hegel’s procedure is 
as a “thinking-through” driven by a determinate species of question, namely, “What?” 
“What is the ‘This’?” “What is the object of experience, more generally?” “What is the 
quality or form of the mind correlative to such an object?” These are the questions that 
drive the thinking-through or “phenomenological deduction” forward.131 
Interestingly enough, this point would seem to suggest that there is a sense in 
which the phenomenological onlooker does play some role in pushing the dialectic 
forward. To be sure, there is an immanent critique or thinking-through of the object or 
form of the mind at any given stage of development. In other words, there is a sense in 
which we merely look on as the internal “logic” of the object or form of the mind unfolds 
before us. Yet, by the same token, unless we posed these questions regarding the 
immanent intelligibility of the object or form of the mind and pursued them ourselves, 
                                                          
129 See Charles Taylor’s “The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology” in Hegel: A Collection of 
Critical Essays. 
130 Cf. Hegel, EL 236 
131 In the EL Hegel refers to this process of “thinking-through” as a Nachdenken as in “thinking-over” or 
“meditating-upon” (25-8 et passim.).  
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nothing would actually unfold. Thus, it may be that the ultimate driving principle of the 
dialectic is the intellectual desire of the phenomenological onlooker. It is our demand for 
the absolute, the essential, the true that turns out to be the ultimate criterion for judging 
the adequacy of any given viewpoint. In following through on that demand we participate 
in revealing how any viewpoint shy of the Absolute Standpoint invariably fails in its 
claim to having achieved the absolute.132 
1.1.1 Thinking-through the ‘Now’ 
As noted, Sense-certainty claims to know the absolute in the immediate sensuous 
‘This, Now, Here’. Hegel, in moving the dialectic forward, poses a further “What” 
question, namely, “What is Now?” Hegel provides on behalf of Sense-certainty a 
provisional answer: “Now is Night.” (PhG 60) Recall, however, that on Sense-certainty’s 
self-interpretation the ‘This, Now, Here’ is absolute, the essential, the true. Thus, insofar 
as Sense-certainty proclaims ‘Now is Night’, it is eo ipso claiming that Night is the 
absolute and that the statement ‘Now is Night’ is absolutely true. 
Hegel directs us to write down the proposition ‘Now is Night’. He then observes 
that, upon writing this proposition down, if we wait, we will see that ‘Now’ has become 
‘Noon’. The contradiction is clear. According to Sense-certainty, the ‘Now’, as a 
determination of the ‘This’, was absolute and the proposition proclaiming it was thus 
                                                          
132 In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Stephen Houlgate maintains that there are moments in the PhG 
when we, the phenomenologists, must simply step in and push the dialectic forward inasmuch as the form 
of the mind under investigation is, unto itself, inadequate to this task. Houlgate would maintain that such a 
procedure does not necessarily violate the ideal that the PhG provides an immanent account of the 
development of consciousness since the progression which we, the phenomenologists, mediate in such 
cases consists of rendering explicit what is implicit in the experience of the form of consciousness under 
investigation (81-2). 
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absolutely true. On the basis of this assumption we proceeded to proclaim that ‘Now is 
Night’, which entailed that ‘Night’ must be absolute and the statement proclaiming it 
must be absolutely true. Yet, merely by waiting a certain period of time, ‘Night’ ceased to 
exist and the statement proclaiming it ceased to be true. Thus, the ‘Now’ qua ‘Night’ 
turns out not to be absolute and the statement proclaiming it turned out not to be 
absolutely true. 
Yet, notice, the ‘Now’ indeed persists or preserves itself. For, now it is ‘Noon’. 
As Hegel states, “The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not 
Night; equally, it preserves itself in face of the Day that it now is, as something that also 
is not Day, in other words, as a negative in general” (PhG 60). ‘Now’ is equally and 
indifferently ‘Night’ and ‘Day’, just as it is equally and indifferently ‘not-Night’ and 
‘not-Day’. The ‘Now’ preserves itself through its ongoing series of particular positions 
(“Now is…”) and negations (“Now is not...”) and thereby negates these negations and 
assumes the character of a universal determination: It is always Now.  
Recall, however, that we are thinking-through the object that Sense-certainty took 
to be the absolute, the essential, the true. Sense-certainty took the immediate, particular, 
sensuous ‘This’ to be the absolute. Yet, the ‘This’ in the case of the ‘Now’ turned out not 
to be a particular at all but a universal determination. Thus, the thinking-through of the 
object of Sense-certainty reveals that object to be other than what Sense-certainty took it 
to be. 
1.1.2 Linguistic Expression of the ‘Now’ 
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Hegel adds a further element to his discussion which perhaps both illuminates and 
threatens to obscure his analysis. He states: 
It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say 
is: ‘This’, i.e. the universal This; or, ‘it is’, i.e. Being in general. Of course, we do 
not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in 
other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. 
But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute 
what we mean to say, the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and 
since language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us 
ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean. (PhG 60) 
The “we” to which Hegel appears to refer in this instance is not we, the 
phenomenologists, at least not the phenomenologists as inhabiting the more detached 
phenomenological perspective. Rather, the “we” referred to appears to be those who 
inhabit as a matter of fact, or through phenomenological transposition, the viewpoint of 
Sense-certainty. We, in Sense-certainty, thus utter the word ‘This’ or ‘Now’ when 
attempting to speak of what we take to be our object. Yet, Hegel claims, ‘This’ or ‘Now’ 
are universal determinations; they apply equally to all ‘Thises’ and all ‘Nows’. Thus, our 
speaking betrays or refutes our meaning inasmuch as we would mean the particular yet 
we invariably speak the universal. According to Hegel, what this all reveals is that 
language is more truthful than our intentions or meanings, at least at this stage of 
development. For, language indirectly reveals that the true object of Sense-certainty – if 
Sense-certainty would but think it through – is the universal. 
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 Unfortunately, it is not perfectly clear what exactly this portion of Hegel’s 
discussion contributes to his larger effort to think-through the object of Sense-certainty 
and thereby expose that it is not what Sense-certainty took it to be. It seems to be 
something of a digression into a nascent but, at this point, woefully underdeveloped 
theory of language and, as such, it threatens to obscure as much as it might illuminate 
Hegel’s overall point. One way to recover some useful instruction from Hegel’s 
discussion, however, is to see how it illuminates the very process of self-interpretation in 
which the various viewpoints engage, especially insofar as this self-interpretation would 
seek to express itself in more or less philosophical terms. 
 Thus, a given philosophy might declare or utter that the absolute or “Being” is the 
immediate sensuous particular object, the ‘This’. Hegel would point out that ‘Being’ and 
‘This’ are universal determinations. Thus, in the very act of declaring its position, such a 
philosophy would appeal to a realm of universal determinations or objects which it 
nevertheless fails to account for. In other words, although this philosophy may not 
explicitly advert to the realm of universal determinations or objects, such determinations 
or objects are nevertheless constitutive of its experience. 
 Thus, Hegel’s brief and entirely inadequate digression on the nature of language 
and its potential role in the unfolding of the dialectic can nevertheless perhaps be usefully 
interpreted as illuminating the problem of performative self-contradiction that is liable to 
beset any viewpoint shy of the Absolute Standpoint when it attempts to articulate its own 
self-understanding.  
1.1.3 Thinking-through the ‘Here’ 
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 Hegel next provides a similar analysis of the other determination of the ‘This’, 
namely, ‘Here’. Sense-certainty presumes that the ‘This’ which is ‘Here’ is absolute, 
essential, true. Yet, just as it was a mere matter of waiting in order to reveal that the 
temporal determination ‘Now’ that was ‘Night’ was not absolute, so all that is required is 
a mere change of spatial location in order to reveal that the ‘Here’ is not absolute, either. 
As Hegel states 
‘Here’ is, e.g. the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into 
its opposite. ‘No tree is here, but a house instead’. ‘Here’ itself does not vanish; 
on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc. and 
is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the ‘This’ shows itself to be a 
mediated simplicity, or a universality. (PhG. sec. pp. 60-61) 
Hegel’s point is that in thinking-through the ‘Here’ we discover that it is not what Sense-
certainty took it to be, namely, a particular object or determination, but is rather a 
universal determination: Everywhere is Here. 
 The analysis of Sense-certainty continues through several more dialectical 
variations as Hegel describes how Sense-certainty continually shifts its ground in order to 
hold onto its original conviction that it knows or otherwise experiences the absolute in the 
immediate sensuous particular. There is no pressing need to rehearse all the details of this 
analysis at present; instead, let us focus on a few of the more salient lessons learned by, 
or at least about, Sense-certainty in this section. 
1.2 The Dialectical Reversals and Ground-shifting of Sense-certainty 
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According to Hegel, as a result of Sense-certainty’s discovery that its object is in 
fact a universal, the relation between knowing or the ‘I’ and the object has been reversed. 
Previously, Sense-certainty took the object to be the absolute, the essential, the true. 
Sense-certainty, in other words, was certain of the object’s existence and that the latter 
was given in immediate sensuous experience. That pretension, however, has been 
dispelled with the discovery that the object was not what Sense-certainty took it to be. 
Thus, according to Hegel,  
The certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in knowing, which 
previously was the unessential element. Its truth is in the object as my object, or 
in its being mine [Meinen]; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty, then, though 
indeed expelled from the object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven 
back into the ‘I’. (PhG 61)  
At least two points are noteworthy about Hegel’s discussion. First, what is unfolding is 
Sense-certainty’s shifting of its ground in order preserve its initial conviction that it 
knows its object through immediate sensuous experience. Previously, the object was 
taken to be the absolute and essential element, and knowing was dependent upon it. Now, 
the knowing or the ‘I’ is held to be the absolute and essential element, while the object is 
relegated to a dependent status. Whereas before, the ‘I’ knew or experienced the object 
strictly because the object was “really out there”, now, the object – the ‘Now’ and/or the 
‘Here’ – is there because I experience it “in the immediacy of my seeing, hearing, and so 
on” (PhG 61).  
Second, although Sense-certainty’s immediate concern is evidently to shift its 
ground in order to preserve its original conviction as to how it knows its object, the effect 
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of its effort is, despite itself, to move the dialectic forward. For, what begins to emerge at 
this point is a nascent appreciation on the part of the mind of the role of consciousness or 
the ‘I’ in constituting its object. Previously, the ‘I’ was little more than an afterthought 
for Sense-certainty – the object was absolute; it was being. Now the ‘I’ steps forward as 
an explicit object of inquiry and reflection. To be sure, as we will see, the ‘I’ in turn is 
subjected to a similar dialectical treatment as the ‘This’ has been. Yet, an invaluable, if 
still incomplete, lesson regarding the very nature and structure of the mind will have been 
won in the process. Self-knowledge is beginning to emerge. 
1.3 The ‘I’ of Sense-certainty 
Hegel, indeed, demonstrates that the ‘I’ is subject to a dialectical critique similar 
to that of the ‘This’. For, Sense-certainty now wants to maintain that the ‘I’ is absolute 
and essential. The ‘I’ does not experience the ‘Now’ or the ‘Here’ because they are; 
rather, “‘Now’ is day because I see it; ‘Here’ is a tree for the same reason” (PhG 101). 
Yet, Hegel continues, 
In this relationship sense-certainty experiences the same dialectic acting upon 
itself as in the previous one. I, this ‘I’, see the tree and assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; 
but another ‘I’ sees the house and maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house 
instead. Both truths have the same authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing, 
and the certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing; but the one 
truth vanishes in the other. (PhG 61)  
Thus, insofar as Sense-certainty maintains that this ‘I’ is absolute and essential, and that 
‘Here’ is here because this ‘I’ sees it, it will find itself contradicted or negated by a 
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subsequent ‘I’ which experiences something different but which has equal claim to 
absoluteness and essentiality. Both ‘I’s’ are absolute; therefore, neither ‘I’ is absolute. 
Each one, in fact, vanishes upon the appearance of the other. 
 The problem, of course, lies in the attempt on the part of Sense-certainty to think 
of the ‘I’ as a ‘This’ after the manner of a putatively immediate sensuous object.133 For, 
the ‘I’ qua ‘This’ is subject to the same dialectical critique as the object qua ‘This’. Thus, 
as Hegel notes, while each particular and putatively absolute ‘I’ vanishes upon a mere 
shift of attention, “What does not disappear in all this is the ‘I’ as universal, whose seeing 
is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is a simple seeing which, though 
mediated by the negation of this house, etc. is all the same simple and indifferent to 
whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc.” (PhG 62) Once again, Sense-certainty 
discovers that what it took to be the absolute, in this case, the immediate ‘I’ qua ‘This’, 
turns out not to be absolute, after all. Instead, the ‘I’ turns out to be a universal principle 
                                                          
133 Incidentally, although he does not explicitly state it at this point, Hegel is in fact drawing attention to an 
underlying thematic that will recur throughout the PhG regarding the process by which the ‘I’ routinely 
attempts to conceive or understand itself. There are two basic ways in which this thematic tends to manifest 
itself. First, the ‘I’, particularly at its lower stages of development such as Sense-certainty, will attempt to 
conceive of itself after the manner of the primary reality with which it is familiar. In other words, to take 
the example of Sense-certainty, in order for something to be for Sense-certainty it must be something like 
an immediate sensuous particular object. Thus, when the ‘I’ of Sense-certainty at first attempts to 
understand or conceive of itself it invariably assumes that it must be something very like, or at least 
analogous to, an immediate, particular ‘This’. Needless to say, this way of proceeding necessarily leads the 
‘I’ to misconstrue itself and thus prevents it from attaining true self-knowledge. Second, as the sort of 
obverse of the previous process of mis-taking the ‘I’ for an, as it were, spiritless or mindless object, the ‘I’ 
will project itself into the object but fail to recognize itself therein. For Hegel, of course, the continual self-
objectification of the mind is an entirely necessary and salutary aspect of the mind’s ongoing development. 
Yet, until the mind recognizes that it is in fact doing this it can take its own self-objectifications to be alien 
objects and powers that stand over-against it and which, among other things, threaten to dominate it and 
undermine its freedom. Needless to say, this failure of self-recognition also prevents the mind from 
attaining true self-knowledge, which is its ultimate goal. Thus, there are twin pitfalls to which the mind is 
continually exposed: 1) misconstruing itself as something like a mindless object and 2) failing to recognize 
itself in its own mind-full self-objectifications. These two general pitfalls take on various specific 
manifestations depending upon the stage of development which the mind has thus far been able to reach. 
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of awareness that encompasses and penetrates any particular intentional act such as 
seeing or hearing. 
1.4 The ‘I-Object’ Relation as Absolute 
 Hegel next turns to indicating the lesson that Sense-certainty has thus far learned 
in the experience of thinking-through its own initial presuppositions about the nature of 
its object and its ‘I’. 
Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is neither in the 
object nor in the ‘I’, and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one 
nor of the other; for in both, what I mean is rather something unessential, and the 
object and the ‘I’ are universals in which that ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ and ‘I’ which I 
mean do not have a continuing being, or are not. Thus we reach the stage where 
we have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as it essence, and no longer 
only one of its moments, as happened in the two cases where first the object 
confronting the ‘I’, and then the ‘I’, were supposed to be its reality. (PhG 62) 
Recall, Sense-certainty has twice now experienced what it took to be absolute and 
essential turn out not to be absolute and essential, after all. According to Hegel, Sense-
certainty is pushed to adopt a third alternative, namely, positing that neither the object nor 
the ‘I’ but rather the whole relationship obtaining within Sense-certainty between 
consciousness or the ‘I’ and its object is absolute and essential. Hegel does not explain 
why Sense-certainty, or even we, the phenomenologists, would make this move. 
Nevertheless, the insight gained by Sense-certainty at this point – which it will 
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unfortunately promptly forget – is instructive in terms of the larger trajectory of the 
mind’s development. 
  Sense-certainty – however tenuously or provisionally – gains some insight into 
the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its object. While by no means 
identical, a close analogue to the insight gained by Sense-certainty at this point is the 
famous Husserlian insight that consciousness is always consciousness-of, or, more 
precisely, that intentional acts and intentional objects are correlative. In other words, 
Sense-certainty gains some appreciation of the fact that, just as there is no consciousness 
without an object, there is equally no object without consciousness or an ‘I’.  
To be sure, this is a profound and demanding insight and Hegel unfortunately 
does little to explicate its full significance at this point. Instead, Hegel moves directly to 
discussing how Sense-certainty makes use of its insight merely in order once again to try 
to salvage its initial conviction that it knows its object in a state of pure immediacy. 
Sense-certainty – again, in a quasi-Husserlian sense – brackets its presupposition of the 
transcendence or absoluteness of the object as well as that of the ‘I’, thereby attempting 
to constitute the correlation between the two into “a relation […] into which also no 
distinction whatever can penetrate.” (PhG 62) Sense-certainty also attempts to bracket 
any relationship it might have with distinct conscious acts and their correlative objects. 
The result is the following: 
I, this ‘I’, assert then the ‘Here’ as a tree, and do not turn round so that the Here 
would become for me not a tree; also, I take no notice of the fact that another ‘I’ 
sees the Here as not a tree, or that I myself at another time take the Here as not-
tree, the Now as not-day. On the contrary, I am a pure [act of] intuiting; I, for my 
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part, stick to the fact that the Now is day, or that the Here is a tree; also I do not 
compare Here and Now themselves with one another, but stick firmly to one 
immediate relation: the Now is day. (PhG 62-3)  
Noteworthy, here, is the bathos of the predicament into which Sense-certainty has 
worked itself by shifting its ground in order to preserve its original conviction. For, 
originally Sense-certainty was certain that its knowledge of its object was “the richest 
kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be 
found” and in which nothing was omitted from the object (PhG 58). Sense-certainty 
originally took the realm of sensuous immediacy as one of infinite expanse and richness. 
Yet, in order to maintain its conviction that this realm is indeed given in immediate 
sensuous experience, Sense-certainty now finds itself restricted to a single act of would-
be pure intuiting, an act, that is to say, which has been abstracted from the concrete 
context of other acts through which the object indeed might have been experienced in 
much greater richness. Sense-certainty thus finds itself banished, or rather has banished 
itself, from a garden of infinite immediate sensuous delight into a domain of utter 
experiential impoverishment. 
1.4.1 Thinking-through the ‘I-Object’ Relation 
 Hegel pushes the dialectic forward by instructing us, the phenomenologists, to 
enter phenomenologically into the viewpoint of Sense-certainty at this point – the reason 
being that since Sense-certainty has confined itself to a single act of intuiting it is 
incapable of “standing at a distance” from its very experience in order thereby to 
articulate it to us (PhG 63). We must therefore enter into the viewpoint of “this ‘I’ which 
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confines itself to one ‘Now’ or one ‘Here’” and we must “point them out to ourselves” 
(PhG 63). In other words, we, the phenomenologists, must confine our attention to a 
particular ‘Now’ or ‘Here’ and indicate for ourselves what we experience through an act 
of sheer pointing.  
 We, the phenomenologists, point to the particular this ‘Now’ that we are 
experiencing. Yet, as Hegel points out, this ‘Now’ “has already ceased to be in the act of 
pointing to it.” (PhG 63) This ‘Now’ has now become that ‘Now’ which merely has 
been. Recall, however, that for Sense-certainty its object is. Yet, if Sense-certainty’s 
object is this ‘Now’, then Sense-certainty’s object is of such a nature as “to be no more 
just when it is.” (PhG 63) As Hegel goes on to state 
The Now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has been, and this is its truth; it 
has not the truth of being. Yet this much is true, that it has been. But what 
essentially has been [gewesen ist] is, in fact, not an essence that is [kein Wesen]; it 
is not, and it was with being that we were concerned. (PhG 63) 
In the very act of pointing the object of Sense-certainty ceases to be and instead merely 
has been. Thus, Sense-certainty is again frustrated in its attempt to maintain its original 
conviction regarding its object. 
 Indeed, the object of Sense-certainty is again revealed to be a universal 
determination, as Hegel lays out in the following dialectical progression: 
(1) I point out the ‘Now’, and it is asserted to be truth. I point it out, however, a 
something that has been or as something that has been superseded; I set aside the 
first truth. (2) I now assert as the second truth that it has been, that it is 
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superseded. (3) But what has been, is not; I set aside the second truth, its having 
been, its supersession, and thereby negate the negation of the ‘Now’, and thus 
return to the first assertion, that the ‘Now’ is. (PhG 63) 
The ‘Now’ that is returned to, however, is different than the original ‘Now’. For, instead 
of vanishing upon being pointed out, the new ‘Now’ preserves itself through the passing 
of various immediate, particular ‘Nows’ as well as their being pointed to. It is “a Now 
which is an absolute plurality of Nows.” (PhG 64) An hour would be an example of such 
a ‘Now’ since it preserves itself in the passing of its various minutes; yet it may be 
pointed to throughout all of those minutes. Thus, Hegel concludes, “a plurality of Nows 
all taken together” is the result of the experience of Sense-certainty at this stage, and “the 
pointing-out is the experience of learning that Now is a universal” (PhG 64).   
1.5  Review of the Dialectic of Sense-certainty 
Initially, Sense-certainty took the particular sensuous object – the ‘This’ – to be 
the absolute, the essential, the true. Thinking-through the ‘This’ according to its two 
principal determinations – the ‘Now’ and the ‘Here’ – revealed that they are both 
universal determinations. In response, Sense-certainty shifted its ground and insisted 
instead that the ‘I’ was the absolute, the essential, the true. Yet, like the object, the ‘I’ 
turned out to be a universal determination, as well. In response to this insight, Sense-
certainty once again shifted its ground by attempting phenomenologically to bracket any 
presuppositions about the transcendence or absoluteness of either the ‘I’ or the ‘object’ as 
well as any awareness of intentional acts other than the one in which it was immediately 
engaged. In thinking-through the ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ which were supposedly constitutive 
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of this phenomenologically purified experience, however, it was once again revealed that 
these were universal determinations. 
In the process of this examination Hegel also introduced elements of a theory of 
language and a phenomenology of meaning, presumably in order to explicate and 
underscore his larger argument. According to Hegel, even singular demonstrative 
pronouns are universal terms. Thus, while one might merely “mean” a particular ‘This’, it 
is apparently impossible to say what one means in such a case, for every term is 
ultimately a universal. For Hegel, the lesson to be derived from this fact is that language 
reveals that, despite Sense-certainty’s pretensions to the contrary, the true object of 
Sense-certainty is the universal. Without wading into the controversy over the adequacy 
of Hegel’s underdeveloped theory of language, it was suggested that one possible insight 
to be gleaned from Hegel’s discussion would be his identification of the possibility of 
performative self-contradiction when a given form of the mind attempts to give linguistic 
philosophical expression to a problematic self-understanding.  
 In the last two sections of Sense-certainty Hegel calls attention to a few of the 
central lessons learned from the analysis of the experience of Sense-certainty and then 
pivots to setting up the subsequent discussion to take place in the following chapter, 
Perception. Thus, in beginning to round off the Sense-certainty chapter, Hegel states “It is 
clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its 
movement or of its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this 
history” (PhG 64). Hegel thus reminds us that Sense-certainty undergoes the previously 
adumbrated dialectical movement within its viewpoint. Indeed, in an important sense, 
Sense-certainty just is this dialectical experience.  
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The basic structure of the dialectic has thus assumed the following shape, one 
which will repeat itself throughout the subsequent stages of the mind’s dialectical 
development. First, there is a presupposition or expectation on the part of the form of the 
mind in question – in this case, Sense-certainty – as to the nature and “location” of the 
absolute, the essential, the true. Second, there is a thinking-through of this presupposition 
or expectation in light of what is actually given in experience the upshot of which is to 
expose that the absolute, the essential, the true is neither what nor “where” the form of 
the mind thought it was. Third, in order to preserve what remains of its initial 
presupposition or expectation, the form of the mind shifts its ground and maintains that 
the absolute, the essential, the true is still susceptible to being known or experienced 
within its limited horizon – in this case, immediate sensuousness – albeit on slightly 
different grounds. Lastly, in thinking-through the terms of this new ground the form of 
the mind is once again disappointed in its presuppositions or expectations, as the 
absolute, the essential, the true again turn out not to be what the form of the mind took it 
to be. At this point, the mind finds itself on the threshold of a fundamental reorientation 
of its basic presuppositions and expectations regarding the absolute, the essential, the 
true, and is thus primed for a transition to a higher viewpoint. 
 In the case of Sense-certainty, the lesson that it learns is that the absolute, the 
essential, the true is not an immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’, but rather a universal 
determination. It learns that the universal is its proper object and that its ‘I’, too, is 
something that perdures after the manner of a universal. Sense-certainty learns, moreover, 
that the immediate particular is dependent upon and only emerges within a more 
universal relational context, and that without that context the immediate particular is as 
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nothing. Thus, for example, the immediate, particular ‘Now’ is a mere vanishing point 
whose nature is “to be no more just when it is.” 
 Hegel goes so far as to suggest that there is a an incipient awareness of the nullity 
of the immediate, particular, sensuous object revealed in the practices of ancient mystery 
cults and even that of animals. According to Hegel, in placing the consumption of 
sensuous objects like bread and wine at the center of their practices, the initiates of these 
ancient cults made explicit for themselves – albeit in a merely symbolic, not yet 
scientific, form – the nothingness of such things. Hegel further states 
Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but, on the contrary, show 
themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand idly 
in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of 
their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without 
ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open 
Mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things. (PhG 65). 
Sense-certainty began with the conviction that immediate, particular, sensuous objects 
were absolute, were being, and built up an entire worldview based upon this conviction. 
Yet, animals treat them as ephemeral vanishing points and as such manifest a greater 
insight into the nature of reality. 
1.6 Brief Interlude on the Phenomenon of the Mind’s Self-forgetting 
Before moving on to Hegel’s account of the viewpoint which begins to appreciate 
that the universal is its proper object, it will be worthwhile calling attention to one further 
point Hegel makes in summarizing the dialectical experience of Sense-certainty. After 
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noting that Sense-certainty is constituted by the very dialectical movement of its 
experience, Hegel states, “[t]hat is why the natural consciousness, too, is always reaching 
this result, learning from experience what is true in it; but equally it is always forgetting it 
and starting the movement all over again” (PhG 64). The form of the mind or 
consciousness under investigation does indeed learn from its experience. In the case of 
Sense-certainty, the lesson that it learned was that, not the immediate, particular, 
sensuous ‘This’, but the universal was the absolute, the essential, the true. Yet, according 
to Hegel, while we, the phenomenologists, explicitly appreciate the import of this lesson 
and recognize that it calls for the transition to a higher viewpoint, Sense-certainty itself 
repeatedly forgets the lesson it has learned and falls back into a dialectically less 
sophisticated viewpoint. 
 This phenomenon of the mind’s repeated forgetting of the history and result of its 
own development is, in fact, an utterly crucial, yet often underappreciated, aspect to 
Hegel’s larger account of how the dialectical development of the mind unfolds. Indeed, 
one of its most important functions is to help explain how different philosophies emerge 
from different stages of the minds development. Therefore, it will be worth briefly 
pausing to explicate some of its basic facets since doing so will both further clarify what 
has already been covered and also provide great help in the treatment of later stages of 
the mind’s development.   
 Hegel’s notion of forgetting actually covers a range of distinct but related 
phenomena. What all these phenomena have in common is a failure or refusal on the part 
of the mind to appreciate and appropriate the history and results of its own development. 
Thus, in the case of Sense-certainty, upon thinking-through its own presuppositions it 
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finds that its object, for example, was not what it initially took it to be. Yet, instead of 
appreciating and appropriating this discovery and using it as the basis for a deliberate 
transition to a higher viewpoint, Sense-certainty shifts its ground and ultimately “forgets” 
the result of its previous lesson in order to avoid being forced to change its fundamental 
presuppositions and expectations regarding the nature of the absolute. As already noted, 
for Hegel, in spite of its intentions, the effect of Sense-certainty’s efforts to avoid being 
forced to change and develop is in fact to push the dialectic forward. For, in shifting its 
ground, Sense-certainty simply thereby exposes another of its basic presuppositions or 
expectations to the process of thinking-through. Hegel often refers to this working out of 
the development of the mind behind its own back as the “Ruse of Reason” [Der List der 
Vernunft].134 
 Another way in which the process of forgetting functions will make greater sense 
if we recall the second stage of the basic structure of the Concept’s development 
discussed in the previous chapter. In the second stage of its development, the Concept 
manages to posit an object for-itself. Yet, it fails to recognize the object as its own 
production and instead treats it as an alien ob-ject or gegen-stand which it merely “finds” 
existing “out there”, over-against the mind. In other words, the mind “forgets” the 
dialectical history through which it constituted both its object and, correlatively, itself 
qua producer of the object. As a result, the mind routinely takes the object or itself as 
something both immediately and absolutely given, instead of as the result of process of 
dialectical development. 
                                                          
134 Cf. Hegel: “Reason is as cunning as it is mighty” (EL 384). 
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In both of these cases of “forgetting” the mind blocks or simply neglects to 
appreciate and appropriate its own development and as a result repeatedly mis-takes the 
nature and location of the absolute. The effectiveness of grasping and deploying this 
notion of the mind’s self-forgetting in explaining the emergence of different philosophies 
is profound. Hegel provides a first taste of the power of this technique in the closing 
sections of Sense-certainty. 
1.6.1 The Self-forgetting of the Mind Used to Explain the Emergence of Schulze’s 
Philosophy 
After pointing out that each form of natural mind repeatedly learns only to forget 
basic lessons about the nature of itself, its object and its relation to its object, Hegel 
states, 
It is therefore astonishing when, in face of this experience, it is asserted as 
universal experience and put forward, too as a philosophical propositions, even as 
the outcome of Scepticism, that the reality or being of external things taken as 
Thises or sense-objects has absolute truth for consciousness. (PhG 64-65) 
Among Hegel’s contemporaries who asserted such a position was G. E. Schulze. Schulze 
incurred the brunt of Hegel’s philosophical scorn on more than one occasion, most 
notably, in the “Skeptizismus” essay from Hegel’s Jena period. Schulze at times wrote 
under the pseudonym, Aenesidemus, who himself was member of the ancient skeptical 
school. Hegel had great regard for the tradition of ancient skepticism but felt that modern 
practitioners, like Schulze, despite thier professed allegiance to the traditional school, fell 
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well short of the ideal form of skepticism.135 Schulze’s overall position, moreover, 
manifests a quintessential philosophical expression of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, 
including the phenomenon of forgetting which both complexifies and clarifies the 
dialectical nature of the mind’s development. 
 As a self-professed skeptic, Schulze divides his skepticism into a “positive side” 
and a “negative side”. The positive side affirms that the existence of immediate, 
particular sensuous objects is given in consciousness with indubitable certainty. The 
negative side denies the possibility of speculative or rational cognition of the absolute 
grounds or conditions of these immediately known objects. In announcing the positive 
side of his skepticism, Schulze states, 
The existence of what is given within the compass of our consciousness has 
undeniable certainty; for since it is present in consciousness, we can doubt the 
certainty of it no more than we can doubt consciousness itself; and to want to 
doubt consciousness is absolutely impossible, because any such doubt would 
destroy itself since it cannot occur apart from consciousness and hence it would 
be nothing; what is given in and with consciousness we call an actual fact 
[Tatsache] of consciousness; it follows that the facts of consciousness are what is 
undeniably actual, what all philosophical speculations must be related to, and 
what is to be explained or made more comprehensible through these speculations. 
(qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 318) 
                                                          
135 Michael Forster’s Hegel and Skepticism has spurred a resurgence of interest in Hegel’s relation to both 
ancient and modern skepticism. For Forster’s treatment of Hegel’s view of Schulze, see Hegel and 
Skepticism 33-4. For a helpful and more recent contribution to this particular topic, see William Bristow’s 
Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique 107ff.  
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Later in the same work Schulze continues along similar lines, stating  
The intuiting subject cognizes the objects and their existence directly and as 
something which exists and subsists in complete independence of the workings of 
the presentative power just as the cognitive subject exists and subsists 
independently. (qtd. in “Skeptizismus”  319) 
Obviously, the positive side of Schulze’s skepticism expresses the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty. Thus, for Schulze, as with Sense-certainty, the existence of an object insofar as 
it is given in immediate intuition – a ‘This’ – is thereby known with absolute certainty. 
Schulze refers to the existence of these objects along with the indubitable certainty with 
which they are cognized as “facts of consciousness” [Tatsache der Bewusstsein].136 Also 
like Sense-certainty, Schulze conceives of the cognizing subject – or the ‘I’ – after the 
manner of ‘This’ in that he views the mind to be constituted by discrete, particular 
“powers” or faculties which merely rest “in here” alongside the mind’s other faculties in 
a mental quasi-space.137  
The negative side of Schulze’s skepticism amounts to, as Hegel puts it, little more 
than a “vulgar Kantianism” (“Skpetizismus” 318). Thus, for Schulze, despite the fact that 
                                                          
136 To be clear, Schulze’s argument in favor of the positive side of his skepticism amounts to saying that 
since consciousness as a matter of fact takes the objects which are given in immediate intuition to exist 
independently of itself, then they must be so. For, apparently to doubt the existence of such objects would 
be to “doubt consciousness”, which would in turn lead to Cartesian problems of regarding the possibility of 
conscious doubt doubting itself. Of course, the epistemological question which the ancient Skeptic, among 
others, would forthwith ask is whether or not consciousness has any good grounds for taking the object of 
which it is conscious to exist independently of itself, irrespective of how things might, as a matter of fact, 
initially appear to consciousness. 
137 As Hegel notes, for Schulze, “the human cognitive faculty is a thing, which has concepts” 
(“Skeptizismus” 341). Later, Hegel states that Schulze’s faculty psychology “disperses the spirit [Geist] into 
mutually external qualities and hence finds no whole, no genius and no talent among these qualities but 
describes them as if they were a sack full of ‘faculties’ each of which is quite particular”, and, again, that 
Schulze’s conceives of the mind as a “soul-sack” in which various particular faculties dwell” 
(“Skeptizismus” 354). 
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the aforementioned facts of consciousness are known with indubitable certain, all 
“speculative” or “rational” cognition is nevertheless restricted to “the formal unity which 
is to be assigned to those facts” (“Skeptizismus” 318). As a result, according to Schulze, 
“although the being of things is quite certain according to the verdict of consciousness, 
this in no way satisfies Reason, because with the existing things of our acquaintance it is 
not self-explanatory, that they are, and that they are what they are” (qtd. in 
“Skeptizismus” 319).  
To clarify further, Schulze draws a distinction between two types of types of 
cognition and two types of object. In terms of cognition, on the one hand, there is the 
immediate sensuous certainty of the facts of consciousness, or what Hegel calls the 
“perpetual glassy-staring perception of objects,” and, on the other hand, there is rational 
cognition through concepts (“Skeptizismus 319). These concepts, again, provide the 
formal unity of the objects of immediate sensuous certainty, but through rational 
cognition of these concepts the existence of no object can be inferred. 
In terms of objects, Schulze distinguishes between the objects of immediate 
sensuous certainty, on the one hand, and the “unconditioned causes of all conditioned 
things whose actuality we are otherwise certain of,” on the other (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 
317). Thus, despite being indubitably known to exist, the objects of immediate sensuous 
certainty are nevertheless conditioned by, among other things, the concepts providing 
their formal unity.138 Beyond these absolutely existing yet conditioned objects, however, 
Schulze maintains that reason seeks to discover the things which provide their 
                                                          
138 Cf. Schulze: “For everything that exists according to our insight into it only in a conditioned way (qtd. 
in “Skeptizismus” 319). 
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unconditioned ground. He concludes, in accord with standard Kantian doctrine, that such 
objects are beyond the ken of human cognitive ability. In other words, although Schulze 
maintains that rational cognition of the concepts that lie “in here” in the mind is possible, 
he is skeptical about the possibility of rational cognition of the unconditioned causes of 
the objects whose existence, while conditioned, nevertheless possesses immediate and 
absolute certainty. 
 Hegel moves quickly to point out the rather egregious contradiction into which 
the two sides of Schulze’s skepticism cannot help but fall. First, he notes that “if every 
fact of consciousness has immediate certainty, then this insight that something exists only 
in a conditioned way is impossible; for ‘to exist in a conditioned way’ is synonymous 
with ‘not being certain on its own account’” (“Skeptizismus” 319). In other words, there 
would be no occasion for the mind to seek out the grounds for anything if its existence 
was absolutely certain. If something exists in a conditioned way, then its existence cannot 
be certain through itself, which is what Schulze nevertheless maintains for the objects of 
immediate sensuous certainty. 
Hegel continues to press the point in noting that Schulze states that “although the 
being of things is quite certain according to verdict of consciousness, this in no way 
satisfies Reason, because with the existing things of our acquaintance it is not self-
explanatory, that they are, and that they are what they are” (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 319). 
To this statement, Hegel duly responds 
In view of this absolute certainty that things exist (and certainty of how they exist) 
how can it at the same time, be the case that it is not self-explanatory that they are 
and that they are what they are? Two cognitions are asserted simultaneously: one 
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in which the existence and character of things is self-explanatory and another in 
which this existence and character is not at all self-explanatory. One could not 
devise a more complete contradiction. (“Skeptizismus” 319) 
Hegel thus exposes a rather flagrant contradiction on the part of Schulze in the latter’s 
attempt to maintain simultaneously that the very being of things is known with absolute 
certainty and thus without need for any further explanation and that the existence of such 
things is not self-explanatory, at all.139 
 To bring the discussion back to more present concerns, it should be noted that in 
the “Skeptizismus” essay Hegel is providing a rather ruthless example of a dialectical 
critique of Schulze’s position by revealing an egregious contradiction. By contrast, in the 
PhG Hegel is doing something different. There, he is providing a dialectical explanation 
for the very emergence of a viewpoint like Schulze’s. For, in the “Sense-certainty” 
chapter Hegel provides not just a critique but a phenomenology of a particular form of 
the mind and then shows how from such a form of the mind a determinate philosophical 
position such as Schulze’s emerges. 
 For, it is clear that in constructing his philosophy, Schulze operates within the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty. Indeed, as he states explicitly, all philosophical 
speculations must be referred back to the “facts” of sensuous certainty. Thus, we have the 
grounds for not only a dialectical critique but also a dialectical explanation for Schulze’s 
                                                          
139 An important point of reference here is Hegel’s observation that, for Sense-certainty, “the thing is, and it 
is, merely because it is” (PhG 58). Hegel’s point is that for the sensuous certainty that is expressed in the 
positive side of Schulze’s skepticism, the object’s existence is self-explanatory: “it is because it is.” For 
Schulze then to turn around and in the negative side of skepticism declare that such objects are not self-
explanatory presents a clear contradiction. 
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position. Why does Schulze maintain the position that he does? Answer: he is giving 
philosophical expression to the experience of Sense-certainty. 
 Other aspects of Hegel’s analysis of Sense-certainty provide an explanatory basis 
for still further details of Schulze’s position. For example, the phenomenon of the mind’s 
forgetting its own development would seem to be noticeably at work in the case of 
Schulze. For, juxtaposed – however haphazardly – alongside his positive skepticism, 
there is Schulze’s negative skepticism. Yet, whereas his positive skepticism expresses the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty, his negative skepticism, as we will see, is much closer to 
the viewpoint of Perception as well as in some ways Force and Understanding, the two 
viewpoints whose respective analyses succeed that of Sense-certainty in the PhG. Thus, 
Schulze’s negative skepticism reveals that at some point Schulze, himself, managed to 
learn some of the lessons that Sense-certainty learns – perhaps, first of among them being 
the insight that the immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’ is not absolute but rather 
depends on some further context for its existence. Yet, his positive skepticism betrays the 
fact that he has forgotten or otherwise failed to appropriate this lesson, and therefore he 
finds himself reverting to a less developed position and insists that all philosophical 
speculations refer back to the convictions of this viewpoint.140 
 On the basis of these observations it actually becomes possible to correct Hegel 
when he expresses his astonishment that a position like Schulze’s should emerge. The 
point is rather that, given the phenomena of the mind’s dialectical learning and 
                                                          
140 Cf. Hegel’s reference to Schulze’s skepticism in the EL: “Ancient high skepticism must not be confused 
with the modern one […] which partly preceded the Critical Philosophy and partly grew out of it. This 
consists simply in denying that anything true and certain can be said about the supersensible, and in 
designating, on the contrary, the sensible and what is present in immediate sense-experience as what we 
have to hold onto” – or, in other words, what we can be certain of (131). 
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subsequent forgetting and regression, it is all too understandable that Schulze should have 
carved out the incoherent position that he did. Indeed, herein lies the power of Hegel’s 
dialectical phenomenology: making such seeming strangeness explicable. 
 Before moving on to examining Hegel’s discussion of Perception it will be useful 
show how Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty, along with providing the basis for 
a dialectical explanation for the emergence of a position like Schulze’s, also provides the 
basis for an even more sophisticated dialectical critique than was on display in the 
“Skeptizismus” essay. Thus, based upon the analysis of Sense-certainty, Hegel would not 
criticize Schulze for maintaining that the absolute is given in conscious experience. In 
fact, he ultimately chides Schulze as much for his negative skepticism as for his positive 
inasmuch as the former posits that the absolute or unconditioned is both forever beyond 
the ken of human cognition and yet somehow known to cause the objects of cognition.141 
What Hegel reveals in Sense-certainty is, not that the absolute is not given in 
consciousness, but merely that it is not given in the way that Sense-certainty and Schulze 
take it to be, namely, as an immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’. 
 The absolute or unconditioned is given consciousness, not as an isolated ‘This’ 
(which turns out to be conditioned, anyway), but rather as the conditioned along with its 
conditions which together form a self-conditioning totality or concrete universal. Indeed, 
as the analysis of the ‘This’ shows, the self-conditioning totality through which a ‘This’ 
can be experienced at all is given in consciousness, albeit at first only in-itself. The task 
of the PhG itself is to render explicit or for-itself what is at first present merely in-itself.  
                                                          
141 Hegel famously quips that on Schulze’s view, the absolute or unconditioned, as a phenomenon behind 
the phenomena, amounts a kind of “mountainpeak under snow” (“Skeptizismus” 318). 
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As Hegel already notes in the Skeptizismus essay by way of rejecting Schulze’s 
view that speculative philosophy is concerned with the (ultimately futile) pursuit of the 
hidden unconditioned causes of the objects of conscious experience,  
The causal relation is wholly banned from speculative thought; if it seems 
sometimes to occur in form of producer and product, then it is only the verbal 
expression for the relationship not the relationship itself that is employed; for the 
producer and the product are posited as equivalent, that is equivalent to the effect, 
one and the same [substance is posited] as cause of itself, and as effect of itself, so 
that the relationship is immediately sublated. There is simply no question in 
speculative philosophy of the unconditioned being inferred from the constitution 
of the conditioned. (Skeptizismus 345)  
There will be occasion to discuss in more detail Hegel’s critique and sublation of the 
notion of causality when we examine the “Force and Understanding” and “Self-
consciousness” sections of the PhG. Hegel’s basic argument, however, which is 
indicated, here, is that all would-be causal relationships ultimately function within the 
context of a self-conditioning totality. Moreover, the task of speculative philosophy is not 
to infer the unconditioned from the conditioned, but, as the etymology of the term 
phenomen-ology indicates, to “read off” or otherwise think-through the self-conditioning 
totality that is actually given in experience. Hence, Hegel’s original subtitle for the PhG: 
the science of the actual experience of consciousness. In sum, Schulze, like Sense-
certainty, was right that the absolute is given in consciousness; he was simply wrong 
about how it is given. 
2. Perception 
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 Perception is the form of the mind which takes over the truth revealed in the 
experience of thinking-through Sense-certainty. The truth of Sense-certainty, despite its 
own initial preoccupations with the immediate, sensuous, particular ‘This’, turned out to 
be the universal. Within Perception, there are in fact two” immediately self-
differentiating moments”, both of which are universals unto themselves, namely, the ‘I’ 
and its object (PhG 67). In the specific context of Perception, the ‘I’ is the act of 
perceiving, whereas the object is that which is perceived. For us, the phenomenologists, 
or in-itself, both moments together constitute a concrete unity, which is to say, self-
differentiating and self-relating, universal. Yet, for Perception, the two moments are 
related as opposites only one of which can constitute the essential element in the 
relationship.  
As with Sense-certainty, the emphasis for Perception initially falls on the object, 
and so it is taken to be the essential moment while the ‘I’ is relegated to an unessential 
element, “the unstable factor which can as well be as not be”142 (PhG 67). Therefore, 
again, as with Sense-certainty, Hegel immediately turns to thinking-through the object of 
Perception. The form of the mind or the ‘I’ correlative to the object will, of course, come 
under phenomenological investigation in its own turn. Let us turn first to examining 
Hegel’s initial phenomenology of the object of Perception.  
2.1  The Thing and Its Properties  
                                                          
142 Perception thus begins by recognizing or remembering that the universal is its proper object while 
simultaneously forgetting the lesson at least partially learned in the experience of Sense-certainty regarding 
the essential correlativity of ‘I’ and object. 
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Regarding the object of Perception, Hegel states, “[s]ince the principle of the 
object, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express this 
its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be the thing with many 
properties” (PhG 67). As was first indicated in Sense-certainty, the universal, for Hegel, 
is not a mere abstraction which excludes difference; rather, it is a self-differentiating 
totality, or mediated universal, a universal which preserves difference within itself. 
Therefore, since the principle of the object of Perception is the universal, the object must 
constitute a self-differentiating totality or whole. Such an object would be a Thing with 
many different properties. 
 Having established that the object of Perception is the Thing with many 
properties, Hegel proceeds more or less simultaneously to think-through the following: 1) 
the nature of the Thing, 2) the nature of its properties and 3) the nature of the relations 
between both the Thing and its properties and amongst the properties themselves. For, it 
becomes apparent that, despite initial appearances, the Thing, its properties and their 
respective mutual relations mutually define one another. 
The properties of the Thing preserve yet supersede or sublate the sensuous 
element present in Sense-certainty. For, while they stand in relation to sensuousness, the 
properties are not particular ‘Thises’ but rather universal determinations which include 
different particular instances within themselves. In other words, with respect to its 
properties, the Thing of Perception is not this or that immediate swatch of orange, but the 
universal quality or property “orange”, or the universal property “sweetness” and so on. 
 The Thing, of course, possesses these properties. Yet, initially it would seem that 
they exist within the Thing as mutually indifferent determinations, each existing 
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independently of the others. As such, the Thing would appear to be an “abstract universal 
medium” in which the properties subsist (PhG 68). The Thing is what has become of the 
‘This’, namely, a spatio-temporal location that preserves within itself a plurality of 
indifferent differences or determinations. Thus, with the respect to a perceived Thing like 
salt, Perception can say, “Here and Now is white and also tart and also a cubical shape 
and also a specific gravity and so on” (PhG 113). Importantly, each property is 
everywhere present in the Thing, yet they simultaneous manage not to affect one another. 
For example, the whiteness of the salt, while it qualifies the entire salt, nevertheless does 
not affect the cubical shape, nor does either affect the tartness (PhG 68-9). Thus, in the 
first instance, the Thing appears to be an indifferent ‘Also’, a medium which permits the 
properties to subsist in it while also allowing them not to directly affect each other. 
 Hegel demands, however, that we think-through such a conception of the Thing, 
its properties and their mutual relationships. Thus, he states, 
[I]f the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another, if 
they were simply and solely self-related, they would not be determinate; for they 
are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, 
and relate themselves to others as to their opposites. (PhG 69) 
Here, Hegel indicates his basic acceptance of the Spinozist principle: omnis determinatio 
est negatio.143 All determinations are negations. All determinations, in other words, 
cannot be merely self-related but presuppose a relation of negation to that which they are 
not. Orange is orange, not simply because it is orange – that would have been Sense-
                                                          
143 Cf. Hegel: “The basis of all determinacy is negation (omnis determinatio est negatio)” (EL 147). 
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certainty’s position; rather, orange is orange because it is not green, or red, or sweet, or 
round and so on.  
 The fact that the properties of the Thing must negate and exclude one another in 
order to be what they are presents a problem, however, for the would-be simple unity of 
the Thing. Thus, Hegel states, 
As thus opposed to one another [the properties] cannot be together in the simple 
unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as negation; the 
differentiation of the properties, in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation 
but is exclusive, each property negating the other, thus falls outside of this simple 
medium; and the medium, therefore, is not merely an Also, an indifferent unity, 
but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other. (PhG 69) 
If the properties exclude one another that would seem to preclude the possibility that they 
could exist together in one Thing as their shared medium. Yet, that medium is as essential 
to their existence as the fact that they exclude each other. In other words, in order to exist, 
the properties must both exclude each other and share a common medium. Reconciling 
this tension or contradiction intrinsic to the relationship of the properties to one another 
and to the Thing becomes the task for the succeeding sections of Perception.  
Important to note, however, is that Hegel also leaps to asserting that the Thing, 
too, like its properties is both a universal and exclusive. The Thing is universal qua 
“abstract medium”, and it is exclusive qua One Thing among other Things which it is not. 
Thus, we in fact have a twofold set of contradictions to be worked out, or thought-though, 
during the course of the ensuing sections of Perception: 1) the properties must 
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simultaneously be exclusive and share a common medium; 2) the Thing must be both an 
indifferent or “abstract” universal medium in which the properties subsist and a 
determinate, exclusive One. 
2.2 The Thing, Self-identity, Truth and Error 
Recall that so far as Perception is concerned at this point the object is the 
absolute. Thus, the task of consciousness is simply to take the Thing in an act of pure 
apprehension. It must not actively engage with the object or alter it in any way since to do 
so would undermine its truth. Perception is nevertheless aware that it can fail to 
apprehend the object correctly. For, the principle of the object is universality, and 
universality contains differences or otherness; therefore, it is possible that Perception can 
take the object as other than what it is. Accordingly, the criterion of truth for Perception 
is self-identity or self-sameness. Previously, in Sense-certainty, the criterion of truth had 
been immediate, sensuous presence. Now, the criterion the object must satisfy in order to 
be considered the true object is that it should remain identical to itself.  
In a sense, the criterion of self-identity was operative – albeit implicitly – in 
Sense-certainty. What Sense-certainty learned was simply that the immediately, 
sensuously present ‘This’ was never what it was immediately taken to be. Moreover, 
immediacy continues to be a criterion for truth into Perception and, as we will see, 
beyond. The point is that what is immediately present to Perception is a mediated object, 
namely, a universal. Thus, in Perception, the criterion of immediacy is sublated through 
the mediation of the universal. The criterion of self-identity will also be sublated by 
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further mediations. Yet, at present, Perception is not aware of this and so begins with an 
unmediated or immediate criterion of self-identity for the object. 
 Again, since the object is a differentiated totality, consciousness is aware of the 
possibility of taking the object differently than what it is; in other words, it is aware of the 
possibility of error. The problem of error is a crucial if at times neglected aspect for all 
philosophy. For, indeed, a theory of error is an intrinsic correlate to any theory of 
knowledge; in other words, no theory of knowledge could be considered complete 
without at the same time providing a theory of error. Hegel, for his part, is providing at 
least the basic outlines for such a theory in this section of Perception. 
 For Perception, then, the object is the absolute, the true. Yet, in order to be true 
the object must be self-identical. Still, diversity is constitutive of Perception’s object at 
this point. Therefore, Perception is forced to conclude that anything in its experience 
which appears to undermine the self-identity of the object, and thereby cause an 
erroneous rather than truthful “taking” of the object, cannot be due to the object in-itself 
but rather must be the fault of consciousness. Consciousness is the source of any 
deception or untrue “taking” in the experience of Perception. 
 The self-identity of the object does indeed seem to be undermined in the very first 
instance in which it is taken by Perception. For, in the first instance, the Thing presents 
itself as a ‘One’, as a distinct and singular unity; yet, at the same time, Perception 
perceives in the Thing the universal property which transcends singularity. According to 
Hegel, Perception therefore concludes that it errored in taking the Thing as a ‘One’, as a 
unity, and in turn maintains that the object is an association or community of properties. 
Immediately, however, Perception perceives that the properties are mutually exclusive 
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which prevents them from forming a community. Thus, consciousness again convicts 
itself of error in taking the object as a community or continuity of properties and reverts 
to positing the object as an exclusive unity (PhG 70-71). 
 Perception once again discovers, however, that the Thing has many properties, 
and so consciousness was wrong to take it as exclusive. As a result Perception finds that 
what it perceives is not common medium or mere community, but rather the single 
property itself. Yet, by itself the property can be neither a property, since it is not related 
to the Thing, nor determinate, since it is not related to or distinguished from the other 
properties. Such an immediate, unrelated or context-less sensuous being, moreover, is 
scarcely distinguishable from the immediate, sensuous object of Sense-certainty. 
Consciousness would thus appear to have been thrown back to the beginning of its 
development. 
2.3 Clarification and Upshot of the Preceding Analysis 
 To be sure, these sections of Perception can come across as an exercise in a 
dialectical frenzy the point of which is not always immediately evident. Hegel, 
nevertheless, pauses to bring out a nest of key points regarding what consciousness learns 
in the course of this somewhat frenzied experience. For, what appears to be happening to 
the object is actually happening to consciousness itself in relation to its object. 
 In thinking-through the first object of Sense-certainty, consciousness was forced 
to reflect upon itself, upon the ‘I’, in order to maintain its original conviction that its 
object is given in immediate, sensuous particularity. In thinking-through Perception, 
consciousness is once again forced to reflect upon itself qua perceiver. The difference is 
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that, whereas Sense-certainty was driven to reflect upon the ‘I’ and thereby concluded, at 
least provisionally, that its truth lay within the ‘I’ rather than the object, Perception, being 
aware of a diversity or contradiction in its object, concludes that it is the source of error 
or untruth which it experiences. Yet, this is an enormous discovery unto itself, and for 
more than one reason.  
First, consciousness is hereby engaged in a process of discovering its own activity 
in constituting the object it experiences. In other words, in undergoing the preceding 
dialectical frenzy, consciousness begins to discover that the way in which the object 
appears, the way that it is taken, depends upon consciousness’ own taking, its own 
perceptual activity.144 To be sure, at this point, for Perception, the object is still the 
absolute and the true, and so, as far as Perception is concerned, any activity on its part 
can only be the source of error or illusion. Yet, in recognizing this point, consciousness 
discovers a second factor about itself, namely, that it possesses the criterion of correction 
within itself.145 To be sure, since Perception takes the object to be the absolute at this 
point, it will draw the naïve conclusion that correction is a matter of eliminating the 
distorting affects that consciousness has upon the object in order thereby to get back to 
the object as it really is in-itself or “out there” in the “world”.146 Yet, despite its own 
                                                          
144 Cf. Hegel: “Thus it becomes quite definite for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially 
constituted, viz. that it is not a simply pure apprehension, but in its apprehension is at the same time 
reflected out of the True and into itself. This return of consciousness to itself which is directly mingled with 
the pure apprehension [of the object] – for this return into itself has shown itself to be essential to 
perception – alters the truth” (PhG 71). 
145 Cf. Hegel: “Consciousness recognizes that it is the untruth occurring in perception that falls within it. 
But by this very recognition it is able at once to supersede this untruth; it distinguishes is apprehension of 
the truth form the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and since it undertakes to make this 
correction itself, the truth, qua truth of perception, falls of course within consciousness” (PhG 72). 
146 We thus have an explanation for the very emergence of the naïve epistemological procedure which 
Hegel famously critiques in the Introduction to the PhG (PhG 73ff.). That procedure, of course, involves 1) 
the presupposition that cognition is a kind of instrument whose activity invariably distorts the object as it is 
in-itself and 2) the (self-defeating) attempt to remove the effect of this instrument on the object in order that 
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preoccupations with the object, consciousness is learning that it possesses its own 
immanent, self-correcting criterion. In other words, in convicting itself of error or untruth, 
consciousness thereby enacts and partially gleans its own immanent criterion of truth.147 
2.4 Phenomenology of the Thing Resumed 
 Hegel duly returns to Perception as it begins again to think-through the Thing, 
with the difference now that it is equipped with an explanation of the source of error to 
go along with its criterion of self-identity. Thus, in the first instance, Perception is aware 
of the Thing as One, as a unity. Yet, Perception also perceives a multiplicity of 
properties, which, qua multiple, contradict the unity of the Thing. Still, the Thing is One, 
and so Perception concludes that the source of the multiplicity of properties which would 
contradict the truth of the object – its self-identity – must lie in consciousness. As Hegel 
states, 
So in point of fact, the Thing is white only to our eyes, also tart to our tongue, 
also cubical to our touch, and so on. We get the entire diversity of these aspects, 
not from the Thing, but from ourselves; and they fall asunder in this way for us, 
because the eye is quite distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are thus the 
universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its 
own. (PhG 72) 
                                                          
the latter might be cognized as it is in-itself. We are now in a position to explain this very effort – 
including, the naïve presupposition about the nature of cognition – to be the result of the experience of 
Perception as it struggles to preserve its initial conviction about the nature of its object.  
147 Cf. Hegel: “Otherness or error, as sublated, is itself a necessary moment of the truth, which can only be 
in that it makes itself into its own result” (EL 286). 
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In order to preserve its original conviction of the unity of the Thing which it perceives, 
consciousness shifts its ground and makes itself responsible for the diversity of properties 
which it also perceives. The Thing is a unity, but consciousness possesses different 
organs of perception – eyes, ears, tongue and so on – which, accordingly, perceive the 
unified thing in different ways. Consciousness itself thus becomes a universal medium 
which preserves these different properties in their exclusivity.  
Important to note is the similarity between this move on the part of conscious and 
the earlier one which took place in Sense-certainty. In Sense-certainty, upon first being 
driven back into itself, consciousness conceived of itself after the manner of the object – 
the particular ‘This’. In Perception, upon being driven back into itself, consciousness 
conceives of itself as it had initially conceived of the Thing, namely, as an indifferent, 
universal medium in which the different properties subsist.  
 Having drawn this conclusion about consciousness, however, Perception is 
immediately confronted with a problem when it returns to thinking-through the Thing in 
its unity. For, in order to be a One, the Thing must exclude other Things. Yet, it is not 
through being a One that it is thereby exclusive. Rather, according to Hegel, oneness or 
unity is “the universal relation of self to self” (PhG 73). All unified Things possess such 
intrinsic self-relating, which entails that, to the extent that it is self-relating, the Thing is 
indistinguishable from other Things. It is by being determinate not merely self-relating 
that the Thing distinguishes itself from other Things, and it is through its properties that 
the Thing is determinate. A Thing, therefore, in order to be itself and not some-Thing 
else, must possess properties intrinsic to itself. The properties cannot simply be the 
possession of consciousness. They must be, indeed, proper to the Thing. 
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 Yet, insofar as consciousness maintains that the Thing is the bearer of its own 
intrinsic properties, it reverts to conceiving of the Thing as an indifferent universal 
medium in which the mutually exclusive properties subsist. As a result, the problem of 
the unity of the Thing returns. In response to this problem consciousness takes it upon 
itself to maintain the unity of the Thing, albeit by means of a contrived artifice. The 
Thing is perceived as a unity but also as an indifferent medium in which exclusive 
properties subsist. Consciousness thus perceives the Thing as, for example, white and 
also tart and also cubical and so on. In order to preserve the unity of the Thing, however, 
consciousness adds the further contrivance that “in so far as it is white, it is not cubical, 
and in so far as it is cubical and also white, it is not tart, and so on” (PhG 73). 
Hegel’s invocation of the “insofar” is not perfectly clear, but his general point 
seems to be that it is a distinction which consciousness draws in order to preserve or 
otherwise make intelligible for itself the fact that it perceives the Thing as both a unity 
and an indifferent universal medium of mutually exclusive properties. It is, effectively, 
another instance of consciousness shifting its ground in order to preserve its original 
conviction about its object. The Thing is a unity with determinate properties. Yet, 
consciousness can think or perceive these properties apart from one another by specifying 
the Thing only insofar as it is white and therefore not tart, and so on. It is, more or less, a 
sheer contrivance, but one through which consciousness nevertheless manages to learn 
something of exceeding importance about itself and its object. 
2.5 Clarification of the Preceding Analysis 
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 As Hegel notes, if we survey the course of Perception’s development thus far we 
notice that it has made a pair of complementary discoveries about itself and its object. 
If we look back on what consciousness previously took, and now takes, 
responsibility for, on what it previously ascribed, and now ascribes to the Thing, 
we see that consciousness alternately makes itself, as well as the Thing, into both 
a pure, many-less One, and into an Also that resolves itself into independent 
‘matters’ [i.e. properties]. (PhG 74) 
Through the course of Perception, consciousness has alternatingly ascribed to itself and 
to the Thing the principle of unity and the principle of differentiation. Yet, in recognizing 
this very fact, “Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only its truthful 
perceiving [Nehmen des Wahren], contains the distinct moments of apprehension and 
withdrawal into self, but rather that the truth itself, the Thing, reveals itself in this twofold 
way” (PhG 74). Just as consciousness found itself in both Sense-certainty and Perception 
driven back from its immediate apprehension of its object into a reflection upon itself, so 
now the object, too, has been discovered to possess its own duality of moments: 1) a 
moment of presentation for consciousness apprehending it and 2) a moment of reflection 
into itself.  
 Here we have a major moment in Hegel’s ongoing explanation of the emergence 
of different philosophies and so it will be worthwhile to pause and flesh out more 
precisely just what Hegel is articulating. Perception has been attempting to think-through 
how its object can be both one and many.148 In the course of doing so it has discovered 
                                                          
148 At this point, it would be worth noting that the dialectic of the one and the many has been examined 
throughout much of the history of philosophy and that, for Hegel, the purest ancient expression of this 
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that the object itself can be considered both as it appears to consciousness and as it is in-
itself. Thus, in thinking-through the object qua one-and-many, consciousness is led to 
posit a distinction between appearance and reality. Consciousness draws a distinction 
between the Thing insofar as appears for or is related to consciousness, on the one hand, 
and the Thing insofar as it is self-related, on the other. Several important points must be 
noted with respect to this distinction. 
 First, Hegel is providing a more or less generic or typological explanation for a 
distinction that historically has received myriad specific expressions. The Platonic 
distinction between appearance and reality, the Lockean distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities, and the Kantian distinction between the phenomena and noumenon, 
just to name a few, would all constitute instances of this generic type. The important 
point to note, however, is that Hegel is providing an explanation as to how and why these 
philosophies – at least in this particular respect – emerge in the first place. They emerge 
in and through a determinate experience of consciousness, specifically, that of 
Perception, as it attempts to think-through the complexity of the object which it in fact 
perceives.   
 Second, the distinction drawn by consciousness has its correlate in the structure of 
consciousness itself. Thus, although the emphasis still remains on the object, what is 
actually set up at this point is a parallel set of distinctions within both consciousness and 
                                                          
dialectic occurs in Plato’s Parmenides (“Skeptizismus” 323-4). Importantly, however, on Hegel’s 
interpretation, the result of the Parmenides is merely destructive and, therefore, propadeutic to later, more 
speculative works, such as the Sophist. In the rarity of its dialectical destructiveness, however, the 
Parmenides also represents, for Hegel, the highest achievement of ancient skepticism. Hegel, for his part, 
sees himself as incorporating the destructive element of ancient skepticism into his own dialectic only to 
sublate it as a moment in the larger development of the mind. 
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the object, respectively. In other words, we have the beginnings of a distinction drawn by 
consciousness with respect to how it knows its object. For, the consciousness to which the 
object appears has de facto been distinguished from the consciousness that withdraws 
into itself. Thus, along with the Platonic distinction between appearance and reality, we 
have the beginnings of the Platonic distinction between aesthesis and noesis; or, along 
with the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumenon, we have the beginnings 
of the distinction between the empirical and transcendental ego, and so on.149 
 Third, the fact that it is consciousness itself which draws the distinction between 
the object qua appearing-to-consciousness versus the object qua withdrawing-into-itself 
must not be lost sight of. Hegel does not emphasize this point, here, but the Introduction 
to the Phenomenology has prepared us to watch for it. As Hegel states in the Introduction, 
“The essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two 
moments, ‘Notion’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself’, both fall within 
that knowledge which we are investigating” (PhG 53). Consciousness draws the 
distinction between the object as it is for-consciousness, on the one hand, and as it is in-
itself, on the other. Consciousness distinguishes between the object as related to 
consciousness and the object as self-relating. The distinction is not a given, “brute” fact 
which consciousness merely finds “already there”, but is rather constituted and preserved 
by and in consciousness itself. Thus, the object as self-relating, and thus presumably 
independent of consciousness, nevertheless remains within consciousness. 
                                                          
149 Hegel’s explanation for the emergence of the Kantian distinction between the empirical versus the 
transcendental ego will be discussed at much greater length in Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
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 Part of the reason why this point is essential to bear in mind is that even though 
we, the phenomenologists, know that the distinction between what is for-consciousness 
and what is in-itself is internal to consciousness, Perception does not. Therefore, the 
emphasis throughout Perception will continue to fall on the object. Consciousness need 
no longer convict itself as the strict source of error since it has come to recognize that the 
object can appear to consciousness differently than it is in-itself. Yet, it will still be 
preoccupied with thinking-through the object in its complexity, rather than directing its 
attention upon its own concrete activity in constituting the object. 
2.6 Analysis of the Thing Resumed 
 To return to the analysis, then, Hegel points out how, now, the object contains 
within itself the two moments which were previously constitutive of consciousness’ 
relation to its object: “The Thing is One, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but is also for 
an other; and, moreover, it is an other on its own account, just because it is for an other” 
(PhG 74). Previously, the object was self-related or for-itself, and yet also related to or 
for-consciousness. Now, in continuing to attempt to think-through the complexity of the 
object, consciousness posits that the Thing is self-related or for-itself and also related to 
or for another Thing. In other words, consciousness posits that the Thing is a unity qua 
self-related; yet, in interacting with other Things, the Thing is drawn into manifesting 
different properties. For example, consciousness might posit a planet as a unified Thing 
and maintain that it is only upon interacting with another planet that either object 
manifests its various properties of solidity, specific gravity and so on. Or, consciousness 
might posit a squirrel as a Thing and maintain that it is only through its relation to other 
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Things such as fellow squirrels and sources of food that it manifests it various properties 
of intussusception, sympathy, aggression, parturition and so on. 
 The problem with this solution is that each Thing, through its self-relating 
identity, is supposedly in-itself different from other Things. Yet, it is only in its relation 
to other Things that the Thing can be differentiated from these others according to its 
various determinate properties. Therefore, consciousness once again shifts its ground and 
maintains instead that the Thing possesses an absolute difference that is essential to it in-
itself. Yet, this essential property which constitutes its absolute difference is posited 
precisely as a means to distinguish the Thing from other Things, which is the same as 
saying that through this absolute difference the Thing is absolutely related to all other 
Things. 
 Here, consciousness seems to be in the throes of another dialectical frenzy. It is 
working feverishly to maintain its original conviction that the Thing unto itself 
constitutes a unity with many properties. Yet, as it thinks-through this position 
consciousness is continually forced to recognize that the Thing only is what it is through 
its relation to something else. Thus, consciousness is on the cusp of grasping the fact that 
the notion of a Thing with properties which could be defined in abstraction from its 
relational context to other Things is illusory. As Hegel states, 
The experience through which consciousness discovers that the Thing is 
demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its essence and its being-
for-self, can be summarized as follow. The Thing is posited as being for itself, or 
as the absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely self-related negation; 
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but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself; in other words, the 
Thing has its essential being in another Thing. (PhG 76) 
Consciousness might posit for the Thing an “essence” through which it is absolutely One 
and therefore absolutely distinct from other Things. Yet, in order actually to differentiate 
the Thing from other Things it is necessary to make reference to the apparently 
unessential properties that only become manifest through the Thing’s relation to other 
Things. Thus, the unessential turns out to be necessary and therefore essential, while the 
essential turns out to be unnecessary and therefore inessential to differentiating and 
therefore defining the Thing. The being of the Thing is thereby revealed to be 
determined, not through itself, but through its relations to other Things. 
2.7 Consciousness’s Discovery of Constitutive Relationality 
 At this point, consciousness has broken-through to the insight that reality in its 
concreteness is constitutively relational. Things maintain relations to other Things in 
order to be what they are. As such, Things are not prior to but emerge out of their 
relational orders. In other words, “what we now have is unconditioned absolute 
universality” (PhG 77). The singular Thing is not universal or absolute; or, more 
precisely, it is not universal and therefore not absolute. What is absolute is a universal 
relational context.150  
Perception’s invocation of “Also” and the “in so far”, and its distinction between 
the “essential” versus the “inessential”, were all attempts to preserve its original 
                                                          
150 Cf. Fichte: “[T]he relation must be absolute, and the absolute must be nothing more than a relation” (WL 
181). 
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conviction that the Thing with properties was primary and absolute. While Perception in 
principle transcended the domain of the immediately sensuous present and posited for 
itself a Thing with universal properties, still “this universal, since it originates in the 
sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly self-identical universality 
at all” (PhG 76). Perception does not break decisively with its attachment to the sensuous 
and so it oscillates back-and-forth between the universal which it perceives and the 
immediate sensuous particular which it also perceives. Yet, it cannot see – that is, sense – 
how they are related. Perception cannot preserve the self-identical in its universality. It 
does not see the universal relational totality that governs the universe and which is thus 
the truly absolute, because self-conditioning, Thing.151 
 Understanding, the viewpoint which succeeds Perception, by contrast, begins by 
accepting that “Seeing and Hearing,” or, in other words, the senses, “have been lost to 
consciousness” (PhG 79). It is at home – however tenuously, at first – with “the 
unconditioned universal” as its proper object. Perception ultimately still found this object 
to be a mere “mental entity”; it did not recognize, in other words, the universal relational 
context as the realm of “pure essences, the absolute elements and powers” which governs 
                                                          
151 This entire analysis seems to have been prefigured in Fichte: “Hence […] the totality consists simply in 
the complete relation, and there is nothing else of an intrinsically stable kind that determines this. The 
totality consists in the completeness of a relationship, but not of a reality [Hegel might say ‘Thing’ at this 
point]. The terms of the relationship, taken individually, are the accidents [i.e. ‘properties’], while their 
totality is substance […] Here it merely needs stating expressly […] that in substance we are not to think of 
anything fixed at all, but simply of an interplay” (WL 184). Fichte goes on to point out that this relational 
totality, which is “substance”, is ultimately just the self itself in its dialectical unfolding (WL 185). In other 
words, for Fichte, too, substance has become subject. Another point of reference would, of course, be the 
abortive attempt by the young Socrates in the Parmenides to render intelligible the relation between the 
forms and their would-be instantiations. Arguably, the underlying flaw which perpetually thwarts Socrates’ 
effort in this case is the fact that he conceives – or, rather, picture-thinks – of the universal forms as like 
Things, which is, of course, precisely what Perception repeatedly does. 
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the universe in its concreteness (PhG 78). Understanding begins with this recognition, so 
we are led to examine how Understanding goes about thinking-through this object. 
2.8 Summary of Perception 
 Before turning to the viewpoint of Force and Understanding, let us first recall the 
experiences undergone and lessons learned by Perception that were especially pertinent 
to Hegel’s explanation of the emergence of different philosophies.  
 Perception began with the conviction that its object was a Thing with many 
properties. Importantly, however, the principle of Perception’s object was the universal 
while Perception’s criterion of truth was self-identity. As a result, Perception was faced 
with the task of thinking-through how its object could be both self-identical and universal 
since the universal is that which preserves difference within itself. The dialectical 
frenzies which it underwent in the course of thinking-through its object were but various 
permutations on this basic dialectic between particular self-identity and universality. Yet, 
many of these permutations produced lessons that were valuable not least for their use in 
explaining how different philosophies emerge as the result of the ongoing dialectical 
development of the mind. 
 Recall that due to the dialectical tension between its principle of the object and its 
criterion of truth, the threat of error or deception immediately presented itself to 
Perception. According to Hegel, however, “At first, then, I become aware of the Thing as 
a One, and have to hold fast to it in this its true character” (PhG 72). Initially, then, the 
primacy falls on the unity of the Thing. Therefore, when Perception perceives something 
that contradicts this unity, such as the multiplicity of exclusive properties, it contrives for 
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itself a solution by which it can “hold fast” to the Thing’s primary unity and thereby 
preserve the latter’s self-identity. The solution that Perception first contrives for itself is 
to make consciousness responsible for the “error” of perceiving the Thing to be 
constituted by a multiplicity of exclusive properties. The Thing is One; therefore, it is 
white only to our eyes, tart only to our tongue and so on.  
As a result of drawing this distinction, and despite the fact that it is primarily 
concerned simply with preserving the self-identical unity of the Thing, Perception hits 
upon the appearance/reality distinction for the first time. As previously mentioned, this 
distinction will manifest itself throughout the history of philosophy in various guises. 
Yet, the crucial point is that Hegel has provided an explanatory account of the basis of 
the distinction – and therefore of the philosophies which adopt it – namely, a particular 
experience of consciousness. The drawing of the appearance/reality distinction is thus not 
some haphazard event in the history of philosophy; rather, it is the result of a particular 
viewpoint, in this case, Perception, thinking-through a contradiction within its 
experience.  
Recall, also, that in and through drawing this initial distinction between 
appearance and reality, consciousness is driven back into itself, if only provisionally or 
tenuously. The object remains its focus; yet, consciousness cannot help but become more 
reflectively aware of its own role in constituting its object of experience.152 Indeed, it is 
                                                          
152 Cf. Fichte’s expression of this self-reflective discovery: “The Thing is nothing whatsoever but the sum 
of all these relations as combined by the power of the imagination, and all of these relations, taken together, 
constitute the thing. The object is indeed the original synthesis of all of these concepts” (IWL 28). 
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this nascent awareness on the part of consciousness as being forced to reflect upon itself 
that sets the conditions for a subsequent permutation in its conception of its object. 
For, on taking upon itself the responsibility for the multiplicity of determinate 
properties that it perceives, Perception discovers that it has no basis for distinguishing the 
Thing from other Things. Therefore, consciousness inverts the conception of the object 
which it had just established and posits the Thing as a universal medium in which the 
properties subsist while making itself responsible for the unity of the Thing. In so doing, 
however, consciousness breaks-through to the insight that, not only itself, but the Thing 
contains the two moments of 1) a differentiated and determinate appearance for-
consciousness and 2) a withdrawal into undifferentiated self-identity.  
Here we have, in other words, the basis in conscious experience for the Kantian 
phenomena/noumenon distinction. Indeed, there can be little doubt that Hegel means to 
provide an explanatory account of at least this central aspect of Kant’s philosophy in this 
analysis of Perception, for in the PM, Hegel states, “The more specific stage of 
consciousness at which Kantian philosophy conceives the mind is perception” (PM 149). 
To be sure, the analysis in Perception is hardly Hegel’s last word on Kant. Yet, it remains 
that we have here in the PhG the beginnings of a thoroughgoing dialectical explanation 
for the very existence of the Kantian philosophy. 
In connection with the dialectical explanation that Perception provides for the 
Kantian philosophy, it should be further recalled that a major limitation of Perception is 
its continued naïve attachment to sensuousness.153 To be sure, Perception in principle has 
                                                          
153 Perception for its own part nevertheless thinks that through this continued naïve attachment to 
sensuousness it is simply maintaining the “realism” of “sound common sense”. As Hegel states, “These 
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transcended the attachment to immediate sensuous particularity characteristic of Sense-
certainty. Yet, its appropriation of the universal is only partial and so the particular Thing 
of sensuous consciousness merely rests “alongside” its own universal determination. In 
other words, the sensuous has not yet been properly reduced by consciousness to a mere 
moment of the “unconditioned absolute universality,” but instead retains its own quasi-
absoluteness in opposition to the universality of the property, which latter, for its part, is 
revealed to be still a merely “sensuous universality”154 (PhG 77). Thus, Hegel states 
My ‘meaning’ has vanished, and perception takes the object as it is in itself, or as 
a universal as such. Singular being therefore emerges in the object as true 
singleness, as the in-itself of the One, or as reflectedness-into-itself. But this is 
still a conditioned being for-for-self alongside which appears another being-for-
self, the universality which is opposed to, and conditioned by singular being […] 
The sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, 
and it seeks to lay hold on the truth, by distinguishing between the aspects, by 
sticking to the ‘Also’ and the ‘in so far’, and finally by distinguishing the 
‘unessential’ aspect from an ‘essence’ which is opposed to it. But these 
expedients, instead of warding off deception in the process of apprehension, prove 
themselves on the contrary to be quite empty. (PhG 77) 
                                                          
empty abstractions of a ‘singleness’ and a ‘universality’ opposed to it, and of an ‘essence’ that is linked 
with something unessential – a ‘non-essential’ aspect which is necessary all the same – these are powers 
whose interplay is perceptual understanding, often called ‘sound common sense’. This ‘sound common 
sense’ which takes itself to a solid, realistic consciousness is, in the perceptual process, only the play of 
these abstractions; generally, it is always at its poorest where it fancies itself to be the richest” (PhG 77). 
154 Cf. the section of PM in which Hegel comments on this problematic connection between the sensuous 
particular and the universal property in the experience of Perception: “The connection is therefore a many-
sided contradiction – in general between the individual things of sensory apperception, which are supposed 
to constitute the foundation of universal experience, and the universality which is supposed rather to be the 
essence and the foundation” (PM  150). 
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Thus, as Hegel famously says about the Kantian philosophy in particular, so it might be 
said of Perception more generally, “it consists merely in a tenderness for the things of this 
world” (EL 92). Perception retains a tender and perhaps nostalgic attachment to the 
seeming absolute integrity of the immediate, sensuous particular. As a result, it makes 
recourse to all manner of sophistry and contrivance in order to avoid ascribing to the 
Thing in-itself the contradiction that it nevertheless perceives between the particular and 
universal, for this would involve reducing the sensuous to a mere moment in an 
“unconditioned absolute universality”.  
2.9 A Special Note on Perception and Explaining Philosophical Multiplicity 
As it turns out, the “Perception” chapter contains embedded within it a very 
special lesson vis-à-vis Hegel’s larger effort to explain and critique the multiplicity of 
philosophies. As such, it behooves us to note this lesson in some detail before moving on 
to examining the “Force and Understanding” chapter.  
In order to appreciate this lesson properly, it is necessary, first of all, to recall a 
major point Hegel makes at the very beginning of the Preface to the PhG. Thus, 
regarding the problem of philosophical differences, Hegel states, 
The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, 
the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or 
contradicted; and hence its finds only the acceptance or rejection. It does not 
comprehend t diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of 
truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the 
bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the 
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latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a 
false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it 
instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also 
supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid 
nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not 
conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity 
alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who rejects a philosophical system 
does not usually comprehend what he is doing in this way; and he who grasps the 
contradiction between them does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from 
its one-sidedness, or maintain it in its freedom by recognizing the reciprocally 
necessary moments that take shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility. 
(PhG 2) 
Here, Hegel is, of course, providing a general statement about how to interpret the 
multiplicity of different philosophies. Let us pause to clarify this general point and then 
show how Hegel’s analysis of Perception can now be used to illuminate specific elements 
of Hegel’s point that otherwise would not be readily apparent. 
2.9.1  Hegel’s General Point Regarding the Explanation of Philosophical Multiplicity 
in the “Preface” 
   Hegel’s general point is that the multiple philosophies do not stand in a 
relationship of mere conflict and contradiction. Rather, each historical philosophy 
constitutes a moment in the unfolding of an organic whole. Still, as Hegel points out, it is 
possible to view the various different philosophies as simply contradicting one another. 
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Invoking, once again, an organic analogy, Hegel observes that it is possible to view the 
blossom as simply refuting the bud and the fruit as refuting the blossom in its turn such 
that what is in fact the organic unfolding of the whole plant is viewed instead as the 
successive emergence of discrete and incompatible stages, with each stage refuted the 
prior stage only to find itself refuted and excluded in turn.  
Hegel chastises this view, however, for failing to notice and account for the 
unitary dialectico-organic process governing the emergence of the different philosophies. 
According to Hegel, previous philosophies constitute necessary intellectual preludes to 
subsequent developments. Yet, the genuine insights contained within these earlier 
positions are not simply discarded upon the appearance of a more advanced position; 
rather, they are preserved and sublated by being released from their one-sidedness and 
thereby finding their place within a larger organic whole.  
2.9.2 Perception as Providing Greater Insight into Hegel’s General Explanation of 
Philosophical Multiplicity  
The analysis of Perception allows us to extricate at least two further specific 
components from Hegel’s general point regarding philosophical multiplicity. First, as we 
have already seen, the transition from Sense-certainty to Perception gives a concrete 
instance of dialectical development and sublation. Second, the experience of Perception, 
and specifically its conception of its object, actually provides the means for explaining 
the very emergence of the kind of interpretation of the history of philosophy Hegel 
critiques. Let us examine each of these points. 
159 
 
 
Dialectical development entails undergoing the experience of thinking-through 
what is implicit in a given viewpoint. Typically, this thinking-through involves the 
negation of an initial position only to have that negation negated which results in the 
return of the original position but in a sublated form. Thus, sublation entails the 
preservation and transposition of an insight or position from a lower viewpoint into a 
higher viewpoint by means of which the original insight is reduced to a moment of a 
larger whole.155 For example, the ‘This’ qua immediate ‘Now’ of Sense-certainty was 
negated by a subsequent immediate ‘Now’ only to have this very process of negation 
negated by the emergence of a mediated and universal ‘Now’ which reduced the many 
immediate ‘Nows’ to mere moments of a larger whole. The original ‘This’ qua ‘Now’ 
was thus preserved, not merely refuted or contradicted, within the subsequent higher 
viewpoint.  
By analogy, insofar as it can be shown that a given philosophy expresses the 
position of Sense-certainty regarding the nature of the ‘This’ and that a subsequent 
philosophy expresses the transposed and sublated insight of Sense-certainty as manifested 
in Perception, then we have the means for understanding how the two philosophies stand 
in a relationship not of mere refutation and contradiction but of dialectical continuity. 
Thus, a philosophy of Perception such as Kant’s does not simply refute but rather 
sublates a philosophy of Sense-certainty such as Schulze’s. 
Yet, it remains that the history of the multiple philosophies itself has not always 
been so interpreted. As Hegel notes, conventional opinion has viewed the various 
                                                          
155 This process of transposition and sublation was discussed in Chapter One under the rubric of “Vertical 
Teleology”. 
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philosophies as each forming fundamentally distinct units standing in relationships of 
mere opposition and contradiction to one another. To be sure, there are theories regarding 
how one philosophy “influenced” a subsequent philosophy in historical time. For Hegel, 
however, such talk of influence does little to help move the discussion beyond conceiving 
the various philosophies as still simply contradicting one another; it does not help, in 
other words, in demonstrating the dialectico-organic pattern by which the totality of 
philosophies are intrinsically united. Importantly, however, in the analysis of Perception, 
Hegel provides the means for not merely critiquing but for beginning to explain the very 
existence of this kind of interpretation of the history of the multiple philosophies itself.  
This point is the special insight that the phenomenology of Perception provides 
for elucidating Hegel’s larger explanatory account of philosophical multiplicity. For, the 
analysis of Perception reveals why philosophy is so often interpreted as a mere haphazard 
succession of mutually exclusive ‘Things’ or ‘positions’. 
2.9.3  Perception as the Basis of Naïve Interpretations of Philosophical Multiplicity 
It should be recalled that Perception identifies itself as the viewpoint of “sound 
common sense”. Yet, as noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, it is precisely the 
viewpoint of sound common sense or conventional opinion that views the history of 
philosophy as a history of mere contradiction and refutation. The experience of 
Perception, however, explains why this would be the case. 
 For Perception, reality is constituted by discrete and mutual exclusive Things with 
their various properties. As such, we only need to imagine how the history of philosophy 
would appear to such a viewpoint. For, philosophies themselves could only appear to 
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Perception as fundamentally distinct and mutually exclusive quasi-Things which have 
various “properties”. The properties of the various philosophies would be their various 
“positions” and “arguments” concerning the litany of philosophical topics and questions 
that each takes up. 
 Thus, when Perception looks at the history of philosophy, it will invariably 
arrange philosophies according to distinct groupings, each marked by their different traits 
or “properties” according to which they exclude and contradict each other. Such 
groupings are only too common. Thus, according to the ordinary conception of 
philosophy, there are Realists, and also Idealists, and also Materialists, and also 
Empiricists, and so on. Realists share various properties amongst themselves, as do 
Idealists amongst themselves, and these properties contradict one another, just as they 
both equally contradict those of Empiricists, and so on. If it becomes necessary to make 
distinctions within a certain group, then one simply identifies and adds the contradictory 
properties. A Kantian Idealist is to be distinguished from a Platonic Idealist inasmuch as 
the former holds that the ideas or categories are located in the transcendental ego whereas 
the latter holds that they are located in a noetic heaven. A Kantian Idealist is 
transcendental and also this, and this, and this and so on. 
 Lost in this catalogue of the mutually exclusive philosophies with their various 
essential properties, of course, is any account as to why the philosophies emerge in the 
way that they do, at all. Yet, the present point is that this very fact, namely, that the 
history of philosophy is so often conceived, or rather Perceived, in this way, is now 
explained, at least in part, by Hegel’s phenomenology of the experience of Perception. 
Moreover, if we recall the experience at which Perception culminates and thus transitions 
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into Understanding, we see the ground laid for a radical reinterpretation of the manner in 
which the different philosophies relate to one another. Indeed, in an important sense, this 
radical reinterpretation of the relationships among the different philosophies just is the 
PhG. Thus, the transition from Perception to Understanding provides an at least partial 
guide on how to interpret the PhG itself. 
2.9.4 Transition to Understanding as Providing Suggestions for Reinterpreting 
Philosophical Multiplicity and Conflict 
 Although we have not yet accompanied Hegel in thinking-through the viewpoint 
of Understanding, we have seen what drives the transition from Perception to that higher 
viewpoint. As Hegel states, Perception culminates in the recognition that “the object in its 
pure determinateness, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its 
essential being, is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being” (PhG 76). 
Perception’s ideal of a discrete object capable of being defined apart from its relational 
context has been overcome. It has been sublated as a moment within a larger universal 
process, one governed by an order of “pure essences, the absolute elements and powers” 
(PhG 78). The ensuing chapter on Force and Understanding will take up an examination 
of these absolute elements and powers. It will start with a conception of Force and 
culminate with a conception of Life as a self-conditioning totality. 
 For Hegel, as he maintained starting from some of his earliest works, in order to 
interpret the history of the different philosophies adequately it is important to transition 
from viewing that history after the manner of Perception and into a viewpoint which 
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grasps the many philosophies as forming a self-conditioning dialectico-organic whole.156 
The long passage from the Preface of the PhG quoted above makes this abundantly clear. 
The Introduction to LHP provides an even more extended meditation on the need to make 
this transition from a Perception-based interpretation of the history of the different 
philosophies to an interpretation based on a higher viewpoint. Let us briefly examine the 
account provided in that Introduction. 
 First, Hegel critiques those Perception-based interpretations which treat “the 
diversity in philosophies as if the manifold were fixed and stationary and composed of 
what is mutually exclusive” (LHP I 33). Then, he articulates the need for what would be 
entailed in transitioning to a higher viewpoint in interpreting the history of different 
philosophies. Hegel’s basic point is that the different philosophies must be understood as 
constituting expressions of the development of the mind itself and thereby forming 
moments in the unfolding of a self-conditioning, self-differentiating universal organic 
process: 
A complete form of thought such as is here presented, is a philosophy […] But 
everything hangs on this: these forms are nothing else than the original distinction 
in the Idea itself, which is what it is only in them. They are in this way essential 
to, and constitute the content of the Idea, which in thus sundering itself, attains to 
form. The manifold character of the principles which appear, is, however, not 
accidental, but necessary: different forms constitute an integral part of the whole 
                                                          
156 Cf. the DZ: “Speculation is the activity of the one universal Reason directed upon itself. Reason, 
therefore, does not view the philosophical systems of different epochs and different heads merely as 
different modes [of doing philosophy] and purely idiosyncratic views. Once it has liberated its own view 
from contingencies and limitations [i.e. limitations that would result from operating in a viewpoint below 
Reason such as Perception], Reason necessarily finds itself throughout all the particular forms” (87-8). 
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form. They are the determinations of the original Idea, which together constitute 
the whole; but as being outside one another, their union does not take place in 
them, but in us, the observers. Each system is determined as one, but it is not a 
permanent condition that the differences are thus mutually exclusive. The 
inevitable fate of these determinations must follow, and that is that they shall be 
drawn together and reduced to elements or moments. (LHP I 34-5) 
The Idea and/or Concept, which is the “pure essence and absolute power” mentioned in 
the PhG, differentiates and concretizes itself into various forms of thought or the mind 
such as Sense-certainty and Perception. These forms, when expressed, just are different 
philosophies. Accordingly, the different philosophies do not constitute mutually 
exclusive and contradictory options but rather moments in a self-differentiating, organic 
whole which just is the mind itself.157  
 In the first instance, however, the philosophies themselves are unaware of their 
intrinsic dialectico-organic unity with one another. Rather, it remains for us, the 
phenomenological and historical observers, to discern this unity.158 For a viewpoint such 
as Perception, the history of philosophy appears to be an inorganic if not thoroughly 
unintelligible agglomeration of mutually exclusive positions. As such, then, the Hegelian 
philosophy, with its breakthrough into grasping the dialectico-organic unity of the 
                                                          
157 Cf. Hegel: The progression of the history of philosophy “shows itself to be universal Mind presenting 
itself in the history of the world in all the richness of its form” (LHP I 33); “Within [the developed Idea] 
Philosophy in its developed state is constituted: it is one Idea in its totality and in all its individual parts, 
like one life in a living being, one pulse throbs throughout all its members” (LHP I 28). 
158 Cf. Hegel: “The manifold character of the principles [of the different philosophies] which appear, is, 
however, not accident, but necessary: the different forms constitute an integral part of the whole form. They 
are determinations of the original Idea, which together constitute the whole; but as being outside of one 
another, their union does not take place in them, but in us, the observers” (LHP I 35). 
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different philosophies, constitutes the latest and highest development of philosophy itself. 
As Hegel states, 
It is only the living and mental [Geistig] which internally bestirs and develops 
itself. Thus the Idea as concrete in itself, and self-developing, is an organic system 
and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of moments of 
development. Philosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this 
development, and as conceiving Thought, is itself this development in Thought. 
The more progress made in this development, the more perfect is the Philosophy. 
(LHP I 27) 
What Hegel is providing is the foundation for a thoroughgoing scientific hermeneutic of 
the history of philosophy. He is providing the means of eschewing the all too 
conventional Perception-based practice of the viewing the different philosophies as 
forming discrete and mutually exclusive positions which can be grouped and aggregated 
according to various “properties”. In its stead, Hegel shows how to interpret the different 
philosophies as forming moments of a dialectico-organic whole. He replaces the basic 
terms and relations by which philosophies are conventionally distinguished – for 
example, Realists are “in between” Empiricists and Idealists – with a new set of basic 
terms and relations derived from a phenomenology of the development of the mind itself. 
Philosophies differ inasmuch as different stages in the development of the mind differ. As 
such, they do not form mutually exclusive and contradictory positions; rather they are 
expressions and moments of a unitary, organic process. 
 For Hegel, again, it is only the latest and highest philosophy – the Hegelian 
philosophy – that grasps this fact. Yet, by that very fact, Hegel is able to provide an 
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explanation as to why the other philosophies fall short of such an understanding. For, the 
ultimate conclusion to which Hegel’s explanatory account of philosophical multiplicity 
drives us, at this point, is that the other philosophies are expressions of forms of the mind 
that are inadequate to grasping the very notion of development itself. 
 The chapter on Force and Understanding greatly augments our understanding of 
Hegel’s conception of development as consisting in the dialectical unfolding of an 
organic whole. It is apposite, then, that we should now turn to that discussion. 
3. Force and Understanding 
 The viewpoint of Force and Understanding begins where Perception leaves off. 
Consciousness has sublated its view of the object as a self-identical Thing with many 
universal properties into the notion of the object as an “unconditioned universal” or 
universal relational context. As Hegel states, with the emergence of this universal 
relational context, 
[t]he unity of ‘being-for-self’ [i.e. self-identical unity] and ‘being-for-another’ 
[i.e. properties defined by their relations to others] is posited; in other words, the 
absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence. At first sight, this seems 
to concern only the form of the moments in reciprocal relation; but ‘being-for-
self’ and ‘being-for-another’ are the content itself as well, since the antithesis in 
its truth can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result, viz. that the 
content taken in perception to be true, belongs in fact only to the form, in the 
unity of which it is dissolved. This content is likewise universal; there can be no 
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other content which by its particular constitution would fail to fall within this 
unconditioned universality. (PhG 80) 
It is not that the mind has simply come to recognize that its objects – the Things – have 
the form of relating to one another. Rather, the content of the present object is the 
relation, or more precisely, it is the universal reciprocal relationality in which Things, 
with their particular constitutions, have been reduced to mere moments. Thus, the present 
chapter is a prolonged examination on the nature of relationality, which for Hegel is 
typified in the relationship which he calls “Force”. 
 Before moving on to the examination of Force, it would be worth recalling 
Hegel’s comments in the first paragraph of this new chapter. He reminds us that the 
object currently under investigation appears differently to the form of consciousness 
presently under investigation, namely, Understanding, than it does to us, the 
phenomenologists. Thus, Hegel states, 
It is essential to distinguish the two: for consciousness, the object has returned 
into itself from its relation to an other and has thus become Concept in principle; 
but consciousness is not yet for itself the Concept, and consequently does not 
recognize itself in that reflected object. For us, this object has developed through 
the movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is involved in 
that development, and the reflection is the same on both sides, or, there is only 
one reflection. (PhG 79) 
The mind now has an object that has returned to itself through its relation to another. Yet, 
only we, the phenomenologists, know that such an object qua relational pattern is a very 
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tissue of the mind itself and that therefore what consciousness grasps in its object is but 
an objectification by consciousness of its own self.159 To be sure, this is a theme that runs 
throughout the Phenomenology. Nevertheless, it is a point worth emphasizing again as we 
examine the continued development of both consciousness and its object in 
Understanding. 
 Not all of the details of Hegel’s analysis of relationality in the mode of Force are 
of equal interest, not least because they often rely on antiquated conceptions of science. 
For example, in contemporary physics the very idea of gravity or universal attraction as a 
kind of “force” has been superseded by the view of gravity as a curvature in space-
time.160 Thus, it will be useful to dilate only on those sections of Force and 
Understanding that help in understanding Hegel’s larger effort to explain the emergence 
of different philosophies. 
3.1  Universality and Particularity Sublated in the Unity of Force 
 According to Hegel, within the unconditioned universal, at least provisionally, 
there is still a distinction to be drawn between the two moments of the universal medium 
of diverse properties, on the one hand, and the One reflected into itself, on the other, or in 
                                                          
159 Cf. Hegel on the viewpoint of Understanding: “Consciousness still shrinks away from what has 
emerged, and takes it as the essence in the objective sense” (PhG 80). In other words, consciousness refuses 
to take full responsibility for having constituted the object in and through its own development. Instead, it 
still treats it as something “found” “out there” in the “world”. 
160 Hegel, in his often uncanny penchant for prescience, seems to have been aware of the need to move 
beyond a scientific viewpoint limited by the conception of “force”, though he of course did not produce the 
Einsteinian insight through which it was overcome. Thus, speaking of the laws of planetary motion in the 
Philosophy of Nature, Hegel states, “we must not speak of forces. If we want to speak of force then there is 
just one force, and its moments do not, as two forces, pull in different directions. The motion of celestial 
bodies is not any such pulling this way and that but is free motion; they go their own way, as the ancients 
said, like blessed gods” (65). 
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other words, between being-for-another and being-for-itself. Yet, he immediately clarifies 
that, in examining Understanding, 
[w]e have to see how these moments exhibit themselves in the unconditioned 
universality which is their essence. It is clear at the outset that, since they exist 
only in this universality, they are no longer separated from one another at all but 
are in themselves essentially self-superseding aspects, and what is posited is only 
their transition into one another. (PhG 81) 
The unconditioned universal or absolute relational context is the object for the mind in 
Understanding. Thus, being-for-another and being-for-self have been reduced to 
moments in this universal process. Still, it remains to show how these two moments 
operate within this higher context which is their essence. 
 According to Hegel, the diverse properties or “matters”, provisionally taken as 
independent, in fact “pass over into their unity,” while their unity, again, provisionally 
taken as independent, “directly unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces itself to 
unity” (PhG 81). This very dialectical movement, however, according to Hegel, just is 
Force. Thus, there are not two problematically independent realities – Thing and 
properties – but only one universal relational context or process, namely, the totality of 
Force.161 Yet, this process has two moments: 1) its dispersal into a plurality of properties 
or “matters”, which Hegel calls the “expression of Force”, and 2) its withdrawal back into 
unity from its expression, which Hegel calls “Force proper”. These two moments 
                                                          
161 Cf. Hegel: “In point of fact, however, Force is the unconditioned universal which is equally in its own 
self what it is for an other” (PhG 82).  
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constitute one process inasmuch as Force proper must express itself, yet, in expressing 
itself, it remains entirely within itself.162 
 Hegel quickly clarifies, however, that the truth of the intrinsic unity of Force is, at 
this stage, only for us, the phenomenologists. By contrast, while it has broken into the 
realm of the unconditioned universal, Understanding still shares with Perception the 
proclivity for holding the two moments apart from one another as independent. As Hegel 
states, “the Understanding, to which the Concept of Force belongs, is strictly speaking the 
Concept which sustains the different moments qua different.” (PhG 82) As a result, 
Understanding initially posits Force proper as the “inner being of Things”. (PhG 83) 
Force thus initially appears as a unitary substance reflected into itself, which 
entails that the unfolding of the diverse properties must be something other than Force. In 
order for Force to be the very the subsistence of Things with their properties which 
consciousness perceives, however, it must express itself. Thus, it would seem that Force 
is solicited into expressing itself by what is other than it, namely, the unfolded or 
universal medium of matters or properties. Yet, this soliciting is itself Force, and so it 
would appear that Force proper resides in its expression. The Force that is expressed, 
however, is itself solicited to reflect back into itself by the principle of unity which is 
now other than Force, which in turn reveals itself in fact to be Force. 
 Upon further thinking-through, however, Hegel shows that in order to solicit 
Force proper to express itself, the soliciting Force must be solicited to do so, namely, by 
Force proper. Thus, Force was never solicited by something alien to express itself; Force 
                                                          
162 Similarly, for Hegel, the multiplicity of philosophies would constitute the various expressions of, as it 
were, the Force of Forces, namely, the mind. 
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rather ultimately solicits itself. Moreover, it is also Force proper which solicits itself to 
solicit it out of expression and back into the latent unity of Force proper. “Consequently”, 
Hegel states, “this distinction, too, which obtained between the two Forces, one of which 
was supposed to be soliciting, the other solicited, Force is transformed into the same 
reciprocal interchange of determinatenesses”163 (PhG 84). We have thus another 
dialectical frenzy the immediate upshot of which it will be important to clarify. 
3.1.1 Clarifying the Previous Section 
 Although its proper object is the unconditioned universal context of Force, for 
Understanding there was nevertheless an obvious distinction to be drawn between latent 
Force, or Force proper, on the one hand, and the expression of Force, on the other. It thus 
drew a distinction for itself between the condition and the conditioned. Force proper was 
posited as the condition for the expression of Force in the unfolding of various properties 
perceived by consciousness. Thus, qua conditioned, the expression of Force had to be 
posited as other than Force, since Force is the universal unconditioned. Yet, as the 
subsistent condition of its own expression, Force proper nevertheless must be solicited to 
express itself by its other. To that very extent, however, Force proper is revealed to be 
itself conditioned. The ultimate lesson for consciousness up to this point, then, is that 
Force is unconditioned precisely and only to the extent that it is a self-conditioning whole 
with various moments. 
                                                          
163 Cf. Fichte: “If a substance is to be determined […] or if something determinate is to be considered a 
substance, then certainly the interplay must proceed from one of the components, which is to that extent 
fixed, insofar as the interplay is to be determined. But it is not fixed absolutely; for I can equally set out 
from the opposing term; and then the very component that was previously established, fixed, essential – 
becomes contingent” (WL 185). 
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3.2 Form and Content Sublated in Force 
 Hegel pauses, here, to draw a distinction between the form and content of the 
Concept of Force currently under investigation. According to Hegel, what has thus far 
been examined, namely, the distinction between Force proper versus the expression of 
Force, concerns more precisely the content of Force. In contrast, the distinction between 
the Force which solicits versus Force as solicited concerns the form of the relation. 
Hegel’s point is to make clear that the preceding investigation has revealed that “the 
differences, qua differences of content and form, vanished in themselves” (PhG 85). In 
other words, 
On the side of form, the essence of the active, soliciting or independent side, was 
the same as that which, on the side of content, presented itself as Force driven 
back into itself; the side which was passive, which was solicited or for an other, 
was, from the side of form, the same as that which, from the side of content, 
presented itself as the universal medium of the many ‘matters’. (PhG 85) 
On the side of form, that which solicits another turned out to be the same as the Force 
which, on the side of content, withdraws back into itself. By the same token, however, 
that which was solicited into activity, on the side of form, turned out to be the same as the 
expression of Force itself, in terms of content. 
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 According to Hegel, then, Force exists only as actual,164 and actual Force is not a 
substance or a Thing but a pure relationality. The two moments of Force, Force proper 
and the expression of Force, 
are not divided into two independent extremes offering each other only an 
opposite extreme: their essence rather consist simply and solely in this, that each 
is solely through the other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, 
since it is the other. They have thus, in fact, no substances of their own which 
might support and maintain them. (PhG 86) 
For Hegel, substances or Things are not absolute. They are but moments in a pattern of 
relations.165 As Hegel states, “the moments of [Force’s] actuality, their substances and 
their movement, collapse unresistingly into an undifferentiated unity, a unity which is not 
Force driven back into itself (for this is itself only such a moment), but is its Concept qua 
Concept” (PhG 86). Thus, in recognizing that the reality of Things is dependent upon and 
governed by a pattern of pure relationality, the mind has thereby broken into the realm of 
pure conceptuality, as well. The result, for the mind, is that “the realization of Force is at 
the same time the loss of reality” (PhG 86).  
Understanding had initially taken Force to be a form in which substances related 
to one another. Now, it realizes that Force is the very content of its object, as well. Its 
object, in other words, is pure relationality grasped under the auspices of pure 
                                                          
164 Or, as self-actualizing. Cf. the discussion in the previous chapter vis-à-vis Hegel’s appropriation of the 
Aristotelian notion of “act” or energeia. 
165 Cf. Fichte: “The terms of the relationship, taken individually, are accidents, while their totality is 
substance” (WL 184). 
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conceptuality, which is to say, apart from any even quasi-sensuous determinations which 
hitherto had provided consciousness with its basic sense of “reality”.166 
3.3 Inner and Outer, or Reality and Appearance, Sublated in Force 
 At this point, Hegel calls attention to a distinction which consciousness draws 
between the universal which appears to the mind as the “play of forces”, on the one hand, 
and the inner being of this play as it is understood in its pure conceptuality, or under the 
“Concept of Force qua Concept”, on the other (PhG 86). The play of forces is what 
appears to the mind as the ongoing manifold of changes among the Things in its sensuous 
perceptual field, whereas the pure Concept of Force “exists only as an object for the 
Understanding”167 (PhG 86). Understanding thus understands itself to be that which 
“looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things” (PhG 
86). 
 Hegel frames his discussion in terms of a sort of syllogism in which the sensuous 
appearance of the play of Forces functions as a middle term uniting the extremes of the 
Understanding, on the one hand, and the inner world of Force in its pure conceptuality, 
on the other. The middle term, as Hegel states “is therefore called appearance; for we 
call being that is directly and in its own self a non-being, a surface show” (PhG 87).  
                                                          
166 Cf. Fichte: “Form and content are not two separate elements. Form in its entirety is the content” (IWF 
28); “mere relation without anything to relate,” i.e. the pure form of relationality (WL 187). 
167 With the emergence of Understanding we thus have a further articulation of the explanation of, for 
example, the Platonic doctrine of noesis or the Kantian transcendental ego mentioned previously. 
175 
 
 
In one sense, then, for the mind, the sensuous appearance of the play of Forces is 
merely a kind of epiphenomenal reality through which it peers in order to understand the 
real phenomenon of Force itself. Yet, Hegel quickly qualifies this point by stating, 
It is not merely a surface show; it is appearance, a totality of show. This totality, 
as totality or as universal, is what constitutes the inner [of Things], the play of 
Forces as a reflection of the inner into itself. In it, the Things of perception are 
expressly present for consciousness as they are in themselves, viz. as moments 
which immediately and without rest or stay turn into their opposite, the One 
immediately into the universal, the essential immediately into the unessential and 
vice versa. This play of Forces is consequently the developed negative; but its 
truth is the positive, viz. the universal object that, in itself, possesses being. The 
being of this object for consciousness is mediated by the movement of 
appearance, in which the being of perception and the sensuously objective has a 
merely negative significance. (PhG 87) 
The ongoing play of Forces experienced in the mind’s perceptual field, in which the 
Things of Perception have indeed been reduced to perpetually negated or vanishing 
moments, nevertheless presents merely a negative side to the more positive reality of the 
realm of pure conceptuality which is the inner truth of this show and which is the object 
strictly of the Understanding. This inner realm of pure conceptuality is thus equally the 
play of Forces but in its totality or strict universality – the total pattern of intelligible 
relations, in other words. 
 According to Hegel, the positing by consciousness of a distinction between the 
play of Forces and its inner truth actually manifests – albeit, only for us, the 
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phenomenologists – a movement of the mind or consciousness itself. As he states, in 
drawing this distinction  
Consciousness, therefore, reflects itself out of this movement back into itself as 
the True, but, qua consciousness, converts this truth again into an objective inner, 
and distinguishes this reflection of Things from its own reflection into itself: just 
as the movement of mediation is likewise still objective for it. This inner is, 
therefore, for consciousness an extreme over against it; but it is for consciousness 
the True, since in the inner, as the in-itself, it possess at the same time the 
certainty of itself, or the moment of its being-for-self. But it is not yet conscious 
of this ground or basis. (PhG 87) 
In positing an inner Truth “behind” the play of Forces, the mind is in fact objectifying 
itself since it is the true being-for-itself. Yet, the mind does not recognize that it has done 
this and so treats the inner Truth as an object-in-itself that stands radically over against it. 
In other words, what should, or at least could, constitute for the mind a moment of 
profound self-recognition instead produces a state of utter self-alienation. For the mind 
now treats what is in fact an objectification of itself as a “pure beyond”, an object-in-
itself existing intrinsically outside the scope of consciousness.  
3.3.1 The Appearance/Reality Distinction as a Further Explanation of Kantian 
Philosophy   
 Important to note is that the in-itself “beyond” is posited as the supersensible 
world in contrast to the sensuous world experienced in perception. For, in noting this 
point we are able to recognize how Hegel is providing a more profound explanatory 
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account of the Kantian distinction between Things qua appearing, or phenomena, versus 
the Thing-in-themselves, or the noumenal realm. The noumenal realm, for Kant, is indeed 
the realm of the Thing-in-themselves beyond the scope of conscious experience, whereas 
the phenomena are the Things inasmuch as they can be perceived within what Kant 
declares to be the limits of human conscious experience. Indeed, noumenon literally 
means “object of Nous [or Understanding]”. It is the would-be object of pure 
Understanding. Yet, Hegel’s point is that Kant does not recognize that this object is in 
fact simply a self-objectification of Understanding. The real Thing-in-itself is the mind.    
 The mind, including the mind of Kant, at this stage, however, does not recognize 
itself in the object it has posited. Ironically, then, although it is in fact nothing other than 
a self-objectification of consciousness, the Thing-in-itself, insofar as it is posited as a 
“pure beyond” of the mind, can only be interpreted by the mind as “void of all spiritual 
relationships and distinctions of consciousness qua consciousness” (PhG 88). The Thing-
in-itself, the putatively real thing, is thus ironically reduced to a mere void lacking all the 
rich determinations of conscious experience. 
3.4  Determining the ‘Inner’ or ‘Beyond’: The Emergence of Law 
 According to Hegel, although Understanding takes the object in its truth to lie in a 
supersensible “beyond” devoid of all determinations, it nevertheless sets about positing 
determinations for this realm. The first determination that Understanding posits for the 
supersensible is that of the notion of “Law”. Law is the expression of the universal 
difference or relational totality that Force proved itself to be upon being thought-through. 
According to Hegel, 
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This [universal] difference is expressed in the law, which is the stable image of 
unstable appearance. Consequently, the supersensible world is an inert realm of 
laws which, though beyond the perceived world – for this exhibits law only 
through incessant change – is equally present in it and is its direct tranquil image. 
(PhG 90-91) 
Rather than being beyond consciousness, the supersensible is grasped by the 
Understanding as the realm of laws which is itself simply the truth of sensuous 
perception. The realm of laws is what governs the pattern and order of incessant 
transitions constitutive of the realm of perceptual appearance. It is not separate from the 
perceptual field, but is rather the latter’s own immanent intelligibility. Nor is it beyond 
the scope of consciousness, rather it is given the very experience of Understanding. 
 According to Hegel, there is a limitation at this point to the mind’s positing of a 
realm of laws governing appearance. The limitation is actually twofold: 1) scientific laws 
are abstract and so prescind from the particular determinations given in perceptual 
experience,168 2) the realm of laws itself ipso facto constitutes a plurality, which is a 
problem insofar as that plurality violates the simple, tranquil unity which was supposed to 
characterize the realm of laws inasmuch as they transcended the flux of appearance. It is 
this twofold limitation within the very concept of law that constitutes the fulcrum point 
upon which consciousness is lifted out of Understanding to a higher viewpoint. There are 
several details in Hegel’s analysis of Force and Understanding that lead up to the 
                                                          
168 Cf. Hegel: “This realm of laws is indeed the truth for the Understanding, and that truth has its content in 
the law. At the same time, however, this realm is only the initial truth for the Understanding and does not 
fill out the world of appearance. In this the law is present, but is not the entire presence of appearance; with 
every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality” (PhG 91). 
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emergence of this higher viewpoint, not all of which, however, are equally important. 
Nevertheless, the most important points admit of being summarized in short order. 
3.4.1 The Emergence of Law as Mediating the Movement to Self-consciousness 
In response to the second problem vis-à-vis the realm of laws mentioned above, 
Hegel states that, in contrast to the many specific laws of the contemporary physics of his 
time, consciousness posits a “pure Concept of law”169 (PhG 92). This pure Concept of 
law is the Newtonian law of universal attraction. This law in effect encompasses, and 
thereby reduces to unity, the plurality of more particular laws which the physics of 
Hegel’s time had managed to formulate. The problem with this solution is that, within the 
formulation of universal attraction, plurality and difference still remain inasmuch as the 
terms constituting the definition of universal attraction are distinguished and related in 
the definition itself.170 Thus, the pure Concept of law, as simple, undifferentiated unity, 
“is turned against law itself” (PhG 92). As a result, a distinction appears to be drawn 
between the phenomenon, Force, which is a simple unity, on the one hand, and its 
expression in law, which necessarily posits differences, on the other.  
 Hegel’s major concern in this context is that the existence of Force as an actually 
existing phenomenon cannot be derived with necessity from the Concept of law 
expressed in its definition. “Law and Force, or […] Notion and being” are indifferent, 
Hegel states (PhG 93). The indifference affects both the relation between law and its 
existence as Force as well as the relation between the different parts of the law itself: 
                                                          
169 Here, Hegel would seem to be referring to Newton’s generalization of Kepler’s laws. 
170 Cf. F = MA in which Force is distinguished from, yet identified with, Mass times Acceleration. 
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“either the universal, Force, is indifferent to the division which is law, or the differences, 
the parts, of the law are indifferent to one another.” (PhG 94) Yet, it turns out that in the 
actual explanation of the phenomena of perception, 
Force is constituted exactly the same as law; there is said to be no difference 
whatever between them. The differences are the pure, universal expression of law, 
and pure Force; but both have the same content, the same constitution. Thus the 
difference qua difference of content, of the thing, is also again withdrawn. (PhG 
95) 
The immanent intelligibility of the law and the immanent intelligibility of the 
phenomenon to be explained by the law are the same. Thus, in understanding the law, we 
thereby simply understand the phenomenon which it explains, nothing more.  
 The difference that was no difference which was experienced in the play of 
soliciting versus solicited Forces is now repeated in the Understanding itself in the 
difference that is no difference between law and Force as well as between the parts of law 
which consciousness moves back and forth between. The result is that consciousness 
learns a more basic law, namely the law of appearance itself, according to which 
“differences arise which are no differences, or that what is selfsame repels itself from 
itself; and similarly, that the difference are only such as are in reality no differences and 
which cancel themselves; in other words, what is not selfsame is self-attractive” (PhG 
96). Both the realm of appearance and the realm of inner Truth or law thus posit 
distinctions within themselves only to supersede these differences and return to a unity-
in-difference.  
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The first supersensible inner realm, the realm of inert law, which was “the 
tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the perceived world,” is now changed 
into its opposite, one in which the simple, selfsame and tranquil realm of law repels itself 
from itself thus becoming a realm of pure change. (PhG 96) Hegel calls this s;econd 
supersensible world which is opposite the realm of inert, tranquil law, the “inverted 
world”: 
The first supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the perceived 
world into the universal element; it had its necessary counterpart in this perceived 
world which still retained for itself the principle of change and alteration. The first 
kingdom of laws lacked that principle, but obtains it as an inverted world. (PhG 
96-97) 
 In thinking-through the inversion of the supersensible world into its opposite, 
Hegel maintains “We have to think pure change, or think antithesis within the antithesis 
itself, or contradiction” (PhG 90). The supersensible realm of laws is the antithesis of the 
realm of appearance; yet, within that antithesis is the difference constitutive of law as 
such, a difference which is produced as a matter of pure change. The inverted world is 
thus the opposite of the opposite of the realm of appearance and so “overarches” the latter 
and “has it within in” (PhG 99). Only thus is the difference between the inner world and 
its expression in appearance a “difference as inner difference, or difference in its own 
self, or difference as infinity” (PhG 99). 
 This “simple infinity, or the absolute Concept,” according to Hegel, “may be 
called the simple essence of life,” and it is with the emergence of this conception of Life 
that Hegel proposes to overcome the twofold limitation of the realm of laws as previously 
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discussed (PhG 100). For laws are 1) abstract and so fail to determinate the actual in its 
particular and 2) lack simple unity and so fall asunder into mutually indifferent moments. 
Life, by contrast, in its infinity eo ipso determines the totality of its moments or 
differences; yet, it simultaneously supersedes these differences and preserves itself in a 
higher unity. Accordingly, regarding the simple essence of Life, Hegel states that it is 
“the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor 
interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their 
supersession; it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest” 
(PhG 100). 
 Infinity as the self-supersession or sublation of all differences, moreover, just is 
the mind or consciousness, according to Hegel, and so in having infinity or Life as its 
object, consciousness thereby becomes self-consciousness. Again, for Hegel, it is through 
its attempt to explain Force that the Understanding manages to objectify for itself the 
very nature of consciousness. As Hegel states, 
The Understanding’s ‘explanation’ is primarily only the description of what self-
consciousness is. It supersedes the differences present in the law, differences 
which have already become pure differences but are still indifferent, and posits 
them in a single unity, in Force. But this unifying of them is equally and 
immediately a sundering, for it supersedes the differences and posits the oneness 
of Force, only by creating a new difference, that of Law and Force, which, 
however, at the same time is no difference; and, moreover, from the fact that this 
difference is no difference, it goes on to supersede this difference again, since it 
lets Force be similarly constituted to Law (PhG101). 
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Understanding posits Force as a unitary phenomenon which is merely explained by the 
law which contains indifferent differences. Yet, this positing of Force as unitary itself 
produces a difference between Law and Force, or Concept and Being. At the same time, 
however, Understanding posits the essential unity of content of Law and Force and so 
maintains that it is a difference that is no difference. This very movement, however, of 
positing differences only to sublate them is of the very nature of the mind itself. Thus, in 
the process of explaining Force, consciousness becomes conscious of itself, or self-
consciousness. 
 Hegel maintains that while the self-sublating infinity of Life which is the new 
object of the mind, has in fact been produced by the mind, it is nevertheless not an object 
for consciousness, but only for us, the phenomenologists: 
To the Understanding, the movement, as it is found in experience, is here a [mere] 
happening, and the selfsame and the unlike are predicates, whose essence is an 
inert substrate. What is, for the Understanding, an object in sensuous covering, is 
for us in its essential form as a pure Concept. (PhG 102) 
For Understanding, there is still an object – for example, a substance or Thing with a 
sensuous covering “out there” – which constitutes the basic content of reality and to 
which are attached the various predicates of selfsame and unlike. It does not understand 
that the very movement of Life, the process of its self-sublating infinity, is its proper 
object and, moreover, that it itself is responsible for it. 
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 The fact that the mind has as its object the infinity of Life, yet simultaneously 
does not recognize itself therein, will form the basis for the ensuing dialectic of self-
consciousness. 
3.5     Summary of Force and Understanding 
The viewpoint of Force and Understanding provides a provisional sublation of 
Perception, in particular the tension between particularity and universality operative 
therein. The key insight for Understanding is that Things or substances are not primary; 
rather, they are moments in a universal relational context. 
The further question that Understanding thinks-through is the nature of 
relationality itself. Understanding goes through several stages in its attempt to conceive 
of relation as Force. It initially conceives of Force according to the residual restrictions of 
the viewpoint of Perception and distinguishes between Force as a latent, universal power 
and the particular expressions of Force. Upon thinking-through this distinction, however, 
Understanding experiences a dialectical frenzy in which latent Force is revealed to be 
indistinguishable from its expression. This was only to be expected inasmuch as Force is 
not a ‘Thing’ with properties, but a concrete and universal relational pattern. 
In order to preserve its original conviction regarding the distinction between the 
universal and particular aspects of Force, Understanding shifts its ground and postulates a 
distinction between the appearance of Force and its reality behind or beyond the realm of 
appearance. The realm of appearance is the realm of perceptual or sensuous flux, while 
the ‘beyond’ consists of the tranquil unity which is the essence or pure form of 
appearance.  
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In terms of explaining the multiplicity of philosophies, Hegel thus shows how the 
distinction between appearance and reality, as manifested in a plurality of instances such 
as Kant’s phenomena/noumenon distinction, is not simply a haphazard event. Rather, the 
positing it is to be explained as the result of a form of the mind attempting to account for 
what is given in its experience, albeit from a restricted viewpoint. For, the mind 
experiences the difference between that which is given in sensuous perception, on the one 
hand, and that which is grasped by the Understanding, on the other. Yet, it struggles to 
grasp the nature of the relation between these two aspects of its experiences, and at this 
stage of its development it contrives to explain the nature of the relation in terms of the 
appearance/reality distinction. 
Understanding eventually postulates the realm of Force qua ‘beyond’ as the realm 
of the pure form of law as opposed to the appearance of Force. Yet, this postulation 
proves to be doubly problematic. For, the realm of Law postulated is supposed to 
represent the tranquil unity of Force as the opposed to flux of its sensuous appearance. 
Yet, the law contains difference within itself. Thus, in the Newtonian formulation F = 
MA, a distinction is drawn between Force, on the one hand, and Mass times Acceleration, 
on the other. This distinction undermines the tranquil unity of the pure form of law. Still, 
the difference is immediately annulled inasmuch as Force is affirmed to be identical to 
Mass times Acceleration. Thus, the difference is revealed to be no difference.  
The larger point is that this transition from the tranquil unity of the pure form of 
law, to the positing of a difference which negates that unity, to the subsequent negation of 
this negation through the affirmation of an identity in a higher unity – this tripartite 
transition itself manifests the pure form of change or development. Yet, the realm of law 
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was postulated precisely as the opposite or negation of the realm of changing 
appearances. This point pushes the analysis to the second problematic aspect of positing a 
realm of law ‘beyond’ that of the appearance of Force. 
For, the realm of appearance is postulated as the realm in which Force is enacted 
in the play of changing appearances. Thus, Understanding would presume to posit a 
distinction between Force and law, or Reality and Concept. Yet, the immanent 
intelligibility of Force is identical to that of its law. Thus, consciousness again posits a 
difference which in fact is no difference. Indeed, the realm of law already revealed itself 
to be the realm of pure change. Thus, the distinction between law and Force proves to be 
doubly a difference which is no difference. For, the tranquil realm of law is the realm of 
pure change, just as the realm of changing appearances manifests the immanent and 
abiding intelligibility of law, as such. 
According to Hegel, the process by which differences are posited only to be 
negated and sublated into a higher unity constitutes the very essence of Life qua infinity. 
Infinity, for Hegel, as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four, does not 
prescind or abstract from differences or limitations, but posits them in order to preserve 
itself within them. Life manifests this form of infinity in a form that, as we will see, is 
only surpassed by the mind itself. At any rate, insofar as the object of consciousness 
consists in such self-sublating infinity, then the object of consciousness has become Life. 
It is with the emergence of Life as the object of consciousness that the mind transitions 
from mere consciousness to self-consciousness. For, the work of self-sublation 
manifested in the object is actually performed by the mind itself. Yet, at this stage, the 
mind does not yet recognize this fact. In-itself the object of the mind is now 
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consciousness itself. Still, it will only be in and through the dialectical development of 
Self-consciousness that this fact will become for consciousness. 
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Chapter III 
Self-consciousness and Hegel’s Explanation of Transcendental Philosophy 
 The “Self-consciousness” chapter constitutes a pivotal turning point in the 
development of the Phenomenology for several reasons. The present chapter is charged 
with the task of explicating the most salient among these reasons in the service of the 
larger goal of demonstrating how Hegel explains the emergence of the multiplicity of 
conflicting philosophies. This chapter will accordingly proceed as follows. 
 First, there will be a brief review of key points that precipitated the transition 
from consciousness to self-consciousness in the Phenomenology. 
 Second, there will be an extended analysis of key aspects of J.G. Fichte’s system 
as it is primarily found in the Wissenschaftslehre (WL), although other texts from Fichte’s 
corpus will be called upon to provide support or clarity, as needed. The reason for this 
analysis of Fichte is that a central argument of the present chapter will be that Fichte’s 
system constitutes an indispensable point of reference for any proper comprehension of 
Hegel’s effort in the “Self-consciousness” chapter, especially the Lord/Bondsman 
dialectic. 
 Third, there will be an examination of Hegel’s initial response to Fichte’s system 
in the Differenzschrift (DZ). The DZ provides crucial insights into Hegel’s view of 
Fichte’s system, insights which can in turn be used to help analyze the account put forth 
in the “Self-consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology. 
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 Fourth, the “Self-consciousness” chapter will be examined in close detail and in 
light of the preceding discussion of Fichte’s system and the DZ. In this part of the 
chapter, the controversial argument will be put forth that the Lord/Bondsman dialectic 
constitutes an allegory for the internal experience of an individual consciousness. Such an 
interpretation is, to say the least, unorthodox. For, the overwhelming consensus among 
commentators has been to read the Lord/Bondsman dialectic as the account of a 
primordial social encounter between two distinct individuals in which they attempt to 
extract mutual recognition from one another. A close reading of the text, especially in 
light of a sustained analysis of Fichte’s system and Hegel’s initial critique thereof, 
however, will show that the orthodox reading is unsustainable.  
John McDowell has recently defended this heterodox interpretation of the 
Lord/Bondsman dialectic, as well. He identifies Kant as providing the crucial backdrop 
for properly understanding the Lord/Bondsman dialectic. While Kant’s distinction 
between the transcendental ego versus the empirical ego does provide the remote context 
for Hegel’s effort in the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, Fichte’s appropriation and elaboration 
of that distinction provides the proximate context and, as such, greatly overshadows 
Kant’s influence. McDowell, unfortunately, almost entirely neglects the role of Fichte. 
Still, the helpful insights he provides will be enlisted in support of the larger argument I 
will be presenting. 
With respect to the overall argument of this dissertation, the reason why it is 
important to establish that the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, at least as it unfolds in the “Self-
consciousness” chapter, is a dialectic which occurs within an individual consciousness is 
that, as such, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic provides a rather unique and profound means 
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for explaining the emergence of a vast range of different philosophies. In fact, so it will 
be argued, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic qua internal to consciousness turns out to be 
applicable to the entire panoply of differing philosophies. For, the Lord/Bondsman 
dialectic provides the means for differentiating philosophies according as they more or 
less succeed in reconciling the relation of lordship and bondage, or domination and 
servitude, internal to any given individual consciousness.  
Fifth, Hegel’s continued analysis of the development of self-consciousness in the 
sections of Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness will be explicated, 
albeit rather summarily. The discussions of Stoicism and Skepticism are of interest in this 
context largely because the forms of consciousness which give rise to these philosophies 
are unambiguously correlated with the philosophies themselves. Thus, little to no 
interpretive subtlety is needed to show just how Hegel is explaining the emergence of 
these differing philosophies. The discussion of Unhappy Consciousness calls for a 
summary treatment for a different set of reasons. First, Unhappy Consciousness 
constitutes a form of consciousness that undergirds not only some set of particular 
philosophies but in fact the philosophico-theological outlook characteristic of an entire 
culture which extended over the course of roughly a thousand years, namely, medieval 
Christianity. Second, the analysis of Unhappy Consciousness is incredibly rich, 
suggestive and provocative in its detail and, as such, calls for an extended treatment in 
order to make sense of its precise import, an effort which present restrictions of space do 
not permit. 
Lastly, the transition from self-conscious into Reason will be briefly discussed in 
order to set up the following chapter. 
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1. Review of the Transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness 
 As mentioned, the “Self-consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology 
constitutes a pivotal point of transition in Hegel’s account of the ongoing development of 
the mind. To recall, according to the viewpoint of consciousness out of which the mind 
has just emerged, the object or the true “is something other than [consciousness]” (PhG 
104). In other words, mere consciousness took the object to be utterly different than 
consciousness. Consciousness thereby also took the object to exist independently of or 
“outside” consciousness. The object existed in and through itself: “the object is, and it is, 
merely because it is” (PhG 58). The object was self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In 
contrast to the self-sufficient, self-explanatory object, consciousness’s awareness of the 
object was something merely accidental and inessential. While the object was 
independent and self-sufficient, consciousness itself was dependent upon the prior 
existence of the object in order that it should be conscious and, therefore, exist at all. 
 During the course of development from Sense-certainty, through Perception, to 
Force and Understanding, consciousness is disabused of its conviction regarding the 
primacy, independence and self-sufficiency of the object. Each time consciousness 
believed that it had seized upon an object that would conform to its ideal of independence 
and self-sufficiency it would soon learn that the object was radically dependent upon a 
universal relational context. Consciousness ultimately reaches a point at which the object 
of which it is conscious is the self-differentiating, self-relating universal relational 
context which just is consciousness or the mind itself.  
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 In having itself for its own object consciousness thus transitions into self-
consciousness. It is this development which marks out the “Self-consciousness” chapter 
as so pivotal to the progression of the Phenomenology. For, as Hegel states, “With self-
consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the native realm of truth” (PhG 104). 
Indeed, Hegel maintains a unique species of correspondence theory of truth according to 
which truth is the correspondence between thought and being, concept and reality. The 
uniqueness of Hegel’s correspondence theory of truth lies in the fact that, instead of 
conceiving truth as a matter of thought or the mind becoming adequate to or otherwise 
conforming an “independent” object, Hegel envisaged truth as a matter of the object or 
existence progressively becoming more adequate to its concept. The Concept or the mind 
is the criterion which existence must satisfy in order for truth to emerge. Thus, it was 
only upon the emergence of an object that corresponded to consciousness that we entered 
the native realm of truth.171 
 Importantly, however, while at the culmination of the “Consciousness” chapter 
consciousness indeed has itself as its own object and has thereby attained to self-
consciousness, consciousness is nevertheless not conscious of this fact. At this point 
consciousness is conscious of itself in its object only on the level of immediacy or in-
itself.172 This immediate consciousness of itself will have to be mediated through the 
                                                          
171 For, once it is admitted 1) that it is the mind which supplies the criterion for the object and 2) that 
knowledge is a matter of the adequacy of the object to the mind, then it follows that the only object that 
could possibly satisfy the criterion of truth and become adequate to the mind would be the mind itself. 
Truth, then, for Hegel, is fundamentally a matter of self-consciousness, which is to say, self-knowledge. 
The uniqueness of Hegel’s position on truth, of course, should not be overstated as it certainly had 
precedents. Among the most immediate precursors to Hegel’s view would have been that of Fichte, as 
reflected in statement like the following from his Foundation of Natural Rights (FNR): “To say that a 
person is free means: the person, merely by constructing a concept of an end immediately becomes the 
cause of an object corresponding perfectly to that concept.” (FNR 56) 
172 Cf. Hegel in the “Self-consciousness” section of the Philosophy of Mind (PM) on self-consciousness as 
it first appears on the scene or in its immediacy: “I have in one and the same consciousness I and world, in 
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continuing experience of the mind as this is recounted in the ensuing chapter on self-
consciousness. Consciousness is to become conscious of itself, or self-conscious, not 
merely in-itself but for-itself. In so doing, the mind will learn to inhabit more properly its 
native realm of truth. 
 Due to its pivotal role in the development of the Phenomenology, the “Self-
consciousness” chapter has generated immense interest and voluminous commentary. In 
order to pierce to the core set of issues and concerns motivating and guiding Hegel’s 
analysis in the “Self-consciousness” chapter it will be necessary first to widen the scope 
of the present inquiry. As noted, a chief point of reference for Hegel in his analysis of 
self-consciousness is the thought of Fichte. Thus, it will be necessary to proceed to a 
thorough analysis of the salient aspects of Fichte’s system.  
2. Fichte’s System 
The goal of the Fichtean system is to provide an account of the explanatory 
ground of experience, and from there to provide a scientific deduction of the total system 
of experience.173 Thus, Fichte’s system is transcendental. For, Fichte’s system is a 
science of knowledge and, as such, it is concerned to provide a scientific account of what 
grounds empirical knowledge or experience. Yet, according to Fichte, the explanatory 
                                                          
the world I find myself again and, conversely, in my consciousness I have what is, what has objectivity. 
This unity of the I and the object constituting the principle of the mind is, however, at first present in an 
abstract way in immediate self-consciousness, and is known only by us, the onlookers, not yet by self-
consciousness itself” (PM 152). 
173 Cf. Fichte: “Philosophy has to display the basis or foundation of all experience” (IW 9); “[T]he question 
the Wissenschaftslehre has to answer is the following: What is the origin of the system of representations 
accompanied by a feeling of necessity? Or, how do we come to ascribe objective validity to something 
purely subjective? Or – since objective validity is designated by the term ‘being’ – how do we come to 
assume the existence of any being?” (IW39). 
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ground of something is necessarily distinct from that which it grounds. Thus, insofar as 
one seeks to provide an account of the explanatory ground of empirical experience itself, 
one must make recourse to that which transcends empirical experience.174 Accordingly, 
Fichte’s system constitutes an instance of transcendental philosophy.175 
2.1 The Argument of the Wissenschaftslehre: The Self-Positing I 
The foundation of Fichte’s system is the absolute self-positing of the self. In order 
to express the peculiar character of this act Fichte coins a neologism: Tathandlung. 
Literally, the term might be translated into English as “deed-act”. As such, the term is 
meant to emphasize the identity of subject and object in this act of self-positing. In 
describing the self’s self-positing Tathandlung, Fichte states 
The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The self 
posits itself, and by virtue this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, 
the self exists and posits its own existence by virtue of merely existing. It 
is at once the agent and product of action; the active and what the activity 
brings about; action and deed are one and the same. (WL 97) 
Insofar as the self posits itself, the activity (i.e. the “subject”) and the product of that 
activity (i.e. the “object”) are the same. Agent and product of the act are one and the 
                                                          
174 Cf. Fichte: “It follows from the mere thought of a basis or reason that it must lie outside of what it 
grounds or explains. The basis of an explanation and what is explained thereby thus becoe posited – as such 
– in opposition to one another, and are related to one another in such a way that the former explains the 
latter. Philosophy has to display the basis of foundation of all experience. Consequently, philosophy’s 
object must necessarily lie outside of all experience” (IW 9). 
175 Cf. Hegel on Fichte: “This being posited by the Ego [i.e. Ich or I] is the deduction of nature, and it is the 
transcendental viewpoint” (DZ, 136). 
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same. The self is a subject-object. The proposition which expresses this identity is ‘I am 
I’ or ‘I = I’, in which subject and predicate, or “object”, are identified.  
Importantly, the identity of subject and object posited in and through the self’s 
self-positing is an immediate one. As Fichte states, “the self is a necessary identity of 
subject and object: a subject-object; and is so absolutely, without further mediation” (WL 
99). The identity of the self with itself in its self-positing is absolute and immediate. 
Important to note, as well, is that along with being absolutely self-identical, the 
self-positing self is absolutely spontaneous and self-sufficient in its activity. Its activity is 
unconditioned and strictly without relation to, or dependence upon, anything external to 
itself.176 As Fichte states, 
To posit oneself and to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical. Thus the 
proposition, ‘I am, because I have posited myself’ can also be stated as: ‘I am 
absolutely, because I am.’177 (WL 99) 
The Fichtean self is because it is. It is self-sufficient. One can note the inversion of the 
principle articulated at the beginning of the “Self-certainty” section in which the object 
was because it was. For Fichte, the self or consciousness is because it is. Thus, as will 
become clearer throughout the ensuing analysis, in Hegelian terms, the Fichtean self is 
the “self-conscious” self. At any rate, the beginning or foundation of Fichte’s system is 
the absolute, self-sufficient self-positing self or I.  
                                                          
176 Cf. Fichte’s reference to “the man who becomes conscious of his self-sufficiency and independence of 
everything that is outside of himself” (WL Heath and Lachs, 15). 
177 Jacobi, in his “Open Letter to Fichte,” was perhaps the first to note the unsettling suggestion of the “self-
divination” of human being in Fichte’s formulation inasmuch as it seems to mirror or perhaps eclipse the 
theophany on Mt. Sinai in which God says to Moses: “I am who I am” (Philosophy of German Idealism 
138-9).  
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2.1.1 The Counter-positing of the Not-I 
 It must be recalled that the goal of Fichte’s science of knowledge is to provide an 
explanatory account of the ground of experience and empirical knowledge. As it stands, 
however, the absolutely self-positing self, merely unto itself, cannot provide such an 
explanation. For, while the absolute self is in principle perfectly self-identical, empirical 
experience, by contrast, is marked distinction, opposition and non-identity. In empirical 
experience the self finds itself opposed by an object, or range of objects, distinct from 
itself. For Fichte, this experience of distinction and opposition is simply a “fact of 
empirical consciousness,” which, as such, demands an explanation178 (WL 102).  
In order to explain the fact of distinction and opposition given in empirical 
experience, Fichte argues that, along with positing itself, the absolute self also posits, or 
rather counter-posits, a not-self or not-I. Several important aspects of Fichte’s account of 
the process whereby the absolute self posits the not-self bear immediate examination. 
First of all, empirical consciousness is not directly conscious of this act of 
counter-positing on the part of the absolute self. This point is consistent with Fichte’s 
methodological principle according to which that which explains must necessarily lie 
outside of that which is explained. As Fichte states, 
                                                          
178 Recall Schulze’s denial that any ultimate or speculative explanation for such facts could be had. It is in 
his review of Schulze/Aenesidemus that Fichte first publicly introduces his notion of Tathandlungen 
precisely in order to provide such an explanation. See Di Giovanni 136ff. 
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It follows from the mere thought of a basis or reason that it must lie outside of 
what it grounds or explains. The basis of an explanation and what is explained 
thus become posited – as such – in opposition to one another. (IW 9) 
Yet, the counter-positing of the not-self by the absolute self is meant to explain the fact of 
empirical consciousness and the experience of distinction and opposition contained 
therein. Hence, such an act must fall outside empirical consciousness. Indeed, the totality 
of acts of the absolute self never actually emerges into empirical consciousness.179  
Second, insofar as the primordial activity of the absolute self never emerges into 
empirical consciousness, empirical consciousness thus, as it were, “forgets” the activity 
of the absolute self by which the not-self is posited. Through his doctrine of the 
unconscious character of the positing of the not-self by the absolute self, Fichte sets a 
radical precedent for Hegel’s key methodological conceit according to which 
consciousness, as it develops, repeatedly forgets the prior activity through which it has 
posits its object and so, in the first instance, naively assumes the object to be distinct from 
itself and to have its source in something other than itself. As Fichte states, 
We do not become aware of our own action, and are necessarily bound to assume 
that we have received from without what we have in fact ourselves produced by 
our own forces, and according to our own laws (WL 255). 
                                                          
179 Cf. Fichte: “The self as such cannot come to consciousness, since it is never immediately conscious of 
its own action” (WL 259); “The self is […] quite unaware of its own activity, and does not reflect thereon” 
(WL 264); “In acting the rational being does not become conscious of its acting; for it itself is its acting and 
nothing else: but what the rational being is conscious of supposed to lie outside what becomes conscious, 
and therefore outside the acting; it is supposed to be the object, i.e. the opposite of the acting. The I 
becomes conscious only of what emerges for it in this acting and through this acting (simply and solely 
through this acting); and this is the object of consciousness, or the thing” (FNR 4-5);  
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Empirical consciousness experiences the not-self, not as a production of the self, but 
rather as an alien object (Gegenstand) or check (Anstoss) external to and independent of 
itself. The not-I is experienced by empirical consciousness as the whole expanse of the 
natural world which stands opposed to itself.  
Along with maintaining that empirical consciousness “forgets” the positing of the 
not-self by the absolute self and so naively takes the object to be “out there”, Fichte 
maintains that it is the task of philosophy to recollect the activity of the absolute self in 
order thereby to generate a scientific account of the ground of knowledge itself – which is 
to say, a science of knowledge.180 Indeed, such a task of recollection is, for Fichte, the 
signal calling of transcendental philosophy181 and, as such, Fichte denies that Kant’s 
doctrine of the thing-in-itself is a residue of the very kind of forgetting and naïveté that 
transcendental philosophy would deliver us from.182 What remains to be determined at 
this point, however, is to what extent Fichte, especially according to Hegel, succeeds in 
the task of radical recollection of the activity of the absolute self.  
At any rate, while the counter-positing of the not-self by the absolute self would 
seem to provide an explanation for the fact of distinction and opposition between subject 
and object experienced in empirical consciousness, it nevertheless raises its own peculiar 
                                                          
180 Cf. Fichte: “One might ask: if reality belongs only to that which is necessarily posited by the I, then 
what reality is supposed to belong to those actions that lie outside the sphere of all consciousness and are 
posited within consciousness? – Obviously, no reality except insofar as it is posited, and thus merely a 
reality for philosophical understanding […] As soon as the human mind reverts back into itself […], and 
finds that everything it believes it perceives outside itself was actually produced by and from itself, then the 
task that arises for reason in its constant synthetic progression is similarly to unite all these operations of 
the human mind in one ultimate ground” (FNR 25-6) 
181 Cf. Fichte: “The assumption that objects exist outside of and quite independently of us, is contained 
within idealism and is explained and derived within idealism. Indeed, it is the sole aim of all philosophy to 
provide a derivation of objective truth” (Breazeale, 38); 
182 For further discussion see IW 51-76 
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problem. In order to clarify this problem it will first be necessary to examine Fichte’s 
account of the absolute self. 
2.1.3 The Opposition between the Absolute Self and the Empirical Self 
As its name indicates, the absolute self is indeed absolute. Yet, Fichte states: 
Insofar as the self is absolute, it is infinite and unbounded. Everything that exists 
it posits; and what it does not posit, does not exist (for it; and apart from it there is 
nothing). But everything it posits is posited as self; and the self posits it as 
everything that it posits. From this point of view, therefore, the self includes 
everything, that is, an infinite, unbounded reality (WL 225). 
The absolute self is unbounded, infinite, self-identical, self-sufficient and unconditioned 
by anything external to itself. It posits all that is. It is the supreme source of everything 
which exists. Nothing exists external to or apart from it. 
To say that that the absolute self posits a not-self, however, presents immediate 
problems for the unboundedness, infinity, unconditioned-ness and, therefore, the 
absoluteness of the absolute self. For, as Fichte’s states, “Insofar as the not-self is posited, 
the self is not posited; for the not-self completely nullifies the self” (WL 106). The not-
self, by definition, limits the self precisely to the extent that it, the not-self, is posited. 
How can it come to pass that the absolute self should posit a not-self which would by 
definition limit it, when the former is precisely infinite, unbounded and absolute? Fichte’s 
answer to this problem will prove of enormous significance for understanding Hegel’s 
discussion of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic. 
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Fichte’s key argument in this context is that the absolute self posits within itself 
an empirical self. Fichte refers to the empirical self also as the “divisible self”. According 
to Fichte, it is the divisible empirical self which is limited by the not-self, not the absolute 
self. The empirical self and the not-self are both divisible and mutually limiting. Thus, 
insofar as the divisible not-self is posited, the divisible empirical self is not posited, and 
vice-versa. 
On this account, the absolute self seems to preserve its utter independence, 
unrestrictedness, self-sufficiency and self-identity vis-à-vis the not-self. For, while the 
empirical self is opposed and limited by the not-self, “As opposed to the absolute self 
[…], the not-self is absolutely nothing” (WL 109). Moreover, rather than being opposed 
to the absolute self, the not-self, along with the empirical self to which it is opposed, is 
posited within the absolute self. As Fichte states, “In the self I oppose a divisible not-self 
to the divisible self” (WL 110). 
Inasmuch as he maintains that the not-self is not opposed to the absolute self but 
is opposed only to the empirical self, Fichte would seem to preserve the perfect self-
identity, unrestrictedness and independence of the absolute self. Yet, the matter is much 
more complicated. For, inasmuch as the absolute self posits within itself an empirical self 
which is opposed by the not-self, the absolute self thus finds itself paradoxically identical 
with yet opposed by the empirical self. As Fichte states, 
The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to, itself. But in regard to 
consciousness it is equal to itself, for consciousness is one: but in this 
consciousness the absolute self is posited as indivisible; whereas the self to which 
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the not-self is opposed is posited as divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self 
opposed to it, the self is itself in opposition to the absolute self. (WL 109) 
The absolute self is unrestricted, infinite, self-sufficient and opposed by nothing. The 
empirical self, by contrast, is defined precisely as that which is restricted, limited, finite 
and dependent in many ways upon the not-self. Yet, the empirical self with its correlative 
and opposed not-self is posited within the absolute self. Thus, within the absolute self 
there is something which by definition is opposed to the absolute self. It is this 
contradiction between the absolute self and the empirical self and the attempt to 
overcome it which in effect sets in motion the rest of Fichte’s system and which also 
provides the fulcrum point of Hegel’s eventual critique thereof. 
2.1.4 The Empirical Self qua Intelligence and qua Practical Reason 
 Having distinguished between the absolute self and the empirical self, Fichte 
further subdivides the empirical self into the empirical self qua intelligence and the 
empirical self qua practical reason. The empirical self qua intelligence resembles the 
larger form of consciousness described in the “Consciousness” part of the 
Phenomenology. For, the intelligence is the empirical self insofar as it passive with 
respect to the not-self or object. The intelligence is caused by, and therefore dependent 
upon, the object. As Fichte states, “The self, qua intelligence, stood in a causal relation to 
the not-self, to which the postulated check [Anstoss] is to be ascribed; it was an effect of 
the not-self, as its cause.”183 (WL 221) The absolute self thus posits a not-self which is 
                                                          
183 Cf. Fichte: “as intelligence in general, the self is dependent on an undetermined and so far quite 
indeterminable not-self; and only through and by means of such a not-self does it come to be an 
intelligence” (WL, 220). 
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experienced by the empirical self qua intelligence as an external force impinging upon it 
and upon which it is dependent for its very existence.  
 Yet, we are here presented with a major contradiction afflicting the self. For the 
absolute self is purely active and is unconditioned by and thus independent of any 
external principle. Yet, the empirical self qua intelligence is passive and caused by the 
not-self. There is thus a radical opposition within the self, as such, one which threatens to 
undermine its perfect self-identity and which therefore demands to be overcome, 
reconciled or sublated. As Fichte states, “there lies a major antithesis, which spans the 
entire conflict between the self as intelligence, and to that extent restricted, and the self as 
an absolutely posited and thus unrestricted entity” (WL 219). 
 Fichte’s solution to this antithesis within the self is to posit the absolute self as the 
cause of the not-self: 
Since […] the absolute self must be capable of no passivity whatever, and be 
absolute activity and nothing other than activity, we have had to assume […] that 
even this postulated not-self must be determined, and thus passive; and that the 
activity of the not-self must be determined, and thus passive; and that the activity 
opposed to this passivity has to be posited in the opposite of the not-self, namely 
the self; and not indeed in the intelligent self, since this is itself determined by the 
not-self, but rather in the absolute self. But a relationship of the kind thus assumed 
is the causal relation. The absolute self must therefore be cause of the not-self, 
insofar as the latter is the ultimate ground of all presentation; and the not-self 
must to that extent be its effect (WL 221). 
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In order to overcome the antithesis within the self that results from the fact that, while the 
empirical self qua intelligence is limited, passive and dependent, the absolute self is 
unrestricted, purely active and independent, Fichte states that we must posit the absolute 
self as ultimately causing the not-self. 
 Yet, this solution turns out to be not quite so simple, for another contradiction 
emerges. On the one hand, Fichte notes, 
The self is to exert causality on the not-self, and first bring forth the latter for 
possible presentation by itself, because nothing is attributable to the self which it 
does not posit in itself, either mediately or immediately, and because it has to 
absolutely everything that it is by means of itself. – Hence the demand for 
causality is based on the absolute essentiality of the self (WL 225). 
Yet, on the other hand, Fichte states, 
The self can exert no causality on the not-self, because the not-self would then 
cease to be a not-self (to stand opposed to the self) and would itself become the 
self. But it is the self that has opposed the not-self to itself; and this opposition 
cannot therefore be eliminated unless by eliminating something that the self has 
posited, and thus by the self’s ceasing to be a self, which contradicts the identity 
of the self. – Hence the contradiction confronting the required causality is based 
on the fact that a not-self is, and must remain, absolutely opposed to the self (WL 
225) 
Let us clarify the contradiction. If the absolute self were directly to cause the not-self, 
then either the not-self would simply be absorbed into the absolutes self’s own act of 
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self-positing/self-causing and as such cease to be a not-self, at all, or, insofar as the not-
self was in fact posited absolutely, it would destroy the absolute self since by its nature 
the not-self excludes or annuls the self. Thus, in order to preserve the reality of the not-
self without thereby destroying the absolute self, Fichte must show the absolute self to be, 
not the direct cause of the not-self since that would nullify the reality of the not-self, but 
rather its mediate or indirect cause. 
 The means by which the absolute self mediately causes the not-self is by positing 
or causing a practical faculty within the empirical self which will itself directly cause the 
not-self.184 Thus, whereas the empirical self qua intelligence was caused by and 
dependent upon the not-self, the empirical self qua practical reason will causally 
determine the not-self. Fichte thus distinguishes two types of activity within the self: 1) 
the pure activity of the absolute self and 2) the objective activity of the practical faculty 
of the empirical self. Fichte designates the second type activity as “objective” because it 
posits an object and is itself objectively determinate with respect to this object. Thus, the 
absolute self posits or causes the empirical self, and the empirical self in its practical 
capacity causes the not-self.  
We thereby seem to have found a solution to the previous dilemma threatening to 
undermine the reality of either the absolute self or the not-self. As Fichte states, 
The self which, regarded in general as an intelligence, is dependent on the not-
self, and is an intelligence simply to the extent that a not-self exists, is nonetheless 
                                                          
184 Cf. Fichte: “There lies a major antithesis, which spans the entire conflict between the self as intelligence, 
and to that extent, the self as an absolutely posited and thus unrestricted entity; and which compels us to 
adopt as a means of unification a practical capacity of the self.” (WL 219) 
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to depend merely on the self; and to find this possible, we again had to assume a 
causality of the self in determining the not-self, insofar as the latter is to the object 
of the intelligence self. At first sight, and taking the word in its full extension, 
such a causality annulled itself; once it was presupposed, either the self was not 
posited, or the not-self was not, and hence no causal relationship could occur 
between them. We attempted to mediate this conflict by distinguishing two 
opposed activities of the self, the pure and the objective; and by supposing that 
perhaps the first might be immediately related to the second, as cause to effect; 
while the second might be immediately related to the object, as cause to effect. 
And hence we supposed that the pure activity of the self might at least stand 
mediately (through the intermediacy of the objective activity) in a causal relation 
with the object (WL 231). 
The absolute self posits or causes the objective activity of the empirical self which in turn 
causes the not-self, thereby allowing the absolute self mediately to cause the not-self 
without thereby destroying itself or the not-self. 
Having identified the objective activity of the empirical self qua practical reason, 
we have pushed more explicitly into the realm of Fichte’s ethical philosophy. We must 
briefly examine the salient aspects of Fichte’s ethical philosophy, as it figures 
prominently in Hegel’s eventual critique of the larger Fichtean system. 
2.2 Fichte’s Ethical System: A Realm of Domination and Servitude 
 Let us begin by recalling the precise state of the discussion at this point. For that 
we can turn to the following helpful passage from Fichte: 
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The absolute self is identical with itself: everything therein is one and the same 
self, and belongs […] to one and the same self; nothing therein is distinguishable, 
nothing manifold; the self is everything and nothing, it is nothing for itself, and 
can distinguish not positing or posited within itself. – In virtue of its nature it 
strives […] to maintain itself in this condition. – There emerges in it a disparity, 
and hence something alien to itself. […] That this happens, can in no sense be 
proved a priori, but everyone can confirm it in his own experience (WL 233). 
The foundation of Fichte’s system is the self-positing absolute self. The absolute self is 
absolutely self-identical in its self-positing. If there is a distinction between the absolute 
self qua positing and the self qua posited, it is distinction which is immediately annulled 
or sublated. It is a distinction which is yet not a distinction. For subject and object are 
perfectly identical: I = I.  
Fichte adds that the absolute self naturally strives to preserve itself in its self-
identity. In the first instance, this striving is thus not what is ordinarily thought of as 
striving. Fichte states that it can be considered striving only in a qualified or “figurative” 
sense. For, typically, striving involves an object for which one strives. Yet, in the first 
instance, there is nothing for which the absolute self might strive since no object has been 
posited for it. Instead, the absolute self strives simply to maintain itself in its absolute and 
perfect self-identity. 
Yet, according to Fichte, as a matter of a posteriori empirical experience, 
disparity and distinction emerge within the self. It is in acknowledging and attempting to 
reconcile this alien principle with the absolute self-identical character of the absolute self 
that the complexity of Fichte’s system truly enters in. 
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For, Fichte explains that the experience of the alien object in empirical 
consciousness is the result of the positing of the not-self by the absolute self. For the 
absolute self, therefore, the not-self is nothing. The not-self is only an object for the 
empirical self. Yet, the fact that the empirical self and the not-self are posited within the 
absolute self poses its own problem.  
For, the absolute self finds itself both identical to and yet opposed by the 
empirical self with its correlative object. Indeed, the absolute self is opposed to the 
empirical self precisely to the degree that the latter is itself opposed and limited by the 
not-self. For, were it not opposed and limited by the not-self, the empirical self would 
simply be the absolute self. 
By the same token, however, the absolute self does not merely posit but 
spontaneously strives to maintain its absolute identity with itself. Yet, the very opposition 
within itself of the empirical self threatens to undermine this perfect self-identity. Thus, 
in order to preserve or otherwise restore is perfect self-identity the absolute self must 
make use of the empirical self as an instrument for causally determining the not-self. 
Insofar as the empirical self causally determines the not-self it subordinates the not-self to 
its own immanent laws and thus transforms the not-self into the self. Transforming the 
not-self into the self would thus negate the limitation or negation of the empirical self by 
the not-self which would in turn eliminate the opposition between the empirical self and 
the absolute self. The empirical self would in fact become the absolute self, and the 
absolute self would thus succeed in preserving its perfect self-identity.  
The primary means by which the empirical self causally determines the not-self is 
through the activity of its practical reason. In the practical reason of the empirical self the 
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abstract striving-in-general of the absolute self to preserve its perfect self-identity 
becomes determinate and objective. The activity of practical reason is objective in the 
dual and correlative sense that the activity is itself an objective operation of empirical 
consciousness and it also determines on object which hitherto stood opposed to it. In 
order to clarify this point further, let us specify the relation between striving [Streben] 
and drive [Trieb] in Fichte as well as the distinct types of drives constitutive of the 
empirical self. 
 Striving in general, or, you might say, striving überhaupt, is the absolute self’s 
spontaneous striving to preserve its perfect self-identity. Insofar as that striving becomes 
determinate within the experience of the empirical self, it becomes a drive. As Fichte 
states, “striving that is fixed, determinate and definite in character is known as a drive” 
(WL 253). The drive of practical reason is, generally speaking, to causally determine the 
not-self and thereby to preserve the perfect self-identity of the absolute self. This picture, 
however, gets more complicated when it is noted that the pure drive of practical reason is 
not the sole drive of the empirical self. 
2.2.1 Pure Drive versus Natural Drives 
For Fichte there is a division within the empirical self between the self and its 
object, namely, the not-self or nature. Yet, the self is partly determined by nature. The 
most important way in which the empirical self is determined by nature is through what 
Fichte calls “the original and determinate system of drives and feelings” (SE 113-4). 
Regarding the way in which this system determines the empirical self, Fichte states 
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Consciousness of them obtrudes on us and, at the same time, the substance in 
which this system of boundaries is found is supposed to be the substance which 
freely thinks and wills, and which we posit as ourselves. So the nature that 
obtrudes is our nature (SE 113-4). 
The system of natural drives, feelings and inclinations which partially determines the 
empirical self thus obtrudes as something alien on the truer nature of the self. For, these 
drives are determined mechanically by laws that the empirical self does not itself cause. 
As such, a task emerges for the self, specifically for its practical faculty, to causally 
determine the natural drives which otherwise obtrude upon the freedom of the self to act 
according to laws and determinations it gives to itself. 
 Fichte thus distinguishes two fundamentally different drives: 1) the system of 
lower, natural drives of the self which is directed towards more or less biological 
enjoyment and 2) the higher drive of the practical faculty which is directed towards 
freedom for freedom’s sake.185 The higher drive for freedom is capable of reflecting on 
the on the lower, natural drive and, through raising it to consciousness, subordinating it to 
the ends of the higher drive. As Hegel states regarding this aspect of Fichte’s system, 
That which reflects is higher than what is reflected: the drive of him who does the 
reflecting, that is, of the subject of consciousness, is called the higher drive. The 
lower drive, that is, nature must be placed in subservience to the higher, that is, to 
reflection. This relation of subservience which one appearance of the self has to 
the other is to be the highest synthesis (DZ, 138). 
                                                          
185 Or, in other words, I for the sake of I; I because I. 
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At the core of Fichte’s ethical system, one part of the empirical self, the natural drives, 
goes into subservience to another part, the practical faculty. This domination of the 
“merely natural” within the empirical self by the pure practical drive of the empirical self 
is, moreover, a mediated expression of the domination of the empirical self in general by 
the absolute self. For, the empirical self qua pure practical drive functions as a mere 
instrument and, therefore, servant of the absolute self’s more basic striving to preserve its 
pure self-identity. 
 Indeed, the empirical self qua “merely natural” is, as we have seen, equated with 
the not-I since the not-I has been identified with nature. Therefore, for Fichte, the quest 
for domination over the empirical self qua “merely natural” extends to the whole expanse 
of the natural world, which is to say, the world which the empirical self naively assumes 
to be independent of the absolute self. Thus, Fichte states, 
Man’s ultimate and supreme goal is complete harmony with himself and – so that 
he can be in harmony with himself – the harmony of all external things with his 
own necessary, practical concepts of them (Philosophy of German Idealism 8). 
And, again, 
Man’s final end is to subordinate to himself all that is irrational, to master it freely 
and according to his own laws (Philosophy of German Idealism 9). 
 The empirical self is to become master or lord over its lower nature and, by extension, 
the entirety of all irrational nature, in order that the absolute self might preserve or 
otherwise restore its threatened pure self-identity or harmony. 
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Such a relation of domination and servitude within the self, moreover, is supposed 
to be the highest synthesis in the self and would lead it back to the pure identity or perfect 
harmony of the absolute self. The relation of domination and servitude within the 
different parts of the self thus constitutes the highest moral ideal for Fichte. As he states, 
Man is supposed to determine himself and not permit himself to be determined by 
something foreign. He is supposed to be what he is because this is what he wants 
and is supposed to want to be. The empirical I is supposed to be determined in a 
manner in which it could be eternally determined. Therefore, I would express the 
principle of morality in the formula […]: ‘Act so that you could consider the 
maxim of your willing as eternal laws for yourself.’ The ultimate characteristic 
feature of all rational beings is, accordingly, absolute unity, constant self-identity, 
complete agreement with oneself. This absolute identity is the form of the pure I 
and is its only true form, or rather, in the conceivability of identity we recognize 
the expression of the purer form of the I (Philosophy of German Idealism 6-7). 
The highest synthesis in the self and Fichte’s highest moral ideal thus turns out to be a 
scenario in which the empirical self submits to the domination of the form of the absolute 
‘I’ and, in so doing, sets itself about the task subordinating nature to that form. 
 Important to note in this context is that, according to Fichte, “mere will is not 
sufficient for removing [the influence of the not-I on the empirical self] and restoring the 
original pure shape of our I; we require, in addition, that skill which we acquire and 
sharpen through practice” (Philosophy of German Idealism 7). The fact that labor and 
practice is necessary for the empirical self to be able to develop the skill to carry out the 
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task to which it is set by the absolute self will prove quite relevant vis-à-vis the necessity 
of work in the experience of the Bondsman in Hegel’s Lord/Bondsman dialectic. 
2.3 The Failure of Fichte’s System to Demonstrate the Identity of the Empirical Self 
and the Absolute Self  
While, in principle, the complete causal determination of the not-self, including 
the empirical self itself qua part of nature, by the empirical self qua practical reason 
would preserve or restore the perfect identity of the absolute self by, in effect, sublating 
the empirical self into the absolute self, as a matter of fact no such sublation occurs 
within Fichte’s system. Instead, what occurs is an infinite and indefinitely prolonged 
striving on the part of the empirical self qua practical reason. 
 Fichte’s argument here is complex, but the main outline admits of a ready sketch. 
Fichte draws a distinction between the empirical self’s finite objective activity versus its 
infinite objective activity. The activity of the empirical self qua practical reason is 
objective in the dual sense that it is both a determinate operation of empirical 
consciousness and also directed towards a determinate object. Fichte specifies further that 
such objective activity can be either finite or infinite.  
The infinite and the finite activity of the empirical self, however, cannot both be 
objective in the same sense. According to Fichte, the distinction lies in the fact that, “the 
finite objective activity of the self relates to a real object, while its infinite striving is 
directed upon a merely imaginary object” (WL 236). While perhaps initially appearing 
odd, what Fichte means here is rather straightforward. Qua finite, practical reason 
consists in a drive that engages with and attempts to causally determine particular, finite 
213 
 
 
“real” objects, whether these be material objects, bodily movements, or “lower” natural 
drives. Qua infinite, practical reason, as it were, looks past any finite object towards an 
ideal horizon in which the object would be a pure product of the self. 
Importantly, however, even the infinite objective activity of the empirical self is 
not purely infinite; rather, it is characterized by a juxtaposition of finitude and infinitude, 
a juxtaposition which in the end amounts to a contradiction which is never reconciled or 
sublated. With respect to the simultaneous finitude and the infinitude which characterizes 
the infinite objective striving of the empirical self, Fichte states, 
But how far is the striving nonetheless finite? To the extent that it refers in 
general to an object, and must posit limits to this object, as surely as the latter is to 
be such. In the real object, it was not the act of determining in general, but the 
limits of the determination, that depended on the not-self: but in the ideal object, 
both the act of determining, and the limits, depend solely on the self; the latter is 
subject to no condition, save that it must posit limits in general, which it can 
extend out to infinity, because this extension depends solely on itself. The ideal is 
an absolute product of the self; it can be elevated out to infinity; but at each 
determinate moment it has its limits, which at the next determinate moment must 
be utterly different (WL 237). 
According to Fichte, any object is intrinsically limited and finite. In the case of the finite 
objective activity, the object of this activity is a “real” object and as such prescribes an 
initial set of limits – for example, the quantity of matter or the spatio-temporal limits of 
the bodily movement – to the action. The empirical self in this case does not prescribe the 
limit of the object per se, but rather seeks to actively determine the object by 
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subordinating it to the immanent laws of practical reason – for example, by subordinating 
bodily movements or lower drives to some intelligent or moral action. In the case of 
infinite objective activity, by contrast, practical reason is not limited by any pre-given 
object but instead posits the limits and determines the object entirely through itself. 
 The contradiction arises due to the fact that, even though in the mode of infinite 
objective activity practical reason is not limited by a pre-given object, still the object 
which it posits must itself be limited and therefore finite. “Hence,” Fichte states, “the 
juxtaposition of infinite and objective is itself a contradiction” (WL 237). In other words, 
infinity is not a characteristic of any object for Fichte.186 Infinity is rather external to the 
object. It lies not in the actual object but in the possibility of practical reason to posit and 
determine some further object beyond the finite one that it had just posited and 
determined.  
Infinity is never actualized, for Fichte; it is never actually objectified. Instead, it 
forever remains an indefinitely deferred possibility or ideal. Still, according to Fichte 
The idea of an infinity to be thus completed floats as a vision before us, and is 
rooted in our innermost nature. We are obliged, as it enjoins us, to resolve the 
contradiction; though we cannot even think it possible of solution, and foresee 
that in no moment of an existence prolong to all eternity will we ever be able to 
consider it possible. But this is just the mark in us that we are destined for eternity 
(WL 238). 
                                                          
186 Cf. Fichte: “The I […] can posit only what is finite” (FNR 24). 
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Recall that the absolute self is immediately infinite. It is infinite in its immediate self-
relation in which it is opposed by nothing. Yet, the absolute self nevertheless finds itself 
opposed by the empirical self. To that extent the absolute is not infinite. Still, the would-
be-infinite absolute self naturally strives to maintain itself in its perfect and infinite self-
identity. In order to preserve or restore its effectively negated infinity it confers upon or 
imbues the empirical self with a striving to completely dominate and thereby negate the 
alterity of the object which opposes it. This striving can take a finite form, as mentioned 
above. It can also take an infinite form which, qua infinite, would thus seem to be rooted 
in “our innermost nature”, namely, the self-identity of the self-positing absolute self. 
 Yet, this very objective, infinite striving is beset by finitude since objectivity 
intrinsically entails finitude, for Fichte. Hence, the empirical self is obliged to resolve a 
contradiction for which the solution, according to Fichte, is not even thinkable, namely, 
the positing and determining of an object which is infinite. The result of being thus 
obliged is that the empirical self, like Sisyphus, is condemned to undertake an infinitely 
renewed yet intrinsically futile task.187 
2.4 Brief Summary of Section 2  
                                                          
187 Cf. Fichte: “[T]he Idea of a self whose consciousness has been determined by nothing outside itself, it 
being rather its own mere consciousness which determines everything outside it. Yet this Idea is itself 
unthinkable, since for us it contains a contradiction. But it is nevertheless imposed upon us as our highest 
practical goal. Man must approximate, ad infinitum, to a freedom he can never, in principle, attain” (WL 
115). Cf. Hegel: “This is, in general, the standpoint of Kant with regard to human action, and also that of 
Fichte. The good ought to be realized; we have to work at this, to bring it forth, and the will is simply the 
good that is self-activating. But then if the world were as it ought to be, the result would be that the activity 
of willing would disappear. Therefore the will itself also requires that its purpose shall not be realized” (EL 
302). 
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We have thus laid out the aspects of Fichte’s overall system which will figure most 
prominently in Hegel’s explanation and critique of that system. The goal of Fichte’s 
system is to provide a scientific account of the ground of all experience and knowledge. 
His first move is to postulate an absolutely self-positing, self-identical self. Yet, in order 
to explain the fact of distinction and opposition within empirical consciousness, Fichte 
postulates that the absolute self also counter-posits a not-self which is opposed to the 
empirical self. Insofar as the empirical self is opposed and thus limited by the not-self, 
however, the absolute self finds itself in opposition to the empirical self, a state which 
threatens the absolute self’s claim to absoluteness. In order to overcome this threatened 
contradiction, Fichte postulates that the empirical self, particularly in its capacity as 
practical reason, causally determines the not-self. The completion of this causal 
determination of the not-self by the empirical self, however, is infinitely deferred. Let us 
turn now to examining the important details of Hegel’s initial response to these aspects of 
Fichte’s system in the DZ. 
3. Hegel’s Initial Response to Fichte in the DZ 
 Hegel’s critical response to Fichte in the DZ is complex. Still, it is possible to 
isolate the most crucial aspects of that response which will prove relevant to 
understanding Hegel’s later and dialectically more sophisticated response in the “Self-
consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology. The most crucial of Hegel’s criticisms of 
Fichte in the DZ are: 1) the end of Fichte’s system fails to correspond to and fulfill its 
beginning and 2) Fichte’s system is permeated by a relation of domination and servitude 
within the experience of self-consciousness. 
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3.1 The End of Fichte’s System Fails to Correspond to the Beginning  
 According to Hegel, in the DZ the task of philosophy is to sublate the distinction 
between pure or transcendental self-consciousness and empirical consciousness, or in 
Fichtean terms, the distinction between the absolute self and the empirical self. The way 
in which the philosopher is to achieve this goal is by deducing empirical consciousness 
from pure self-consciousness.188 More specially, according to Hegel,  
Philosophy must show that empirical consciousness in all its manifoldness is 
identical with pure consciousness, and it must show this by its deed, through the 
real evolution of the objective out of the Ego [Ich]. Philosophy must describe the 
totality of empirical consciousness as the objective totality of self-consciousness 
(DZ 121-2). 
It is important to note the ways in which Hegel’s position both agrees with and subtly 
diverges from that of Fichte. For, Hegel evidently agrees with Fichte that the major task 
of philosophy is to provide an account of the explanatory ground of empirical experience 
and that this is done by showing that empirical consciousness is grounded in absolute or 
pure self-consciousness and that the former can be deduced from the latter.  
 Still, beyond this transcendental requirement, Hegel adds the further speculative 
requirement that the completeness of the explanation of empirical consciousness show 
that empirical consciousness is, or at least becomes, identical to pure self-consciousness. 
                                                          
188 Cf. Hegel: “[The philosopher’s] task is now to suspend the apparent opposition of transcendental and 
empirical consciousness; and, in general terms, this is done by deducing the latter from the former” (DZ 
120). 
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In ordinary consciousness the Ego [Ich] occurs in opposition. Philosophy must 
explain this opposition to an object. To explain means to show that it is 
conditioned by something else and hence that it is appearance. Now, if empirical 
consciousness is shown to be completely grounded in, and not just conditioned 
by, pure consciousness, then their opposition is suspended [Aufgehoben] as long 
as the explanation is otherwise completely shown – i.e., as long as it is not merely 
a partial identity of pure and empirical consciousness that has been shown. The 
identity is only a partial one if there remains as aspect of the empirical 
consciousness in which it is not determined by the pure consciousness, but is 
unconditioned. And as only pure consciousness and empirical consciousness are 
presented as the elements of the highest opposition, pure consciousness would 
then be determined and conditioned by empirical consciousness so far as this was 
unconditioned. The relation would in this way be a sort of reciprocal relation, 
comprised of mutual determining and being determined. It presupposes, however, 
an absolute opposition of the reciprocally effective terms; and then it would be 
impossible to suspend [Aufheben] their dichotomy in absolute identity (DZ 119-
20).  
Philosophy must explain the opposition experienced in empirical consciousness. It does 
so by showing that empirical consciousness is grounded in pure self-consciousness. So 
far, Hegel is in agreement with Fichte. Hegel adds, however, that insofar as empirical 
consciousness is shown to be completely grounded in pure consciousness, insofar as it is 
shown to evolve out of the latter and thereby constitute the latter’s objective existence, 
the difference between them is sublated into an absolute unity. 
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 Insofar as the explanation is only partial, however, and the empirical self remains 
opposed and thus conditioned by an aspect which is not itself determined by pure 
consciousness, then pure consciousness and empirical consciousness find themselves 
opposed. Indeed, pure self-consciousness thus finds itself not to be absolute at all since it 
is conditioned by the empirical consciousness which is opposed to it. Instead, pure 
consciousness and empirical consciousness fall into a relation of mere reciprocal 
determination which presupposes an absolute dichotomy which is never resolved or 
sublated into an absolute identity. 
 The application of the immediately forgoing discussion to the earlier discussion of 
Fichte’s system should be readily apparent. What is more, Fichte in some sense did 
recognize the speculative requirement to produce an absolute identity between the 
empirical self and the pure or absolute self. The problem for Hegel at this point is that 
Fichte simply fails to produce the requisite identity between empirical consciousness and 
pure self-consciousness. In Fichte, the infinite objective activity of practical reason is 
supposed to be the “supreme synthesis” (DZ 134). Yet, as Hegel notes, the “infinite 
progression” of the objective activity of practical reason in Fichte intrinsically entails an 
“absolute opposition” (DZ 134). For, according to Hegel, true, speculative infinity is, in 
Fichte, “shoved in to the form” of mere finitude, which is to say, time, and “time […] 
immediately involves opposition, extraneousness. What exists in time is something that is 
opposed to itself, a manifold” (DZ, 134). Indeed, as we have already witnessed, Fichte 
concedes to the intrinsic incompleteness and opposition which characterizes the infinite, 
temporal striving of the empirical self’s objective activity. Thus, he states, “The ideal is 
an absolute product of the self; it can be elevated out to infinity; but at each determinate 
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moment it has its limits, which at the next determinate moment must be utterly different” 
[Emphases mine] (WL 237).  
 We arrive at a clarification of Hegel’s first major criticism of Fichte in the DZ. 
For, Hegel’s criticism is that the end of Fichte’s system fails to correspond to or fulfill the 
beginning and, as such, fails to produce the speculative identity of pure self-
consciousness and empirical consciousness. Fichte’s system begins with the absolutely 
self-positing, self-identical absolute self. The absolute self is the immediate identity of 
subject and object. Yet, in order to explain the experience of opposition within empirical 
consciousness, Fichte also postulates that the absolute self posits within itself an 
empirical self opposed by the not-self or object. Thus, the absolute, unopposed, self-
identical, self-positing self with which Fichte’s system begins finds itself opposed by an 
alien principle, namely, the empirical self with its own correlatively opposed object. As a 
result, Fichte is unable to show how the absolute self overcomes or otherwise sublates 
this opposition which it has posited for itself and so, in contrast to its beginning, the end 
of Fichte’s system is marked by an absolute opposition. 
 It helps to make sense of Hegel’s critique if we examine more closely some of the 
particular terms he employs in articulating it. Thus, in the DZ Hegel identifies pure self-
consciousness as the “subjective Ego [Ich]”, while the empirical self constitutes the 
“objective Ego [Ich]” with its correlative opposed object (DZ 124). As Hegel states, “The 
subjective Ego is Ego, the objective is Ego + non-Ego (DZ,124). Pure self-consciousness 
is the subjective Ego inasmuch as it is opposed to and “conditioned by abstraction from 
empirical consciousness” (DZ 123). Indeed, as Hegel states, “the act of self-
consciousness differs decisively from all other consciousness in that its object is the same 
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as the subject. Ego = Ego is in this regard opposed to an infinite objective world” (DZ 
121).  
Since pure self-consciousness is an immediate identity of subject and object, it 
might be referred to as the “subjective subject-object”,189 whereas empirical 
consciousness qua objective Ego would constitute the “objective subject-object”. For 
Hegel, the task of philosophy is to demonstrate how the objective subject-object becomes 
identical to the subjective subject-object. The way in which this presumably could be 
accomplished would be for the subject of the objective subject-object to completely 
determine its object and thereby sublate the distinction between empirical consciousness 
(i.e. the objective subject) and its object (i.e. the objective object). For, in so doing, the 
objective subject-object would overcome the opposition which characterizes it and 
thereby constitute itself as a sublated identity of subject and object. As such, it would 
itself attain to an identity with the subjective subject-object which latter just is a sublated 
identity of subject and object. In Fichte’s system a residual absolute opposition remains 
between the subject and object of the objective subject-object which in turn entails an 
unsublated opposition between the subjective subject-object and the objective subject-
object. Thus, to repeat, the end of Fichte’s system fails to correspond to or fulfill its 
beginning. 
Before moving on, one small but important point of interest that should be noted 
regarding the immediately preceding discussion is that Hegel characterizes the “objective 
world”, which is opposed to the subjective subject-object and which includes both the 
                                                          
189 Cf. Hegel: “The principle, the Subject-Object, turns out to be a subjective Subject-Object” (DZ 81). 
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objective subject and its object, as infinite. Hegel is speaking of Fichte, here, and so it 
should be immediately recalled that a prime reason for the failure of Fichte’s system to 
sublate the opposition between the objective subject and its object is that the objective 
subject fails to posit an infinite object. Yet, here, Hegel is saying that the objective realm 
in in fact infinite.  
This point will become more relevant once we turn to examining Hegel’s 
discussion of self-consciousness. Yet, what might be noted is that Hegel is pointing out 
that there are two infinities already operative in Fichte, but that neither constitutes a 
properly speculative infinity. First of all, the subjective subject-object of pure self-
consciousness or the absolute self is infinite inasmuch as it is purely self-sufficient, self-
relating act of self-positing. For Hegel, however, it will turn out that this infinity is a 
merely abstract infinity, an infinity which does not preserve itself in, but rather abstracts 
from, all differences. Second, the objective subject-object is also infinite. Yet, unlike the 
abstract infinity of the subjective subject-object which abstracts from all differences, the 
infinity of the objective subject-object is an infinity which is beset by an absolute 
difference or opposition which it cannot sublate. Again, the full significance of this point 
will become clear only later in the present discussion, but it is worth noting even at 
present. 
3.2 Fichte’s System is Beset by Relations of Domination and Servitude in 
Consciousness 
Hegel’s second point of criticism of Fichte’s system concerns the relations that 
wind up obtaining between the un-sublated opposed principles in Fichte’s system. Hegel 
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is especially concerned with the fact that in Fichte the relation between the absolute self 
and empirical self as well as between the empirical self and its object is ultimately a 
relation of causality.  
For,  the absolute self strives to causally determine the not-self by using the 
empirical self as an instrument, while the empirical self qua determinate objective drive 
seeks to directly causally determine the object. Yet, according to Hegel, the causal 
relation is intrinsically one of inequality and non-identity. Moreover, it entails a relation 
of domination and servitude between the terms of the relation. Thus, in the DZ regarding 
the causal relation, Hegel states, 
The causal relation […] is a false identity; for absolute opposition is at the basis 
of this relation. In the causal relation both opposites having standing, but they are 
distinct in rank. The union is forcible. The one subjugates the other. The one 
rules, the other is subservient. The unity is forced, and forced into a mere relative 
identity (DZ 115). 
In Fichte, the relation between the opposed elements is one of causality. Hegel identifies 
such a relation as a false identity in which the terms enter into a relation of domination 
and servitude. The absolute self dominates the empirical self which in turn dominates the 
object. Stated inversely, the empirical self enters into a state of bondage to the absolute 
self and becomes a mere instrument which the latter uses for the domination of the object. 
The situation is even more complex if we recall that the object of the empirical 
self includes itself qua natural. According to Hegel, the harshness of this relation of 
domination and servitude within the self becomes even more pronounced in works such 
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as Fichte’s FNR and SE. Speaking of the former work, Hegel states, “As a result of the 
absolute antithesis between pure drive and natural drive Natural Right offers us a picture 
of the complete lordship of the intellect and the complete bondage of the living being” 
(DZ 148).190 Thus, according to Hegel, the ultimate expression of freedom for Fichte is a 
mode, not of unrestricted self-positing, but of self-bondage in which one part of the self 
goes into subservience to the other. Through the relation of domination and servitude 
within the self, “the inner harmony is destroyed” (DZ 150). 
3.3 Brief Summary of Section Three 
 These are the two major points of criticism which Hegel addresses to Fichte in the 
DZ. First, the end of Fichte’s system fails to preserve or sublate the initial self-identity of 
the absolute or transcendental ego (i.e. the subjective subject-object) in its relation to the 
empirical ego (i.e. the objective subject-object). Instead, the Fichtean system culminates 
in an infinitely recurring absolute opposition between the empirical ego and its object 
and, therefore, also between the empirical ego and the absolute ego. Second, while Fichte 
is aware of the speculative task of achieving a sublated identity between the terms that 
remain opposed in his system, the best he can offer is a relationship of causality between 
these terms. For Hegel, the causal relationship is invariably one of domination and 
servitude. Thus, rather than overcoming the opposition between the empirical ego and the 
absolute ego, the causal relation succeeds merely in solidifying it further.  
                                                          
190 Cf. Hegel on Fichte’s System of Ethics: “In [Fichte’s] ethical life the relation of freedom and nature is 
supposed to become one of subjective lordship and bondage, a suppression of nature by oneself” (DZ 150). 
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 The time has come to transition into an examination of the “Self-consciousness” 
part of the Phenomenology. In order to aid in this transition, however, it will be helpful to 
give a point of reference to help focus the results of the preceding discussion of Fichte as 
well as Hegel’s initial response to Fichte in the DZ. This effort can be achieving by 
briefly returning to Hegel’s larger theory of development, especially as it is illuminated 
by the biological analogy, and applying it to what has been covered in Fichte’s theory of 
self-consciousness, thus far.  
4. “Self-consciousness” in the Phenomenology 
 It is highly significant that the subtitle for the “Self-consciousness” chapter is 
“The Truth of Self-certainty” [Die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner Selbst]. For, as we 
saw, in the course of the “Consciousness” chapter the certainty with which consciousness 
began vis-à-vis its object eventually had to give way to the truth of that object since the 
object was not what consciousness initially took it be. Consciousness was certain that its 
object was something distinct and independent of itself, but upon the experience of 
“thinking-through” the object, consciousness is disabused of this certainty and forced to 
confront the truth that what it initially took to be its object is radically dependent upon a 
universal relational context which is itself constituted in and by consciousness. Thus, as 
Hegel states, “the in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object only is for an other” 
– which is to say, the object exists only as for and thus in consciousness (PhG. 166, p. 
104). By contrast, in self-consciousness, “certainty is to itself its own object, and 
consciousness is to itself the truth” (PhG. 166, p. 104). In self-consciousness, 
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consciousness draws a distinction between itself and its object which is at the same time 
not a distinction, for its object is precisely itself.  
 Two important points bear immediate mentioning in regards to the point that, in 
self-consciousness, consciousness becomes its own object. First, insofar as consciousness 
thus posits a distinction which is not a distinction, this entails that the distinction is to be 
sublated. What is different about self-consciousness, however, is that, while the 
distinction between consciousness and its object was in fact sublated in the experience of 
mere consciousness, that sublation occurred only for us, the phenomenological observers. 
By contrast, the sublation of the distinction between self-consciousness and its object will 
be something that occurs, not just for us, but for consciousness, which is to say, self-
consciousness. Thus, part of what occurs in the course of the experience of self-
consciousness is that the mind learns to observe or otherwise know itself in a manner that 
is more than analogous to the way in which we, the phenomenologists, observe the whole 
range of phenomenal consciousness. 
 Second, as Hegel famously states, “With self-consciousness, then, we have 
therefore entered the native realm of truth” (PhG. 167, p. 104). Truth for Hegel is the 
adequacy and correspondence of the object to the subject, of existence to Concept. In 
order to attain truth, the task of the mind is to posit an objective existence for itself which 
is adequate to itself. A non-conscious object such as a mere Thing could never satisfy the 
criterion of truth. Truth demands that consciousness have consciousness for its own 
object, that certainty become certain of certainty.191  Insofar as consciousness becomes 
                                                          
191 Cf. Hegel on the result of the Phenomenology: “Truth is now is equated with certainty and this certainty 
with truth” (SL 49). 
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conscious of consciousness it becomes self-consciousness. Yet, this implies that in order 
for its object to be adequate to itself, self-consciousness’s object must be self-
consciousness, too. Only such a duplication of self-consciousness within itself could 
produce the adequacy of object to subject by which truth can be attained and the 
distinction between the mind and its object be sublated. 
 The process of sublation by which truth thus emerges in the course of the “Self-
consciousness” chapter is complex and demands a close reading of the text. Fortunately 
begins, with a helpful outline of the basic structure of the experience of self-
consciousness at the beginning of its development. Let us begin by examining this brief 
prospectus.  
4.1 First Stages in the Development of Self-consciousness 
The first task is to examine the state of self-consciousness as it first comes on the 
scene. Thus, Hegel states 
If we consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing of itself, in relation to that 
which preceded, viz. the knowing of an other, then we see that though this other 
had indeed vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, 
and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as they are in themselves. 
The [mere] being of what is merely ‘meant’, the singleness and universality 
opposed to it of perception, as also the empty inner being of the Understanding, 
these are no longer essence, but are mere moments of self-consciousness. (PhG 
104-5)  
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According to Hegel, while the various objects of Sense-certainty, Perception and Force 
and Understanding have been thought-through and thus “vanished” at least in their 
pretension to independence and self-sufficiency, they are at the same time preserved as 
moments of self-consciousness itself. Here we encounter a crucial complexity that 
derives primarily from the fact that we are as yet only dealing with self-consciousness as 
it first comes on the scene.  
For, regarding the apparent vanishing of the independence of the object of mere 
consciousness, Hegel immediately clarifies that, 
Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz. the self-
subsistent existence for consciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is 
the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is 
essentially a return from otherness. (PhG 105)  
The nuance of the point here is subtle and needs to be tracked very closely. For, the 
various objects of mere consciousness have been revealed to be moments of self-
consciousness. To that extent, then, they have been preserved. It would thus seem that 
only the principal moment of these moments has been lost, namely, their collective 
pretension to self-subsistence or self-sufficiency. But – and this is the crucial point – in 
point of fact, this is not entirely the case. For, while in one sense, self-consciousness 
constitutes the sublation and preservation of these distinct moments (save, of course, for 
their principal moment – i.e. independence and self-sufficiency – which has vanished), in 
another sense, self-consciousness is the reflection out of the world of sense and 
perception entirely. Thus, within self-consciousness Hegel distinguishes between, on the 
one hand, self-consciousness for which the being of Sense-certainty, the Thing of 
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Perception and so on have been preserved, albeit as mere moments, and, on the other 
hand, self-consciousness which has reflected entirely out of the world of sensuousness 
into a pure self-relation.192  
Grasping the nature of this distinction between two self-consciousnesses within 
self-consciousness is utterly essential for understanding the entirety of Hegel’s 
subsequent analysis in the “Self-consciousness” chapter. Let us track Hegel’s initial 
account of the distinction between the two. 
4.1.1 The Two Self-consciousnesses within Self-consciousness 
 Hegel first describes the self-consciousness which is a withdrawal or return out of 
otherness: 
As self-consciousness, it is movement; but since what it distinguishes from itself 
is only itself as itself, the difference as an otherness, is immediately superseded 
for it; the difference is not and it [self-consciousness] is only the motionless 
tautology of: ‘I am I.’ (PhG 105) 
This self-consciousness which reflects or abstracts out of otherness clearly corresponds to 
the absolute self of Fichte’s system. For, as self-consciousness, it is movement; in other 
words, it does posit a difference within itself. Still, this difference is immediately 
sublated. Similarly, in Fichte’s system the absolute self qua positing is distinct from the 
absolute self qua posited; yet, this difference is immediately sublated. The difference is 
                                                          
192 Cf. Hegel on “the element of pure indeterminacy or of the ‘I’’s pure reflection into itself, in which every 
limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires and drives, or 
given and determined in some other way, is dissolved” (EPR, 37). 
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not, for ‘I am I’. Therefore, there is “movement” in this immediate self-consciousness 
inasmuch as a difference is posited and then sublated. But there is no mediation. It is 
therefore motionless, for neither side undergoes development. 
 The abstract and immediate self-consciousness which reflects out of the being of 
the world of sense and perception eo ipso does not preserve as moments of itself the 
otherness experienced in mere consciousness. It posits and preserves a form of difference 
– namely, the difference between ‘I’ and ‘I’ – but “for it the difference does not have the 
form of being”. Instead, it is immediately sublated.  
The point, here, is that the difference between the absolute I qua positing and the 
absolute I qua posited is a difference that lacks the being of the world of sense and 
perception. It is a difference which is not. The result, according to Hegel, is that for self-
consciousness which is reflected out of the sensuous world and into itself “otherness is 
for it in the form of a being, or as a distinct moment” (PhG 105). In other words, self-
consciousness in-itself preserves as a moment of itself the otherness of the being of the 
sensuous world of “Consciousness”. Yet, for abstract self-consciousness that reflects 
itself out of the being of the world of sense and perception, the otherness of this world 
returns as it was in the experience in mere consciousness, namely, as a being – be it a 
‘This’ or a ‘Thing ‘ – which is entirely distinct from and independent of self-
consciousness.  
Yet, since what we are examining is not mere consciousness, but rather self-
consciousness, “there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a 
second distinct moment” (PhG 105).Thus, there are two distinct moments constituting the 
experience of self-consciousness as it first comes on the scene. Regarding the first 
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moment, as Hegel states, “self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the 
whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it” (PhG 105). Thus, in one of its 
moments self-consciousness has preserved the being of the world of sense and 
perception. Yet, according to Hegel, this first moment is preserved “only as connected 
with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself” (PhG 105). Thus, 
there is a difference and connection between, on the one hand, the self-consciousness that 
preserves the being of the world of sense and perception and, on the other hand, the self-
consciousness which reflects out of that world in order to maintain its exclusive identity 
with itself. They are different inasmuch as the self-consciousness which preserves the 
being of the sensuous world as a determination of itself is thus distinct from the self-
consciousness which reflects entirely out of the sensuous world. Yet, they are connected 
inasmuch the two self-consciousnesses – albeit as yet merely in-themselves and not for-
themselves – constitute the unity of self-consciousness with itself. 
 Now, since the first moment of self-consciousness exists only in connection with 
the second moment, Hegel states that for self-consciousness “the sensuous world is […] 
an enduring existence which, however, is only appearance, or a difference which, in 
itself, is no difference” (PhG 105). The enduring existence or independence of the 
sensuous world is a mere appearance or difference which in itself is no difference. Still, 
the quality of the sensuous world as a mere appearance is not yet for self-consciousness 
– specifically, for self-consciousness which reflects itself out of the sensuous world. 
Thus, “the antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the 
truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to 
self-consciousness” [Emphasis mine] (PhG 105). The truth of the distinction between the 
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sensuous world (i.e. appearance) and self-consciousness has as its essence or basis the 
truth, namely, the unity of self-consciousness. Yet, its essence is only this truth. However, 
it is not yet for self-consciousness, and therefore not certain, that the distinction between 
itself and the appearance of the sensuous world has its essence in itself. 
4.2 Self-consciousness as Desire 
 Immediately following this observation Hegel famously states, “self-
consciousness is Desire [Begierde] überhaupt” (PhG 105). Much ink has been spilt 
trying to sort out what Hegel means by the statement that self-consciousness is “desire 
überhaupt” which might be translated as “desire in general” or “desire as such”. If we 
keep in mind the vital connection between this part of the Phenomenology and Fichte’s 
system as well as exploit some clarifications provided by the PM “Phenomenology” 
section, however, Hegel’s basic point can be explicated without undue difficulty. 
 Desire for Hegel is, in the first instance, simply the felt tension of the inner 
contradiction between one’s concept and one’s existence, and the concomitant urge to 
sublate this contradiction. In other words, desire is what contradiction feels like.193 
According to the PM, the concept of self-consciousness “consists in being in relation to 
its own self, being I = I” (PM 155). Qua reflected out of the sensuous world, self-
consciousness thus does attain to its concept, this pure self-relation. Yet, qua reflected out 
of the sensuous world, self-consciousness attains this self-identity only in an abstract 
manner. As a result, self-consciousness as reflected into itself and merely self-relating 
                                                          
193 Cf. Hegel: “need and drive are […] the felt contradiction, as it occurs within the living subject itself” 
(EL 281). 
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finds itself simultaneously in a “relationship to an immediate Other not posited ideally, to 
an external object, to a non-I, and is external to its own self” (PM 155).  
Self-consciousness qua reflected into itself simultaneously finds itself in relation 
to something external. Therefore, self-consciousness qua reflected into itself both does 
and does not correspond to its concept, which is the purely self-relating I = I. Hence, it is 
in contradiction with itself and, accordingly, feels the urge to sublate this contradiction. 
 Importantly, the external object to which abstract self-consciousness is related is 
self-consciousness, too. Thus, insofar as self-consciousness is, at least implicitly, always 
the unity of subject and object, we have distinction now between a merely subjective 
subject-object (an “abstraction which is supposed to be objective”) and a merely objective 
subject-object (an “external object [which] is supposed to be subjective”) (PM 154). Like 
the subjective subject-object, or self-consciousness reflected out of sensuous existence, 
the objective subject-object initially will turn out both to correspond and not to 
correspond to its concept. Yet, it will manifest this contradiction in a different manner. 
For, whereas the subjective subject-object constitutes self-consciousness that does not yet 
recognize itself in its object, the objective subject-object will constitute the object which 
does not yet recognize itself as self-consciousness. Thus, as Hegel states, in-itself self-
consciousness “is a totality, a unity of subjective and objective” (PM 155). Yet, initially, 
self-consciousness is “something identical with itself [which] bears within itself a 
contradiction and is filled with the feeling of its implicit identity with itself as well as 
with opposite feeling of its inner contradiction” (PM 154-55).  
 The place to turn to make sense of the overriding point is Fichte’s discussion of 
the relation between the absolute and the empirical ego. For recall, according to Fichte, 
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The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to, itself. But in regard to 
consciousness it is equal to itself, for consciousness is one: but in this 
consciousness the absolute self is posited as indivisible; whereas the self to which 
the not-self is opposed is posited as divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self 
opposed to it, the self is itself in opposition to the absolute self. (WL 109) 
In Hegel’s terms, what Fichte is expressing is that, in-itself, self-consciousness constitutes 
“a totality, a unity of subjective and objective”. Yet, the absolute self constitutes self-
consciousness as merely the subjective subject-object, or self-consciousness merely for-
itself. For, in Hegel, just as well as in Fichte, the subjective subject-object is “indivisible” 
inasmuch as it consists in the immediate and exclusive self-relating identity of ‘I = I’. 
Yet, simultaneously it is opposed by the empirical self. Herein lies the contradiction 
which is explicit in Hegel, but only partially and problematically confronted and dealt 
with by Fichte. 
 For, recall, according to Fichte, “nothing is equated or opposed to” the absolute 
self (WL 117). Yet, simultaneously there is something opposed to the absolute self, 
namely, the empirical self. Thus, the absolute self is exclusively self-related and opposed 
by nothing, on the one hand, and also related to and opposed by something external, on 
the other. But, how can this be unless the absolute self is itself internally contradictory? 
 Here we might also have the materials for generating greater insight into what 
Hegel means when he refers to self-consciousness as desire überhaupt. For, recall that – 
albeit perhaps only partially and problematically – Fichte is aware of the internally 
contradictory nature of the absolute self: 
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The absolute self is identical with itself: everything therein is one and the same 
self, and belongs […] to one and the same self; nothing therein is distinguishable, 
nothing manifold; the self is everything and nothing, it is nothing for itself, and 
can distinguish not positing or posited within itself. – In virtue of its nature it 
strives […] to maintain itself in this condition. – There emerges in it a disparity, 
and hence something alien to itself. […] That this happens, can in no sense be 
proved a priori, but everyone can confirm it in his own experience (WL 233). 
The absolute self strives to preserve its perfect self-identity. Yet, Fichte immediately 
follows this statement by pointing that, while the absolute self is perfectly identical with 
itself, still, disparity emerges within it. Fichte seems to treat the striving of the absolute 
self to preserve its perfect self-identity as something which is at least in principle prior to 
the contradiction that emerges within the absolute self. For Hegel, the point would be that 
the absolute self of its nature strives to preserve its self-identity precisely because in its 
nature it is contradictory.194 
 Thus, through connecting it with its Fichtean backdrop, we have an at least first 
approximation to what Hegel means by saying that self-consciousness is desire 
überhaupt. Self-consciousness, in the first instance, is the desire of self-consciousness to 
sublate its own internal contradictoriness, which is to say, the contradiction between its 
concept (i.e. perfect self-relation) and its existence (i.e. relatedness to, and thus ultimately 
                                                          
194 Cf. Hegel: “Mind can step out of its abstract universality, a universality that is for itself, out of its simple 
self-relation, can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple I, and 
hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is, for mind, not merely possible but necessary because it is 
through the Other and by sublation of it, that mind comes to authenticate itself as, and in fact comes to be, 
what it ought to be according to its concept, namely the ideality of the external, the Idea that returns to 
itself out of its otherness, or, expressed more abstractly, the self-differentiating universal which in its 
difference is together with itself and for itself. The Other, the negative, contradiction, rupture, thus belongs 
to the nature of the mind” [Emphases mine] (PM 16). 
236 
 
 
dependence upon, another). In other words, in the first instance, desire is a principle of 
self-mediation. As such, desire is not directly related to any object, unless that object is 
self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness qua desire überhaupt does not desire what it 
takes to be external objects because, for example, it seeks to possess them or even to 
negate them. What self-consciousness desires as such, or überhaupt, is to overcome its 
own internal contradiction. The putatively external objects which, as we will see, it 
attempts to negate turn out to be not directly desirable in themselves but rather merely as 
means for this more basic process of self-sublation. 
 Let us not forget, as well, that self-consciousness will turn out to be doubly self-
contradictory. For, just as the subjective subject-object is simultaneously exclusively self-
related and also related to something external, so the objective subject-object will 
inversely turn out to be simultaneously related to something external – namely, the 
subjective subject-object – and also purely self-related. The self-sublation of self-
consciousness will thus involve the supersession of this duplication of self-consciousness 
within itself. 
4.3 The Double Object of Self-consciousness  
 Having thus clarified, in part, what Hegel means by calling self-consciousness 
desire überhaupt, let us return to the thread of the discussion in the PhG. What needs to 
be emphasized is Hegel’s following discussion of the double object of self-
consciousness: 
Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the 
immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-
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consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is 
the true essence, and is present in the first instance only as opposed to the first 
object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which 
this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for 
it. (PhG 105) 
There is thus a double object for self-consciousness: 1) the object of mere consciousness 
and 2) itself. In the first instance, however, the second object is present in self-
consciousness only as opposed to the first, for, indeed, the second object has reflected 
itself out of the first object and into itself.  
The truth, however, is that these two objects actually form an identity. The 
problem is that this truth is only in-itself, not yet for self-consciousness. The immediately 
succeeding sections of “Self-consciousness” delineate the process whereby the truth of 
self-consciousness becomes explicit for self-consciousness so that the truth of self-
consciousness can become certain in-and-for-itself. 
4.3.1 One Object of Self-consciousness: Life 
 During the course of the “Consciousness” chapter, the first object of self-
consciousness mentioned above, namely, the “whole expanse of the sensuous world” has, 
like consciousness, returned into itself. For Hegel, “[t]hrough this reflection into itself the 
object has become Life” (PhG 106). The first object of self-consciousness mentioned 
above is thus life. Accordingly, since self-consciousness is itself desire “the object of 
immediate desire is a living thing” (PhG 106). Self-consciousness thus sunders itself into 
self-consciousness, on the one hand, and life, on the other.  
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According to Hegel, self-consciousness is “the unity for which the infinite unity of 
differences is”, whereas life “is only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time for 
itself” (PhG 106). The whole expanse of the sensuous world qua life is the infinite unity 
of self-differentiating and self-reconciling development that emerged during the course of 
the “Consciousness” chapter. This infinite, dynamic unity, however, is not yet explicit for 
life; it is only for self-consciousness, which latter, however, treats life as a merely 
“negative element” which it desires but only, as we will see, that it might negate it in 
order to preserve its own pure self-relation. 
 According to Hegel, life is a dialectic between the “simple universal fluid 
medium” or “restless infinity” of life in-itself, on the one hand, and the positing of 
individual shapes or members existing for-themselves, on the other (PhG 106-7). The two 
initial aspects of the dialectic mutually produce and negate each other. Life for-itself must 
negate life in-itself in order that the former might live, for life lives on life. Yet, the 
simple universal fluid medium of life is preserved precisely in and through the perpetual 
positing and negation of the individual members. 
Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the 
same time the dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the 
splitting-up is just as much the splitting-up and a forming of members. With this, 
the two sides of the whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the 
passive separatedness of the shapes in the general medium of independence, and 
the process of Life, collapse into one another. The latter is just as much as an 
imparting of shape as a supersession of it; and on the other, the imparting of 
shape, is just as much a supersession as an articulation of shape. (PhG 108) 
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Life, then, is not just the simple universal fluid medium or the positing of individual 
members but the “self-developing whole” of these two moments in their dialectic 
sublation (PhG 108). 
 Hegel specifies that the resultant sublated whole or unity is indeed not the 
immediate unity of the simple universal medium of life, but a “reflected unity”, or, in 
other words, a “universal unity, which contains all these moments as superseded 
[aufgehoben] within itself” (PhG 108). Life, then, according to Hegel, is not simply an 
immediate universality, but a sublated universality which posits and sublates differences. 
As such, it is was Hegel calls a simple genus [Gattung] or mediated universal.  
Recall, however, that life does not yet exist for itself. Thus, it does not yet exist 
for itself qua this simple determination of genus. Rather, life just is the infinite, universal 
self-differentiating and self-sublating generic process. According to Hegel, life qua 
simple genus, therefore, “points” [verweist] to something other than itself, namely, 
consciousness (PhG 109). It is for consciousness that life exists as a mediated universal 
or genus. 
4.3.2 The Second Object of Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness 
 Self-consciousness is that consciousness for which the genus of life exists. As 
such, according to Hegel, it is an-other life. Hegel adds the further important point that 
self-consciousness is itself a “genus on its own account” (PhG 109).  Self-consciousness 
qua genus has itself as pure ‘I’ for object. In other words, self-consciousness, in one 
sense, is the immediate identity of subject and object: ‘I = I’. Thus, self-consciousness is 
a genus whose immediate object is the pure ‘I’ which just is self-consciousness itself and 
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is therefore also a genus. At least two points of reference ought to be kept in mind in 
order to keep track of Hegel’s discussion at this stage, one of which has already been 
discussed in a previous chapter at some length and the other is on the immediate horizon 
of the current chapter and so permits a few anticipatory remarks. 
The first point of reference is Aristotle’s notion of rational Nous as potentia 
omnia facere et fieri. Rational Nous, in the first instance, is a potential totality or, as 
Hegel would put it, a genus in-itself. Education, for Hegel, is the process whereby this 
“initially abstract universality is developed to concrete universality” (PM 53). In other 
words, in the first instance, self-consciousness qua genus is the abstract ‘I’ which 
contains the totality of individual determinations within itself, but only in-itself, in 
potency. Its development consists in positing these determinations for-itself, thereby 
rendering them actual and concrete.195 Thus, Hegel states that the abstract ‘I’ qua object 
“will enrich itself for the ‘I’ [qua subject] and undergo the unfolding which we have seen 
in the sphere of life,” for, as we have just seen, the sphere of life is the sphere of a 
universal medium which posits individual differences only to sublate them (PhG 109).  
The apex of this development will, of course, entail self-consciousness or mind 
qua genus in-itself becoming actualized for-itself such that the immediate and abstract 
identity of the ‘I = I’ of self-consciousness becomes the mediated and concrete identity of 
the Aristotelian Noesis noeseos. As Hegel states, 
In natural things their substance, the genus, is different from their existence […] 
The content of natural things does not acquire the form of universality and 
                                                          
195 Cf. Hegel: “The genus genuinely actualizes itself […] in mind, in thinking, in this element which is 
homogeneous with the genus” (PM 54). 
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essentiality through itself, and their individuality is not itself the form; only 
subject thinking is the form for itself and in philosophy gives that universal 
content an existence for itself. The human content by contrast is the free mind 
itself, and it comes to existence in mind’s self-consciousness. This absolute 
content, the intrinsically concrete mind, is just this: to have the form itself, 
thinking, for its content. Aristotle soared above the Platonic Idea (the genus, the 
substantial) to the heights of the thinking consciousness of this determination in 
his concept of the entelechy of thinking, which is Noesis tos noeseos. (PM 254-
5)196 
In natural things, the individual remains in contradiction with its genus or concept. Life 
attains to a mediated identity of the abstract universal medium and the equally abstract 
individual, thereby producing a concrete universal, or a universal which posits and 
preserves its individual differences. Yet, life achieves this mediated universal only in-
itself. It remains for the individual self-consciousness, which is an abstract universal or 
genus in-itself, to posit its implicit universality for-itself in order thereby to actualize the 
true concrete unity of individual and universal in which the individual is both itself and 
the genus. 
 Aside from Aristotle, the other major point of reference that must be borne in 
mind in order to make sense of Hegel’s point that the abstract ‘I’ of self-consciousness is 
itself a genus is Kant’s notion of self-consciousness as the Transcendental Unity of 
                                                          
196 Bernard Williams thus paints a misleading picture by suggesting that the Aristotelian noesis noeseos 
would, for Hegel, correspond to the merely abstract identity of the Ficthean’ I = I’ (Recognition 268-70). 
For Hegel, the Aristotelian noesis noeseos clearly corresponds to the intrinsically concrete mind. 
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Apperception (TUA). Fichte is, of course, relevant as well in this context, but mainly as 
extending or otherwise refining Kant’s position.  
For Hegel, the TUA is more or less cognate with Aristotelian rational Nous at 
least in the latter’s initial abstract or potential quality. Thus, in the case of the TUA, the 
mind or self-consciousness just is a genus or, as Hegel will specify later, a category 
which turns out to be a category of categories – which is to say, a mediated universal, or a 
category/genus which posits and sublates differences within itself.197 Yet, like the 
abstract ‘I’ of self-consciousness, the TUA is thoroughly abstract and lacks concrete, 
individual determinations. Moreover, the concrete determinations which it does achieve 
are problematically derived in the Kantian system. Again, all of these points will be 
returned to in later discussions. Yet, they are helpful to bear in mind when attempting to 
make initial sense of Hegel’s claim that life qua self-consciousness has in the first 
instance itself qua abstract ‘I’ which is itself a genus as an object. 
4.3.3 Self-consciousness as Desire Redux 
Having established the nature of the double object of self-consciousness, namely, 
life qua genus in-itself and itself qua genus for-itself, let us return to the thread of the 
Phenomenology and further examine Hegel’s discussion of the simple, abstract genus or 
‘I’ that is self-consciousness. Thus, Hegel states, 
                                                          
197 Cf. Hegel: “This category […] possesses difference in itself; for its essence is just this, to be 
immediately one and selfsame in otherness, or in absolute difference. The difference therefore is, but is 
perfectly transparent, and a difference that is at the same time none. It appears as a plurality of categories” 
(PhG 142). 
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The simple ‘I’ is this genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are 
not differences only by its being the negative essence of the shaped independent 
moments; and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding 
[Aufheben] this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent 
life; self-consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it 
explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys 
the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true 
certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an 
objective manner (PhG 109). 
Recall, the simple, abstract ‘I’ qua genus for-itself is also self-consciousness qua 
reflecting out of the world of sensuous life and existence. Thus, for self-consciousness 
qua reflecting out the world of sensuous life and existence, that world is not even a mere 
moment of itself (although, to be sure, that world is indeed a moment of self-
consciousness in-itself).198 Therefore, the world of sensuous life and existence is for 
abstract, reflecting self-consciousness, at this stage, nothing at all. At the very same time, 
however, abstract, reflecting self-consciousness is confronted by the otherness of the 
sensuous world of life. Thus, there is for abstracting, reflecting self-consciousness a 
difference which is not a difference, for it is confronted by an other which for it is 
nothing. Stated differently, abstract, reflecting self-consciousness is self-contradictory 
since, for-itself, it both is and is not related to something other. 
                                                          
198 Recall, Hegel: “The [mere] being of what is merely ‘meant’, the singleness and the universality opposed 
to it of perception, as also the empty inner being  of the Understanding, these are no longer essence,  but 
are moments of self-consciousness” [Emphases mine] (PhG 105). 
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 Recall, further, that along with being reflected out of the sensuous world of life, 
the simple, abstract ‘I’ or self-consciousness is also a genus. Therefore, the difference 
between itself and the sensuous world of life which confronts self-consciousness is not a 
difference only insofar as self-consciousness constitutes the negative essence of the 
independent moments, only insofar as self-consciousness is “infinity as the supersession 
of all distinctions” (PhG 106). How, then, does abstract, reflecting self-consciousness 
sublate the distinction between itself and the world of sensuous life that confronts it, 
thereby proving that the distinction was no distinction? Answer: in the first instance, 
through desire.  
 Recall, once more, that desire qua self-consciousness is not primarily concerned 
with consumption or destruction in the satisfaction of desire. Rather, desire primarily is 
the felt contradiction within self-consciousness between its existence and its concept as 
well as the concomitant urge to sublate this contradiction. Thus, self-consciousness qua 
reflected, abstract ‘I’ is in contradiction with itself inasmuch as it is both purely self-
related and related to something external. Pure self-relation or I = I, however, is the 
concept self-consciousness. Thus, in order to achieve an existence that is adequate to its 
concept, self-consciousness must negate the object – the sensuous world of life – which 
stands opposed to it.  
In so doing, self-consciousness actually achieves two correlative goals. First, in 
consuming or otherwise destroying the object, self-consciousness proves to itself that the 
object was in fact nothing and that self-consciousness is purely self-related. Second, 
through its activity of consumption or negation, self-consciousness explicitly objectifies 
for-itself its own – previously implicit – certainty of existing purely for-itself, of being 
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purely self-related. As such, the subjective or abstract certainty of self-consciousness now 
becomes its objective or concrete truth.199 This is the overall pattern of development, for 
Hegel: an initially abstract principle actively posits differences within itself in order to 
recognize itself objectively therein. 
 Still, despite the success with which self-consciousness meets in destroying the 
objectivity of the sensuous world of life and thereby objectifying for-itself its own 
implicit certainty of itself as purely self-relating, the achievement is fleeting, even 
somewhat illusory. Indeed, a crucial turning-point in the experience of self-consciousness 
occurs when in the very satisfaction of its desire it realizes that the object has its own 
independence. For, despite the fact that it would affirm the nothingness of the other by 
negating it, self-consciousness realizes that its self-certainty comes precisely through 
overcoming this other. Thus, according to Hegel, self-consciousness experiences the 
irony that “by its negative relation to the other, [self-consciousness] is unable to 
supersede it” (PhG 109).  
Were self-consciousness truly independent and self-sufficient, and were its object 
truly nothing, then it should not feel the desire to negate its object. For, in such a case, 
                                                          
199 Hegel summarizes this point of discussion in the PM as follows: “Abstract self-consciousness is the first 
negation of consciousness, therefore also burdened with an external object, formally with the negation of 
itself; thus it is at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction between itself 
as self-consciousness and itself as consciousness. Consciousness and the negation in general are already 
implicitly sublated in the I = I; so as this certainty of itself in contrast to the object, it is the urge to posit 
what it is implicitly, – i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract awareness of itself, and conversely 
to free itself from its sensoriness, to sublate the objectivity that is given and to posit it as identical to itself. 
The two things are one and the same, the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness” (153). 
Abstract self-consciousness, due to its internal contradiction – namely, its being both purely self-related (I 
= I) and related to an external, sensuous object – feels the urge to overcome this distinction. The means by 
which it would achieve this are 1) negating the external object which it takes to be merely given and 2) 
positing its own objective activity so that the only object to which it would be related would be itself, thus 
returning to a mediated I = I. These two actions are in fact one and same since the activity of negating just 
is the objectification for self-consciousness of its implicit pure self-relating. 
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self-consciousness would not be self-contradictory. Yet, insofar as it does experience 
such desire and its subsequent satisfaction, self-consciousness eo ipso establishes a 
relation, indeed a relation of dependence, to the object of which it would otherwise 
presume to be independent.  
As the result of this ironic experience, self-consciousness is forced to the 
realization that while, in one sense, self-consciousness is the essence of desire or desire 
überhaupt (for desire, in the first instance, seeks to sublate the internal contradiction of 
self-consciousness), still, in another sense, and despite or perhaps because of the self-
contradictory nature of self-consciousness, the essence of desire “is something other than 
self-consciousness” (PhG. 175, p. 109). For desire qua desire, despite its initial 
pretensions to the contrary, is inextricably linked with and therefore dependent upon 
something distinct from itself.200 
 Yet, by the very same token, self-consciousness does exist absolutely for-itself, 
and it must experience the satisfaction of overcoming the other, namely, the world of 
sensuous life. The true overcoming of the other and the concomitant establishment of 
independence and self-certainty, however, cannot take the form of a desire which simply 
negates the object. For, that effort ironically only reveals the dependency of self-
consciousness qua desire on its object. Instead, Hegel asserts that the other of self-
consciousness, namely, its object-qua-life, must negate itself. Only then, can self-
                                                          
200 To put it in FIchtean terms, desire initially seems to manifest the pure self-positing of ‘I am I’ or ‘I 
therefore I.’ For, in the first instance, I desire in order to mediate myself – hence, ‘I therefore I.’ Yet, in 
proving to be dependent upon something external, desire simultaneously manifests the principle of ‘I 
therefore not-I’ or ‘I am not-I’.  
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consciousness attain the satisfaction which would attend upon its own self-certainty and 
self-sufficiency. 
4.4 Life as the Concrete, Developing Object of Self-Consciousness 
 With Hegel’s claim that the sensuous world of life must negate itself in order for 
self-consciousness to truly objectify its own certainty of itself, and thereby raise that 
certainty to truth, we have entered into a new phase of the discussion of self-
consciousness. For, previously the focus of the attention was placed on self-
consciousness as reflected out of the world of sensuous life and existence along with its 
failed attempt to preserve or otherwise sublate its hitherto abstract self-identity by merely 
negating the sensuous world of life which threatened the purity of that self-relation. Now, 
the focus broadens to include the activity and development of the sensuous world of life 
itself in relation to abstract, reflecting self-consciousness.  
To begin the discussion it must be recalled that, according to Hegel, insofar as it 
is both the independent genus of life and its own self-negation, this object of self-
consciousness is consciousness (PhG. 175, p. 110). Thus, while, on the one hand, self-
consciousness reflects out of the world of sensuous life, it also posits and preserves that 
life for which the whole expanse and infinite variety of the natural world is its own 
object. Self-consciousness is, accordingly, divided into: two moments: 1) abstract self-
consciousness and 2) consciousness which is immersed in and opposed by the entire 
sensuous world – in other words, life. 
In the PM Hegel clarifies the point, stating 
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The defect of abstract self-consciousness lies in this: it and consciousness are still 
two different things confronting each other, they have not yet achieved a 
reciprocal equilibrium. In consciousness, we see tremendous difference, on the 
one side, of the I, this wholly simple entity, and on the other side, of the infinite 
variety of the world. The opposition of the I and world, which does not yet come 
to genuine mediation here, constitutes the finitude of consciousness. Self-
consciousness, by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly abstract identity with 
its own self.201 (PM 153) 
Abstract self-consciousness is “burdened” by an external object – consciousness – which 
latter is itself opposed by the infinite variety of the sensuous world. The correlative terms 
in Fichte’s system should be readily apparent. For, there, the absolute self (i.e. abstract 
self-consciousness) was identified with, yet opposed by, the empirical self (i.e. 
consciousness) which latter was opposed by the world nature or the not-I (i.e. the whole 
expanse of the sensuous world). 
 Yet, it is important not to lose track of the fact that the distinction between self-
consciousness and consciousness is a distinction within self-consciousness itself. As 
Hegel states, “The rift between self-consciousness and consciousness forms an inner 
contradiction of self-consciousness with itself, because self-consciousness is also the 
stage directly preceding it, consciousness, and consequently is the opposite of itself (PM 
                                                          
201 Recall that in Fichte, the empirical self (i.e. consciousness) and the absolute self (i.e. abstract self-
consciousness) both were also beset by finitude. 
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153).202 Again, the correlates in Fichte should be readily apparent. For, there, the 
empirical self was simultaneously opposed to, yet posited within, the absolute self. 
 Important to note, as well, is that Fichte’s system essentially stops at the 
viewpoint of abstract self-consciousness. For, it does not succeed in moving past the 
moment of desire or striving in self-consciousness and the concomitant effort to negate 
the object. As noted, however, the source of Hegel’s eventual critique of Fichte lies in 
Hegel’s decision to take on the viewpoint of the empirical self, which up to this point has 
been characterized as mere consciousness. 
Yet, Hegel proceeds to observe how the would-be merely conscious life which is 
the opposed object of self-consciousness turns out to be itself self-consciousness. For, 
recall that as consciousness qua life is a genus. Yet, it is a genus which is conscious of 
itself, and a genus that is conscious of itself, for Hegel, just is self-consciousness. Thus, 
the self-negating independent object of self-consciousness is a self-consciousness. In the 
terms of the DZ, the objective subject-object of life is truly a subject-object.203  
Recall that self-consciousness seeks the satisfaction derived from the certainty 
that its object corresponds to itself. Yet, we have just learned that the object of self-
consciousness is a self-consciousness. As a result, Hegel states, “Self-consciousness 
achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (PhG 110). In other words, 
abstract, reflecting self-consciousness will achieve satisfaction only in the independent 
world of sensuous life which has itself become self-consciousness. 
                                                          
202 Cf. Hegel: “Self-consciousness necessarily goes on, therefore, to confront itself with another self-
consciousness by repulsion of itself from itself” (PM, 146). 
203 Cf. the Philosophy of Mind: “The object is […] immersed in the inwardness of the self” (PM, 153). 
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4.4.1 McDowell’s Challenge to the Orthodox Interpretation of Self-consciousness 
According to McDowell, the claim that self-consciousness achieves its 
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness “is usually taken to claim that there can be 
a self-conscious individual, say a self-conscious human being, only if there are at least 
two, each recognizing the other as another of what it is one of” (HWV 159). The strongest 
part of McDowell’s larger argument occurs precisely in his response to this more or less 
orthodox position, as he states, 
The otherness that needs to be aufgehoben by the movement of self-consciousness 
appeared in the first instance as the otherness of ‘the whole expanse of the 
sensible world’, one moment in the doubled object of self-consciousness, whose 
movement is to overcome the antithesis between that moment and the other, 
namely itself. It was that moment in the doubled object, ‘the whole expanse of the 
sensible world,’ that returned into itself and became life, and then revealed itself 
as consciousness and finally self-consciousness. This is the ‘another self-
consciousness’ of our passage. It should surely be in some sense the same object, 
or moment in a doubled object, that we began with, only now more hygienically – 
less immediately – understood. But if ‘another self-consciousness’ here is a 
literally other mind, say a different human being, what has happened to ‘the 
whole expanse of the sensible world’? How does replacing the first moment in the 
doubled object of self-consciousness [i.e. the whole expanse of the sensuous 
world] with someone else’s self-consciousness belong with the unfolding of that 
251 
 
 
moment that Hegel seemed to be offering in the text up to this point? [Emphases 
mine] (HWV 159) 
The orthodox interpretation would replace the entire expanse of the sensuous world, 
which is the first object of the doubled object of self-consciousness204 and which through 
its own inward reflection reveals itself to be conscious life and ultimately self-
consciousness, with “a literally other mind, say a different human being”. Yet, in such a 
scenario, what happens to the entire expanse of the sensuous world? How is the other 
self-consciousness qua other individual human being which self-consciousness would 
thus confront itself the entire expanse of the sensuous world of life? Moreover, how is the 
entire expanse of the sensuous world preserved as a moment within self-consciousness? 
All of these questions are avoided if the orthodox interpretation is jettisoned, and the two 
self-consciousnesses which find themselves opposed are interpreted as abstract/absolute 
self-consciousness, on the one hand, and empirical self-consciousness, on the other. 
4.4.2 Summary of Preceding Section and Transition to the Lord/Bondsman Dialectic 
At this point, Hegel briefly summarizes the state of the argument thus far: 
The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) 
the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ is its first immediate object. But (b) this immediacy is 
itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a supersession of the independent object, 
in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of 
self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the 
                                                          
204 The other object, of course, being self-consciousness for-itself. 
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truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplification of self-
consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits 
its otherness of difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. (PhG 
110)  
In the first instance, self-consciousness has the abstract or undifferentiated ‘I’ as it 
immediate object: I = I. This is self-consciousness qua reflected into itself and out of the 
sensuous world of life. But this immediate, self-sufficient identity can only be preserved 
by negating the independent object, life. The demand for this negation is experienced as 
desire and its fulfillment as satisfaction. Thus, in one sense, the satisfaction of desire is 
the very “reflection of self-consciousness into itself”. It is that by which self-
consciousness becomes certain of itself in its self-sufficiency and independence. Yet, the 
truth of this experience of self-certainty reveals that there must be a double reflection: 
one by self-consciousness and one by the object. Since the object is a genus, however, the 
reflection of itself into itself reveals it to be self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness 
is duplicated within itself.  
 With the discovery that the object of self-consciousness is a self-consciousness, 
“we already have before us the concept of mind [Geist]” (PhG 110). Yet, Hegel 
maintains that the experience of what mind is still lies ahead for consciousness. For mind 
in its fullest sense is the “absolute substance which is the unity of different independent 
self-consciousness, which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 
‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We” that is ‘I’” (PhG 110).  
The vast majority of commentators take this statement to imply that in the “Self-
consciousness” chapter we thus entered upon the stage in which the analysis has shifted 
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from the the experience of a single self-consciousness to the experience of the social 
encounter and interplay between two distinct and independent individual self-
consciousnesses. McDowell is right to emphasize, however, that Hegel clearly states that 
the experience of this truth about the mind still lies ahead for consciousness (HWV 160-
61). We are as yet dealing with an individual self-consciousness which has itself as its 
own object.  
 This claim can be verified by simply recalling the beginning of the present 
analysis of self-consciousness in which Hegel states that the being of the whole expanse 
of the sensuous world was but a moment of self-consciousness, albeit merely in-itself 
(PhG 105). For abstract self-consciousness, as it first comes on the scene, this infinitely 
self-differentiating sensuous world, the world of life, is taken to be an independent object. 
Thus, self-consciousness found that it had two objects: itself and life. In truth, or in-
themselves, these two objects were the same, but self-consciousness was not yet certain 
of it; the truth was not yet explicit for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness initially 
tried to make this truth explicit for itself by simply negating the object. This procedure, 
however, only revealed the independence of the object. It was necessary for the object to 
negate itself in order for self-consciousness to become certain of itself in its own object. 
For in thus reflecting into itself, the object constituted itself as the genus which exists for 
itself, which just is self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness duplicates itself in order 
that its self-certainty might become objective for-itself. 
 The parallel between the present analysis of self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology and the previous analysis of Fichte’s system and Hegel’s critique thereof 
has also been revealed. For, self-consciousness qua reflected into itself would correspond 
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to the absolute self of Fichte’s system. Indeed, Hegel explicitly invokes the foundational 
principle of the WL, I = I, in describing this moment of self-consciousness. The self-
consciousness constituted by the object reflecting into itself would correspond to the 
empirical self, or objective subject-object, of Fichte’s system. Self-consciousness 
reflected into itself would correspond the subjective subject-object. 
Importantly, self-consciousness in the first instance, or the subjective subject-
object, is an abstract and immediate self-identity which lacks motion or mediation. It will 
therefore be within the objective subject-object that mediation and development take 
place. More precisely, development and mediation will occur both in the relation between 
the subjective subject-object and the objective subject-object as well as among the 
distinct aspects of the objective subject-object. The fact that the development and 
mediation that occur will take place through the form of lordship and bondage, however, 
indicates that Hegel will be here extending his critique of the ultimate inadequacy of 
Fichte’s system. 
4.5 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic 
  The initial phase of Hegel’s account of the relationship between the subjective 
subject-object and the objective subject-object takes place in the section entitled, 
“Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage” (PhG 
111). It begins by noting that self-consciousness exists in-and-for-itself only insofar as it 
exists for another. Thus, the object of self-consciousness must be self-consciousness in 
order for self-consciousness properly to exist, which is to say, in order for self-
consciousness not to be in contradiction with its own concept. Each self-consciousness 
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must exist for the other in order for either to exist, at all. In other words, self-
consciousness exists only insofar as it is acknowledged by self-consciousness. The 
process in and through which this acknowledgement is achieved is what Hegel calls the 
“process of recognition” (PhG 111). 
 Self-consciousness has “come out of itself” (PhG 111). In terms of Fichte’s 
system, the absolute self or subjective subject-object has posited for itself an empirical 
existence. The absolute self, as it were, loses itself inasmuch as it finds itself as an-other 
being. In other words, the absolute self finds itself objectified in an-other being, namely, 
the empirical self, which, while constituting an objectification or positing of the absolute 
self, nevertheless is opposed to the absolute self.205 At the same time, however, the 
absolute self has already superseded the other for the empirical self is posited within the 
absolute self; therefore, “it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other 
sees its own self.”206 (PhG 111) 
 For Hegel, the twofold relation of the absolute self to the empirical self yields a 
twofold ambiguity [gedoppelte Doppelsinn]. First, the absolute self must overcome the 
ambiguous opposition of the empirical self to itself in order thereby “to become certain of 
itself as the essential being” (PhG 111). Yet, overcoming this ambiguous opposition gives 
                                                          
205 Recall the relevant passage in Fichte: “The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to, itself […] 
Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the [empirical] self is itself in opposition to the absolute 
self” (WL 109).  
206 Cf. Fichte: “Opposition is possible only on the assumption of the unity of consciousness between the 
self that posits and the self that opposes. For if consciousness of the first act were not connected with that 
of the second, the latter would be, not a counterpositing, but an absolute positing. It is only in relation to a 
positing that it becomes a counterpositing” (WL 104); “Now the not-self is posited in the self; for it is 
counterposited; but all such counterpositing presupposes the identity of the self, in which something is 
posited and then something set in opposition thereto” (106); “the identity of consciousness [is] the sole 
absolute foundation of our knowledge” (107). 
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rise to a second ambiguity, namely, that in thereby overcoming the opposed empirical 
self, the absolute self simply overcomes its own self, “for this other is itself” (PhG 111). 
 According to Hegel, the abstract or absolute self’s “ambiguous overcoming of its 
ambiguous otherness” thus constitutes an “ambiguous return into itself” (PhG 111). For, 
in the first sublation, the absolute self returns into itself inasmuch as it regains the self-
identity of I = I, while in the second sublation, the empirical self “gives back” the 
absolute self to itself inasmuch as it, the empirical self, overcomes or negates its very 
being-other in the absolute self.  
Hegel’s primary critique of Fichte should be recalled here, namely, that the 
latter’s system does not achieve this very kind of return of the objective subject-object 
back into identity with the subjective subject-object. Hegel, himself, proposes to 
accomplish this return in the PhG, yet it will not be completed during the course of the 
Lord/Bondsman dialectic. Rather, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic will reveal the ultimate 
futility of attempting to produce this return by way of a relation of domination and 
servitude within self-consciousness.  
 Hegel’s observation that the empirical self would negate or overcome its own 
otherness to the absolute self, thereby giving back to the absolute self its self-identity, 
precipitates his subsequent comment that, while in one sense, the dialectic between the 
absolute and the empirical self is driven by the activity of the absolute self, nevertheless 
this activity of the absolute self has a double significance inasmuch as it is the activity of 
the absolute self and the activity of the empirical self. Absolute self-consciousness has 
the empirical self before it, not as the mere object of desire, but as a self-relating, self-
negating self-consciousness in its own right. In principle, then, the absolute self cannot 
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treat the empirical self as a mere instrument which it would subordinate to its own 
purposes. Still, although this is true as a matter of principle or in-itself, it will not prevent 
the absolute self from attempting to reduce the empirical self to the status of a mere 
instrument. The point is simply that such an effort is doomed to failure since it neglects 
the intrinsically self-relating and self-determining character of the empirical self. The 
doomed attempt by self-consciousness to achieve this return into itself through a relation 
of domination and servitude, however, will not be entirely fruitless since in the process 
consciousness will learn several important lessons about itself.  
4.5.1 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic as the Expression of an Allegorical Self 
interpretation by Self-consciousness 
 Hegel observes that the doubled activity of self-consciousness repeats the double 
reflected-ness into self that we witnessed in the play of Forces, yet with the crucial 
difference that this dialectic will now occur, not just for us, the phenomenologists, but for 
the consciousness we are observing itself. Thus, as previously mentioned, the account of 
self-consciousness marks an important turning point in the emergence of the very form of 
the mind which could conduct the Phenomenology itself. Yet, just like for the forms of 
the mind within the “Consciousness” chapter, the forms of the mind within self-
consciousness, while they will achieve a heightened level of self-observation, 
nevertheless will misinterpret the object of their observation, namely, themselves, and 
will thus be forced to learn through experience to adjust, in this case, their own self-
interpretation. 
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  Importantly, the account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic begins with Hegel 
stating, “We have now to see how the process of this pure Concept of recognition, of the 
duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, appears to self-consciousness” 
[Emphasis mine] (PhG 112). The point of Hegel’s examination in this section of “Self-
consciousness” is to analyze the process by which the absolute self and the empirical self 
come to recognize one another. McDowell rightly points out, however, that to begin with, 
we will not be examining how this process occurs properly or for us, phenomenological 
observers, but rather, how it appears to the self-consciousness(es) we are observing 
(HWV 160-61). The image or pattern of the relationship between the absolute self and the 
empirical self that is thus portrayed, therefore, will be distorted or skewed due to the 
inadequacy of self-consciousness to observe and properly interpret itself.  
According to McDowell, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic is thus a kind of allegory 
that self-consciousness constructs for itself in order (inadequately) to interpret its own 
observation of itself (HWV 161ff.). Just as Sense-certainty and Perception routinely mis-
took themselves, which is to say, misinterpreted themselves and their experience due to 
their lack of self-knowledge, so the Lord/Bondsman dialectic is not an account of the 
experience that Self-consciousness actually undergoes at this stage of its development, 
but is rather an expression of its own misinterpretation of itself and its experience. To be 
sure, such misinterpretation or inadequate self-understanding will push the dialectical 
development of consciousness forward in spite of itself. Nevertheless, it is important not 
to confuse Self-consciousness’s inadequate self-understanding of its experience with 
what we, the phenomenologists, know it actually experiences. 
4.5.2 The Life-and-Death Struggle of Self-consciousness 
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 As the name indicates, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic entails an inequality between 
the two terms of the relationship. Thus, in its allegorical account of its experience, Self-
consciousness will exhibit the absolute self and the empirical self in a relationship of 
inequality in which one is merely recognized and the other is merely recognizing. In the 
allegory, what is other for the absolute self, namely, the empirical self, is experienced by 
the absolute self as a mere object submerged in the immediacy of biological existence. 
Yet, the same is true for the empirical self. Thus, the relation internal to self-
consciousness between the absolute self to the empirical self is understood by self-
consciousness at this stage to be a confrontation between two individuals. 
 Initially, therefore, no distinction has been drawn within the allegory between 
absolute versus empirical self-consciousness since for both self-consciousnesses as they 
appear immediately on the scene the other does not appear to be self-conscious, at all. 
Instead, for each individual the other appears as a form of consciousness “which ha[s] not 
yet accomplished the movement of absolute abstraction, of rooting-out all immediate 
being, and of being merely the purely negative being of self-consciousness; in other 
words, they have not as yet exposed themselves to each other in the form of pure being-
for-self, or as self-consciousness” (PhG 113). Each fails to recognize the other as self-
conscious. In order to attain the necessary mutual recognition, therefore, each must 
demonstrate to the other that it is indeed a self-consciousness. 
 The means by which self-consciousness demonstrates that it is the pure self-
relating of self-consciousness “consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its 
objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, to the 
individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life” (PhG 113). Self-
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consciousness shows itself to be self-conscious inasmuch as it demonstrates that it is not 
attached to the world of sensuous life which includes its individual biological existence – 
that it is capable, in other words, of abstraction from or reflecting out of this specificity 
and individuality. 
 Such abstraction from merely biological existence entails a twofold action from 
self-consciousness, one aspect of which is on the part of the other and one on the part of 
itself. Thus, there are two actions, each with a twofold aspect. Insofar as the action is on 
the part of the other, “each seeks the death of the other” (PhG 113). Yet, in the very 
action of the other, “action on its own part is involved” as well (PhG 113). Here we have 
another double ambiguity that can only be clarified if we recall the distinction between 
the viewpoint of the form of the mind which we are investigating, namely, self-
consciousness as it immediately comes on the scene, and that of we, the 
phenomenologists.  
For, why should seeking the death of the other necessarily involve risking one’s 
own life? Surely, one might figure out a means of killing the other – for example, through 
cunning and deceit, or simply superior technology – which would not entail risking one’s 
own life. If, however, the other is one’s own objective mode of biological existence, then, 
by definition, to seek the death of this existence would simultaneously be to risk one’s 
own life. In other words, the radical abstraction from one’s merely biological existence is 
in fact a twofold action: 1) the (attempted) negation of one’s biological existence and 2) 
the risking of that very existence. For the form of self-consciousness under observation, 
however, these two aspects of a single activity would appear, at least initially, as two 
separate realities. 
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As a result of this twofold action on the part of each self-consciousness, a life-
and-death struggle ensues. According to Hegel, 
They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for 
themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is 
only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus it is proved that for 
self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the immediate form 
in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that 
there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, 
that it is only pure being-for-self. (PhG 114) 
The result of “Consciousness” was consciousness’s discovery that the entire expanse of 
sensuous life and being was but a moment of its own being-for-self. Consciousness 
became self-consciousness. Yet, this self-certainty of self-consciousness was merely 
immediate; it had yet to be objectified or raised to truth for self-consciousness. It is only 
in the activity of staking one’s life that the certainty of self-consciousness begins to be 
raised to truth. 
 To the extent that the trial-by-death issues in the death of both self-
consciousnesses, however, self-consciousness fails to raise its certainty to truth. For, each 
self-consciousness was to the other its biological existence, and insofar as each succeeds 
in killing the other, they thereby achieve, not mutual recognition, but merely mutual 
destruction. In this case, the relationship between the two self-consciousnesses “collapses 
into a lifeless unity which is split into lifeless, merely immediate, unopposed extremes” 
(PhG 114). 
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 Through the experience of the futility of the life-and-death struggle as a means for 
attaining mutual recognition and thus raising the certainty of self-consciousness to truth, 
“self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness” (PhG 
115). As a result of this experience the initial immediate unity of self-consciousness, the 
simple I = I, is dissolved into the two essential principles of self-consciousness: 1) pure, 
self-relating self-consciousness and 2) consciousness as immediately bound up with 
biological existence.  
While both moments are essential to self-consciousness, they come on the scene 
as unequal and lacking true unity. Pure self-consciousness experiences itself as 
independent and existing for-itself, while the consciousness bound up with biological 
existence experiences itself as dependent and existing, not for-itself, but for another, 
namely, pure self-consciousness. In the relationship between the two self-
consciousnesses, then, pure self-consciousness is the Lord, while consciousness bound up 
with biological existence is the Bondsman.   
 Here, then, is expressed in allegorical terms the process described in the WL by 
which the immediate identity of the purely self-positing I is differentiated into absolute or 
pure self-consciousness, on the one hand, and empirical self-consciousness which is 
bound up with the not-self, on the other. The I = I of self-consciousness, in other words, 
has dirempted itself into: (I therefore I) + (I therefore not-I).  
It might be further noted that a major difference between Hegel and Fichte in this 
context is that, while Fichte’s procedure is deductive, starting, as it does, from a first 
principle and proceeding “downwards”, Hegel’s procedure can only be called 
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“emergentist.”207208 For, although in Hegel’s account the life-and-death struggle issues in 
the dissolution of the immediate self-identity of pure self-consciousness, the distinction 
thus posited itself constitutes, as we will see, the concrete conditions or potency for a 
higher, more profound unity, a unity in which empirical consciousness will become 
adequate, indeed identical, to pure self-consciousness. 
4.5.3 The Structure and Elements of the Lord/Bondsman Dialectical Relationship 
 The structure of the relationship between the Lord and Bondsman, or pure self-
consciousness and empirical consciousness, is complex but can be summarized in fairly 
clear terms. Like the immediate I = I, the Lord is self-consciousness existing for-itself. 
The difference, however, is that a mediation has occurred in which the I relates not 
strictly to itself but to itself through another, namely, the Bondsman or empirical 
consciousness. The Bondsmna is, again, that consciousness which is bound up with the 
independent objects of empirical existence or “thinghood in general” (in Fichtean terms, 
the not-I) (PhG 115). As such the Lord relates both to the Bondsman and the latter’s 
                                                          
207 Cf. Hegel: “[The Concept is] a going forth of the more perfect from the imperfect” (EL 233). 
208 A translation from Geraets, Suchting and Harris of a footnote in the EL would seem to suggest that 
Hegel disavows the term “emergence” as capturing his position (EL 16). A closer examination of the 
German term employed as well as the context in which it is used, however, contradicts this suggestion. The 
German term which is translated as “emergence” is Hervorgehen which carries with it the connotation of 
“going out.” In the context, Hegel is objecting to von Baader’s ascription to him, i.e. Hegel, of the position 
according to which matter eternally “emerges” from, in this sense of “goes out” from, God. Hegel points 
out that he would not use this term in this context because it is a “pictorial expression” [bildlicher 
Ausdruck]. Here, then, Hegel is not objecting to the notion that higher orders of existence emerge from 
lower orders and, therefore, to the very notion of emergence, but rather to the pictorial expression of 
creation of matter as entailing a kind of pseudo-spatial going out from God. In other words, the objection to 
the term Hervorgehen in this context has nothing to do with denying the reality of emergence, but is rather 
an instance of Hegel’s familiar rejection of using spatial images as means for expressing the relation 
between consciousness and its object – in this case, the relationship between the consciousness of God and 
His object, namely, Creation. 
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object; moreover, the Lord relates immediately to both as well as mediately to both 
through the other.  
First of all, the Lord relates mediately to the Bondsman through the things of 
empirical existence. For, the Bondsman was unable to free himself from being 
determined by this very realm. Insofar as the Bondsman finds himself dependent upon his 
objective existence he corresponds to Fichte’s divisible empirical self especially in its 
mode as intelligence as well as its mode as a system of merely natural drives. For, qua 
intelligence, the divisible, empirical self found itself determined by and dependent upon 
the empirical object or not-self.209 Moreover, in its mode as a system of natural drives the 
empirical self was thoroughly immersed in or even identified with the whole expanse of 
sensuous existence. As with the absolute self, however, for the Lord, the object that keeps 
the Bondsman in bondage is “something merely negative” (PhG 115).210 As such the 
Lord has immediate power of the object and mediate power over the Bondsman through 
the object  
 Second, the Lord also relates mediately to the object through the Bondsman. For, 
the Bondsman, like the empirical self, is also self-conscious and is thus capable of 
negating the object – albeit not to the degree of the Lord whose action entailed the 
(apparent) total abstraction from the object. Rather, the Bondsman works on the object 
and in so doing he transforms it into a form which can be enjoyed by the Lord. Thus, 
through the mediation of the labor of the Bondsman the Lord succeeds where mere desire 
                                                          
209 Cf. Fichte: “Thus, as intelligence in general, the self is dependent on an undetermined and so far quite 
indeterminable not-self; and only through and by means of such a not-self does it come to be intelligence” 
(WL 220). 
210 Cf. Fichte: Insofar as the not-self is opposed to the absolute self, “the not-self is absolutely nothing” (WL 
109). 
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failed, namely, in ridding himself of the independent aspect of the object and taking to 
himself the merely dependent aspect of it which permits him the pure enjoyment of the 
object. In other words, the object as worked on by the Bondsman, for the Lord, just is the 
experience of mere satisfaction which, as such, is a determination of the Lord, not the 
object.211 
 Needless to say, the discussion of the labor by which the Bondsman actively 
determines the object, as opposed to being merely determined by it, points to the 
transition in Fichte from empirical self qua intelligence to the empirical self qua practical 
reason. Further aspects of the ongoing relationship between the Lord and Bondsman 
make this point even clearer. 
 At the current stage of the relationship, the Lord has achieved for himself two of 
the crucial moments in the process of recognition. Recognition, first of all, calls for each 
side to do to themselves what the other does to it. Thus, in setting aside his own 
immediate desires and working for the sake of the Lord, the Bondsman places himself in 
the service of the Lord just as much as the Lord forces the Bondsman into servitude. 
Second of all, in order to achieve recognition, the action of one party must in fact be the 
action of the other. Thus, the activity of the Bondsman is really just a mediated activity of 
the Lord. Here we have, moreover, an evocation of the process in Fichte in which the 
striving of the empirical self to determine the not-self is simply an indirect expression of 
the absolute self’s striving to preserve its own pure (or, for Hegel, abstract) self-identity. 
The problem to which Hegel’s account calls attention, however, is that the recognition is 
                                                          
211 Recall, once again, that, according to Hegel, in principle or in-itself “[t]he [mere] being of what is 
merely ‘meant’, the singleness and universality opposed to it of perception, as also the empty inner being of 
the Understanding, these are no longer essence, but are mere moments of self-consciousness” (PhG 104-5). 
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unequal and one-sided. For, while Bondsman does to himself what Lord does to the 
Bondsman, the Lord does not do to himself what the Bondsman does to the Lord, nor is 
the action of the Lord’s truly that of the Bondsman. 
4.6 The Dialectical Inversion of the Lord/Bondsman Relation: The Development of 
the Bondsman 
 The result of the analysis, thus far, has shown the Bondsman entering into 
servitude to the Lord. The Lord treats the Bondsman as a mere object or instrument 
indistinguishable, in fact, from the biological existence in which the latter is immersed. 
Yet, the fact that the Bondsman constitutes the object of the Lord sets up a radical turning 
point in the entire analysis of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, one which marks the 
beginning of a rather profound dialectic critique and inversion of the entire Fichtean 
backdrop to this dialectic. For, insofar as the object of the Lord is the Bondsman, the 
Bondsman thus is the latter’s truth. What that means is that, as Hegel states, “The truth of 
independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the Bondsman” 
(PhG 117). Understanding more precisely what it means to say that the servile 
consciousness of the Bondsman is in fact the truth of the independent consciousness of 
the Lord requires tracking very closely Hegel’s subsequent analysis of what servile 
consciousness itself is. 
 To begin with, in contrast to the Lord, the Bondsman has the independent 
consciousness that exists for-itself of the Lord as his truth. Servile consciousness, 
however, is not yet explicitly aware that it contains this truth implicitly within itself. Yet, 
what does it mean to say that the truth of the Bondsman is the pure being-for-self of the 
Lord’s consciousness? It means that the abstraction from or reflected-ness out of 
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immediate attachment to merely biological existence which the Lord putatively achieved 
in the risking of his life in the life-and-death struggle is, ironically, even more radically 
achieved by the Bondsman who seemed to be utterly attached to this biological existence.  
How is this radical abstraction from the whole expanse of sensuous biological 
existence achieved by the Bondsman? It is achieved in and through the fear of death. 
Thus, ironically, despite the fact that Bondsman would cling to his biological existence, 
in the experience of fearing its loss he is actually driven all the more deeply into himself 
and thus reflects all the more out of his immediate identity with that biological existence. 
Speaking of the experience of servile consciousness in its fear of death, Hegel states, 
This consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at 
odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has 
experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been 
quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and 
stable has been shaken to its foundations (PhG 117).   
In the fear of death, even more so than in the staking of one’s life, consciousness 
succeeds in the universal abstraction from and nullification of the whole expanse of 
sensuous biological existence. Thus, in fact implicit in servile consciousness is the 
absolute negativity or pure being-for-itself which had hitherto been ascribed to the 
Lord.212 
                                                          
212 The discussion of the fear of death is thus also a continuation of Hegel’s emergentist view of 
development. For, the fear of death constitutes – quite ironically – the “natural” emergence of 
consciousness out of mere nature. Needless to say, this emergence of mind from nature is ultimately a 
“play” of mediation of mind with itself. As Hegel states in the PM:  “The emergence of mind from nature 
must not be conceived as if nature were the absolutely immediate, the first, the original positing agent, 
while mind, by contrast, were only something posited by nature; it is rather nature that is posited by mind, 
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 To be sure, while we, the phenomenologists, are able to recognize the implicit 
truth contained in the experience of servile consciousness, for the Bondsman himself his 
pure being-for-self is still only objectified in the Lord. This alienated objectification or 
projection of his own intrinsic power, however, is eventually overcome by the Bondsman 
in and through his very work for the Lord – although, it should be noted, this work of the 
Bondsman will take the remainder of the PhG itself to be completed, and so will not be 
achieved within the “Self-consciousness” chapter. For work accomplishes two things: 1) 
it makes concrete in every particular detail what was merely an abstractly universal 
detachment from biological existence experienced by the Bondsman in his fear of death; 
2) it objectifies, not just for us, but for the Bondsman himself, the truth about the 
Bondsman, namely, that it is he, not the Lord, who truly possesses the universal negating 
and abstracting power of being-for-self.   
 Through work the Bondsman imparts form and permanence to what previously 
had been fleeting objects of mere desire. In the work itself, then, the Bondsman is able to 
recognize himself in the objective order which he in fact posits. As Hegel states, 
“consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own 
independence” (PhG 118). What is more, insofar as the Bondsman imparts form and 
permanence to the world of fleeting sensuous biological existence he thereby negates it, 
at least in the form in which it initially presented itself to him. Yet, it was precisely this 
realm of sensuous biological existence before which the Bondsman had trembled in fear. 
                                                          
and the mind is what is absolutely first. Mind that is in and for itself is not the mere result of nature, but is 
in truth its own result; it brings itself forth from the presuppositions that it makes for itself, from the logical 
Idea and external nature, and is the truth of the logical Idea as well as of nature.” (PM, 14). Thus, much 
more clearly than in Fichte, for Hegel, the mind posits nature or the not-self not simply as a mere fact but 
precisely in order to mediate its own development and thereby to emerge as mind in and for itself.   
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Thus, through work, the Bondsman “destroys this alien negative moment, posits himself 
as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone 
existing on his own account” (PhG 118). 
 Through fear, service and labor, then, the Bondsman, unlike the Lord, 
simultaneously forms an objective order in which he can recognize himself and forms 
himself into a master or universal power over “the whole of objective being” (PhG 196, 
119). In other words, he forms himself into a pure self-consciousness or being-for-self. 
The Bondsman has become the Lord. 
4.7 Explication of the Upshot of the Lord/Bondsman Allegory 
 It is important to clarify the precise nature and scope of the dialectical inversion 
that has just been allegorically represented as an encounter between a Lord and a 
Bondsman. First of all, in terms of scope, the significance of the relationship of 
domination and servitude (as well as, of course, its dialectical sublation), for Hegel, is 
practically unrestricted. From his earliest to his most mature works Hegel was especially 
preoccupied by this theme. Indeed, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic can be read as an 
allegorical figure for virtually all relationships that Hegel addresses throughout his corpus 
shy, of course, of the culminating moment of development in which this relationship is 
finally sublated.213  
                                                          
213 Hegel’s interest in the relation of domination and servitude stretches at least from the early The Spirit of 
Christianity and Its Fate all the way through the discussion of causality in the SL, and beyond (ETW 182-
301 and SL 554-76). Indeed, there is an argument to be made that famous dialectic between Being and 
Nothing at the beginning of the SL is but the most purified conceptual expression of the relation of 
domination and servitude. 
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Second, in terms of the significance of the dialectical inversion for the PhG, it 
now becomes possible 1) to qualify accounts of earlier stages of development as 
manifesting an at least implicit relationship of domination and servitude, and 2) to qualify 
accounts of later stages of development as further workings-out of this relationship by, 
for and within consciousness. Thus, for example, in Sense-certainty consciousness takes 
itself initially to be dominated by and dependent upon the object. Through the intellectual 
labor of thinking-through this object, however, consciousness manages, albeit still 
problematically and tenuously, to invert this relationship. It remains to be seen how 
subsequent sections of the PhG manifest further developments and sublations of the 
relation of domination and servitude. 
 Third, the significance of the dialectical inversion of the Lord/Bondsman 
relationship for this dissertation is that, on the basis of Hegel’s analysis, it now becomes 
possible to explain the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies in terms of their 
manifesting various stages of the dialectic of domination and servitude within 
consciousness. We have already discussed at some length the way in which the 
Lord/Bondsman relationship serves as an allegorical figure for explaining the constituent 
elements of the Fichtean philosophy in particular as well as transcendental philosophy 
more generally. It will be useful, however, to return again to this theme in order to 
explain more fully how, in the allegory, Hegel is providing an initial schematic of his 
eventual full dialectical explanation of transcendental philosophy as resulting from a 
failed sublation of the relation of domination and servitude within consciousness. 
4.7.1 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic and Transcendental Philosophy 
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 Perhaps the most crucial turning-point in the Lord/Bondsman dialectic occurs 
when it is observed that “the truth of independent consciousness is […] the servile 
consciousness of the bondsman” (PhG 117). What this fact entailed was that true being-
for-self or self-consciousness was achieved, not by the Lord, but by the Bondsman. 
Indeed, the Bondsman became the true Lord of his objective existence. In terms of the 
experience of consciousness as well as the task of explaining the emergence of different 
philosophies, such as Fichte’s, to say that the Bondsman becomes the true Lord is, 
allegorically, to say that the empirical self becomes the absolute self.214 
 What does it mean to say that the empirical self becomes absolute or pure self-
consciousness? It means that Fichte’s philosophy expresses a misinterpretation of the 
experience of empirical consciousness. For, empirical consciousness becomes absolute or 
pure self-consciousness. At the present stage of its development as represented 
allegorically by the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, however, the empirical self does not 
recognize this fact. In other words, in-itself, the empirical self is or has become pure self-
consciousness. Yet, for the empirical self qua Bondsman, pure self-consciousness 
actually resides in an alien element, namely, the Lord. It is just this alienated self-
interpretation, moreover, which Fichte’s philosophy expresses inasmuch as in that 
                                                          
214 McDowell makes substantially the same point when he states vis-à-vis the philosophical upshot of this 
aspect of the Lord/Bondsman allegory, “an empirical consciousness becomes an apperceptive 
consciousness” (HWV 164). McDowell uses the Kantian terms “apperceptive consciousness” and 
“apperceptive I” in order to refer what Fichte (and Hegel in the DZ) tends to call the absolute self or ego. 
Both Fichte and Hegel view Fichte’s notion of the absolute self as simply a more purified expression of the 
Kantian “apperceptive ego” or “transcendental unity of apperception”. Moreover, there are several 
elements in the Lord/Bondsman dialectic that have direct and precise correlates in Fichte’s philosophy but 
which are either missing entirely or only suggestively present in Kant’s philosophy. As such, focusing more 
heavily on the specifically Fichtean backdrop to the account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic seemed called 
for.  McDowell does manage to note, albeit briefly and in passing, that the “intervening contribution” of 
Fichte between Kant and Hegel would be relevant to this overall discussion (HWV 153). He seems to have 
missed, however, the utter indispensability of that contribution for properly understanding Hegel’s effort in 
this section of the Phenomenology.   
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philosophy the true absoluteness of empirical consciousness is said to reside in an alien 
element, namely, the absolute or transcendental self. To put the point in terms of the 
overall thesis of this dissertation: Fichte’s philosophy expresses in philosophical terms an 
alienation within and misunderstanding of the experience of empirical consciousness. 
In Fichte’s philosophy, the empirical self is alienated from absolute or pure self-
consciousness – they do not achieve an identity. Rather, in Fichte, the absolute self lords 
it over the empirical self and uses the latter as a mere instrument for reestablishing the 
lost certainty of its self-identity. The result of this domination of the empirical self by the 
absolute self, however, is the mere condemnation of the empirical self to a futile infinite 
striving to completely determine its object, the not-self. Fichte thus fails to appreciate 
how through fear, service and labor the empirical self becomes the absolute self. Fichte’s 
philosophy thus expresses a flawed and alienated self-interpretation of the empirical self. 
It represents, in other words, a lack of self-knowledge on the part of the empirical person, 
Fichte, himself.  
The empirical person, Fichte, has failed to understand that through his own fear, 
service and labor as a philosopher he has become an absolute or pure self-consciousness. 
In a very pregnant passage Fichte does allude to the possibility that empirical 
consciousness, through the labor of education and philosophical development, might 
attain to pure self-consciousness:  
The more a determinate individual can think away of himself, the closer does his 
empirical consciousness approximate to pure self-consciousness; – from the child 
who leaves his cradle for the first time, and thereby learns to distinguish it from 
himself, to the popular philosopher who still accepts material idea-pictures, and 
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searches for the seat of the soul, and thence to the transcendental philosopher, 
who at least entertains and abides by the rule of conceiving a pure self. (WL 216) 
This passage is highly suggestive and instructive. In order to understand its significance it 
will be important to recall a central aspect of Fichte’s overall system, specifically, the 
means by which it explains the fact of empirical experience. 
 For, recall, Fichte maintains that the absolute self unconsciously posits a not-self 
which the empirical self confronts as an external object opposed to it. The empirical 
subject “forgets” this aboriginal act of positing by the absolute self and so, under the 
domination of the absolute self and its striving in general to preserve its perfect self-
identity, the empirical self sets about on its infinitely deferred task of determining the 
object in a manner that would be ultimately adequate to the infinity of the absolute self.  
Yet, in the above passage Fichte describes what is in effect the inverse task – or, 
rather, a task which is apparently the inverse but which would in fact constitute the same 
task, for Hegel. For, Fichte is describing a process whereby the empirical self infinitely 
approximates to the absolute self. Yet, if we were to apply the logic of Fichte’s own 
explanation of empirical experience which culminates in an infinite approximation to an 
infinite or absolute object, then we must conclude that Fichte has forgotten that the 
absolute self has in fact been posited by Fichte himself. In other words, rather than there 
being merely one moment of forgetting on the part of empirical consciousness, as in 
Fichte, what Hegel’s account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic permits us to see is that 
there are in fact two correlative acts of forgetting: one by which empirical consciousness 
posits and then forgets its positing of an independent, absolute object, and the other by 
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which the empirical self posits and then forgets its positing of an independent, absolute 
self or subject. 
Indeed, this act of forgetting penetrates to the very core of Fichte’s, not to say, 
Kant’s, philosophy – yet, it is also patently on the surface for all to see. For, to what is 
Fichte himself referring in discussing the absolute self’s infinite, unrestricted, self-
sufficient act of self-positing if not an absolute and infinite object?215 In WL, this object 
has been constituted by the empirical consciousness of Fichte and by anyone who has 
understood Fichte’s system. Fichte, however, has forgotten this and so declares that 
empirical consciousness – including his own – can only ever infinitely approximate to the 
absolute self. 
Like the Bondsman vis-à-vis the Lord, Fichte locates his own absolute or pure 
self-consciousness in a principle outside of his empirical self, namely, in the absolute 
self, which, by definition, never appears in empirical consciousness.216 The same 
dialectical explanation would apply to Kant and to most all philosophy in the Kantian 
transcendental tradition inasmuch as these draw a distinction between the absolute or 
transcendental ego and the empirical ego. 
For Hegel, by contrast, educated empirical consciousness just is absolute or pure 
self-consciousness. In other words, for Hegel, there is no absolute self distinct from the 
empirical self. That there is such a distinction is simply how things appear to the self-
consciousness at this stage of its development. For us, the phenomenologists, and thus in-
                                                          
215 Cf. Hegel, according to whom, “the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure 
thinking of oneself” can be had by any individual “consulting” their own self-consciousness (EPR 37). 
216 For, recall, according to Fichte, insofar as absolute consciousness is to provide the explanation for 
empirical consciousness it must necessarily fall outside of empirical consciousness. 
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itself, the empirical self becomes the absolute self.217 This fact simply does not yet 
become explicit for the empirical self, and so it misinterprets itself. This is the primary 
lesson of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic. 
4.8 Preemptory Response to a Potential Objection 
Since passages from the PM have been made use of in supporting the current nest 
of arguments, it is only fair to note that select few passages in that PM give some support 
to the orthodox interpretation according to which the confrontation between the two self-
consciousness hitherto discussed is that between two distinct human beings. Thus, 
regarding this confrontation, Hegel states,  
In this determination lies the massive contradiction that, since the I is what is 
wholly universal, absolutely pervasive, interrupted by no limit, the essence 
common to all men, the two selves here relating to each constitute one identity, so 
to speak one light, and yet they are also two selves, which subsist in complete 
rigidity and inflexibility towards each other, each as a reflection-into-self, 
absolutely distinct from and impenetrable by the other (PM 157).  
Such passages must be read within the context of the larger works in which they are 
embedded and ultimately within the larger context of Hegel’s entire corpus. 
                                                          
217 Cf. Hegel on the emergence of his own philosophy: “This is then the demand of all time and of 
philosophy. A new epoch has arisen in the world. It would appear as if the World-spirit had at last 
succeeded in stripping off from itself all alien objective existence, and apprehending itself at last as 
absolute Spirit, and keeping it within its own power, yet remaining at rest all the while. The strife of finite 
self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which last seemed to the other to lie outside of 
itself, now comes to an end. Finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and in this way absolute self-
consciousness has, on the other hand, attained to the reality which it lacked before” [Emphases mine] (LHP 
III 551). Absolute self-consciousness attains to its proper reality precisely by finite, empirical self-
consciousness becoming infinite. 
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 First, none of the terms used by Hegel to describe the relation between the two 
selves operative within self-consciousness (e.g. “rigidity,” “inflexibility”) run counter to 
the interpretation of self-consciousness offered, thus far. To be sure, according to the 
orthodox interpretation as voiced by Pippin, to maintain that two rigidly opposed selves 
or self-consciousnesses are nevertheless unified in a single individual is to consign such 
an individual to a “schizophrenic frenzy” (Hegel on Self-Consciousness 48). Yet, 
according to that logic, the Kantian who finds her particular, natural inclinations rigidly 
and inflexibly opposed by her universal, absolute moral conscience is but a mere 
schizophrenic. Indeed, the limitation of self-consciousness as it first comes on the scene 
lies precisely in the fact that abstract self-consciousness and empirical consciousness are 
each only reflected into themselves and thus stand in a relation of mere externality to one 
another, rather than being sublated into a higher unity.  
 It would be useful to recall the figure of Christ. For, according to traditional 
Christology, which Hegel at least partly accepts, Christ is a single individual with an 
absolute/lordly as well as empirical/human or even slavish consciousness.218 Indeed, in 
The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, Hegel describes Christ as instantiating in his 
individual person a sublation of the radical Kantian dichotomy between absolute and 
empirical self-consciousness which characterizes self-consciousness in its initial 
stages.219 
                                                          
218 Cyril O’Regan, in his The Heterodox Hegel, attempts to work out the details of Hegel’s peculiar 
appropriation of the Christological doctrine of the hypostatic union, i.e. the doctrine according to which 
Christ is one person with two natures, one human (empirical) and one divine (absolute) (219-21 et passim). 
219 Cf. Hegel: “In this Kingdom of Heaven, however, what [Christ] discovers to them is not that laws 
disappear but that they must be kept through a righteousness of a new kind in which there is more than is in 
the righteousness of the sons of duty and which is more complete because it supplements the deficiency in 
the laws [or ‘fulfills’ them]. This supplement he does on to exhibit in several laws. This expanded content 
we may call an inclination so to act as the laws may command, i.e., a unification of inclination with the law 
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Second, immediately preceding the above passage from the PM, while discussing 
the opposition between empirical consciousness and abstract self-consciousness, Hegel 
states, “The two things are one and the same, the identification of [self-consciousness’s] 
consciousness and its self-consciousness” (PM 144). For Hegel, however, as we know 
from the PhG as well as the PM consciousness just is self-consciousness.220 Thus, self-
consciousness is in fact the identity of abstract self-consciousness and empirical self-
consciousness – they are one and the same. 
Third, like the PhG, the PM indicates how it will be only for the form of the mind 
under investigation, not for us, the phenomenological observers, that the development 
which occurs in the objective, empirical self-consciousness is something truly distinct 
from the ‘I’ or subjective/abstract self-consciousness: 
In phenomenology , the soul, by the negation of its bodiliness, raises itself to pure 
self-identity, becomes consciousness, becomes I, is for itself over against its 
Other. But this first being-for-self of mind is still conditioned by the Other from 
which the mind originates. The I is still completely empty, an entirely abstract 
subjectivity; it posits all the content of immediate mind outside itself and relates 
                                                          
whereby the latter loses its form as law. This correspondence with inclination is the [fulfillment] [Hegel 
might say ‘sublation’] of the law, i.e., it is an ‘is,’ which, to use an old expression, is the ‘complement of 
possibility,’ since possibility is the object as something thought, as a universal, while ‘is’ is the synthesis of 
subject and object, in which subject and object have lost their opposition. Similarly, the inclination [to act 
as the laws may command], a virtue, is a synthesis in which the law (which, because it is universal, Kant 
always calls something ‘objective’) loses its universality and the subject its particularity; both lose their 
opposition, while in the Kantian conception of virtue this opposition remains, and the universal becomes 
the master and the particular the mastered” (ETW 214). Cf. also: “Between the Shaman of the Tungus, the 
European prelate who rules church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans, one the one hand, and the man 
who listens to his own command of duty, on the other, the difference is not that the former make 
themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that the former have their lord outside themselves, while the 
latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own slave” (ETW 211). 
220 Cf. Hegel: “Consciousness of an other, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness” 
(PhG 102); “All consciousness of another object is self-consciousness” (PM 152).  
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to it as to a world it finds before it. Thus what was initially only our object, does 
indeed become an object for mind itself, but the I does not yet know that what 
confronts it is the natural mind itself. There, the I, in spite of being-for-self, is at 
the same time not for itself, for it is only in relation to an Other, to something 
given. [Emphases mine] (PM 27) 
 In other words, abstract self-consciousness forgets that the mind which apparently 
confronts it as an “external,” “given” body is just its own “natural mind”, or empirical 
consciousness. Indeed, as a rule, it only appears to the form of consciousness under 
investigation that its object operates independently of itself, including when that object is 
empirical self-consciousness itself.221 To interpret the Lord/Bondsman dialectic along 
orthodox lines, however, would effectively do away with the distinction between how 
things merely appear to the form of consciousness under investigation and how things 
actually are in-themselves or for us, the phenomenological observers. For, it would entail 
that the first moment of the doubled object of self-consciousness, namely, empirical self-
consciousness, does not merely appear to be, but is in fact or in-itself, a wholly alien, 
external object – namely, another human being. 
 Fourth, McDowell’s objection still stands: the orthodox interpretation leaves 
entirely unexplained what happens to the whole expanse of sensuous being inasmuch as it 
constitutes a moment of self-consciousness. 
                                                          
221 Cf. Hegel: “Since the I is for itself only as formal identity, the dialectical movement of the concept, the 
progressive determination of consciousness, does not look to it like its own activity, but is in itself and for 
the I an alteration of the object” (PM 144). 
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 Fifth, the orthodox interpretation renders virtually meaningless the strikingly 
evident Fichtean and Kantian context to the entire discussion of self-consciousness in the 
PhG. For, that context concerns precisely the distinction in Fichte and Kant between the 
transcendental or absolute ego and the empirical ego as well as the experience within an 
individual consciousness of the tension between these two principles – specifically, the 
experience of domination and servitude, lordship and bondage. To say, for example, that 
one of the two distinct human beings in the orthodox interpretation constitutes abstract or 
pure self-consciousness while the other constitutes empirical self-consciousness does not 
solve anything. For, I fail to see how the results of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic which do 
occur could be attained on the assumption that one of the two distinct human individuals 
involved was not empirically conscious. 
5. Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness 
Before turning to the “Reason” chapter, let us first briefly examine how Hegel 
advances upon the results of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic in explaining the emergence of 
Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness. 
5.1 Stoicism 
In the experience of consciousness which gives rise to Stoicism, the first point to 
note is that, while, for us, or in-itself, the object of consciousness qua formed by the 
Bondsman’s fear, service and labor is identical with the being-for-itself of self-
consciousness, still, for the form of consciousness under investigation these two elements 
“fall apart” (PhG 120). Stated differently, self-consciousness at this stage of development 
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achieves the identity of its being-for-self and being-in-itself, but only on the level of 
immediacy. Insofar as it recognizes the unity of itself and its object, self-consciousness 
becomes thinking consciousness. “For,” as Hegel notes, “in thinking, the object does not 
present itself in picture-thoughts [Vorstellungen] but in Concepts [Begriffen], i.e. in a 
distinct being-in-itself or intrinsic being, consciousness being immediately aware that this 
is not anything distinct from itself” (PhG 120).  
Thinking consciousness, moreover, is a free or independent form of consciousness 
inasmuch as, in thinking, consciousness is not determined by something alien to itself. Yet, 
insofar as the identity recognized by self-consciousness between itself and its object is 
merely immediate, consciousness remains merely thinking consciousness in general 
[denkendes Bewusstsein überhaupt]. Therefore, consciousness identifies only with the 
universal aspect of conceptual thinking in general and forgets the “development and 
process of its manifold being” (PhG 197 and 122).  As a result, the development and 
process of its manifold being remains for consciousness an alien “multiplicity of things” 
(PhG 122).  
 Stoicism as a philosophy thus expresses a form of consciousness which has 
undertaken the intellectual labor of forming its object as an objectification of itself but 
which is still, as it were, under the sway of the moment of fear and the general withdrawal 
out of objectivity characteristic of that experience. As Hegel states, “As a universal form 
of the World-Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of universal fear 
and bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had raised itself to the level of 
thought” (PhG 121). Thus, the object with which Stoicism identifies lacks the fullness of 
life. Instead, Stoicism finds itself inhabiting a world of mere generalities which lack 
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concrete determinations. Its pretension to freedom is therefore compromised inasmuch as 
the concrete, individual determinations of natural existence from which it would presume 
to abstract are simply given to it from without. 
5.2  Skepticism  
Despite the intellectual labor entailed by its level of education, Stoicism expresses 
the moment of fear in the experience of the Bondsman. Skepticism, by contrast, expresses 
the labor of the Bondsman who sets about actively negating the independence of the 
merely natural object. As Hegel states, “In Skepticism […] the wholly unessential and 
non-independent character of this ‘other’ becomes explicit for consciousness; the 
[abstract] thought becomes the concrete thinking which annihilates the being of the world 
in all its manifold of determinateness, and the negativity of free self-consciousness comes 
to know itself in the many and varied forms of life as a real negativity” (PhG 123). 
 Recall that with the emergence of self-consciousness it was discovered that the 
whole expanse of life and the being of natural existence constitute merely vanishing 
moments of self-consciousness itself. Yet, this occurred only in-itself, or for us, not yet 
for the form of consciousness under investigation. In Skepticism, consciousness succeeds 
in actively bringing about this negation of the seeming stability and objectivity of natural 
existence.  
Skepticism causes to vanish “not only objective reality as such, but its own 
relationship to it, in which the ‘other’ is held to be objective and is established as such” 
(PhG 124). Stoicism abstracted itself from identifying with the flux of life and empirical 
existence. Skepticism does not merely abstract from but actively negates this object, and 
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not only this object but its relationship to it which had been established by the abstraction 
of Stoicism. As a result, Skeptical consciousness careens back and forth between two 
different ways of experiencing itself. At times Skeptical consciousness experiences itself 
as “a consciousness which is empirical […] a single and separate, contingent and, in fact, 
animal life, and a lost self-consciousness”, while at other times it experiences itself as “a 
consciousness that is universal and self-identical; for it is the negativity of all singularity 
and all difference” (PhG 125). 
The fundamental limitation of Skepticism222 is that it is unable to unite these two 
ways of thinking about and experiencing itself. Through the method of “equipollence” 
the skeptics were able to negate the certainty of any determinate position by marshalling 
its opposite, thereby revealing to others as well as the skeptics themselves their own 
universal power of negating all determinate or singular principles. Yet, these very same 
skeptics advised that it was appropriate to allow oneself to be guided by merely sensuous 
phenomena and to live in conformity with the particular customs and laws of the country 
in which one happened to find oneself (LHP III 342ff.). Skepticism holds apart these two 
contradictory aspects of its consciousness. 
5.3  The Unhappy Consciousness 
The form of consciousness which succeeds Skepticism, namely Unhappy 
Consciousness, knows that it is both the “self-liberating, unchangeable and self-identical” 
being-for-itself of pure self-consciousness and the contingent, animal, and lost empirical 
consciousness (PhG 126). Thus, in the experience of the Unhappy Consciousness, 
                                                          
222 And it would seem that Hegel, here, is explaining the emergence of ancient, not modern, Skepticism. 
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according to Hegel, “the duplication which formerly was divided between two 
individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one” (PhG. 206, p. 126).  
As McDowell notes, this statement might seem to count against the previously 
advanced interpretation according to which the Lord/Bondsman dialectic is best 
understood as dialectic internal to the experience of one individual consciousness, rather 
than as occurring between two individuals (HVW 164-5). The point to be recalled, 
however, is that the image of self-consciousness as divided into two different individual 
is merely how things appeared to consciousness at that stage of its development. The 
emergence of Unhappy Consciousness is precisely the emergence of a form of 
consciousness which not only experiences in-itself, but recognizes for-itself its own dual 
nature. 
 Even with Unhappy Consciousness, however, the duplication of self-
consciousness within itself is not present in its unity. To the contrary, the internal 
contradictoriness of consciousness is experienced all the more poignantly by the 
Unhappy Consciousness; this is its special burden from which it cannot liberate itself. 
 In terms of explaining the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies, Unhappy 
Consciousness expresses the overarching philosophico-theological viewpoint of the 
Middle Ages as mediated through the religious institution of the Catholic Church. Thus, 
while in principle Unhappy Consciousness is aware of its dual nature, it initially projects 
one aspect of that duality, namely, the unchangeable being-for-self of pure self-
consciousness into alien Beyond, while simultaneously reducing the here-below to an 
unessential vanishing realm. 
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 We have, in fact, already witnessed the basic form of this alienation whereby 
empirical projects its own mastery onto a “Lord” external to it. In the case of the 
Unhappy Consciousness, the external Lord which comes to be invested with the power 
and mastery of developed empirical consciousness is that of the Judeo-Christian God. As 
will be discussed further, in the case of Kantian and Fichtean transcendental philosophy, 
Unhappy Consciousness reemerges in a more poignant form inasmuch as the Lord upon 
which empirical consciousness projects its mastery and power is the transcendental ego.   
  At this stage, Unhappy Consciousness acknowledges that the Unchangeable 
Beyond also resides within itself, but it cannot reconcile this indwelling of the 
Unchangeable with its simultaneous experience of itself as a wretched and fleeting 
natural existence. The Church and, in particular, the priest as mediators between the 
absolute, Unchangeable Beyond and the vanishing, changeable here-below, provide a 
kind of anticipatory figure for the subsequent form of consciousness, namely, Reason. 
For, Reason is the form of consciousness which is certain that, “in its particular 
individual, it has being absolutely in itself, or is all reality” (PhG 138). As such, it will 
apposite to turn to examining the “Reason” chapter of the PhG. 
8. Chapter Summary 
 Self-consciousness is that form of consciousness for which consciousness has 
become its own object. As it first appears on the scene, this fact is true only in-itself, not 
yet for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness undergoes a complex series of dialectical 
transformations, the upshot of which is to mediate the development by which self-
consciousness comes recognize for-itself that its object just is itself. 
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 Insofar as self-consciousness eventually discovers that its object is, in fact, itself, 
it thereby recognizes that its object is not merely conscious, but self-conscious. The 
unfolding of this dialectical development necessitates a complex and doubly ambiguous 
self-duplication of self-consciousness. For, in the process of coming to recognize itself in 
its object, self-consciousness divides itself into an abstract and putatively absolute or 
lordly self-consciousness, on the one hand, and a slavish, empirical self-consciousness, 
on the other. The moment of recognition emerges inasmuch as empirical self-
consciousness, through its fear, service and labor, succeeds in producing a truly universal 
object, an object, that is to say, of thought. For, in producing such an object, empirical 
consciousness itself becomes a universal, absolute mind whose object – qua universal – 
turns out to be just itself. 
 In terms of explaining and critiquing the existence of various philosophies, 
Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness proved to be quite illuminating. For, through this 
analysis it became possible to explain the emergence of transcendental philosophy to be 
the result of the alienation and faulty self-interpretation operative within empirical 
consciousness at a certain stage of its development. Thus, Fichte’s philosophy emerges 
inasmuch as empirical consciousness does not recognize itself to be the universal power 
of thought which it has become, and instead projects that power onto an alien principle, 
namely, a would-be lordly absolute or transcendental ego.  
 The existence of other philosophies was also explained. For example, Stoicism 
was revealed to result from the residual effect of the moment of fear in the development 
of empirical consciousness. For, while Stoicism attains to the level of universal thought, 
in fear it withdraws or abstracts from the realm of natural, empirical existence. Stoicism 
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recognizes itself only in abstract universality; the realm of natural, empirical existence, 
by contrast, strikes it as a realm terror and bondage. 
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Chapter IV 
Reason and Hegel’s Explanation of the Conceptions of Objectivity 
Early in the “Reason” chapter of the PhG Hegel articulates a point which is 
crucial to the overall argument of this dissertation: 
Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various 
ways according to the precise stage it has reached in the development of the 
World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it immediately finds and determines 
itself and its object at any time, or the way in which it is for itself, depends on 
what it has already become, or what it already is in itself. (PhG 234) 
The overall argument of this dissertation is that, for Hegel, the multiplicity of 
philosophies is to be explained and critiqued by way of a theory of the polymorphism of 
the mind. As has been established, different philosophies express different stages in the 
development of the mind. The above quote helps to specify further that inasmuch as the 
polymorphism of the mind explains the fact of the multiplicity of philosophies it thereby 
explains the fact of the multiple conceptions of objectivity – that is to say, the multiple 
conceptions of the mind, the mind’s object and the relationship between the mind and its 
object – operative within those philosophies.  
For, that which perhaps most radically distinguishes philosophies is their 
respective conceptions of objectivity. Thus, in order to explain how Hegel’s account of 
the polymorphism of the mind provides an explanation for the multiplicity of 
philosophies it is necessary to show how the polymorphism of the mind is responsible for 
the multiple conceptions of objectivity. 
The present chapter, therefore, will be broken up into two major sections:  
288 
 
 
First, there will be an examination of Hegel’s own conception of objectivity. It 
will be useful to establish at least the basic elements of Hegel’s conception of objectivity 
first since, for Hegel, conceptions of objectivity other than his own constitute restrictions 
on, and distortions of, his more developed position. The examination of Hegel’s 
conception of objectivity will address the following elements: 
1. Hegel’s effort to generalize his conception of objectivity beyond the 
restrictive distortions of lower viewpoints. 
2. The experiential element of Hegel’s conception of objectivity. 
3. The principle determinations of Hegel’s conception of the mind, the 
mind’s object and the relation between the mind and its object. 
Second, the chapter will show in the case of Kant how Hegel’s phenomenology of 
the polymorphic development of the mind can be used to explain the conceptions of 
objectivity operative within the various philosophies. In order to achieve this goal, the 
discussion will return to the “Reason” chapter of the PhG. For, Reason as it first appears 
on the scene is beset by a peculiar set of limitations which causes it to maintain more than 
one conception of objectivity. It is Hegel’s explanation of how Reason comes to maintain 
these multiple and, as it turns out, conflicting conceptions of objectivity that reveals even 
more fully the effectiveness of his phenomenological method of explaining the existence 
of different philosophies.  
As will be shown, the Kantian philosophy, and, in particular, the multiple 
conceptions of objectivity operative therein, expresses the viewpoint of Reason as it first 
appears on the scene. Accordingly, certain details of Kant’s philosophy will be examined 
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inasmuch as they correspond to Hegel’s explanation of the multiple conceptions of 
objectivity operative within the viewpoint of Reason as it first appears on the scene. 
Having established the twofold goal of this chapter, let us turn to examining 
Hegel’s conception of objectivity. 
1. Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity 
Hegel does not have a systematic work in which he spells out in precise and 
exhaustive detail his conception of the objectivity of knowledge. Indeed, Hegel has often 
been criticized for taking a cavalier or even dismissive stance towards traditional 
epistemological questions. To be sure, Hegel lacks the kind of rigorous gnoseology that 
has become de rigueur in our post-Husserlian context. As a result, we often only get 
indirect insight into Hegel’s own position by way of his explanation and critique of more 
restricted viewpoints. Still, through a close examination of works such as the PhG, the 
PM and the “Positions on Objectivity” section of the EL, it becomes possible to articulate 
at least the basic outlines of Hegel’s larger conception of objectivity. In order to begin 
sketching this outline let us turn first to examining how Hegel would generalize his – and 
our – conception of objectivity. 
1.1 Hegel’s Generalized Conception of Objectivity 
Hegel’s effort to generalize his conception objectivity involves several key 
elements. First, one must recall the passage quoted above in which Hegel states that the 
conception of objectivity operative within a given form of the mind will be determined by 
the stage of development to which that form of the mind has managed to reach. For, a 
conception of objectivity is constituted by the manner in which the mind determines 
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itself, its object and its relation to that object. Thus, Hegel shows that it is possible to 
derive particular conceptions of objectivity from the more basic and general principle of 
the polymorphism of the mind.223  
For example, in the case of Sense-certainty, consciousness or the mind is 
determined to be largely an inessential afterthought, while the object is determined to be 
an absolute and immediate ‘This’. The mind’s relation to the object in the case of Sense-
certainty is determined to be that of immediate “receptivity”.224 Objectivity according to 
this form of the mind thus entails the mind being merely “receptive” or “passive” with 
respect to the “external” object existing “out there.” Other viewpoints, as we have seen, 
determine themselves, their objects and their relations to their objects according to their 
respective levels of development.  
In contrast to the multiplicity of more or less restricted conceptions of objectivity, 
however, Hegel would generalize his conception of objectivity beyond any such 
                                                          
223 Hegel’s well-nigh pathological antipathy for Newton notwithstanding, a useful analogy for 
understanding Hegel’s effort, here, would be Newton’s achievement in generalizing Kepler’s laws. For, in 
generalizing Kepler’s laws Newton achieved two important feats. First, he released Kepler’s insights from 
the restrictive horizon of what could be sensuously experienced or “perceived” from the viewpoint of Earth 
and thereby made them applicable to all moving objects. Second, he made it possible to derive Kepler’s 
laws from a more basic and general principle. Both of these achievements have analogues within Hegel’s 
effort to generalize his conception of objectivity. For, first of all, as we will see, in bracketing the naïve 
assumptions of ordinary consciousness and thinking-through what is in fact given in conscious experience, 
Hegel releases consciousness from the restrictive horizon of, for example, Sense-certainty and Perception 
according to which objects are simply what is given in sensuous experience or intuition. Second, in making 
the entire range of polymorphic consciousness the object of his inquiry, Hegel thereby shows how it is 
possible to derive or otherwise explain specific conceptions of objectivity – such as that of Kant – from a 
more basic and general principle, namely, polymorphic consciousness in its dialectical development. As we 
saw in Chapter One, Hegel’s objection to Newton focuses on the fact that the Concept of Law as expressed 
in Newton’s formulations is not self-differentiating or self-determining. Rather, the parts of the Concept of 
Law as formulated in Newton fall apart into an indifferent multiplicity. Thus, while Newton sublates 
Kepler, Hegel demands that Newton be sublated by Hegel’s conception of life qua self-determining organic 
unity which prescribes its own law or governing principle to itself. For a brief summary of Hegel’s view of 
Newton, cf. LHP III 324ff. 
224 Cf. Hegel: In Sense-certainty, objectivity necessitates that “[o]ur approach to the object […] be 
immediate or receptive” (PhG 58). 
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restrictions by, first of all, showing how they themselves are grounded in a more basic 
and general principle. Thus, an important part of achieving this generalization lies simply 
in the reflective recognition by the mind that the mind will determine in its conception of 
objectivity according to the level of development it has reached. In other words, for 
Hegel, in order to generate a properly generalized conception of objectivity it is necessary 
to abstract from or reflect out of all the more or less restricted conceptions of objectivity 
in order to observe how all conceptions of objectivity are derived from a more basic 
principle, namely, the polymorphism of the mind. Needless to say, the very ability to 
engage in this kind of self-observation is mediated by the experience of Self-
consciousness. 
A second and deeply related element involved in specifying the nature of Hegel’s 
generalized conception of objectivity involves his larger theory of development. For 
Hegel, development is a transition from potency to act. Hegel accepts, moreover, the 
Aristotelian view of the mind as potentia omnus facere et fieri. The mind contains within 
itself the totality of all objects.225 To be sure, it does so, in the first instance, only in 
potency, or in-itself. Yet, what this basic point entails is that, for Hegel, unlike for the 
viewpoints of Sense-certainty and Perception, the mind relates immediately to objects, 
not through “receptive” sensuous experience or intuition, but through itself. For, the mind 
contains, or rather is, the totality of objects in-itself. On such a view, objectivity is not a 
matter of gaining “access” or being “receptive” to an “object” “out there”. Rather, 
                                                          
225 Cf. Fichte’s similar observation: “There can no longer be anything obscure, complicated and confused 
for a practiced Scientist of Knowledge, if only he recognizes the object of concern. It is always easiest for 
him to erect everything new and from the beginning since he carries the plans for every scientific building 
within him” [Emphases mine] (Philosophy of German Idealism, 103). 
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objectivity is fundamentally a matter of self-mediation, of explicitly positing what is 
implicit in the mind, of actualizing the mind’s potency.  
To affirm this point, however, is just to generalize one’s conception of objectivity 
beyond any naïve restrictions. For, the mind on such an account is, by definition, 
unrestricted; it is potentially all things. Thus, for Hegel, an object can be defined in 
abstraction from the restrictions of any particular stage of the mind’s development as 
simply the actualization of the mind’s potency.226 In the most generalized sense, then, an 
object, for Hegel, is whatever the mind posits for itself. 
1.1.1 Preemptory Response to Potential Objections to Ascribing to Hegel Such a 
Generalized Conception of Objectivity 
Before continuing to examine the basic outlines of Hegel conception of 
objectivity, it would be worthwhile to note that many commentators, such as Pippin and 
McDowell, refuse to ascribe to Hegel the generalized conception of objectivity just 
articulated. For them, to affirm that, for Hegel, objects are actualizations of the mind’s 
potency is wrongly to ascribe to him “wild [and] improbable psychological and 
metaphysical claims” (Hegel’s Idealism 14). According to these commentators, Hegel’s 
conception of objectivity simply must entail some notion of “external constraint” lest it 
devolve into a theory of mere “projections of the mind” upon the “independently real” 
(HWV 152-3). A crucial point which these commentators miss, one which has already 
been suggested several times, is that the degree of probability or plausibility one discerns 
in a given philosophical position will depend upon the viewpoint one has attained 
                                                          
226 Thus, Hegel maintains that if the mind only knew itself, “it would go down into the depths of its own 
being, and seek Reason there rather than in things” (PhG 146).  
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oneself. Thus, for example, what appears to be “wild” and “improbable” or otherwise 
incomprehensible to a lower viewpoint will appear perfectly intelligible and rational to a 
higher viewpoint. Nevertheless, it would behoove us to clarify why, for Hegel, objectivity 
is not a matter of an “external” object supplying a normative principle of “constraint” 
upon the mind.  
According to Hegel, that the mind should come to presuppose that there is, or 
must be, a “constraint” supplied by an “external” object is itself the result the mind 
operating at fairly restricted stage of development. Indeed, such a presupposition is but a 
manifestation of the ruse that the mind or Reason plays upon itself in its complex process 
of self-mediation. The mind generates for itself the illusion that there is, or must be, an 
“externally constraining” object, but does so precisely as a means of sublating itself.227 In 
other words, for the mind at a certain stage of its development, there can appear to be an 
“external” object “constraining” it. Yet, we, the phenomenologists, know that this is just 
the mind itself mediating its own self-development and that, accordingly, no such 
“externally constraining” object exists.  Still, in order to clarify this point still further, let 
us return to Hegel’s use of the biological analogy and dis-analogy for understanding the 
development of the mind. 
                                                          
227 Cf. Hegel: “Therefore limitation is not in […] mind: it is posited by mind in order to be sublated” (PM 
23-4); “The concept needs no external stimulus for its actualization…But the concept is just as independent 
of our willfulness in the conclusion of its development as it is in the beginning and in the course of it. In a 
merely ratiocinative approach the conclusion certainly appears more or less arbitrary; in philosophical 
science, by contrast, the concept itself sets a limit to its self-development by giving itself an actuality that 
completely corresponds to it” (PM 7). Thus, contra McDowell, for Hegel, there is no “external constraint” 
on the mind. All limitation, including any “being” or “object” given in intuition, is posited within the mind 
in order to be sublated and thereby to mediate the mind’s own self-development. Cf. Hegel’s reference to 
the Concept’s positing of an “other” opposed to itself as a mere “play”: “The movement of the Concept 
must be considered, so to speak, only as a play; the other which it posited by its movement is, in fact, not 
an other” (EL 238). Hegel also refers to this process as the production of an “illusion”: “It is within its own 
process that the Idea produces that illusion for itself; it posits an other confronting itself, and its action 
consists in sublating this illusion” (EL 286).  
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1.1.2 The Biological Analogy and Clarifying Hegel’s Generalized Conception of 
Objectivity 
The process of the plant’s development is indeed one of self-mediation. The plant 
posits differences or “constraints” within itself which it preserves and sublates within a 
higher unity. Importantly, however, the self-mediation of the plant involves an element of 
“externality,” an element which is instructive precisely because it is not present in the 
self-mediation of the mind. For, in order to develop, the plant must be “receptive” to 
“external” “matter” such as, for example, the soil and carbon-dioxide. Thus, despite the 
fact that its development is largely a matter of self-mediation, the plant is nevertheless 
dependent upon “external” matter. 
Regarding the plant’s relation of dependence upon something external to itself, 
however, a few points must be borne in mind. First, although it initially finds itself 
dependent upon something “external”, the plant immediately negates and sublates this 
externality by incorporating that which was external to it into its own process of self-
mediation. In other words, it does not treat the “matter” external to itself as an object or 
something supplied by the thing-in-itself which “externally” “constrains” it. Quite to the 
contrary, it reduces such “matter” to a means or moment constitutive of its own process 
of self-mediation or self-“constraint”; it makes such “matter” a part of itself.  
Second, insofar as it might be proper to speak of an object or thing-in-itself at all 
in the case of the plant, it would not be of the “external” “matter” “standing over-against” 
the plant of which one spoke, but rather of the plant itself, including, if not especially, its 
culminating moment of development, the fruit. Thus, even in the case of the plant, the 
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object or thing-in-itself is the result of the process of self-mediation and self-positing. It 
is not something “already out there” which imposes “constraints” on that process. Thus, 
if there are constraints on the development of the plant qua thing-in-itself, they are in the 
final instance constraints or limitations which the plant imposes upon itself in its process 
of self-development and self-mediation.228 
So much for the self-mediation of the plant. As far as present concerns go, the 
most important dis-analogy between the self-mediation of the plant and that of the mind 
lies in the fact that, while in the self-mediation of the plant there is a moment of 
dependence upon an external element, in the self-mediation of the mind no such 
dependency or externality obtains. For, while the soil in the ground or the CO2 in the 
atmosphere might be spatially external to the plant, nothing is external – spatially or 
otherwise – to the mind.  
To be sure, the mind can “forget” its process of self-development and treat its 
object as something “external” upon which it is somehow dependent or by which it is 
“constrained.” Indeed, for Hegel, such forgetting is part and parcel of the ruse that the 
mind plays upon itself in mediating its own self-development. Yet, as was revealed in the 
chapter on self-consciousness, anything of which the mind is conscious is already a 
moment or determination within the mind’s process of self-mediation. There is nothing 
“outside” the mind.229  
                                                          
228 Cf. Hegel: “Even in the living thing we see this self-limitation of the concept. The germ of the plant, this 
sensuously present concept, closes its development with an actuality like itself, with production of the 
seed” (PM 7); “Even in the plant, we see a centre which has overflowed into the periphery, a concentration 
of the differences, a self-development-from-within-outwards, a unity that differentiates itself and from its 
differences produces itself in the bud” (PM 10). 
229 Cf. Hegel: “There is simply no out-and-out Other for the mind” (PM 3); “The semblance of mind’s 
being mediated by an Other is sublated by the mind itself, since mind has, so to speak, the sovereign 
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Furthermore, for Hegel, pace Sense-certainty and Perception, sensuous 
experience and our would-be “passive reception” of what is given therein bears no 
especial significance for objectivity.230 Sensuous experience may prove to be a factor in 
objectivity. Yet, as we have already seen in the chapter on self-consciousness, that which 
is given in sensuous experience has already been reduced to a mere means or moment of 
the mind’s own self-mediation and development.231 The object or thing-in-itself does not 
supply the “matter” for this moment; rather, the object or “thing-in-itself” emerges from 
this “matter” as act emerges from potency, or as the fruit emerges from the tree. 
1.1.3 Summary of the Initial Discussion of Hegel’s Generalized Conception of 
Objectivity 
                                                          
ingratitude of sublating, or mediating, that by which it seems to be mediated, of reducing it to something 
subsisting only through mind and in this way making itself completely independent” (PM 15); “Thought, 
and, more precisely, the Concept, is the infinite form, or the free, creative activity that does not need a 
material at hand outside it in order to realize itself” (EL 241). 
230 Cf. Hegel’s famous inversion, or rather sublation, of the pseudo-Aristotelian dictum according to which 
nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses: “There is an old saying that is usually (but 
falsely) attributed to Aristotle – as if it were supposed to express the standpoint of his philosophy: ‘Nihil est 
intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu.’ (There is nothing in the intellect that has not been in sense-
experience.) If speculative philosophy refused to admit this principle, that would have to be considered a 
misunderstanding. But conversely, philosophy will equally affirm: ‘Nihil est in sense quod non fuerit in 
intellectu’ – in the most general sense that the nous, and more profoundly the spirit, is the cause of the 
world, and more precisely that feelings concerning right, ethical life, and religion are feelings – and hence 
an experience – of the kind of content that has its root and its seat in thinking alone” (EL 32).  
231 Cf. Hegel: “The human soul has much to do in making its corporeal nature into a means” (EL, 284); 
“But in the realizing of the purpose of what happens in-itself is that the one-sided subjectivity is sublated, 
along with the semblance of an objective independence standing over against it. In taking hold of the 
means, the Concept posits itself as the essence of the object” (EL 285); “In point of fact, the Mind is the 
idealist proper; in Mind, even as feeling, imagination and still more as thinking and comprehending, the 
content is not present as a so-called real existence; in the simplicity of the ego such external being is 
present only as sublated, it is for me, it is ideally in me” (SL 155); “In this way, our knowing of God, like 
our knowledge of all that is supersensible in general, essentially involves an elevation above sensible 
feeling or intuition; hence, it involves a negative attitude toward the latter as first and in that sense it 
involves mediation” (EL, 37). 
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 The preceding section sought to establish the initial point that Hegel attempts to 
conceive of objectivity according to its full generality. The two keys aspects to Hegel’s 
effort to generalize his conception of objectivity identified were the following: 
1. Hegel contributes to generating a generalized conception of objectivity 
inasmuch as he abstracts from all more or less restricted conceptions of 
objectivity. Hegel achieves this abstraction precisely in and through his 
observation that the mind will determine itself, its object and its relation to its 
object according to the level of development it has reached. 
2.  Hegel’s appropriation of the Aristotelian definition of the mind as potentially 
all things permits him to conceive of a radically generalized conception 
objects and objectivity as ultimately a matter of the mind’s self-mediation. 
Some initial objections to ascribing to Hegel such a generalized conception of objectivity 
were noted and met through an appeal to Hegel’s use of the biological analogy and dis-
analogy in his overall account of the mind’s development. It was also noted how Hegel’s 
articulation of these elements of his generalized conception of objectivity is itself 
mediated by the experience of self-consciousness as it learns to abstract from and observe 
itself. For, in analyzing that experience Hegel thereby explains the emergence of this 
crucial aspect of his own philosophy.  
1.2 The Experiential Element in Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity 
 Having examined certain key elements in Hegel’s effort to generalize his 
conception of objectivity, it will be useful to examine the manner in which experience 
functions in Hegel’s overall conception of objectivity. For, just as Hegel generalizes his 
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conception of objectivity, he also generalizes his conception of the role of experience in 
objectivity. Indeed, the generalized character of Hegel’s conception of objectivity runs 
parallel to his generalized conception of the role of experience in objectivity. 
 For Hegel, sensuous experience, while perhaps a contributing factor to the 
objectivity of knowledge, is nevertheless certainly not decisive in the way that it is for 
Sense-certainty or Perception. Yet, it remains that experience is a crucial element in the 
mind’s attainment of objectivity.232 In order to understand the role of experience in 
Hegel’s conception of objectivity it will be useful to begin by examining his dialectical 
appropriation and sublation of the Empiricist’s insistence on the role of experience in 
their conception of objectivity. 
1.2.1 Hegel’s Appropriation of Empiricism 
The demand that knowledge be grounded in conscious experience, for Hegel, 
marks the peculiar contribution of the Empiricists to the history of philosophy and, 
therefore, to the ongoing genesis of self-knowledge. For, according to Hegel, the flaw 
afflicting the traditional Scholastic and Wolffian metaphysics rests in their failure to 
ground their theorizing in concrete experience. The Empiricists provide an important 
corrective to this deficiency by insisting that all theorizing be grounded or otherwise 
verifiable in experience. As Hegel states, 
Empiricism was the initial result of a double need: there was the need first for a 
concrete content, as opposed to the abstract theory of the understanding [e.g. 
Scholastic and Wolffian metaphysics] that cannot advance from its universal 
                                                          
232 Cf. Hegel: “The principle of experience contains the infinitely important determination that, for a 
content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himself be actively involved with it, more precisely, 
that he must find any such content to be at one time and in unity with the certainty of his own self” (EL 31). 
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generalizations to particularization and determination on its own, and secondly for 
a firm hold against the possibility of proving any claim at all in the field, and with 
the method, of the finite determinations. Instead of seeking what is true in thought 
itself, Empiricism proceeds to draw it from experience.233 (EL 77) 
Thus, Empiricism represents an important contribution to a fully generalized conception 
of objectivity inasmuch as it insists upon the experiential element of objectivity in 
contrast to the abstract theorizing of, for example, the Scholastics whose objects, or 
termini technii, could apparently not be discerned within experience. 
 For Hegel, the flaw with Empiricism, therefore, lies not in its insistence upon the 
experiential element of objectivity but rather in its restricted conception of experience 
and, therefore, of objectivity itself. As Hegel states, 
inasmuch as, so far are the content is concerned, Empiricism restricts itself to 
what is finite, the consistent carrying through of its programme denies the 
supersensible altogether or at least its cognition and determinacy, and it leaves 
thinking with abstraction, [i.e.,] with formal universality and identity. – The 
fundamental illusion of scientific empiricism is always that it uses the 
metaphysical categories of matter, force, as well as those of one, many, 
universality, etc., and it goes on to draw conclusions, guided by categories of this 
sort, presupposing and applying forms syllogizing in the process. It does this 
without knowing that it thereby contains a metaphysics and is engaged in it, and 
that it is using those categories and their connections in a totally uncritical and 
unconscious manner. (EL 77) 
                                                          
233 Cf. Hegel: “In Empiricism there lies this great principle, that what is true must be in actuality and must 
be there for our perception” (EL 77). 
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Empiricism thus corresponds to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and, perhaps, the 
empirical consciousness of the Bondsman at an early stage in his development. For, like 
Sense-certainty and the Bondsman, Empiricism is, in the first instance, wholly immersed 
in the realm of the sensuous. As a result, Empiricism restricts its conception of 
experience to the finite and sensible. Yet, despite this restriction, Empiricism, behind its 
own back, presupposes and, in fact, employs the “lordly” categories – indeed, the very 
categories of the old metaphysics which it would presume to jettison – which clearly 
transcend the realm of the merely sensuous. Since these categories are not given in 
sensuous experience, the Empiricist denies that cognition of these categories or objects is 
possible and, therefore, consigns them to the realm of merely abstract or “subjective” 
thought. Thus, Empiricism’s restricted conception of objectivity runs parallel with its 
restricted conception of experience. 
By contrast, Hegel recovers the Empiricist insistence upon the experiential 
element in objectivity, but, as with his conception of objectivity, he generalizes his 
conception of experience well beyond any Empiricist restrictions. Perhaps the clearest 
statement of Hegel’s generalized conception of experience occurs in the EL in which 
Hegel states: “everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced (This is even a 
tautological proposition.)” (32). To repeat: for Hegel, everything that is in consciousness 
at all is experienced. To appreciate the significance of this radical claim it would be 
helpful to view it in light of Hegel’s comment on Locke in which he explicitly accepts 
Locke’s insistence that objective knowledge be grounded in experience yet, 
simultaneously, generalizes his conception of experience beyond Locke’s Empiricist 
restrictions:  
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As to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true that man 
commences with experience if he desires to arrive at thought. Everything is 
experienced, not merely what is sensuous, but also what excites and stimulates my 
mind. Consciousness thus undoubtedly obtains all conceptions and Concepts from 
experience; the only question is what we understand by experience [Emphases 
mine]. (LHP III 303) 
Thus, for Hegel, everything is experienced - not simply what is sensuous, but also objects 
which “excite the mind,” objects, including, as we will see, universal, necessary, 
concrete, infinite and absolute determinations. To recognize this point, however, one 
must generalize one’s conception of experience.234 
 Hegel’s effort to articulate his generalized conception of experience is verily 
pursued throughout his entire corpus. Thus, for example, as often noted, the original 
subtitle of the Phenomenology was “The Science of the Experience of Consciousness”. 
Indeed, Hegel’s recognition of the experiential element in objectivity is part and parcel 
of his recognition that empirical consciousness becomes absolute consciousness. For, in 
becoming the universal power of thought that is absolute consciousness, empirical 
consciousness does not thereby cease to be empirically conscious. Rather, since 
everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced, for the fully developed mind 
everything that is given in universal, absolute consciousness is experienced. 
1.3 Determinations of Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity 
                                                          
234 Cf. Hegel: “Everything must be experienced. But if we are supposed to be talking about philosophy, 
then we must rise above the demonstrations that remain tied to presuppositions, above empiricism’s 
demonstration, to the proof of the absolute necessity of things” (POM 150). In other words, it is only by 
generalizing one’s conception of experience beyond empiricist restrictions that one attains to the properly 
philosophical viewpoint in which it is recognized that necessary determinations are given in experience.  
302 
 
 
 Having outlined both Hegel’s attempt to conceive of objectivity according to its 
full generality and his generalized conception of the role of experience in objectivity, it 
will now be possible to outline with greater clarity the basic determinations of Hegel’s 
more or less mature conception of objectivity. Recall that the mind’s conception of 
objectivity is determined by three factors: the manner in which the mind determines 1) 
itself, 2) its object and 3) its relation to its object. Let us take up each of these 
determinations in turn. 
1.3.1 Hegel’s Determination of the Mind 
 Beginning with the discussion of Hegel’s overall theory of development through 
the examination of his phenomenology of the dialectical development of self-
consciousness, the manner in which Hegel conceives of or determines consciousness or 
the mind has already been outlined in great detail in this dissertation. To be sure, further 
specific elements regarding Hegel’s conception of the mind will be analyzed in the 
present chapter when the discussion turns to Hegel’s phenomenology of Reason. Still, the 
basic elements of Hegel’s conception of the mind have been sufficiently established. 
 For Hegel, the mind is a potential totality which, through a dialectico-organic 
process of self-mediation and self-developing, actualizes itself. The process of self-
mediation occurs inasmuch as the mind posits differences – including objects – within 
itself, only to sublate those differences in a higher unity. Inasmuch as the development of 
the mind culminates thusly, the relation between the fully developed mind and its object 
is, first of all, one of sublated identity. Before examining further details of this 
relationship between the mind and its object, however, let us first examine Hegel’s 
determination of the nature of object itself which is known in and through this identity. 
303 
 
 
1.3.2 Hegel’s Determination of the Object 
 To be sure, for Hegel, the ultimate object of the mind is the mind itself. Still, it is 
possible to identify at least five more specific manners in which the mind determines this 
object: 1) universality, 2) necessity, 3) infinitude, 4) absoluteness and 5) concreteness. 
Thus, for Hegel, in order to demonstrate the objectivity of knowledge of some object of 
inquiry one must demonstrate that its development and eventual existence is universal, 
necessary, infinite, absolute and concrete. It turns out, of course, that the development 
and existence of only one such object can be demonstrated, namely, the mind itself in its 
self-development and self-mediation.235 
 Thus, to begin with, Hegel, like Kant, retains the ideal of universality as a 
determination of objectivity of the mind. Unlike Kant, however, for Hegel, the universal 
mind is not abstract but concrete; or, more precisely, the universal mind begins as 
abstract, but then proceeds to concretize itself. The universal mind is abstract insofar as it 
contains the totality of its eventual determinations within itself but only in potency. The 
universal mind becomes concrete inasmuch as it posits the determinations and differences 
which it contains within itself and preserves itself within them. In other words, a 
universal which abstracts from concrete determinations is not properly uni-versal since eo 
ipso it does not penetrate, govern and order the particular determinations from which its 
abstracts and, therefore, fails to sublate them into a uni-ty.236 Thus, the universal qua 
                                                          
235 This point was discussed in Chapter One vis-à-vis Hegel’s concept of the Concept and its development. 
Indeed, as we learn at the culmination of the PM, the Concept just is the mind and that, therefore, for 
Hegel, the totality of all that is is ultimately “spirit all the way down”: “It is the concept, the nature of the 
subject-matter, that moves onwards and develops, and this movement is equally the activity of cognition. 
The eternal Idea, that is in and for itself, eternally remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute 
mind” (PM 276). Cf. Hegel: “[P]hilosophical thinking […] proves to be the activity of the Concept itself” 
(EL 305). 
236 Cf. the abstract universality of the Stoic mind discussed in Chapter Three. 
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truly universal must not abstract from its particular determinations and differences but, 
again, must posit and preserve itself concretely within them. 
 Regarding the determination of absoluteness, it is clear that the concrete universal 
mind must be absolute. For, were the universal to be restricted in extension, it would not 
be fully universal. Yet, were the universal to be restricted in intension, it would not fully 
concrete. Thus, the concrete, universal mind determines not just everything, but 
everything about everything.237 As such, it is absolute or unconditioned. For, there are no 
conditions external to it. Rather, it posits and preserves within itself all possible 
conditions or determinations. It is absolutely self-conditioning and self-determining.238 
 The concrete universal mind is also thereby infinite in the sense that it is 
unrestricted by anything external. It posits restrictions and determinations within itself 
only to sublate them into its own concrete, absolute universality. 239 
                                                          
237 Cf. Hegel’s insistence that all the elements constitutive of the experience of the empirical consciousness 
of the bondsman – i.e. fear, service and labor – be present in order for the bondsman to truly determine not 
just everything, but everything about everything – in other words, in order for the bondsman to become the 
concrete universal mind:  “Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is 
precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his 
own. For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity are 
necessary, both being at the same time in a universal mode. Without the discipline of service and 
obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. 
Without the formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become 
explicitly for itself […] If it has not experience absolute fear but only some lesser dread, the negative being 
has remained for it something external […] Just as little as the pure form can become essential being for it, 
just as little is that form, regarded as extended to the particular, a universal formative activity, an absolute 
Concept; rather it is a skill which is master over some things, but not over the universal power and whole of 
objective being” (PhG 118-9). 
238 Cf. Hegel: “[T]he definition that results at this point is that ‘the Absolute is the Concept’” (EL 237). 
239 Cf. Hegel: “But when we pronounce the mind to be unlimited, genuinely infinite, we do not mean to say 
that there is not limitation whatsoever in the mind; on the contrary, we have to recognize that mind must 
determine itself and so make itself finite, limit itself. But the intellect is wrong to treat this finitude as a 
rigid finitude, – to regard the distinction between the limitation and infinity as an absolutely fixed 
distinction, and accordingly maintain that mind is either limited or unlimited. Finitude, properly conceived, 
is, as we have said, contained in infinity, limitation in the unlimited. Mind is therefore both infinite and 
finite, and neither only the one nor only the other; in making itself finite it remains infinite, for it sublates 
finitude within itself; nothing in the mind is a fixture, a being, rather everything is only something ideal, 
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 The self-development and self-mediation of the infinite, absolute, concrete and 
universal mind is also, for Hegel, necessary. A task of philosophy is to demonstrate this 
necessity which, for Hegel, entails demonstrating how all particular forms of the mind, 
along with their correlative objects, derive necessarily from the Concept of mind itself: 
[S]peculative thinking has to demonstrate each of its objects and the development 
of them in their absolute necessity. This happens when each particular concept is 
derived from the self-producing and self-actualizing universal concept or the 
logical Idea. Philosophy must therefore comprehend mind as a necessary 
development of the eternal Idea and must let what constitutes the particular parts 
of the science of mind evolve purely from the concept of mind. Just as in the 
living creature generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in 
the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too 
must all particular forms of the living mind grow out of its concept as from their 
germ. (PM 6-7)  
According to Hegel’s particular conception, the necessity of the mind’s development 
rests in the fact that the mind supplies its own conditions for emergence. For, the mind 
qua potency is in contradiction with its concept and so spontaneously desires to posit an 
existence for itself that is adequate to its concept. Yet, in thereby positing its existence 
the mind is not restricted by any external principle but instead supplies the grounds or 
conditions for its own development from within itself.240 As a result, the freedom or self-
                                                          
only appearing […] Therefore limitation is not in […] mind: it is posited by mind in order to be sublated” 
(PM 23-4).For further discussion of sublated infinity, see EL 148-52. 
240 The mind contains the totality of its own determinations and conditions within itself. Yet, according to 
Hegel, “When all conditions are present, the matter must become actual […] Developed actuality […] is 
necessity” (EL 220-1). The Concept supplies the conditions for its own emergence. Yet, since it is 
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determination of the mind in its development is, for Hegel, famously coincident with its 
necessity.241 
 Thus, for Hegel, the normative determinations of the mind’s objectivity consist of 
universality, necessity, concreteness, absoluteness and infinitude. Such an object, in the 
end, can only consist of the mind itself in its full actuality. These determinations of the 
object thus do not constitute “constraints” supplied by an “external” object. They are 
immanent in the mind, and are posited by and for the mind as it engages in its process of 
dialectical self-mediation. 
1.3.3  Hegel’s Determination of the Mind’s Relation to Its Object 
 As already noted, the mind’s ultimate relation to its object is one of mediated or 
sublated identity. As such, recognition is also a quality of the relation between the fully 
developed mind and its object. For, the fully developed mind is not merely identical with 
its object in-itself, but it also recognizes this fact for-itself. 
 Inasmuch as the fully developed mind is identical to its object and recognizes 
itself therein, truth itself must also be a quality of the relation of the mind to its object. 
Indeed, as was noted in the Chapter One, Hegel appropriates the traditional conception of 
truth as the correspondence between thought and being, or the mind and its object. Hegel, 
                                                          
unconditioned by anything external there is nothing to prevent the actualization of itself through the 
positing of the very conditions by which it would emerge. Thus, insofar as the conditions are present, the 
mind necessarily will become actual. For further details, see Hegel’s discussion of the necessity of the 
actual in SL, pp. 541-53. 
241 Cf. Hegel: “The truth of necessity is thereby freedom” (EL 232). 
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of course, adds the crucial point that the only object which could ultimately correspond to 
or be adequate to the mind would be the mind itself.242 
 Insofar as it is the mind itself which is its own object, then not only is truth a 
quality of the relation between the mind and its object, but so is certainty. For, to the 
extent that the mind’s object is ultimately just itself, this would seem to preclude the 
possibility of skeptical doubts that the mind might somehow not be adequate to knowing 
its object or that, in coming to know its object, the mind would be at risk of distorting it. 
Indeed, as we have already seen in earlier sections of this dissertation, Hegel not only 
critiques but explains the very existence of such skeptical doubts, showing them to 
manifest a lower stage of the mind’s development. At any rate, this quality of certainty 
which turns out to be coincident with truth and is that according to which the mind relates 
to its object will become clearer when we turn to the discussion of the “Reason” chapter 
whose subtitle is “The Certainty and Truth of Reason.” 
 Thus, the mind relates to its object in and through identity, recognition, truth and 
certainty. The mind, in the course of its self-development, posits an object for itself 
which slowly becomes adequate to the mind itself. Once the object becomes adequate to 
                                                          
242 Cf. Hegel: “[T]ruth in the deeper sense means that objectivity is identical with the Concept” (EL 287). In 
fairness, this conception of truth as the object’s adequacy to the mind is already present in the tradition 
prior to Hegel, especially in traditional doctrines of God as truth itself. Cf. Aquinas: “Truth is found in the 
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and things according as they have being conformable to 
an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His 
intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of 
every other being and every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. 
Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itselef, and the sovereign and first truth” 
(ST, 1.i, q. 16, a. 5). Needless to say, the proximate source for Aquinas’s doctrine of God as truth itself is 
Aristotle’s concept of the God as noesis noeseos, which Hegel, of course, appropriates. Cf. Hegel: “This 
unity [of Concept and object] is the absolute truth and all truth […] This is the noesis noeseos, which was 
already called the highest form of the Idea by Aristotle” (EL 303).  
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or corresponds to the mind, the mind recognizes itself therein, truth is attained and the 
mind and its object enjoy the certainty of their sublated identity.  
1.4 Summary of Preceding Section 
 We have thus provided an outline of Hegel’s more or less mature conception of 
objectivity. As mentioned, Hegel’s conception of objectivity is often lacking in 
gnoseological detail and rigor. Still, it was possible to determine that Hegel’s conception 
of objectivity includes an effort to generalize it beyond the restrictions of all viewpoints 
shy of the absolute viewpoint. This effort of removing any naïve restrictions on his 
conception of objectivity runs parallel with his effort to conceive of the experiential 
element of objectivity according to its full generality, as well. For Hegel, everything that 
is in consciousness at all is experienced. Therefore, contrary to lower viewpoints such as 
Sense-certainty or Perception, sensuous experience bears no special significance for the 
objectivity of knowledge, for Hegel. Instead, sensuous experience is but a means or 
moment in the minds process of self-mediation. 
 In terms of the basic determinations of Hegel’s conception of objectivity, the 
mind is a self-developing, self-mediating totality which posits an ultimately universal, 
concrete, absolute, infinite and necessary object for itself, which object turns out to be the 
mind itself. Hence, the mind relates to its object according to the qualities of identity, 
recognition, truth and certainty. 
2. Reason 
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 Now that we have established a basic outline of Hegel’s conception of objectivity, 
it will be useful to return to the ongoing analysis of the PhG. For, we are now in a 
position to diagnose with even greater precision how Hegel explains the multiplicity of 
philosophies. As Hegel makes clear, the conception of objectivity operative within a 
given viewpoint will be determined according to that viewpoint’s level of development. 
Lower forms of consciousness will necessarily maintain distorted conceptions of 
objectivity coincident with their restricted viewpoints. Yet, now that we have established 
Hegel’s mature conception of objectivity, we can specify more precisely exactly wherein 
those restriction and distortions lie. As such, we can also specify more precisely how 
Hegel explains the emergence of the philosophies which express these restricted and 
distorted conceptions of objectivity. 
 Reason is the next form of consciousness which Hegel analyzes in the PhG. As 
noted, Reason constitutes a very highly developed form of consciousness. Still, Reason as 
it first appears on the scene is beset by some peculiar restrictions which manifest 
themselves in the conceptions of objectivity to which they give rise. In order to explicate 
this set of issues, let us turn to examining the initial portions of Hegel’s phenomenology 
of Reason. 
2.1 An Examination of the Initial Stages of Reason 
 Like all the major parts of the PhG, the “Reason” chapter is rich and multifaceted. 
Its points of analysis extend from the arcane theories of Phrenology and Physiognomy of 
Hegel’s time all the way to ancient Greece and Sophocles’ great play Antigone. Much of 
this analysis, however, does not admit of proper treatment in the current context. Focus 
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will remain, instead, on those aspects of Hegel’s discussion which serve most directly to 
advance the larger effort of this dissertation, namely, to explicate the method by which 
Hegel explains the emergence of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. Fortunately, 
some of the most pertinent aspects of Hegel’s discussion in this respect occur within the 
opening few sections of the “Reason” chapter. For, these sections pick up and carry 
forward in a most explicit fashion Hegel’s ongoing effort to explain just how Kantian and 
Fichtean transcendental philosophy emerges. 
Reason, like the whole of reality with which it turns out to be coincident, is an 
emergent phenomenon. Reason, qua actual, comes into being. The account of the 
experience of consciousness and self-consciousness which has thus far been provided 
shows the basic schematic structure by which Reason has developed. Reason results from 
the “movement” in which the mind posits “the completely developed single individual” 
(PhG 139). The completely developed single individual is that form of the mind which 
grasps that it is “in itself Absolute essence” (PhG 139). In other words, Reason is the 
form of consciousness which possesses the certainty that, “in its particular individuality, 
it has being absolutely in itself, or is all reality” (PhG. 230, 138). 
Needless to say, that Reason should constitute the consciousness of the fully 
developed, single individual, and that the “Consciousness” and “Self-consciousness” 
chapter of the Phenomenology have described the development of this consciousness, 
serves to confirm all the more one of the central arguments of the preceding chapter, 
namely, that the course of development described within the “Self-consciousness” 
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chapter is that of a single, empirical, individual consciousness.243 Be that as it may, what 
calls for some initial clarification is just what Hegel means by stating that Reason is the 
form of the mind which is certain that it is all of reality. 
2.1.1 Reason qua All of Reality 
According to Hegel, what does it mean to say that Reason is, and recognizes itself 
as, all of reality? The simple answer is that, according to Hegel, Reason recognizes that 
the world it inhabits is one which it has posited for-itself and which, in fact, is itself. For, 
Reason is the successor or continuation of the empirical servile consciousness. Yet, the 
servile consciousness labored to develop an object in which it could recognize itself, and 
in so doing it correlatively produced itself as a fully developed, individual mind. Reason 
is the recognition that the mind and the object which have been thereby produced are in 
fact the same. 
 The object which the servile consciousness produces as it proceeds on its journey 
is the universal. Yet, as Hegel states, “In this movement [consciousness] has also become 
aware of its unity with this universal, a unity which, for us, no longer falls outside of it 
since the sublated [Aufgehoben] single individual is the universal” (PhG 139). In 
producing a universal object, the mind of the particular individual thus becomes universal 
itself. As such, it is united to the universal. Indeed, this is just what an educated, 
individual empirical consciousness consists in for Hegel: a mind which has overcome in 
its initial one-sided particularity and now actively inhabits a universal viewpoint. 
                                                          
243 Cf. Ferrarin: “Hegel’s system will have precisely the task of showing the actuality of the Idea, the Greek 
identity of thought and being, in the individual” (Hegel and Aristotle 46). 
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  Now, despite the fact that the world which the developed empirical mind of 
Reason inhabits is indeed a universe, a universe in which it is certain that whatever it may 
come to know will be just its own self, certain limitations still afflict the mind at this 
point. We have already seen similar limitations afflicting the mind qua consciousness and 
qua self-consciousness during each of their respective initial stages of development. The 
two main limitations afflicting Reason with which Hegel is concerned are 1) that at this 
stage we are as yet only dealing with Reason in its immediacy, or Reason as it first comes 
on the scene, and 2) as a result of its immediacy Reason has forgotten the path of 
development which it has traversed in order to become Reason. Let us examine both of 
these limitations. 
2.1.2 The Immediacy of Reason and its Self-forgetting 
 According to Hegel, 
Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; thus does idealism 
express its Concept. Just as consciousness, that comes on the scene as Reason, 
possesses that certainty directly [unmittelbar] in itself, so too does idealism given 
direct expression to that certainty: ‘I am I’, in the sense that the ‘I’ which is an 
object for me is the sole object, all reality and all that is present. (PhG 140) 
In a sense, we have returned to the truth already revealed in the experience of self-
consciousness, namely, that the object of which consciousness is conscious is itself, 
which truth, moreover, is expressed in the foundational principle: ‘I am I.’ The 
difference, however, between mere self-consciousness, on the one hand, and Reason, on 
the other, is that while in self-consciousness it was true that the object of which it was 
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conscious was indeed itself, that truth had yet to be raised to certainty; it had yet to be 
rendered fully explicit for consciousness.244 In-itself, or for us, the phenomenological 
observers, self-consciousness could be expressed as ‘I am I’; yet, it is only with the 
emergence of Reason that consciousness expresses itself thusly. 
 The emergence of Reason is thus concomitant with the emergence of 
philosophical Idealism. Reason is emergent in and through Idealism. For, Idealism 
objectifies and expresses for consciousness the truth that Reason is all of reality, thus 
raising this truth to certainty. Needless to say, Hegel is here explicitly confirming the 
basic thesis of this dissertation, namely, that different philosophies express different 
stages of the development of the mind. 
 Hegel makes the further point that Reason sublates the viewpoint of the two 
previous major forms of consciousness, namely, consciousness and self-consciousness. 
For, from the viewpoint of consciousness, its object or the true “had for [it] the 
determinateness of being”, while, for the viewpoint of self-consciousness, the object or 
the true “had the determination of being only for consciousness” (PhG 140). Yet, with 
the emergence of Reason, these two viewpoints, “[r]educed themselves to a single truth, 
viz. that what is, or the in-itself, only is in so far as it is for consciousness, and what is for 
consciousness is also in itself or has intrinsic being” (PhG 140-41). The mind posits the 
objective world which it inhabits. By the time we arrive at the viewpoint of 
consciousness, however, the mind has already forgotten that it has posited its object, so it 
                                                          
244 Cf. Hegel: “Immediate self-consciousness does not yet have its object the I= I, but only the I” (PM 152). 
It is only with the emergence of Reason that I = I becomes the object of the mind, for the mind. 
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naively treats it as a “being” which it “finds” “out there” in the “world.”245 As such, mere 
consciousness also naively assumes that any activity on the part of the mind can only 
distort the object thereby resulting in the object becoming “merely” for consciousness 
and so not possessing intrinsic being or existence in-itself.  
The experience of self-consciousness breaks the mind of this naiveté. In its 
culminating moment of development, self-consciousness overcomes the naïve 
assumption that there is an object “out there” in “the world” and that its active positing or 
determination of this object would thus somehow render it “merely” “subjective” or only 
for consciousness. Instead, mind qua Reason “contains no determination that it does not 
recognize as a determination posited by itself” (PM 16). Thus, in becoming Reason, the 
mind recognizes that the objective world which it has posited for itself is the real world, 
or is being-in-itself.246 
 Philosophical Idealism expresses this emergent certainty on the part of Reason 
that it is all of reality or that the world which it inhabits is one which it has posited for 
itself. Yet, in the first instance, Reason is present only in its immediacy. It has therefore 
                                                          
245 In the PM, Hegel clarifies that the point of departure of the PhG, namely, the viewpoint of 
consciousness, has already forgotten that the object which apparently confronts it is itself: “In 
phenomenology, the soul, by the negation of its bodiliness, raises itself to pure ideal self-identity, becomes 
consciousness, becomes I, is for itself over against its Other. But this first being-for-self of mind is still 
conditioned by the Other from which the mind originates. The I is still completely empty, an entirely 
abstract subjectivity; it posits all the content of immediate mind outside itself and relates to it as to a world 
it finds before it. Thus what was initially only our object, does indeed become an object for mind itself, but 
the I does not yet know that what confronts it is the natural mind itself” (PM 27).  
246 Cf. Hegel in the “Reason” section of the PM: “Self-consciousness is thus the certainty that its 
determination are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own 
thoughts. Hence it is reason which since it is this identity, is not only absolute substance, but the truth as 
awareness. For truth here has, as its peculiar determinacy, as its immanent form, the pure concept existing 
for itself, I, the certainty of itself as infinite universality. This truth that is aware is the mind” (164). 
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forgotten the path which it traversed in order to reach its current stage of development. 
Several aspects of this forgetting and its consequences demand immediate clarification. 
 First, because Reason as it first appears on the scene has forgotten the course of 
its development it “does not comprehend its own self” (PhG 141). In other words, 
recollecting the developmental path which the mind has traversed in order to arrive at its 
current viewpoint is essential to its self-knowledge. Needless to say, such self-knowledge 
is crucial, for Hegel, since its lack distorts Reason’s own interpretation of what it means 
to be all of reality. 
 Second, in forgetting its path of development Reason is also unable to “make 
itself comprehensible to others” (PhG 141). The issue raised, here, is explicitly that of the 
problem of philosophical disagreement. For, in first coming on the scene, Reason asserts 
the truth that it is all of reality as an immediate certainty. Here, Hegel surely has in mind 
that fact that Fichte’s system begins with the immediate affirmation of the self-positing I, 
which is expressed in the formula: “I am I, my object and my essence is I” (PhG 141). 
For Hegel, the discovery on the part of the mind that, qua Reason, it is all of reality is the 
result of an arduous journey of intellectual development. Fichte’s Idealism, by contrast, 
begins with the immediate assertion of this principle. 
 The problem with beginning with the immediate assertion that Reason is all of 
reality, according to Hegel, is that such Idealism thereby admits of being refuted by the 
mere counter-assertion of another certainty, namely, that of ordinary consciousness for 
which there is an object other than it which is its essence, or, that the I is the essence of 
consciousness only “by drawing back from the ‘other’ altogether, and taking [its] place as 
an actuality alongside it” (PhG 141). In other words, in merely asserting the truth that it 
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is all of reality as an immediate certainty, Fichtean Idealism 1) proclaims a truth which is 
incomprehensible to ordinary naïve consciousness and 2) gives ordinary naïve 
consciousness license to proclaim its own immediate certainty that it is confronted by an 
“external” object distinct from itself. In such a scenario, philosophical discourse between 
those philosophies which proclaim the immediate certainty of Reason and those which 
proclaim the immediate certainty of ordinary naïve consciousness, or indeed Sense-
certainty, rapidly devolves into battle of counter-assertions. 
 Hegel is perhaps somewhat unjust to Fichte on this score since Fichte is at least 
aware that ordinary naïve consciousness is immediately certain that it is confronted by an 
“external” object that is distinct from itself. Moreover, one of the overriding goals of the 
WL is to provide an explanation of this naïve assumption. Thus, Fichte in principle 
recognizes the need both to comprehend, and to make oneself comprehensible to, naïve 
consciousness. 
 Hegel’s critique, however, seems to focus on the fact that Fichte does not provide 
an account of the genesis of Reason’s own self-certainty. Fichte’s Idealism “appeals to 
the self-consciousness of each and every consciousness” in order to make itself 
comprehensible; in other words, it asks those who would wish to comprehend it to 
engage in the radical abstraction that Fichte describes on various occasions. Yet, it does 
not thereby generate a genetic account of the very emergence of self-consciousness and 
the self-certainty of Reason. It does not, in other words, provide the “natural history of 
consciousness” which it promised. Instead, it forgets this history and proclaims without 
further ado the certainty of Reason that it is all of reality. 
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 For Hegel, ordinary consciousness needs more than the immediate assertion of 
Reason if it is to comprehend and indeed come to adopt the viewpoint of Reason. This 
point, of course, connects back to Hegel’s famous declaration in the Preface to the PhG 
according to which “the individual has the right to demand that Science should at least 
provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within 
himself” (PhG 14-5). Ordinary consciousness has the right to demand that it be provided 
not simply with a bare assertion that Reason is all of reality but with a very ladder by 
which it could raise itself to this viewpoint.  
To be sure, for Hegel, the PhG, not the WL, would constitute such a ladder. For, 
the PhG will demonstrate to ordinary consciousness much more precisely and 
comprehensively than the WL that  
Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various 
ways according to the precise stage it has reached in the development of the 
World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it immediately finds and determines 
itself and its object at any time, or the way in which it is for itself, depends on 
what it has already become, or what it already is in itself (PhG 141-2). 
Fichte can explain to ordinary consciousness the source of its naiveté. For Hegel, 
however, Fichte does not provide ordinary consciousness with a precise phenomenology 
of the stages (i.e. steps on the ladder) it must traverse in order to break itself of its naiveté 
and ascend to the viewpoint of Reason. As a result, ordinary consciousness can only find 
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in Fichtean Idealism an incomprehensible mere counter-assertion against its own 
assertion of its immediate certainty.247 
2.1.3 Summary of Hegel’s Initial Account of Reason as it first Appears on the Scene 
 Reason as it first appears on the scene, or in its immediacy, is Reason which 
immediately asserts the certainty that it is all of reality. Reason in its immediacy is thus 
incomprehensible to ordinary consciousness for whom, by contrast, it is simply obvious 
that Reason or the mind is not all of reality, but rather that the mind is confronted or 
otherwise “constrained” by an “object” “out there”. The result is that the assertion of 
immediate Reason’s certainty – ‘I am I’ or ‘I am because I am’ – can only appear to 
ordinary consciousness as a mere incomprehensible counter-assertion to its own 
immediately asserted certainty, ‘The object is because it is.’ In the context of this 
analysis, Hegel provides an explanation for the ever-renewed and seemingly futile 
conflict and mutual incomprehension between naïve Realists and transcendental Idealists.  
                                                          
247 Hegel repeats the basic outline this entire critique of the Fichte’s failure to provide a ladder for ordinary 
consciousness and consequent mere assertion of the immediate assertion of Reason’s self-certainty along 
with the philosophical conflict to which this approach invariably gives rise in the SL: “In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited consciousness in its movement onwards from the first immediate 
opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form 
of the relation of consciousness to the object and has the Concept of science for its result. This Concept 
therefore (apart from the fact that it emerges within logic itself) needs no justification here because it has 
received it in that work […] The definition with which any science makes an absolute beginning [e.g. ‘I am 
I’] cannot contain anything other than the precise and correct expression of what is imagined to be the 
accepted and familiar subject matter and aim of the science. That precisely this is what is imagined is an 
historical asseveration in respect of which one can only appeal to such and such as recognized facts; or 
rather the plea can be advanced that such and such could be accepted as recognized facts. There will always 
be someone who will adduce a case, an instance, according to which something more and different is to be 
understood by certain terms the definition of which must therefore be made more precise or more general 
and the science too, must be accommodated thereto. This again involves argumentation about what should 
be admitted or excluded and within what limits and to what extent; but argumentation is open to the most 
manifold and various opinions, on which a decision can be finally determined only arbitrarily. In this 
method of beginning a science with its definition, no mention is made of the need to demonstrate the 
necessity of its subject matter and therefore of the science itself” (48-9). 
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Importantly, Reason in its immediacy also has forgotten the path by which it 
developed itself into its current form of the mind. Reason in its immediacy, therefore, 
fails to comprehend itself. It is this self-forgetting and consequent lack of self-
comprehension or self-knowledge on the part of immediate Reason, moreover, which, as 
we will see, serves to explain in greater precision the very emergence of Kantian-style 
transcendental philosophy. Let us turn, then, to examining this aspect of Hegel’s analysis. 
2.2 Kantian Transcendental Philosophy as Expressing the Viewpoint of Immediate 
Reason 
 Recall that Reason just is the single individual which affirms for-itself that it is 
the universal power of thought, or that it is all of reality. As such, it is coincident with 
philosophical Idealism. Still, when Reason first appears on the scene it has forgotten the 
path of development by which it has attained to the standpoint of the universal. As a 
result of having forgotten its path of development, moreover, Reason , according to 
Hegel, reverts “to the standpoint of ‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’” (PhG 145). The fact that 
Reason as it first appears on the scene forgets its path of development and reverts to the 
viewpoints of Sense-certainty and Perception is all-important for certain of the details of 
Hegel’s explanatory account of the emergence of Kant’s philosophy. 
  For, to begin with, recall that for Sense-certainty and Perception objects are given 
in immediate sensuous experience. Thus, despite the fact that Reason has in-itself 
constituted the universal as its object and has in-itself become the universal power of 
thinking, due to its self-forgetting and thus lack of self-knowledge, it reverts to the naïve 
standpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception according to which objects are not universal 
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but rather particular ‘Thises’ or ‘Things’ “out there” which are given in immediate 
sensuous experience. Insofar as Kant’s philosophy expresses the viewpoint of Reason 
which has forgetfully and thus unwittingly reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty 
and Perception we can expect that its conception of itself and its object will correspond to 
that which we have already found in Sense-certainty and Perception. Indeed, this is 
precisely what we find. 
For, despite attaining to the viewpoint of Reason, Kant also clearly reverts to the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. This fact is revealed throughout the Critique 
of Pure Reason. For example, the opening passages of the Transcendental Aesthetic 
clearly articulate a viewpoint that has reverted to Sense-certainty and Perception: “In 
whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through 
which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as 
an end, is intuition” (A19/B33). Thus, according to Kant, cognition relates to objects, not 
through self-mediated identity and truth, but rather immediately through intuition. All 
thought, moreover, is directed as a mere means to intuition. More direct expressions of 
the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception could scarcely be imagined.248 
 Kant continues to express the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception in the 
clearest of terms: 
The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we 
are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by 
                                                          
248 Needless to say, for Hegel, what consciousness learns in thinking-through the viewpoints of Sense-
certainty and Perception is that cognition relates only mediately to objects through intuition. Indeed, 
consciousness learns that intuition is itself a mere means or moment in consciousness’s process of self-
mediation whose end is hardly intuition but rather truth, which is to say, the adequacy of the mind or 
cognition to itself. 
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means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought 
through the understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought, whether 
straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately be related 
to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which 
objects can be given to us (A19/B33). 
Objects are given to us through sensibility which is a receptive capacity for being affected 
by objects. These statements correspond precisely to the self-understanding operative on 
the level of Sense-certainty and Perception. For Sense-certainty and Perception, the 
object is a particular ‘This’ or ‘Thing’, given in “sensibility” and by which consciousness 
is “affected.”  
 Evidence of Kant’s having reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and 
Perception could be multiplied.249 Yet, that is not the end of the story. For, Kant has also 
attained to the viewpoint of Reason. What does it mean to say that one has attained to the 
viewpoint of Reason? It means that one has posited and determined the universal within 
one’s experience and that one has indeed become the universal power of thought. Thus, 
we must conclude that Kant has constituted the universal within his own experience. 
 The fact that Kant both attains to and yet reverts from the viewpoint of Reason – 
or, as Hegel will express more precisely, the fact that Kant “shifts” back-and-forth 
between the viewpoint of Reason, on the one hand, and Sense-certainty and Perception, 
                                                          
249 Despite his genuine advances upon Kant, one can also detect such a reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty and Perception in Fichte. Thus, for example, Fichte states, “Since the Wissenschaftslehre derives 
the entire concept of being only from the form of sensibility, it follows that, for it, all being is necessarily 
sensible being” (IWF 56). In other words, to be a “being” or an object is to be given in sensibility, for 
Fichte. As a result of such reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, Hegel declares that 
Kant’s and Fichte’s Idealism “is bound, therefore, to be at the same time absolute empiricism” (PhG 144).   
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on the other – this fact is an essential basis upon which Hegel explains the very existence 
of the Kantian philosophy (PhG 144). For, Hegel has already succeeded in explaining the 
very existence of certain statements in Kant inasmuch as they express the viewpoint of 
Sense-certainty and Perception. Yet, Hegel’s explanatory account can be further specified 
and enriched by showing how it permits him to account for the different conceptions of 
objectivity operative within Kant’s philosophy. 
2.2.1 The Multiple Conceptions of Objectivity Operative within Kantian Philosophy 
 Insofar as Kant’s philosophy expresses the viewpoint of immediate Reason, 
which is to say, Reason which has also unwittingly reverted to the viewpoint Sense-
certainty and Perception, it will contain at least two distinct conceptions of objectivity, 
two conceptions, moreover, which, in the event, prove to be at odds with one another. 
For, in the case of immediate Reason, there will be a conception of objectivity which 
corresponds to the mind qua operating within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and 
Perception as well as a distinct conception of objectivity which corresponds to the mind 
qua operating within the viewpoint of Reason.  
Hegel provides a quite helpful account of these two distinct conceptions of 
objectivity operating simultaneously within Kant’s philosophy in the EL. In fact, as it 
turns out, Hegel identifies a third, distinct conception of objectivity operative within 
Kant’s philosophy. As will become evident, however, this third conception has already 
been shown to be grounded in the experience of Perception – or, to be more precise, this 
third conception of objectivity will prove to result not merely from the experience of 
Perception, but from the distortion that emerges inasmuch as Kant unwittingly shifts back 
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and forth between the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, on the one hand, and 
that of Reason, on the other. 
 Thus, with respect to the distinct conceptions of objectivity operative in Kant’s 
philosophy, Hegel states: 
’Objective’ and ‘subjective’ are convenient expressions which we employ 
currently, but their use can very easily give rise to confusion too. So far our 
explanation has shown that ‘objectivity’ has a threefold significance. To start 
with, it has the significance of what is externally present, as distinct from what is 
only subjective, meant, dreamed, etc.; secondly, it has the significance, established 
by Kant, of what is universal and necessary as distinct from the contingent, 
particular and subjective that we find in our sensation; and thirdly, it has the last-
mentioned significance of the In-itself as thought-product, the significance of 
what is there, as distinct from what is only thought by us, and hence still distinct 
from the matter itself, or from the matter [Sache] in-itself.” (EL 83) 
Let us take each of these conceptions of objectivity in turn and note how they are 
grounded in the polymorphism of the mind. 
First, within Kant’s philosophy there is a conception of objectivity according to 
which what counts as objective is that which is “externally present” in sensible 
experience. Such a conception of objectivity corresponds to that operative in Sense-
certainty and Perception.  
There is a second conception of objectivity within Kant’s philosophy according to 
which in order to count as objective the object must consist of universal and necessary 
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determinations. Such a conception of objectivity corresponds to that operative within 
Reason.  
There is, of course, a third conception of objectivity according to which to count 
as objective the object must be independent or absolute. Of course, each viewpoint 
determines what it considers to be independent or absolute, or what exists through itself.  
For Sense-certainty, the absolute is the immediate being of the ‘This’: it is because it is. 
For self-consciousness, the absolute is itself: I am because I am. As we saw in the 
specific case of Perception, however, consciousness at a certain point conceives of the 
absolute as a wholly indeterminate ‘Thing’ lurking behind the multiplicity of sensuous 
phenomena. As will be shown, moreover, that, for Kant, this thing-in-itself ultimately 
cannot be known as it is in-itself results from the ad hoc solution he devises for 
reconciling the prior two conceptions of objectivity. Thus, Kant’s three conceptions of 
objectivity clearly are grounded the polymorphism of Kant’s mind as he unwittingly 
shifts back and forth between different viewpoints. 250 
2.2.2 The Significance of Kant’s Multiple and Conflicting Conceptions of Philosophy 
for Explaining and Critiquing his Philosophy 
                                                          
250 Indeed, one can witness Kant shifting back and forth from the viewpoint of Reason to that of Sense-
certainty and Perception within a single sentence: “For if one removes from our experiences everything that 
belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and the judgments generated from them, 
which must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience,  because they make one able to say 
more about objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach, or at least make one believe 
that one can say this, and make assertions containing true universality and necessity, the likes of which 
empirical cognition can never afford” (KRV A1/B5). Thus, according to Kant, upon removing from 
experience that which belongs to the senses, there still remain universal and necessary determinations. Note 
precisely: for Kant, these universal and necessary determinations are elements of experience which still 
remain after removing other elements. Yet, in the very same sentence Kant denies that these elements are 
given in experience, instead equating experience with the realm of the senses and with “merely” empirical 
cognition. Thus, within a single sentence Kant expresses a conception of experience which would 
correspond to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, for which universal and necessary 
determinations are not experienced, as well as a conception of objectivity which would correspond to the 
viewpoint of Reason, for which, of course, universal and necessary determinations are given in experience. 
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 Let us explore in even more depth the precise nature of the dialectical explanation 
and critique of Kant’s position which Hegel is articulating both in his phenomenology of 
Reason and in his treatment of Kant’s multiple conceptions of objectivity laid out in the 
EL. 
Based on what has been covered, thus far, it is clear that, according to Hegel, in 
Kant there is an experiential, a universal and necessary, and an absolute element to 
objectivity. Importantly, however, for Hegel, these various elements and conceptions of 
objectivity in Kant are not synthesized and sublated into a unitary conception of 
objectivity, but rather the different elements and conception remain opposed to one 
another.251 Thus, the first conception of objectivity emphasizes the experiential element 
of objectivity. Here, Kant would appear to be deriving the previously discussed lesson 
from the Empiricists, namely, that in order to be objective knowledge must be grounded 
in experience. Yet, since, like the Empiricists, Kant’s conception of experience is 
restricted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, he can only conceive of 
experience in terms of sensation, whether the so-called inner or outer sense.252  
This fact, however, creates a tension with the second conception of objectivity 
according to which the objectivity of an object depends upon its consisting of universal 
and necessary determinations.253 Yet, such universal and necessary determinations are 
not given in sensation or sensible intuition. Thus, Kant’s first conception of objectivity 
would seem to be at odds with his second conception. For Hegel, it is just this tension 
                                                          
251 Cf. Hegel: “With Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and 
they are united only in an external, superficial way, just a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together 
with a cord” (LHP III 441). 
252 On Kant’s reversion to the naïve viewpoint of Empiricist conception of experience and its role in the 
objectivity of knowledge, cf. Hegel: “Kant’s philosophy […] allies itself with naïve empiricism without 
derogating in the least from the universal principle of empiricism” (EL 107). 
253 Cf. Hegel: “Because it is universal, Kant always calls something ‘objective’” (ETW 214). 
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between these two conceptions of objectivity operative within Kant’s philosophy – along 
with the further complicating factor introduced by the third, absolute, aspect of 
objectivity – which precipitates several of the various problematic aspects of Kant’s 
philosophy. 
Hegel articulates the state of the problem facing Kant by observing that, on the 
one hand, for Kant, “only what is singular and only what happens are contained in 
perception [taken] on its own account”, while, on the other hand, “Critical Philosophy 
holds on to the factum that universality and necessity, being also essential determinations, 
are found to be present in what is called experience” (EL 81).254 In other words, from the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, only singular ‘Thises’ or ‘Things’ as well as 
their contingent succession in imaginable space and time (i.e. “what happens”) are given 
in experience.255 Yet, the viewpoint of Reason, as a matter of fact, experiences universal 
and necessary objects or determinations. Kant’s challenge as a philosopher is to attempt 
to reconcile these two viewpoints. 
 Again, it is helpful to correlate this discussion with the analysis of the 
Lord/Bondsman dialectic. For, it is through the development of the empirical 
consciousness of the Bondsman that the universal is actually constructed as the object of 
experience and that a universal mind comes into existence. Thus, in the case of Kant, the 
empirical person, Immanuel Kant, through the fear, service and labor involved in 
becoming an educated denizen of 18th Century Prussia, learned to construct in his 
                                                          
254 Cf. Kant on universal and necessary determinations constituting a given Faktum: “The empirical 
derivation, however, to which both [Locke and Hume] resorted, cannot be reconciled with the reality of the 
scientific cognition a priori that we possess, that namely of pure mathematics and general natural science, 
and is therefore refuted by the fact” [Emphases mine] (A95/B127-8).  
255 Cf. Hegel’s famous quip that, for Kant, “objects” consist merely in “a candlestick standing here, and a 
snuff-box standing there” (LHP III 444-5). 
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experience such putatively universal and necessary objects or determinations as one 
finds, for example, in the laws of Newtonian science or the laws of moral conscience.256 
Yet, the mere emergence of the universal within the experience of the empirical 
consciousness of the Bondsman does not imply that the Bondsman has attained to perfect 
self-knowledge. Rather, in the first instance, the Bondsman forgets himself and his 
process of development, and as a result ascribes to an alien principle, the Lord, his own 
universal power of thought. A precisely analogous phenomenon occurs in Kant’s 
philosophy. 
 For, Kant has “forgotten” the empirical process of the education and intellectual 
development by which he has posited and determined for himself in conscious experience 
the universal objects and determinations of, for example, Newtonian science or moral 
conscience.257 Still, these objects are indeed given in his conscious experience, provided 
that one generalizes one’s conception of experience.258 Yet, Kant has reverted to the 
                                                          
256 Cf. Hegel on how Kant’s position expresses the viewpoint of the ordinary educated person: “The more 
specific stage of consciousness at which Kantian philosophy conceives the mind is perception, which is in 
general the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less of the sciences. The sensory 
certainties of individual apperceptions or observations form the starting-point; these are supposed to be 
elevated to truth, by being considered in their relation, reflected upon, generally be becoming, in 
accordance with determinate categories, at the same time something necessary and universal, experiences” 
(PM 149); Kant’s view of the relation of subject and object expresses “our ordinary, phenomenal 
consciousness; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same relation 
obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own self, then they are errors the refutation of 
which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy, or rather, as they bar the 
entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at is portals” (SL 45); again, Kant’s philosophy of “reflective 
understanding” “behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous 
reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling 
and reality and that reason left to its resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-
renunciation on the part of reason, the Concept of truth is lost” (SL 45). 
257 Perhaps if Kant had “recollected” this he might also have noticed that these objects are historically 
contingent and thus certainly lack the seemingly self-evident or “factical” universality and necessity which 
he ascribes to them.  
258 Likely due to his method of abstraction, the sophistication of which is to be found nowhere in Kant, 
Fichte is able to raise much more definitively the question of precisely how such (putatively) universal 
phenomena as the moral law are in fact given in conscious experience. As Fichte states, “The intellectual 
intuition of which the Wissenschaftslehre speaks is not directed toward any sort of being whatsoever; 
instead, it is directed at an acting – and this is something that Kant does not even mention (except, perhaps, 
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viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception according to which experience is restricted 
to the realm of the sensuous and objects must be given in sensuous experience in order to 
be considered objective. Thus, in order to account for the Faktum of putatively universal 
and necessary objects constitutive of his experience, the empirical person, Kant (like the 
Bondsman) ascribes to an alien, lordly power – namely, the Transcendental Unity of 
Apperception (TUA) – his own universal power of thought.  
 Hegel thus summarizes the upshot of Kant’s effort: 
 While Hume attacks the universality and necessity of the categories generally, 
and Jacobi their finitude, Kant merely argues against their objectivity in so far as 
they are present in external things themselves, while maintaining them to be 
objective in the sense of holding good as universal and necessary, as they do, for 
instance, in mathematics and natural science. The fact that we crave for 
universality and necessity as that which first constitutes the objective, Kant thus 
undoubtedly allows. But if universality and necessity do not exist in external 
things, the question arises ‘Where are they to be found?’ To this Kant, as against 
                                                          
under the name ‘pure apperception’). Nevertheless, it is still possible to indicate the exact place within 
Kant’s system where he should have discussed this. For Kant would certainly maintain that we are 
conscious of the categorical imperative, would he not? What sort of consciousness is this? Kant neglected 
to pose this question to himself, for nowhere did he discuss the foundation of all philosophy. Instead, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason he dealt only with theoretical philosophy, within the context of which the 
categorical imperative could not appear; and in the Critique of Practical Reason he dealt only with 
practical philosophy and discussed only the content of this sort of consciousness, and thus the question 
concerning the very nature of this sort of consciousness could not arise with the context of the Second 
Critique. – Our consciousness of the categorical imperative is undoubtedly immediate, but it is not a form 
of sensory consciousness. In other words, it is precisely what I call ‘intellectual intuition’” (IWF 56). While 
Hegel would appreciate the advance Fichte has made on Kant in providing a method for identifying the 
moral law as, in fact, constitutive of conscious experience, he would certainly reject the claim that such 
consciousness is immediate. For Hegel, such consciousness is mediated highly by the experience of the fear 
of death, service and labor of empirical servile consciousness. To be sure, however, consciousness of the 
moral law can be taken to be immediate if one forgets the concrete empirical process of development one 
underwent in order to construct it in consciousness. 
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Hume, maintains that they must be a priori, i.e. that they must rest on reason 
itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, ‘I’ in 
my self-consciousness. This, simply expressed, is the main point in Kantian 
philosophy (LHP III 427-8). 
Thus, Kant has attained to the viewpoint of Reason. As such he both experiences 
universal and necessary determinations and insists upon these as the normative criteria 
for the objectivity of objects. Yet, Kant has also reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty and Perception according to which the criteria for the objectivity of an object 
consist not in its possessing universal and necessary determinations but in being 
“external” to the mind and being given in sensible experience or intuition. Since universal 
and necessary objects are not given in sensible intuition they cannot be “objective” 
according to the conception of objectivity operative within Sense-certainty and 
Perception. Yet, it is their very universality and necessity which ensures their objectivity 
from the viewpoint of Reason. 
 According to Hegel, Kant responds to this pseudo-problem by contriving an ad 
hoc solution. Kant’s solution is to maintain the following two positions simultaneously: 
that 
1)  The universal and necessary determinations of pure science, mathematics and 
moral conscience are objective in the sense that they are not reducible to the 
“mere” subjectivity of empirical consciousness but are instead grounded in the 
transcendental subject, or TUA.259  
                                                          
259 Cf. Kant: “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is 
sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The 
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2) The universal and necessary determinations are also not objective in the sense 
that they do not qualify “external” objects as they are in themselves.  
The first aspect of this ad hoc solution satisfies the conception of objectivity operative 
within the viewpoint of Reason, while the second aspect satisfies the conception of 
objectivity operative in Sense-certainty and Perception – satisfies this conception in the 
sense that it A) responds to Sense-certainty and Perception’s demand that, in order to be 
considered truly objective, objects must be given in sensuous experience, and then B) 
acknowledges that this criterion fails to be met in the case of universal and necessary 
determinations.260  
Yet, for Hegel, the result of Kant’s ad hoc attempt to satisfy these two conflicting 
conceptions of objectivity between which he unwittingly shifts back and forth consists is 
a mere contradiction in which knowledge of objects is held to be both objective and not 
objective, true and not true: 
                                                          
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance. I call that in that in the appearance 
which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuition 
as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can 
alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all is 
appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can 
therefore be considered separately from all sensation” (A20/B34). 
In other words, for Kant, since the “form” of the appearance is not sensed, then it must lie merely “in” the 
mind as opposed to the object “out there.” For Hegel, such is, indeed, the conclusion to which Reason 
which has reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception would come. For, on the one hand, 
Reason is aware of the role of “form,” which is to say, putatively universal and necessary relations, in 
constituting the object of experience; yet, on the other hand, for Sense-certainty and Perception, an object is 
what is given in sensuous experience, and universal and necessary patterns of relations are not given in 
sensation as such. Therefore, such a viewpoint can only conclude that the form or intelligible pattern of 
relations of which it is aware is nevertheless not intrinsically constitutive of the object but lies already “in 
here,” “in” the mind.  
260 As Hegel states, Kant’s “solution” to the problematic he sets for himself constitutes nothing more than 
an ad hoc counter-assertion against Hume, and thus begs the question as to the source of our knowledge of 
universal and necessary determinations: “The Humean skepticism does not deny the fact that the 
determinations of universality and necessity are found in cognition. But in the Kantian philosophy, too, this 
is nothing else but a presupposed fact; in the ordinary language of the sciences, we can say that this 
philosophy has only advanced another explanation of that fact” (EL 81). 
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The pure Reason of this idealism, in order to reach this ‘other’ which is essential 
to it [i.e. it is needed to supply the “matter” of sensation], and thus is the in-itself, 
but which it does not have within it, is therefore thrown back by its own self on to 
that knowing which is not a knowing of what is true; in this way, it condemns 
itself of its own knowledge and volition to being an untrue kind of knowing, and 
cannot get away from ‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’, which for it have no truth. It is 
involved in a direct contradiction; it asserts essence to be a duality of opposed 
factors, the unity of apperception and equally a Thing; whether the Thing is called 
an extraneous impulse, or an empirical or sensuous entity, or the Thing-in-itself, it 
still remains in principle the same, i.e. extraneous to that unity (PhG 144-5).  
Kant, despite having attained to the viewpoint of Reason, nevertheless “cannot get away 
from” from Sense-certainty and Perception (i.e. “meaning” and “perceiving”). As a 
result, he contrives an ad hoc solution which in the end condemns him to a knowing 
which is yet a not knowing, for the object which is known is denied to be the thing-in-
itself as it is in-itself. Most importantly, as far as this dissertation is concerned, this 
“direct contradiction” is not just critiqued, but explained to be an expression of the 
polymorphism of Kant’s mind. 
2.2.3 The Significance of Kant’s Restricted Conception of Experience for Explaining and 
Critiquing his Philosophy 
As noted, Kant’s conception of the role of experience in objectivity is restricted 
and distorted due to his inability to get away from Sense-certainty and Perception. This 
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fact adds a still further element to Hegel’s dialectical explanation and critique of Kant’s 
philosophy that bears at least brief mention.  
For Kant, insisting that the pure categories of the TUA do not derive from 
experience, or are “a priori”, is meant to preserve their objectivity in the face of Hume’s 
critique. Yet, for Hegel, this ad hoc maneuver can only appear necessary to the extent 
that one retains a restricted conception of experience, a conception of experience, that is, 
which corresponds to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Once one 
generalizes one’s conception of the experiential element of objectivity and thereby 
recognizes that everything given in consciousness is experienced, then it no longer 
becomes necessary to insist on the “a priority” of universal and necessary determinations 
in order to preserve their objectivity. For, in that case, the fact that a determination is not 
given in sensuous experience does not mean that it is not given in experience at all; nor 
does it threaten to undermine the objectivity of what is thereby experienced, for on a 
generalized conception of experience, sensuous experience possesses no special 
relevance for objectivity. For Kant, by contrast, inasmuch as he reverts to the conceptions 
of experience and objectivity operative in Sense-certainty and Perception, the fact that 
universal and necessary determinations are not given in sensuous experience necessarily 
entails that they are not objective.261 
                                                          
261 Cf. Hegel: “Kant says that reason has certainly the desire to know the infinite, but has not the power. 
And the reason which Kant gives for this, is on the one hand that no psychologically sensuous intuition or 
perception corresponds with the infinite, that it is not given in outward or inward experience; to the Idea 
‘no congruent or corresponding object can be discovered in the sensuous world.’ It depends, however, on 
how the world is looked at; but experience and observation of the world mean nothing else for Kant than a 
candlestick standing here, and a snuff-box standing there. It is certainly correct to say that the infinite is not 
given in the world of sensuous perception; and supposing that what we know is experience, a synthesis of 
what is thought and felt, the infinite can certainly not be known in the sense we have a sensuous perception 
of it. But no one wishes to demand a sensuous proof in verification of the infinite” – no one wishes this, of 
course, unless they are operating within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception (LHP III 444-5) 
333 
 
 
2.2.4 An Example by Way of McDowell 
It will help to clarify and solidify Hegel’s point regarding how the mind can attain 
to the viewpoint of Reason yet revert to a lower viewpoint by examining an example 
other than Kant. As it turns out, we need look no further than McDowell for an example 
of a philosopher and reader of both Kant and Hegel who, despite useful insights, clearly 
reverts to the restrictions of the Sense-certainty and Perception. This reversion to the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception on the part of McDowell can be used 1) to 
explain McDowell’s own interpretation of certain aspects of Hegel which was briefly 
discussed earlier in this chapter and 2) to demonstrate, once again, the ambiguities and 
contradictions involved in Kant’s multiple and conflicting conceptions of objectivity.   
McDowell states, both as a matter of explicating Kant and as a matter of fact: 
“Intuitions are immediately of objects” (HWV 148). McDowell thus clearly shares in 
Kant’s reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Inasmuch as 
McDowell reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception, however, we have 
an explanation as to why he would insist that objectivity for Hegel must entail an element 
of “external constraint” on the part of the object. For, from the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty and Perception, the object does indeed supply an “external constraint” upon or 
otherwise determines the mind.  
Thus, McDowell’s very interpretation of Hegel can be shown to result from 
McDowell’s own reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Indeed, 
McDowell is explicit that Hegel’s conception of objectivity must be made to fit with 
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within the more restricted horizon of Sense-certainty and Perception, or ordinary 
consciousness, more generally: 
A stress on self-determining subjectivity is characteristic of German Idealism in 
general. Hegel takes this theme to an extreme with his talk of absolute knowing as 
the free self-realization of the Concept […] If a conception expressible in such 
terms is to fit subjective engagement with objective reality, the realization of the 
Concept had better itself embody a responsiveness to constraints that are in some 
sense external. Rather than disappearing from the scene, the external constraint 
that figures in a more ordinary conception of objectivity must be incorporated 
within what we are supposed to be shown how to conceive as self-determination. 
(HWV 90) 
According to McDowell, Hegel “incorporates” the ordinary conception of objectivity as 
entailing “external constraint” into his generalized conception of objectivity as a matter 
of self-mediation. As was discussed earlier, this is not what Hegel does. Hegel explains 
and critiques the conception of objectivity as entailing “external constraint” by showing it 
be the expression of a lower viewpoint. He then sublates the very notion of constraint by 
showing it to be a matter of the “internal” self-differentiation and self-determining of the 
mind. Similarly, Hegel, unlike Kant, does not “incorporate” the Empiricist conception of 
objectivity according to which intuition is immediately “of” objects. Rather, he 
dialectically explains and critiques such a conception as being the expression of a lower 
form of the mind, and then sublates the very notion of experience itself by generalizing it. 
 For McDowell, Hegel had better include the notion of “external constraint” on the 
part of “objective reality” if he is going to meet the criterion of objectivity operative on 
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the level of ordinary conception. Yet, what McDowell in fact proposes would entail 
“constraining” Hegel’s speculative or rational conception of objectivity to fit within a 
more restricted horizon. Such a constraint would itself ultimately result in the confusions 
and distortions as manifested in, for example, the pseudo-problems and ad hoc solutions 
which characterize Kant’s position. For Kant’s philosophy, as we have seen, represents 
Reason operating within the “constraining” horizon of Sense-certainty and Perception.262 
The shortcomings of McDowell’s interpretation of Hegel notwithstanding, his 
discussion of Kant is still instructive precisely inasmuch as it throws into relief the 
ambiguities involved in Kant’s multiple conceptions of objectivity. Thus, after 
unquestioningly stating that intuitions are immediately “of” objects, McDowell proceeds 
to quote the following passage from the CPR: “The same function which gives unity to 
the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various 
representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle 
the pure concept of the understanding” (A79/B104-5). According to McDowell, what 
Kant means in this passage is that “The objective purport of intuitions is to be 
understood, then, in terms of their exemplifying logical unities that are characteristic of 
judging” (HWV 148).  
 Thus, McDowell seems to think that the point of the CPR is to demonstrate how 
intuitions gain “objective purport.” Yet, in point of fact, we should already know how, 
according to Kant, intuitions possess “objective purport.” For, McDowell has just told us. 
                                                          
262 Indeed, this view was already anticipated in the DZ in which Hegel refers to Kant’s philosophy as 
“Reason [which] operates as Understanding [Verstand]” – Reason, in other words, which operates within 
the restricted horizon of mere Understanding (96). Of course, in the PhG Hegel will specify more precisely 
that Kant reverts not merely to Understanding but to Sense-certainty and Perception. 
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Intuitions have “objective purport” immediately. They are immediately “of” objects. In 
other words, that intuitions have “objective purport” ought not to be a point that requires 
justification, for Kant, since it is apparently immediately obvious. Kant’s concern in the 
CPR, rather, would seem to be to justify the “objective purport” of “the pure concepts of 
the understanding”, or the TUA. For, these objects are not given in immediate intuition. 
Yet, according to Kant, cognition relates immediately to objects through intuition. Thus, 
the overriding question of the CPR, namely, “How are synthetic judgments a priori 
possible?” is a question seeking to determine, not how intuition, but how the pure 
concepts of the understanding have “objective purport” (B19).263 
McDowell, in fact, misses the great tension and contradiction that Hegel’s 
account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic reveals to be afflicting Kant’s philosophy. For, 
despite their lordly universality and necessity, in the first instance, the pure concepts lack 
objectivity or “objective purport.” Unto themselves, they do not determine any object. It 
is only insofar as the pure concepts relate to intuition that they gain “objective purport.” 
In other words, despite its pretensions to lordly self-sufficiency and spontaneity, the TUA 
is ultimately dependent upon what is given in sensuous intuition in order to gain 
“objective purport.” Thus, in order to show how the categories have “objective purport” 
Kant must show how the categories relate to or otherwise determine intuition. Indeed, 
demonstrating this relation of the categories to intuition is the entire point of Kant’s 
infamous doctrine of the schematism.264 For, unless this relation can be demonstrated, the 
categories will lack all “objective purport”. 
                                                          
263 The pure concepts or categories, of course, just are the functions of unity embedded in the forms of 
judgment. 
264 Cf. CPR A137/B176ff. 
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Yet, there is a further piece of instruction to be derived from McDowell’s 
misguided effort, a piece of instruction which can only be specified precisely now that we 
have examined Hegel’s diagnosis of the multiple and conflicting conceptions of 
objectivity operative in Kant. For, what McDowell’s discussion helps again to confirm is 
that the within Kant’s philosophy itself there is operative multiple conceptions of 
objectivity or “objective purport,” multiple conceptions, moreover, which are never 
properly distinguished but merely juxtaposed. Witness the following passage from Kant 
that makes this point clear: 
But since in us a certain from of sensible intuition a priori is fundamental, which 
rests on the receptivity of the capacity for representation (sensibility), the 
understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given 
representations in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think 
a priori synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold as sensible intuition, 
as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily 
stand, through which then the categories as mere forms of thought, acquire 
objective reality, i.e. applicable to objects that can be given to us in intuition, but 
only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable of intuition a priori. (CPR 
B150-1) 
“Objects” are given to us through the passive faculty of sensibility. It is thus only insofar 
as the categories “apply” to this manifold that they acquire “objective reality”. Yet, by the 
same token, the manifold of intuition must necessarily be determined by the categories in 
order that objects can appear at all in experience. Thus, while the conception of 
objectivity operative within Sense-certainty and Perception is satisfied inasmuch as Kant 
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determines cognition to relate to its object immediately through intuition, this 
determination fails to satisfy the conception of objectivity operative within the viewpoint 
of Reason. For, from the viewpoint of Reason, the criteria of objectivity are not 
immediacy and sensuous intuition but universality and necessity, neither of which is 
given within Kant’s restricted conception of experience. Kant’s ad hoc compromise 
between these two conflicting conceptions of objectivity is to deny that universal and 
necessary determinations qualify things as they are in-themselves but only as they 
“appear” to us. 
There is a sense, then, in which McDowell is correct that, for Kant, even though 
intuition is immediately “of” objects and thus already possesses “objective purport” 
(according to Kant’s first conception of objectivity), nevertheless intuition needs to 
conform to conditions of TUA in order to have “objective purport” (according to Kant’s 
second conception of objectivity).265 The problem is that McDowell misses the 
contradiction involved in the mere juxtaposition of these two conceptions of objectivity 
as well as the manner in which Hegel explains and critiques it. 
2.3  Summary and Clarification of Section 2 
On the basis of his phenomenology of Reason as it first comes on the scene, 
Hegel identifies three conceptions of objectivity operative within Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy. These three conceptions emerge inasmuch as Kant shifts back and forth 
between the viewpoint Sense-certainty and Perception, on the one hand, and that of 
                                                          
265 Needless to say, for Hegel, the process whereby the manifold of intuition is made to conform to the 
TUA results, not in a sublated unity, but merely in a relation of domination and servitude. 
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Reason, on the other. Like all conceptions of objectivity, each of these conceptions 
contains a determination of the mind, the mind’s object and the relation between the mind 
and its object. It will be helpful to summarize the three elements of objectivity which 
characterize Kant’s three conceptions of objectivity as whole. 
First, insofar as Kant operates within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and 
Perception, his conception of the mind is that of a passive faculty of sensibility, the 
relation of the mind to its object is one of immediacy and receptivity to the “external” 
object and the object itself is simply that to which the mind is immediately related 
through intuition. 
Second, insofar as Kant operates within the viewpoint of Reason, the mind is an 
active faculty, the relation of the mind to the object is one of (self-)mediation266 and 
spontaneity and the object itself is a pattern of universal and necessary determinations, or 
more precisely, “that in the [universal and necessary] concept of which the manifold of a 
given intuition is unified” (B137). As established in the previous chapter, however, for 
Hegel, the unification achieved through of the TUA spontaneously determining the 
manifold of empirical intuition is not a true synthesis or sublation, but manifests rather a 
relationship of domination and servitude.  
Third, insofar as Kant shifts back-and-forth between the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty and Perception, on the hand, and Reason, on the other, a certain hybrid 
conception of the mind emerges. Thus, Kant conceives of the possibility of an “intuitive 
                                                          
266 Cf. Kant’s famous line according to which knowledge of the object – i.e. nature – is ultimately self-
mediation: “Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to the inspiration 
that reason what would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter 
(though not merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature” (Bxiv). 
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intellect” which would immediately intuit or experience the absolute or thing-in-itself 
(CPR B145). Indeed, in the very phrase “intuitive intellect” one sees the kind of confused 
juxtaposition – rather than sublation – of the conceptions of the mind operative within 
Sense-certainty and Perception, on the one hand, and Reason, on the other. Still, because 
he has indeed reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception according to 
which experience is restricted to the realm of experience, Kant denies this possibility of 
such an intuitive intellect. The object on such a view, then, while in some sense absolute 
or unconditioned, is relegated to the status of a mere noumenon which can never be 
known or experienced as it is in-itself. The relationship of the mind to the object in this 
case is thus one of “mere” thought (CPR A254ff./B310ff.). At best the object can only be 
infinitely or indefinitely approximated to, but never properly known or experienced.  
Needless to say, as was established in the previous chapter, for Hegel, it is 
precisely in thought that the mind first recognizes itself in its object. Thus, the notion that 
thought should represent, as it does in Kant, a profound state of alienation from the object 
simply reflects the confusions that result from Kant unwittingly shifting back-and-forth 
between more than one viewpoint. 
Hegel thus shows that the very problems which Kant sets for himself as well as 
the solutions which he proposes are not simply haphazard developments in the history of 
thought but have a clear explanatory basis in the polymorphism of Kant’s own mind. 
3. Summary of the Chapter 
The present chapter has been concerned to examine further aspects of Hegel’s 
method of explaining the existence of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. The 
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chapter began by examining the various elements constitutive of Hegel’s mature and fully 
generalized conception of objectivity. For, it was noted that in order to explain the 
existence of the multiplicity of philosophies it is ultimately necessary to explain the 
existence of the multiplicity of conceptions of objectivity. Yet, in order to understand the 
details of Hegel’s explanatory account of the multiple conceptions of objectivity it was 
necessary first to examine Hegel’s own conception of objectivity. For, in the event, all 
conceptions of objectivity shy of Hegel’s own manifest restrictions and distortions of his 
mature position.  
Hegel’s mature conception of objectivity was shown to entail several elements. 
First, Hegel generalizes his conception of objectivity primarily by 1) demonstrating how 
the mind itself is the basic and general principle which determines the total set of 
conceptions of objectivity and 2) showing that objects can be defined in the most general 
terms as actualizations of the mind’s potency. Second, while Hegel notoriously lacks in 
rigorous gnoseological detail, it was still possible to examine the basic outlines according 
to which he determines his conception of objectivity. Thus, Hegel’s determinations of the 
nature of the mind, the mind’s object and the mind’s relation to its object were 
established. 
The discussion then proceeded to examine the “Reason” chapter of the PhG in 
which Hegel articulates further aspects of his dialectical explanation and critique of the 
existence of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition. Along with expressing an 
alienated form of consciousness in which one aspect of the mind or self falls into a 
relation of subservience to another aspect, as was established in Chapter Three, 
transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition also expresses a form of consciousness 
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which, in fact, shifts back and forth between the viewpoint of “lordly” transcendental 
apperception and that of “slavish” empirical consciousness. More precisely, 
transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition expresses a form of consciousness 
which has developed to the viewpoint of Reason, yet which has simultaneously 
“forgotten” the course of its own development and so repeatedly and unwittingly reverts 
to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception in its attempts, for instance, to address 
the philosophical problem of the objectivity of knowledge. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
1. Chapter Review 
The goal of this dissertation has been to explicate the general method by which 
Hegel not only critiques but explains the very existence of the multiplicity of 
philosophies. As discussed in the Introduction, the main motivating factor for pursuing 
this goal lies in the fact that, as Hegel discusses at length, the existence of a multiplicity 
of conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable philosophies threatens to render the entire 
philosophical enterprise futile. As also discussed in the Introduction, the urgency of this 
threat has only been increased in light of the spectacular credentials of modern science 
and technology. For, from the perspective of ordinary consciousness in the modern 
world, science is to be distinguished from philosophy precisely to the degree that it 
succeeds, while philosophy fails, in progressively overcoming initial disagreement and 
conflict to arrive what appears to be universal consensus. In order to respond to the 
challenge posed by this threat, the following efforts were taken. 
 In Chapter One, Hegel’s overall theory of development was analyzed. 
Establishing the basic elements of Hegel’s theory of development was essential. For, as 
was soon to be demonstrated, Hegel explains the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies 
in terms of the development of the mind. Yet, in order to understand how Hegel explains 
the development of the mind, it was first necessary to establish the basic principles of his 
overall theory of development. It was shown in this chapter that a large source for 
Hegel’s theory of development is Aristotle’s conception of the transition from potency to 
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act. The all-important biological analogy for understanding Hegel’s theory of 
development was also examined in detail. 
 Chapter Two initiated the examination of Hegel’s phenomenology of the 
development of the mind. The initial effort, then, was made to show how Hegel explains 
the emergence of the multiplicity of philosophies in terms of the dialectical development 
of the mind. Thus, it was shown, for instance, that the problematic skepticism/naïve 
realism adopted by Hegel’s contemporary, G.E. Schulze, could be explained to result 
from Schulze inhabiting and expressing the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. Chapter Two 
also provided an initial discussion of the “meta” quality of Hegel’s effort in the PhG. For, 
the viewpoint of Perception was shown to be the source of the naïve view of the history 
of philosophy as a mere agglomeration of mutually exclusive viewpoints. Yet, the 
transition from Perception to Force and Understanding provided rich suggestions as to 
how Hegel himself would reinterpret the history of philosophy as a dialectico-organic 
whole. 
 Chapter Three examined in minute detail how Hegel’s phenomenology of self-
consciousness provides essential aspects in his effort to explain the emergence of 
transcendental philosophy in the Kantian and Fichtean traditions. It was shown that, for 
Hegel, transcendental philosophy emerges inasmuch as one aspect of an individual self-
consciousness falls into a relation of subservience to another aspect. The various 
permutations of this dialectic of domination and servitude within self-consciousness were 
shown to give rise to several of the key elements in transcendental philosophy most 
notably of which would be the distinction between transcendental or absolute self-
consciousness, on the one hand, and empirical self-consciousness, on the other. 
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 Chapter Four added a new element to the examination of Hegel’s explanatory 
account of the multiplicity of philosophies. For, it showed how, in explaining the 
emergence of the various philosophies, Hegel thereby explains the various conceptions of 
objectivity operative therein. This analysis was applied in detail to Kant who was shown 
to manifest at least three different and often conflicting conceptions of objectivity. 
Through demonstrating this fact, however, certain of the more problematic details in Kant 
were provided, not simply with a critique, but with an explanation as to their very 
existence. 
 Thus, for Hegel, the multiplicity of philosophies is not a mere haphazard 
agglomeration of mutually incomprehensible and irreconcilable positions. Rather, all 
philosophies have as their core explanatory principle the dialectical development of the 
mind. To the extent that this is true, then philosophy is absolved of the charge of futility. 
For, true development can be discerned within the history of philosophy inasmuch as it 
manifests the successive efforts of the mind to develop and thereby come to know itself. 
Recognizing this fact, however, as Hegel would insist, nevertheless requires a great deal 
of philosophical development. 
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Appendix 
In response to corrections required from members of the dissertation panel the 
following appendix has been supplied. Generally speaking, the panel members wanted 
the dissertation to demonstrate more clearly the unique argument and contribution this 
dissertation is providing vis-à-vis other scholarly treatments of Hegel. In order to 
accomplish this task it was suggested that I clarify the position delineated in this 
dissertation by contrasting it with the work of Michael Forster in his book, Hegel’s Idea 
of a Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter Hegel’s Idea). Given its highly specific 
character, rather than attempt to integrate this critical discussion of Forster into the main 
body of the dissertation, it seemed more efficient simply to include it as an appendix. 
 The present appendix will accordingly proceed in the following manner. The first 
section will examine Forster’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the structure of 
consciousness. This section will show that Forster is misguided in his ascription to Hegel 
of a “representationalist” theory of consciousness. The second section will examine 
Forster’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. This section will show that Forster is 
misguided in his ascription to Hegel of an “enduring communal consensus” theory of 
truth. The third section will examine several weaknesses within Forster’s overall 
treatment of Hegel’s account of development, in general, and of the development of the 
mind, in particular. The fourth section will examine Forster’s discussion of the crucial 
question of the relation between the PhG to the history of philosophy and, therefore, to 
the history of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. This section will show that Forster’s 
interpretation of the relation between the PhG and the history of philosophy is misguided. 
The fifth section will turn to showing how the core analyses and arguments of this 
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dissertation provide a better means for understanding the relation between the PhG and 
the history of philosophy, including the history of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. 
The sixth, and final, section will attempt to recover an aspect of Forster’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s theory of truth; doing so will also help illustrate Hegel’s ultimate view of how 
the problem of philosophical multiplicity and conflict is to be resolved. 
1. Forster on Hegel’s Theory of the Structure of Consciousness 
 According to Forster, in his account of the structure of consciousness, Hegel 
presupposes the theory of his predecessors Kant, Reinhold and Fichte. As Forster states, 
According to this theory, all consciousness essentially includes three 
interdependent elements: consciousness of consciousness itself, or of the self, as 
such; consciousness of something other than oneself, or of an object; and 
consciousness of one’s representation of this other something or objects as such 
(Hegel’s Idea 116-7). 
Forster states further that Hegel takes this theory of the structure of consciousness 
“somewhat for granted” due, at least in part, to its “widespread acceptance by his 
immediate predecessors” (Hegel’s Idea 117). An examination of Hegel’s texts, especially 
in light of what has been covered thus far in the present dissertation, demonstrably shows, 
however, that Forster’s ascription of such a theory of consciousness to Hegel as well as 
Forster’s rather perfunctory explanation as to why Hegel would have chosen to adopt it is 
misguided. 
 To begin with, the account of the structure of consciousness laid out by Forster is 
to be found nowhere in Hegel’s texts except in the instances in which Hegel dialectically 
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explains and critiques it. In order to begin establishing this point, let us examine the first 
passage from Hegel which Forster enlists in support of his interpretation: 
Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, 
consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and 
consciousness of its knowledge of the truth […] But the distinction between the 
in-itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness 
knows an object at all. Something is for it the in-itself; and knowledge, or the 
being of the object for consciousness, is, for it, another moment (PhG 54). 
In his rendering of this passage Forster translates the German term, Wissen, as 
“cognition”, whereas Miller translates it as “knowledge”. More importantly, however, 
Forster forcibly inserts the term “representation” in brackets immediately following the 
first usage of the term Wissen as if to indicate that, for Hegel, knowledge or cognition is 
equivalent to “representation”. 
 The first thing to note is that the German term which is typically translated as 
“representation”, namely, Vorstellung, is nowhere to be found in the present passage or in 
any other relevant instance in the entirety of Hegel’s corpus in which Hegel is discussing 
his own mature view of either consciousness or knowledge. This fact is not merely an 
accident which Forster’s insertion helps to ameliorate. It is rather grounded in Hegel’s 
radically critical view of the “representationalist” theories of consciousness and 
knowledge which were, indeed, to varying degrees, shared by many of his predecessors. 
Before examining the details of Hegel’s dialectical explanation and critique of 
representationalist theories of consciousness, let us first establish more clearly the basic 
elements of Hegel’s own theory.  
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1.1 Hegel’s Theory of the Structure of Consciousness 
 A first approximation to Hegel’s theory of consciousness is supplied by a passage 
from slightly earlier in the Introduction to the PhG in which Hegel states: 
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the 
same time relates itself to it, or as it is said, this something exists for 
consciousness, and the determinate aspect of this relating or of the being of 
something for a consciousness, is knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-
another from a being-in-itself; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is 
also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship; this 
being-in-itself is called truth. Just what might be involved in these determinations 
is of no further concern to us here. Since our object is phenomenal knowledge, its 
determinations too will at first be taken directly as they present themselves; and 
they do present themselves very much as we have already apprehended them. 
(PhG 52-3)  
On Hegel’s account, then, consciousness, or the mind, is self-differentiating.267 Like the 
plant, the mind posits a fruit or object for itself. Insofar as it posits such an object, the 
mind forms a relation to that object. Thus, there are three crucial elements in Hegel’s 
                                                          
267 It should be noted that Hegel is not always clear and consistent in specifying the nature of the 
relationship of the mind [Geist] to consciousness [Bewusstsein]. This point is evident, for example, in the 
fact that the Phenomenology of Spirit or Mind is a phenomenology of the various shapes or forms of 
consciousness. Consciousness, for Hegel, then, can take on more than one meaning depending upon the 
context. Thus, at times, consciousness takes on a generic sense in which forms of consciousness just are 
forms of the mind, whereas at other times, consciousness takes on a more specific sense in which it is 
restricted to one stage in the overall development of the mind, a stage, however, which includes three sub-
stages or forms, namely, Sense-certainty, Perception and Force and Understanding. In similar fashion, spirit 
or mind is both the subject of the entire PhG and restricted to the last chapter. As such, it often simplifies 
matters to treat Hegel’s discussion of especially the generic sense of consciousness as a discussion of the 
mind, even though mind itself, for Hegel, is an even more generic category – indeed, the most generic but 
also the most specific of categories.  
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basic theory of the structure of consciousness or the mind. These elements, however, are 
not those identified by Forster in his account. According to Forster, the three elements 
constitutive of Hegel’s theory of the structure of the mind are: 1) the mind, or 
consciousness, 2) the mind’s object and 3) the mind’s representation of that object 
(Hegel’s Idea 116-7). In point of fact, however, the three elements which are actually 
constitutive of Hegel’s theory of the structure of the mind are: 1) the mind, or 
consciousness, 2) the mind’s object and 3) the mind’s relation to that object.268  
Important to note is that Hegel distinguishes between, on the one hand, the 
relation between the mind and its object which actually obtains in-itself or for us, the 
phenomenological observers, and, on the other hand, the relation as it merely appears for 
the form of the mind under investigation. The fact that Forster makes absolutely no use of 
this crucial methodological distinction would help explain the misguidedness of his 
interpretation. For, as discussed at length in Chapter Four of this dissertation, according 
to Hegel, the mind will determine itself, its object and the nature of the relation between 
itself and its object according to the level of development it has reached (PhG 141-2). 
The relation between the mind and its object is in-itself or for us, the phenomenological 
observer, always one of identity. True, until the final moment of its development, the 
identity between the mind and its object is only partial. That partiality, however, is not 
based upon the fact that up until the final moment there was a “representation”, as it 
were, “between” the mind and its object precluding such perfect identity. Rather, as will 
be discussed below in the critique of Forster’s interpretation of Hegel conception of truth, 
                                                          
268 Cf. Hegel: “In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited consciousness in its movement from the 
first immediate opposition of itself and the object of absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes 
through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object and has the Concept of science for its 
result” (Emphases mine; SL 48). 
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the lack of identity consists in the fact that the object posited by the mind is not yet 
adequate to the mind itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has not yet become 
fully actual.  
The reason why it is especially important to note in this context that the mind 
determines its relation to its object according to the level of development is that the mind 
can, indeed, thus take or determine itself to relate to its object by way of some kind of 
“representation”. Yet, such a self-taking or self-interpretation will prove to be the result 
of the mind’s having forgotten itself and the history of its own development. It will not, 
in other words, express the basic structure of consciousness or the mind as such, 
according to Hegel. 
It should be further added that, in point of fact, the account of the structure of the 
mind just provided in the above passage does not correspond precisely to Hegel’s own 
theory, at least not in terms some of the details. Rather, there are elements contained in 
that passage which, as Hegel states, correspond to how things present themselves to 
merely phenomenal consciousness or knowledge. By qualifying his comments with 
clauses such as “as it is said” [wie diß ausgedrückt wird] and “[b]ut we distinguish” 
[unterscheiden wir], Hegel provides an indication as to which parts of his analysis in 
particular correspond to the viewpoint of mere phenomenal consciousness versus which 
would correspond to the viewpoint of us, the phenomenologists.269  
                                                          
269 It is clear both from the context and from what is said elsewhere in the PhG as well as other works of 
Hegel’s corpus (which will be presently discussed) that the “we” referred to here is not the “we” of the 
community of phenomenological observers, but of the community of ordinary consciousness. In other 
words, Hegel is saying that “we typically” or “as a matter of (naïve) course” posit an object existing outside 
any relationship to the mind. Yet, as has been established repeatedly throughout this dissertation, for Hegel, 
there is ultimately no object which exists “outside” consciousness or the mind. 
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Thus, on Hegel’s account, the mind is a self-differentiating totality in which there 
are three moments: the mind, its object and the mind’s relation to its object. Still, “it is 
said” that the object or the in-itself exists “outside” of this relation. Yet, as has been 
established throughout the course of this dissertation, for Hegel, nothing exists “outside” 
of or independently of its relation to consciousness or the mind. Indeed, in order to 
confirm this point, we need only look later on the same page of the previous passage in 
which Hegel states, “But the essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole 
investigation is that these two moments, ‘Concept’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and 
‘being-in-itself’, both fall within that knowledge which we are investigating” (PhG 53). 
Consciousness or the mind distinguishes its object from itself, yet it simultaneously 
preserves the object within itself.270 Thus, there is no object existing “out there”, perhaps 
lurking behind or apart from our “representation” of it. 
1.1.1 Example of the Meno 
 A useful example for examining this general point can be found in the famous 
Paradox of Learning in the Meno. For, first of all, despite its seeming skeptical 
sophistication, the paradox can be shown to be grounded in the naïve presupposition that 
knowledge must consist in some kind of comparison between our “representations” “in 
here” and objects “out there”. Secondly, the speculative response to this paradox supplied 
by Socrates is precisely that taken up by Hegel, provided that we acknowledge the 
intervening mediation of Aristotle. 
                                                          
270 Cf. Hegel on the structure of consciousness in the PM: “I is itself and extends over the object as an 
object implicitly sublated, I is one side of the relationship and the whole of the relationship” (142). 
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 In the dialogue Socrates articulates the paradox which Meno initially sets forth 
thusly: 
Do you realize [Meno] what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man 
cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot 
search for what he knows – since he knows it, there is no need to search – nor for 
what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. (80e) 
The source of this paradox is precisely the “representationalist” view of knowledge which 
Forster ascribes to Hegel. For, on the representationalist view of knowledge in which 
consciousness consists of the three elements “consciousness”, “representation” and 
“object”, it is impossible to learn anything. Either one already has the “representation” of 
the object, in which case it would be pointless to search for the object since one already 
knows it, or one lacks the representation of the object, in which case it would be 
impossible to know whether or not one had found what one was searching for. 
 Socrates’ solution to this problem is the speculative one in which knowledge is 
conceived to be, not a matter of comparing our “representations” “in here” with “objects” 
“out there” and then seeing whether or not they “correspond”, but rather a kind of self-
mediation which he calls “recollection” [Anamnesis]. Aristotle appropriates this notion of 
knowledge as self-mediation but sublates it into his larger explanatory theory of 
development of potency and act. Thus, with respect to the doctrine of Anamnesis, 
Aristotle states, “It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of the forms’, though this 
description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially” 
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(429a27-29).271 Hegel, in turn, explicitly appropriates this aspect of Aristotle’s sublation 
of Plato and sublates it into his own theory of knowledge as self-mediation: 
The claim in the Platonic philosophy that we remember the Ideas means that Ideas 
are implicitly in the human mind and are not (as the Sophists maintained) 
something alien that comes to mind from the outside. In any case, this 
interpretation of cognition as ‘reminiscence’ does not exclude the development of 
what is implicit in the human mind, and this development is nothing but mediation 
(EL 116). 
For Aristotle and Hegel, knowledge is not a matter of determining whether or not 
“representations” “in here” correspond to “objects” “out there”; rather, it is an ontological 
perfection (energeia) of the knower. 
1.2 Hegel’s Critique of the Viewpoint of Representation 
 Having clarified the basic structure of consciousness according to Hegel, it would 
be worth examining a few aspects of Hegel’s critical treatment of the viewpoint of 
Representation in order to drive home the point about the misguidedness of Forster’s 
interpretation. Let us, then, examine Hegel’s critical appraisal of the viewpoint of 
Representation in the PhG and then complement that examination by drawing on Hegel’s 
discussion of the viewpoint of Representation in the Philosophy of Mind. For, it is 
precisely the viewpoint of Representation which, according to Hegel, finds it so difficult 
to conceive of a relationship such as that constitutive of the mind itself in relation to its 
                                                          
271 Hegel has no patience for the orthodox or otherwise traditional interpretation that Aristotle, as it were, 
reverts from the speculative view of knowledge as self-mediation to the “common sense” “realist” or 
“empiricist” viewpoint according to which knowledge is a matter of “representations” “in here” being 
“caused” “in” us through the passive “reception” in sensation of the effects of objects “out there”. Cf. p. 66 
and note 82 above. 
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object in which a difference is posited only to be sublated into a higher unity or identity. 
As such, it may be possible to attribute Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s position on 
consciousness to the fact that Forster is himself viewing it from something like the 
viewpoint of Representation.  
In the PhG as well as preceding and subsequent works, Hegel will often rely on a 
shorthand method or schema for identifying viewpoints that fall short of his own 
speculative or absolute viewpoint. Among the most common of these lesser viewpoints 
would be that of Representation.272 The relationship between the more generic viewpoint, 
Representation, and that of the more specific forms of the mind delineated in the PhG is 
never worked out by Hegel in detail.273 Still, the basic contours of what Hegel means by 
the viewpoint of Representation in the PhG can be specified without undue strain. 
 In terms of what Hegel means by the viewpoint of Representation, Miller’s often 
disputed but not entirely inapt translation of the term “Vorstellung” as “picture-thinking” 
provides a first approximation. For, despite its weaknesses, what Miller’s translation 
captures is the fact that the viewpoint of Representation is essentially restricted to the 
realm of the sensuous or imaginable. This point is important because, from the viewpoint 
of sensation or imagination, if two things are distinct then they must be “outside” one 
another.274 In other words, it is impossible to sense or to imagine the unity-in-difference, 
                                                          
272 Another would be the viewpoint of Understanding [Verstand]. The precise nature of the relationship of 
the viewpoint of Understanding discussed, for example, in such early works as the DZ, to the one 
delineated in the Force and Understanding chapter of the PhG is likewise nowhere worked out in detail in 
Hegel’s corpus. Suffice it to say, there are certainly superficial similarities but also potential notable 
differences, the parsing of which, however, extends beyond the scope of the present dissertation. 
273 In general, Representation as a viewpoint most closely approximates to Perception. Hence, in the 
“Psychology” section of the PM, Representation follows Intuition, just as in the “Phenomenology” section 
of the PM, Perception follows Sense-certainty. Also, at times, Hegel will simply run together the 
viewpoints of Representation and Perception. Cf. LHP I 122. 
274 Cf. PhG 46, 120, 210. As discussed at length in Chapter One, spatial prepositions such as “inside” and 
“outside”, or “internal” and “external”, are distinctly misleading when dealing with the relation between 
356 
 
 
or speculative identity, according to which consciousness, or the mind, is ultimately 
related to its object.275  
Thus, for the viewpoint of Representation, insofar as the mind’s object is posited 
as distinct from the mind then the former must be “outside” the later. It is this fact, 
moreover, which actually gives rise to the seeming obviousness of conceiving the 
fundamental task of epistemology to be that of solving the Problem of the Bridge, that is 
to say, “justifying the belief” that the representations we have “in here” correspond to 
objects-in-themselves “out there” in the “world”.  
Thus, in the Introduction to the PhG, Hegel famously criticizes the naiveté of 
such putatively critical philosophies of Representation as Kant’s which take as their basic 
point of departure the epistemological task of the Problem of the Bridge. According to 
Hegel, these philosophies engage in the futile attempt to determine the nature of the 
instrument by which our “representations” of objects existing “out there” are generated 
“in here” – that is to say, “in” the mind – in order thereby to subtract the effect which our 
faculty of cognition or “representation”, has upon the object-in-itself “out there”, in 
order, in turn, to provide for consciousness a (doomed to fail) “representation” of the 
object-in-itself in its purity.276 Thus, for Hegel, the very notion that the basic structure of 
                                                          
mind and its object, or knower and known. Thus, we can now see that it is due to the prevalence of the 
viewpoint of Representation and related viewpoints like Perception that there is such a tendency naively to 
employ such prepositions in order to explicate the knowledge-relation. 
275 Cf. Hegel on the inability of the viewpoint of Representation to deal speculatively with concrete relation 
of unity-in-difference characteristic of the mind: “The concrete is not conceived of speculatively, but is 
simply taken from ordinary ideas inasmuch as it is expressed in accordance with their forms of 
representation and of perception” (LHP I 122). 
276 Cf. Hegel:  “It would seem, to be sure, that this evil could be remedied through an acquaintance with the 
way in which the instrument [i.e. the “faculty” of cognition or representation “in” the mind] works; for this 
would enable us to eliminate from the representation [Vorstellung] of the absolute [i.e. object-in-itself “out 
there”] which we have gained through it whatever is due to the instrument. But this ‘improvement’ would 
in fact only bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a reshaped thing what the 
instrument has done to it, then the thing – here the Absolute – becomes for us exactly what it was before 
this superfluous effort” (PhG 46-7). 
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consciousness entails a “representation” of the “object” which is distinct from the object-
in-itself is hardly a basic or normative account of its structure but rather simply expresses 
the impoverished viewpoint of Representation itself. 
1.2.1 Hegel’s Critique of the Viewpoint of Representation in the Philosophy of Mind 
Regarding Hegel’s discussion of the viewpoint of Representation in the PM, it 
should be immediately noted that the representations discussed there are not the 
representations of some further object distinct from the representations. Rather, the 
representations are the object. The problem with the viewpoint of Representation in this 
case is not that it is perhaps unable to “justify belief” in the correspondence between its 
representations and the objects-in-themselves. Rather, a representation as such constitutes 
a not-fully-developed or actualized object of the mind. For, representations as such are 
still conditioned by a sensuous material or intuition which the mind treats as “found” or 
“given” by the object-in-itself “out there” and which thus has not been reduced to a mere 
moment of the mind itself. As Hegel states:  
But as representing begins from the intuition and the ready-found material of 
intuition, this activity is still burdened with this difference, and its concrete 
productions within it are still syntheses which become the concrete immanence of 
the concept only in thinking (POM 185).  
Again, the object of the viewpoint of Representation is the representation. Still, because 
the viewpoint of Representation has not reduced the sensuous material of intuition to a 
moment of the mind, it relates to that material as coming from an object “out there”.277 
                                                          
277 The ultimate reason why the mind treats the sensuous material of intuition as “found” or otherwise 
deriving from the object-in-itself “out there” is that it has forgotten that it, in fact, posited this very 
sensuousness in the course of its own development. As will be discussed below, however, Forster entirely 
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As a result, it can only conceive of its own activity, not as a process of self-differentiation 
and self-mediation, but as the production of syntheses among the various manifolds of 
intuition whose ultimate source is another object “external” to the mind. 
 On the whole, then, Hegel’s view of the viewpoint of Representation and the 
representationalist theory of the structure of consciousness to which it gives rise is far 
from that indicated by Forster. According to Forster, Hegel simply takes up the 
representationalist theory of consciousness because it was popular and happened to be 
laying around.278 As it is, however, Hegel not only heavily criticizes this view of 
consciousness, but, going beyond Socrates’ skeptical critique of this view, explains how 
it comes into existence in the first place, namely, as the expression of the mind at a 
certain lesser stage of its development. The fact that Forster would take this to be Hegel’s 
position and then supply what he takes to be “quite a forceful argument” on behalf of it 
suggests that it is Forster himself who is operating within something like the viewpoint of 
Representation in interpreting Hegel. 
2. Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Truth 
 Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of the structure of consciousness, or 
the mind, has important implications for his misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. 
According to Forster, Hegel rejects the correspondence theory of truth in favor of what 
Forster calls an “enduring communal consensus” theory. It will be necessary first briefly 
                                                          
neglects the crucial methodological role that this forgetting of its own activity and development on the part 
of the mind plays in Hegel’s phenomenology of the mind’s self-mediation. 
278 Recall that it is Hegel who routinely lambasts Kant for simply taking up the naïve psychology of Locke 
and Hume as well as the categories as he found them, as it were, laying around. Cf. Hegel: “We are all well 
aware that Kant’s philosophy took the easy way in its finding of the categories” (EL 85). Cf. p. 294, 
footnote 252, above.   
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to unpack what Forster seems to intend by this notion of “enduring communal consensus” 
as well as his reasons for ascribing it to Hegel. It will then be possible to demonstrate 
more clearly the misguidedness of Forster’s interpretation. 
 According to Forster, Hegel’s theory of truth would 
[P]artially reconceive/reconceptualize “truth,” dropping the offending idea that 
truth consists in the correspondence of representations to independent facts, and 
instead substituting for this the idea that it consists in representations being agreed 
upon by an enduring communal consensus (and falsehood in their failure to be 
agreed upon by such a consensus). (Hegel’s Idea 233) 
Forster is right that Hegel rejects the naïve conception of truth as a correspondence 
between “representations” that are “in here” with objects or “independent facts” which 
are “out there”. Indeed, he not only rejects it, but explains how it comes into existence. 
However, likely due in part to his misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of consciousness, 
Forster does not seem to appreciate that Hegel’s theory of truth would eschew reference 
to the term “representation” altogether. 
 As stated, according to Forster, Hegel maintains that truth consists in 
“representations being agreed upon by an enduring communal consensus”. The support 
that Forster actually marshals in favor of this interpretation in terms of direct evidence 
drawn from Hegel’s texts is scanty at best. It will therefore be helpful to note the broader 
context from which Forster is arguing in order to make sense of his decision to proffer 
such an interpretation. 
In both Hegel’s Idea as well as his earlier work, Hegel and Skepticism, Forster 
emphasizes the role of skepticism, especially ancient skepticism, in shaping the very 
360 
 
 
essence of Hegel’s overall project. Thus, according to Forster, despite the fact that Hegel 
himself supposedly subscribes to a representationalist theory of consciousness, the PhG, 
at least from the viewpoint of Consciousness up through the viewpoint of the Spiritual 
Animalkingdom section of the Reason chapter, provides a series of skeptical paradoxes 
the ultimate upshot of which is to show that there is no “coherent way of articulating a 
conception of representations standing over against independent facts” (Hegel’s Idea 
236). According to Forster, the culminating instance of this skeptical critique of the 
correspondence theory of truth occurs when Hegel shows that consciousness reaches a 
stage at which “objective reality […] is a moment which itself no longer possesses any 
truth on its own account” (PhG 245). The lesson Forster draws from this statement is 
that, for Hegel, insofar as objective reality no longer possesses any truth for 
consciousness, then it would seem that the very notion of truth as a correspondence 
between our “representations” and the “objects-in-themselves out there” is no longer 
possible since “objects-in-themselves” or “objective reality” no longer possesses any 
truth for the mind. Thus, Hegel apparently demonstrates that maintaining such a 
correspondence theory of truth necessarily results in a final skeptical paradox according 
to which “there is no such thing as truth” (Hegel’s Idea 236). 
 In response to this apparent skeptical paradox or impasse, Hegel offers, according 
to Forster, a “skeptical solution” according to which truth would consist in an “enduring 
communal consensus”. The main passage from the PhG which Forster cites in support of 
his claim runs as follows: 
Reality therefore has for consciousness only the value of a being … whose 
universality is one with the action [of consciousness]. This unity is the true 
361 
 
 
product; it is the matter itself, which simply maintains itself in being asserted and 
is experienced as something which endures, independently of the matter which is 
the contingency of the individual action as such …The matter itself is thus an 
expression of spiritual essentiality, in which all … moments are sublated as 
autonomous, and so are only valid qua universal, and in which consciousness’s 
certainty of itself is …the object born of self-consciousness as its own, but 
without ceasing to be a free, real object. (Hegel’s Idea 236-7) 
It should be noted  that Forster states that in paragraph 418 of the PhG Hegel glosses the 
term “spiritual essentiality” [geistige Wesenheit] mentioned in the above passage as “the 
action of the single individual and of all individuals, … the action of each and everyone” 
(Hegel’s Idea 237). Thus, Forster finds evidence for his interpretation of Hegel’s theory 
of truth in Hegel’s apparent view that “the matter itself” [die Sache selbst] consists in an 
expression of spiritual essentiality which itself consists in the action of all individuals. In 
other words, for Hegel, truth, or “the matter itself”, now seemingly just is what is 
expressed, and thus agreed upon, by the community as a whole. As such, truth would 
seem not to consist in the agreement or correspondence between our “representations” 
and “objects”, but instead in “representations” being agreed upon by an “enduring 
communal consensus”. Unfortunately, Forster’s interpretation does not hold up upon a 
close examination of the relevant texts. 
 Before examining the problematic aspects of Forster’s interpretation of the PhG 
and the theory of truth which he purports to find there, however, it would be useful to 
note a brief auxiliary point. For, notice, Socrates already articulated what might be 
considered the definitive skeptical paradox which afflicts the viewpoint of Representation 
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along with its naïve correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, Hegel appropriates, by 
way of Aristotle and in sublated form, the very theory of truth and knowledge which 
Socrates proposes as a response to this paradox. Thus, Forster fails adequately to identify 
Hegel’s peculiar contribution to this whole discussion, which is that Hegel not only 
critiques the naïve representationalist correspondence view of truth, but he explains how 
it comes into existence in the first place. This point is worth noting because it is part and 
parcel of Hegel’s effort to show that the various and conflicting philosophies (e.g. of 
knowledge and truth) do not emerge simply haphazardly and with no intelligible relation 
to one another but rather have an explanatory ground in the polymorphism of the mind. 
Yet, as will be discussed again below, Forster never articulates this central point with 
sufficient clarity and precision. 
2.1 Critique of Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Truth 
To return to Forster’s discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth, Forster’s 
interpretation of the passage in which Hegel says “[O]bjective reality […] is a moment 
which itself no longer possesses any truth on its own account in this consciousness” is 
misguided. According to Forster, what this passage expresses is that the form of 
consciousness operative within the viewpoint of “Reason” has reached a level of 
development for which there no longer exists an objective reality distinct from its own 
“representations”. Previous forms of consciousness presupposed such a distinction and, 
on Forster’s reading, the dialectic of the entire PhG up to this point has unfolded as a 
“serial critique” in which has Hegel demonstrated that ultimately there is “no coherent 
way of articulating a conception of representations standing over against independent 
facts” and that, therefore, there is no coherent way in which to articulate, much less 
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defend, a “correspondence” theory of truth (Hegel’s Idea 236). Thus, for Forster, The 
Spiritual Animalkingdom subsection of Reason marks a radical shift in the entire 
trajectory of the PhG. For, at this stage, not only in-itself, but for consciousness or the 
mind, as such, the correspondence theory of truth has been jettisoned in favor of an 
enduring communal consensus theory. 
 Hegel’s point, however, in stating that “objective reality” is a moment which no 
longer possesses any truth on its own account for Reason at this stage is far from what 
Forster contends. To begin with, it must be immediately noted that we have already 
passed through a similar stage in Self-consciousness. For, Self-consciousness recognizes 
that “being” or “objective reality” is but a moment of Self-consciousness itself and, as 
such, “being” or “objective reality” does not possess any truth on its own account. That 
does not mean, however, that Self-consciousness ceases to have an object; rather, the 
object has become Self-consciousness itself.  
 Yet, there is a further element to this story which – ironically – Forster forgets. 
For, despite the fact that, in-itself, “being” or “objective reality” has been reduced to a 
mere moment of Self-consciousness as a result of its prior development in 
Consciousness, Self-consciousness nevertheless forgets this fact and, as a result, relates 
to the Self-consciousness which it itself is as another Self-consciousness existing “out 
there” in “objective reality”. As a result, there emerged within Self-consciousness the 
distinction between abstract Self-consciousness which reflects out of the world of 
“objective reality”, on the one hand, and the Self-consciousness which is coincident with 
such reality, or Life, on the other. The history of the development of Self-consciousness, 
then, is the dialectic between these two moments of Self-consciousness itself. 
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 Next, it must be noted that a similar dialect unfolds in the case of Reason; in fact, 
it does so more than once. For, recall that, generically, Reason is the viewpoint which is 
confident that it will find only itself in its object. Thus, in Observing Reason, Reason is 
confident that it will find itself within the “objective reality” of the sensuous existence 
which in Self-consciousness confronts it as an other.  
Still, despite having reached the viewpoint of Reason, a certain recapitulation of 
the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception takes place on the level of Reason as it 
first comes on the scene. For, as we know, Reason when it first comes on the scene 
reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Yet, such immediate Reason 
is also, of course, Reason, and Reason knows, at least implicitly or in-itself, that its object 
will simply be itself. Thus, Hegel states, 
[Immediate Reason] reverted from self-consciousness to consciousness, i.e. to the 
consciousness for which the object is something which merely is, a Thing; but 
here, what is a Thing is self-consciousness; the Thing is, therefore, the unity of ‘I’ 
and being – the category. The object being determined thus for consciousness, the 
latter possesses Reason. (PhG 208) 
For both Perception and immediate or Observing Reason, its object is a Thing existing 
“out there”. The difference, however, is that Observing Reason’s object is a new object, 
namely, the category, which, in-itself or for us, the phenomenologists, just is Reason 
itself. 
 The problem with Observing Reason is thus that despite the fact that it has 
produced its object – i.e. through rational observation, modern scientific technique, etc. – 
it forgets this very activity and, therefore, like Perception, relates to its object as 
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something found “out there” (PhG 209). As Hegel states, “The pure category, which is 
present for consciousness [at this stage] in the form of being or immediacy, is the object 
as still unmediated, as merely given, and consciousness is equally unmediated in its 
relation to it”279 (PhG 209). In Observing Reason, as revealed through its confidence that 
it will find nothing but itself in its object, “objectively reality” or being “out there” has 
been reduced to a mere moment of Reason itself, and thus does not possess any truth for 
Reason. Still, despite this implicit confidence that it will only find itself in its object – 
hence, its active observation and experimentation upon its object – Observing Reason 
nevertheless explicitly treats its object as ultimately something found “out there” in the 
“world”. It will remain for the ensuing form of consciousness to objectify and thereby 
“recollect” the very activity of Reason itself. 
 The viewpoint which at first takes up the task of more fully objectifying for 
Reason its own activity is that of “Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be Real In and 
For Itself” along with its subsection, The Spiritual Animalkingdom, the latter of which 
Forster claims marks the definitive break within the PhG in terms of the mind’s explicit 
conception of truth. Again, Forster’s claim is that since by the time we reach The 
Spiritual Animalkindgom the moment of “objective reality” no longer possesses any truth 
on its own account, consciousness or the mind, at this stage no longer has an object to 
which a “representation” could possibly correspond. As a result, the very notion of truth 
as “correspondence” between “representations” and “objects” has ceased to be operative 
                                                          
279 The target of this analysis is, among others, clearly Kant. For, as was noted above, Hegel heavily 
criticizes Kant for merely “finding” the categories constituted by modern science already “in” the 
transcendental ego qua “theoretical”, just as he merely finds the categorical imperative already “in” the 
transcendental ego qua “practical”. For Hegel, there is a prior task of showing how these various categories 
emerge, just as there is prior task of showing how the various philosophies (with, for example, their distinct 
category of categories, or concept of concepts) emerge. 
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now and within all subsequent forms of the mind to be treated in the PhG. But this is not 
at all what is happening at this stage of the PhG. 
 To begin with, although “objective reality” or “being” that is “out there” has been 
reduced to a moment of Reason and thus has ceased to possess any truth on its own 
account for the mind, Reason still has an object. At this stage, the object of Reason is 
rational action itself. Thus, in The Spiritual Animalkingdom, Hegel provides a 
phenomenology of the rational activity which is the object of Reason and which is, in 
fact, coincident with Reason. As Hegel states, 
Action is present at first in the form of object, an object, too as pertaining to 
consciousness, as End and hence opposed to a reality already given. The second 
moment is the movement of the End conceived as passive, and realization 
conceived as the relation of the End to the wholly formal actuality, hence the idea 
of the transition itself, or the means. The third moment is, finally, the object, 
which is not longer in the form of an end directly known by the agent to be his 
own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the form of an 
‘other’. (PhG 239) 
The object of Reason at this stage is thus a complex object composed of three elements: 
the end, the means by which the end is achieved and the achieved end itself.  
In- itself, or implicitly, rational action is not a means by which Reason, as it were, 
acts upon some “objective reality” “out there”; rather, rational action is a process of the 
self-mediation and self-development of Reason itself. As Hegel states, in the case of 
rational action, “objective reality” or the “limitation of being […] cannot limit the action 
of [rational] consciousness, for here consciousness is a relation purely of itself to itself: 
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relation to an other which would be a limitation of it, has been eliminated” (PhG 238). 
The fact that in rational action Reason is not related to an “objective reality” or being 
“out there” therefore does not entail that it has no object. Rather, its object is the complex 
object that just is rational action itself. 
 Importantly, there is an ambiguity built into the very phenomenology of action 
which sets the stage for another dialectic in which the mind forgets its own activity and, 
as a result, re-confronts its object – which just is itself – as something once again external 
or existing in “objective reality”. For, as was noted, the third element of action is the 
achieved work. According to Hegel, the mind at the stage of Reason “withdraws from its 
work” because it, the mind, is the “universal consciousness” while the work, despite 
being an objectification of the mind itself, nevertheless is “determinate or particular” 
(PhG 243). In other words, rational mind is the universal power of thinking; yet, every 
action qua achieved work is particular. As such, these two elements – indeterminate, 
universal rational mind and its particular, determinate action – find themselves opposed. 
The subsequent paragraphs of “The Spiritual Animalkingdom” are dedicated to working 
out these dialectically opposed aspects of rational action. 
 According to Forster, the ultimate upshot of Hegel’s phenomenology between the 
universal and particular aspects of rational action is that truth is revealed to be, not the 
correspondence between “representations” and “objective reality”, but an enduring 
communal consensus. Again, he cites the passage in which Hegel states that the nature of 
“matter in hand” [die Sache selbst] is such that “its being is the action of the single 
individual and of all individuals and whose action is immediately for others, or is a 
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‘matter in hand’ and is such only as the action of each and everyone” (PhG 251-2). 
Hegel’s point at this stage, however, is far from what Forster contends. 
 For, it is not that there is no longer any object for consciousness. Indeed, the 
“matter in hand” is precisely this object. It is an object, however, which is a sublation of 
the universal and particular elements of rational action. Thus, Hegel states, 
The ‘matter in hand’ […] is rather substance permeated by individuality, subject 
in which there is individuality just as much qua individual, or qua this particular 
individual, as qua all individuals; and it is the universal which has being only as 
this action of all and each, and a reality in the fact that this particular 
consciousness knows it to be its own individual reality and the reality of all. The 
pure ‘matter in hand’ itself is what was defined above as the ‘category’, being that 
is the ‘I’ or the ‘I’ that is being, but in the form of thought which is still 
distinguished from actual self-consciousness. Here, however, the moments of 
actual self-consciousness insofar as we call them its content (purpose, action, and 
reality), and also insofar as we call them its form (being-for-self and being-for-
another), are posited as one with the simply category itself, and the category is at 
the same time the entire content. (PhG 252) 
In rational action, the particular individual ultimately recognizes that its object is that 
towards which all rational individuals act; it is a universal end. In Observing Reason, the 
activity of Reason and its object (i.e. the universal category), while implicitly identical, 
were nevertheless experienced by the mind for-itself as opposed elements. However, 
when rational activity is itself objectified, Reason eventually recognizes that its particular 
action is in fact a universal action, that the ‘matter in hand’ or the thing-in-itself is that 
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which is produced through the rational activity of all rational individuals and, as such, is 
universal. Truth, then, at this stage is the coincidence or correspondence of actual self-
consciousness with the category or “matter in hand”.280  
 Needless to say, this coincidence or correspondence between consciousness or the 
mind and its object at this stage of development will prove to be only partial and, 
therefore, will be found to possess a hitherto unsublated element. Hence, the dialectic 
between consciousness, or the mind, and its object will continue until their perfect, 
sublated identity or correspondence is achieved and the True becomes self-conscious, or 
substance corresponds to subject. 
2.1.1 Further Solidification of the Critique of Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s 
Theory of Truth 
 In order to solidify the forgoing critique of Forster, it will be useful to recall the 
many instances in which Hegel states explicitly that truth is the correspondence or 
adequation of the mind and its object as well as clarify the peculiar sense that Hegel 
intends for this formulation of truth. Here is a partial list: 
“Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality” (EPR, 53); 
“What is required by the definition of truth, namely, the agreement of the Concept 
and its object (SL, 595); the definition of truth as agreement of cognition with its 
object is “a definition of great, indeed of supreme, value” (SL, 593); “The Idea is 
what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity” (EL, 
                                                          
280 Cf. Hegel in the immediately follow section of the PhG: “The category is in itself, or implicit, as the 
universal of pure consciousness; it is equally for itself or explicit, for the self of consciousness is equally a 
moment of it. It is absolute being, for that universality is the simply self-identity [or “correspondence”] of 
being. Thus what is object for consciousness has the significance of being the True” (252-3).  
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286); “Only when we consider mind in this process of the self-actualization of its 
concept, do we know it in its truth (for truth just means agreement of the concept 
with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind is not yet true, has not yet made its 
concept an object for itself, has not yet transformed what is present in it in an 
immediate way, into something posited by itself, has not yet converted its 
actuality into an actuality appropriate to its concept” [Emphases mine] (PM, 7). 
It is telling that Forster cites the following passage from the EL in which Hegel rejects the 
naïve representationalist correspondence theory of truth: “In the ordinary way, what we 
call ‘truth’ is the agreement of an ob-ject with our representation. We are then 
presupposing an ob-ject to which our representation is supposed to conform” (60; cited in 
Hegel’s Idea 234). For, Forster then proceeds to entirely neglect the immediately 
succeeding passage of the EL in which Hegel affirms his own speculative correspondence 
theory of truth: “In the philosophical sense, on the contrary, ‘truth,’ expressed abstractly 
and in general, means agreement of the a content with itself. This is therefore a meaning 
of ‘truth’ quite different from the one mentioned above” (EL 60). Thus, the problem with 
ordinary consciousness is not that it maintains a correspondence theory of truth; rather, 
the problem lies in the fact that it naively posits an object distinct from its 
“representations” and therefore is driven to conceive of the basic epistemological 
problem as the Problem of the Bridge.281  
                                                          
281 Cf. Hegel’s later statement in the same section of the EL: “God alone is the genuine agreement between 
Concept and reality; all finite things, however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their 
existence is not adequate to it” (EL 60). 
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In summation in can be stated that the uniqueness of Hegel’s theory of truth lies 
not in the fact that it proposes to replace the correspondence theory of truth with one of 
“enduring communal consensus”. Rather, it lies in the fact that 
1) Hegel would both explain and critique the naïve correspondence theory of 
truth inasmuch as he explains and critiques the very theory of consciousness 
which Forster ascribes to him, and 
2) Hegel inverts the notion of correspondence such that the challenge is not for 
mind to conform itself or its “representations” to objects “out there”, but 
rather for mind to posit an existence or object which is adequate to itself. 
2.2 Problems with Forster’s Conception of Hegel’s Theory of Development 
 Since Forster so fundamentally misinterprets Hegel’s theory of the structure of 
consciousness as well as Hegel’s theory of truth, it is inevitable that Forster should 
misinterpret Hegel’s account of the dialectical structure of consciousness’s development 
as it proceeds towards truth. In fact, Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s account of 
consciousness’s development is unsurprisingly intertwined with his failure to adequately 
explicate Hegel’s overall theory of development. Let us turn then to examining how 
Forster treats of this nest of issues surrounding the theme of development in Hegel. 
2.2.1 Forster’s Neglect of Hegel’s Appropriation of Aristotle’s Theory of Potency and 
Act 
 Forster entirely neglects Hegel’s debt to and appropriation of Aristotle’s theory of 
development, with its central elements of potency and act. He makes a fleeting mention 
of Hegel’s possible debt to Aristotle’s conception of the soul as the first act of body with 
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life potentially within it, but merely in the context of arguing that Hegel is not a “dualist” 
with respect to the relation between the mind and body (Hegel’s Idea 41). Had Forster 
paid due heed to Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle in this regard he might have avoided 
his problematic interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. For, Hegel’s appropriation of 
Aristotle’s theory of potency and act provides a crucial context for understanding the 
manner in which, for Hegel, truth is the correspondence between concept and existence, 
mind and object. 
 As discussed at length in Chapter One, for Hegel, development is a transition 
from potency to act. Development proceeds inasmuch as an initially immediate and 
unstable or “dynamic” unity – for example, a seed or the mind of a human child282 – 
posits a difference within itself and sublates that difference in a higher unity. The initial 
immediate and unstable unity is itself the concept, albeit merely in-itself or in potency. 
As such, it contains all the objective determinations that will eventually become 
actualized in and through the process of self-differentiation. Development is complete 
when the actual existence of the concept corresponds to itself, that is to say, to the totality 
of determinations which were present – in potency – at the beginning of the development. 
The coincidence or correspondence between concept and existence, or mind and object, is 
what Hegel calls the Idea and “it alone is Truth” (LHP I 20).  
2.2.2 Hegel’s Theory of Development and its Relation to Philosophical Multiplicity 
Along with contributing to his misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth, 
Forster’s neglect of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s theory of potency and act also 
has serious consequences for how Forster understands Hegel’s diagnosis of and response 
                                                          
282 Cf. pp. 41-2 above. 
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to the problem of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. This point will be returned in 
more depth momentarily when the discussion turns to examining a central part of 
Forster’s interpretation of how the PhG is related to the history of philosophy and 
philosophical multiplicity. Still, it will be apposite presently to establish certain basic 
ways in which Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s theory of potency and act and, 
therefore, Hegel’s overall theory of development is related to the problem of 
philosophical multiplicity and conflict. 
Hegel states with respect to the difference between potency and act,  
The whole variation in the development of the world in history is founded on this 
difference. This alone explains how since all mankind is naturally rational, and 
freedom is the hypothesis on which this reason rests, slavery yet has been, an in 
part still is, maintained by many peoples, and men have remained contented under 
it. The only distinction between the Africans and the Asiatics on the one hand, 
and the Greeks, Romans, and moderns on the other, is that the latter know and it 
is explicit for them that they are free, but the others are so without knowing that 
they are, and thus without existing as being free. This constitutes the enormous 
difference in their condition. (LHP I 21)  
Despite the shocking offensiveness of Hegel’s racism and Eurocentrism, the relevant 
philosophical point Hegel is making, here, can be extricated. For, Hegel’s point is that the 
differences among the various cultures – whether they are historically or merely 
geographically separated – is to be explained by the notion of development, which is to 
say, in terms of the transition from potency to act.283 Implicitly or in potency, all humans 
                                                          
283 Cf. Hegel: “We could indeed embrace the whole in the single principle of development” (LHP I 20). 
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are rational and, therefore, free, according to Hegel. The fact that some people remain in 
bondage simply entails that their implicit or potential rationality has not been actualized 
or explicitly posited. The relative stage of development of a given culture can thus be 
judged in terms of the relative level of actualization of its potential rationality.  
Needless to say, this general point is, for Hegel, all the more true with respect to 
the multiplicity of different and conflicting philosophies. For, as Hegel states, 
“Philosophy is system in development” (LHP I 29). Thus, the various philosophies 
represent and express the various stages to which the mind has succeeded in developing 
itself, in actualizing the mind’s potency. As, Hegel states: 
Now if we thus grasp the principles of the Concrete and of Development, the 
manifold [of philosophies] obtains quite another signification [than mere seeming 
haphazard and irreconcilable conflict], and what is said of the diversity in 
philosophies as if the manifold were fixed and stationary and composed of what is 
mutually exclusive is at once refuted and relegated to its proper place […] Those 
who believe the principle of diversity to be one absolutely fixed, do not know its 
nature, or its dialectic; the manifold or diverse is in a state of flux; it must really 
be conceived of as in the process of development, and as but a passing moment. 
Philosophy in its concrete Idea is the activity of development revealing the 
differences which it contains within itself. (LHP 33-4)   
Thus, different philosophies represent different stage of the development of the mind. 
Moreover, it is possible for these differences to obtain both historically and 
contemporaneously. Lower stages of development can manifest themselves in latter 
periods if, for example, an individual mind fails to fully actualize the concept of mind 
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which it implicitly is. For, every mind is a potential totality, which is to say, every mind 
contains within itself – albeit, in the first instance, merely in potency – the totality of 
philosophies. What distinguishes one mind from another, just as what distinguishes one 
culture from another, is the relative degree to which they have actualized that potency. 
 It is worth noting further that there is a kind of heightened reflexivity in the case 
of philosophy and its very relation to the notion of development. For, as Hegel states,  
Philosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this development [i.e. 
of the mind as a “self-developing organic system and a totality which contains a 
multitude of stages and of moments in development”], and as conceiving 
Thought, is itself this development in Thought. The more progress made in this 
development, the more perfect is the philosophy. (LHP I 27)284 
Thus, the highest development or perfection of philosophy is manifested in that 
philosophy which most precisely grasps and explicates the very notion of development, 
in general, and the notion of the mind as a self-developing, systematic organic totality in 
which the various other philosophies constitute but moments or stages, in particular.  
As noted, this discussion of Hegel’s notion of development and its concomitant 
notions of potency and act along with their relation to the problem of philosophical 
conflict will be returned to momentarily. Before turning to that task, however, let us note 
a few further elements of Hegel’s account of the dialectic of development which Forster 
unfortunately neglects. 
                                                          
284 Cf. Hegel: “The most important point for the nature of spirit [or mind] is not only the relation of what it 
is in itself to what it is actually, but the relation of what it knows itself to be to what it actually is; because 
spirit is essentially consciousness, this self-knowing is a fundamental determination of its actuality” (SL 
37). 
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2.3 Forster’s Forgetting of Hegel’s Notion of “Forgetting” 
An absolutely essential element in Hegel’s overall effort to provide an 
explanatory account of the multiplicity of philosophies resides in his notion of the mind’s 
forgetting of itself. As already mentioned, far from adequately explicating this notion of 
the mind’s self-forgetting and its role in Hegel’s overall account of the mind’s 
development in the PhG, Forster does not so much as mention it. As it stands, it is 
Forster’s forgetting of Hegel’s account of forgetting that would, in part, explain the 
misguidedness of his various interpretations of Hegel that have been discussed, thus far. 
For example, the fact that Forster forgets Hegel’s account of forgetting helps to 
explain why Forster would ascribe to Hegel the problematic theory of consciousness 
which he does. For, Hegel’s notion of forgetting is especially instructive for 
understanding how he explains and critiques the view of consciousness which Forster 
ascribes to him. For, it is only upon the mind forgetting that it has posited its object in the 
course of its own development that it might treat or relate to the object as something 
“found” “out there”. Moreover, it is only upon relating to its object as a something 
“found” “out there” or “external” to itself that the mind might then wonder how its 
“representations” “in here” could “correspond” to objects “out there”. Thus, Forster’s 
forgetting of Hegel’s account of forgetting also leaves Forster unable adequately to 
account for how Hegel explains and critiques the naïve notion of truth which emerges 
from the very view of consciousness which, again, Forster ascribes to Hegel himself.  
The mind’s forgetting of itself is also ultimately explicable in terms of Hegel’s 
overall theory of development, which, of course, Forster also forgets or neglects. For, 
every object of which the mind is conscious is the result of the mind’s own process of 
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self-differentiation and self-development. Yet, the mind forgets its development and, 
hence, its responsibility for the object and, as a result, relates the object as something 
“found” “out there”. Still, as we have just learned, at its highest moments of 
development, the mind begins to objectify for itself its own activity and, eventually, its 
own process of development. Hence, Active Reason, that is to say, Reason for which its 
own activity becomes its object, for example, is higher than merely Observing Reason 
which, while indeed active, has yet to objectify or render explicit this action for-itself. 
Thus, for Hegel, the antidote to the mind’s self-forgetting is self-knowledge conceived as 
a kind of recollection [Erinnerung], which is to say, a taking-possession-of-self or turning 
inward which is achieved in the very process of self-positing or self-differentiation.285 
Unfortunately, these points go entirely undiscussed in Forster’s work, even though for 
Hegel the self-recollection of the mind as a self-developing organic totality constitutes it 
highest end. 286 
2.4 Forster’s Neglect of the Problem of Futility in Motivating the PhG 
Throughout his first chapter, Forster provides and unpacks an elaborate list of the 
factors that motivate Hegel in the writing of the PhG. Yet, he fails to mention what, 
alongside the goal of mediating self-knowledge in the reader, is perhaps its overriding 
concern, namely, responding to the charge of futility levelled against philosophy due to 
                                                          
285 Cf. p. 29, footnote 33, above. 
286 Cf. Hegel on Plato’s doctrine of Anamnesis: “In one sense recollection [Erinnerung] is certainly an 
unfortunate expression, in the sense, namely, that an idea is reproduced which has already existed at 
another time. But recollection has another sense, which is given by its etymology, namely that of making 
oneself inward, going inward, and this is the profound meaning of the word in thought. In this sense it may 
undoubtedly be said that knowledge of the universal is nothing but a recollection, a going within oneself, 
and that we make that which at first shows itself in external form and determined as a manifold, into an 
inward, a universal, because we go into ourselves and thus bring what is inward in us into consciousness” 
(LHP II 34). 
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the fact of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. This point is worth noting especially 
because it is upon discussing this problem at length in the long Introduction to the LHP 
that Hegel immediately turns to elaborating in detail his larger theory of development. 
For, it is only in and through an adequate theory of development, in general, and of the 
development of the mind, in particular, that, according to Hegel, one can adequately 
respond to this charge of futility against philosophy (not to mention, treat the problem of 
truth). Yet, like so much else needed in order to understand Hegel’s effort in the PhG, the 
problem of futility and its important connection to Hegel’s theory of development goes 
entirely unmentioned in Forster’s account. 
3. The Relation Between the PhG and the History of Philosophy 
It is now time to turn to a portion of Forster’s work in which he raises a set of 
related problems which are quite relevant to the overall aim of the present dissertation. 
Thus, it will be apposite to 1) explicate this set of problems as articulated by Forster, 2) 
recount Forster’s own attempt to respond to them and 3) show how the present 
dissertation provides the means of providing a better overall response to them. 
3.1. Historical Chronology in the PhG 
Forster articulates this set of problems in his chapter “History in the Chapters 
Consciousness through Reason”. The general problem to which Forster calls attention 
concerns the extent to which the phenomenologies of the various forms of the mind 
provided in the PhG are supposed to correspond to specific historical philosophies. It will 
be recalled that a central thesis of this dissertation is that, in the PhG, Hegel attempts to 
provide an explanatory account for the totality of different and conflicting philosophies. 
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Thus, it would seem that the total analysis provided in the PhG should in some way 
correspond to the totality of historical philosophies. Yet, what are the precise mechanics 
of this? Do earlier philosophies necessarily correspond to earlier forms of the mind and, 
thus, earlier sections of the PhG such that the philosophies which express Sense-certainty 
will necessarily be found to have emerged historically prior to philosophies which 
express Observing Reason, for example? Or, is the issue of historical chronology in effect 
irrelevant to the PhG provided that it does, in fact, succeed in integrating the totality of 
philosophies into a unified explanatory account? These are questions which Forster raises 
and attempts to respond to.  
The first step of Forster’s response to these questions is simply to attempt to show 
that there is, in fact, a strict chronological order to the successive forms of the mind dealt 
with in the PhG, or at least those that are covered from Consciousness through Reason. 
Thus, to briefly summarize elements of Forster’s chronology, Sense-certainty, for 
example, being the earliest form of the mind analyzed in the PhG corresponds to the 
viewpoint of “early prehistory” manifested in ancient Persia; Perception, coming next, 
corresponds to “early prehistory” in India; Lordship and Bondage, dealt with a few stages 
later, corresponds to Late 5th Century Athens as well as Rome after the 2nd Punic War; 
Reason as Testing Laws, showing up towards the end of Reason, corresponds to Kant’s 
moral philosophy; and finally the concluding paragraphs of the Reason chapter 
correspond to Hegel’s viewpoint (Hegel’s Idea 297-353). There are further details to 
Forster’s chronology, but the above list provides a rough summary of its basic structure 
and nature. 
3.2 Forster’s Response to Potential Objections against His Chronology 
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After delineating this account of the correspondence between the chronology of 
historical philosophies, or viewpoints, and the forms of consciousness successively 
analyzed in the PhG, Forster acknowledges a set of objections that might be raised with 
respect to his effort. Let us note two of these objections as well as discuss the manner in 
which Forster would respond to them. The first objection Forster articulates concerns the 
fact that in Consciousness, especially, but also in Self-consciousness and Reason, Hegel 
seemingly makes few references to specific historical dates, individuals or works, and the 
ones that he does make would seem to be extremely vague. Thus, against his own 
argument that there is a strict chronological order to the forms of the mind successively 
analyzed from Consciousness to Reason, Forster notes that one might object, “If Hegel 
had really intended to give a chronological history here, would he not have made the 
allusions clearer, or included specific reference?” (Hegel’s Idea 353). 
The second objection that Forster articulates concerns the fact that many of the 
clear historical references that are provided in Hegel’s phenomenology of the forms of 
the mind from Consciousness through Reason occur out of chronological order (Hegel’s 
Idea 354). As Forster notes, this would seem to pose the greatest threat to his argument 
that there is a strict chronological order to the forms of the mind successively analyzed in 
those chapters and sections. 
Forster responds to these two objections by introducing what he regards as a 
“very important principle”, one which he considers to be operative within the overall 
design of the chapters Consciousness through Reason but which is distinct from the 
principle of strict chronological order (Hegel’s Idea 354). Thus, according Forster, 
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[T]he sequence of shapes of consciousness presented in these chapters is 
supposed to be not only a chronological history of consciousness’s development 
but also and simultaneously a collection of the strata constitutive of the modern 
consciousness. (Emphases Forster’s; Hegel’s Idea 354) 
Thus, according to Forster, in the chapters Consciousness through Reason there are 
effectively two distinct but related principles governing the successive analyses of the 
forms of the mind provided therein. First, there is the principle of strict chronological 
order according to which Hegel attempts to provide an account of the emergence in 
historical time of the various forms of the mind and their concomitant viewpoints or 
philosophies. Second, there is the principle according to which Hegel attempts to show 
how forms of the mind which first emerged in earlier historical periods are nevertheless 
preserved within the “strata” of the modern mind. 
 According to Forster, insofar as one recognizes that these two principles 
simultaneously govern the overall presentation provided by Consciousness through 
Reason, one can adequately respond to the objection previously raised. Thus, to the first 
objection that the chapters Consciousness through Reason lack specific historical 
references, Forster provides a pair of related responses. First, he states: 
The depiction in these chapters [i.e. Consciousness through Reason] of a series of 
shapes of consciousness is supposed to serve not only as a chronological history 
of consciousness, but also and simultaneously as an analysis of the strata of the 
modern consciousness. The intrusion of historical details, while it might have 
benefitted the former project, could have done so only at the serious cost of 
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interfering with the latter. Hegel therefore decided to omit historical details as far 
as possible. (Emphases Forster’s; Hegel’s Idea 357) 
Thus, a first reason Hegel refrained from making clear historical references in these 
chapters was apparently in order not to interfere with his simultaneous effort to provide 
an analysis of the strata of forms of the mind present in the modern consciousness or 
mind. 
 The second reason why the early stages of the PhG apparently lack specific 
historical references, according to Forster, has especially to do with the Consciousness 
chapter. Thus, Forster states, 
[W]hen Hegel actually wrote this chapter, he in all probability had no more 
precise idea of the historical reference of its first two sections, Sense-certainty and 
Perception, than that they depicted shapes of consciousness from the very 
beginnings of human prehistory. He was therefore not even in a position to 
provide historical details in these sections when he wrote them. (Hegel’s Idea 
357) 
Thus, according to Forster, Hegel omitted any specific historical references from his 
account of Sense-certainty and Perception simply because there were no specific 
historical details to which he might make references since the period of time to which 
they might refer would be that of prehistory. 
 Forster follows this pair of responses with his response to the second objection 
that could be raised against his argument that the chapters Consciousness through Reason 
are governed by a strict chronological principle. That objection, again, was that the 
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historical references that do, in fact, occur within the Consciousness through Reason very 
often do so out of chronological order. Forster responds to this objection by stating, 
Hegel intends these chapters to provide not only a chronological history of 
consciousness but also and simultaneously, in exploitation of the putative 
circumstance that consciousness’s development has been cumulative in nature an 
analysis of the structure of modern consciousness. Consequently, within any 
given section he will wish to allude, not only to examples of the shape of 
consciousness at issue from the period of its original emergence, but also to 
examples of its preservation in the modern consciousness. (Hegel’s Idea 358) 
Thus, the reason why some historical references are out of chronological order is that at 
times Hegel wishes to draw attention to the instances in which historically earlier forms 
of the mind are retained in the strata of modern consciousness. This fact would explain, 
for example, the many references to Newtonian physics in the Force and Understanding 
chapter, despite the fact that, according to Forster, the historical reference of this section 
is to certain ancient viewpoints which culminate in Greek rationalism. As Forster states, 
Greek rationalism’s distinction between the sensible appearances of things 
recognized by the sensuous representation of the native investigator and the 
underlying supersensible constitutions and causal principles of things recognized 
only through a more exalted mode of cognition is preserved as a fundamental 
background assumption within modern physics. (Hegel’s Idea 358-9) 
Thus, in making multiple clear references to Newton in the course of Force and 
Understanding Hegel is not undermining the strict chronological sequence of 
Consciousness through Reason. Rather, he is fulfilling the ulterior task of showing the 
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reader how the form of the mind first emergent in Greek rationalism is still preserved 
among the strata of the modern mind. 
 Before moving to a critical examination of Forster’s articulation of these possible 
objections to his argument for a strict chronological sequence to Consciousness through 
Reason as well as his proffered responses to them, it will be worth noting an important 
point which Forster notes in the context, albeit merely in a footnote. Concerning this 
general problem of explaining why certain historical references occur out of 
chronological order, Forster adds in the footnote that in the PhG Hegel is probably also 
concerned with the problem of “atavism”, which occurs when “later perspectives which 
do not so much preserve an earlier perspective in a modified form within themselves as 
attempt to return to it” (Hegel’s Idea 359). Thus, for example, according to Forster,  
[I]t is plausible to interpret the Sense-certainty section as an attack, not only on 
the historically original form of the outlook which it describes, but also on later 
positions which Hegel regards as attempts to revert to that outlook, such as certain 
types of philosophical empiricism. (Hegel’s Idea 359) 
In his reference to the phenomenon of the “atavism” of the mind in its course of 
development, Forster thus in effect alludes to a crucial set of elements of Hegel’s entire 
effort in the PhG, such as the phenomenon of the mind’s self-forgetting and its reversion 
to lower viewpoints. The fact that Forster mentions this nest of issues only in a footnote 
and does not explicate it in any more detail provides some indication as to inadequacy of 
his overall analysis of the PhG. This point will be returned to in the course of the ensuing 
critical examination of Forster’s articulation of his position on the issue of historical 
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chronology in the PhG, the possible objections to his position and his response to those 
objections. 
3.3 Critique of Both Forster’s Chronology and His Responses to the Potential 
Objections against It 
 Clearly, the aspects of Forster’s work just adumbrated are quite relevant to the 
overall argument of the present dissertation. For, a central part of overall the argument of 
this dissertation is that in the course of the PhG Hegel attempts to demonstrate how it is 
possible not only to critique but to provide an explanation for the very emergence of the 
multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. Hegel shows that the various conflicting 
philosophies are explicable as expressions of the various stages in the development of the 
mind. In showing that the multiplicity of philosophies are expressions of stages of 
development of the mind Hegel is thus able to show 1) that these philosophies do not 
emerge haphazardly but have an intelligible ground for their emergence and 2) that they 
are not ultimately irreconcilable and that the disputes that have emerged among them are 
not doomed to persist in perpetuity. For, in showing how the various philosophies are 
expressions of the stages of the mind’s development Hegel shows 1) that there is an 
intelligible pattern or unity to the totality of philosophies inasmuch as there is an 
intelligible unity to the mind and 2) that it is possible for there to be progress and 
development within the history of philosophy inasmuch as there is progress and 
development within the mind.  
 A key challenge facing the overall argument of this dissertation which the 
discussion of Forster’s work in the previous section helps to focus is the challenge of 
showing precisely how the phenomenology of the development of the mind provided in 
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the PhG relates to the history of the conflicting philosophies. According to Forster, the 
PhG, at least in the Consciousness through Reason chapters, adheres to a strict 
chronology which begins in prehistory and culminates with the viewpoint of Hegel 
himself in the beginning of the 19th Century. This argument is qualified by Forster’s 
claim that the PhG also supposedly shows how the historically emergent viewpoints are 
preserved within the modern mind – a qualification intended to explain, for example, the 
historical references that are out of chronological sequence. Despite perhaps some prima 
facie plausibility, however, Forster’s argument in this context is flawed. Let us turn to 
delineating this critique of Forster’s argument. 
3.3.1 Forster’s Problematic Interpretation of the Relation between the History of 
Philosophy and the “Strata” of the Modern Mind Delineated in the PhG 
 A first point of entry for a critique of Forster’s argument concerns his claim that 
the intrusion of historical details in Hegel’s analysis of Consciousness through Reason, 
while it might have helped clarify the chronological principle operative in those sections, 
would nevertheless have seriously interfered with Hegel’s simultaneous effort to show 
how the forms of the mind analyzed in these sections are also present as strata in the 
modern mind. Forster, unfortunately, makes no argument and provides no evidence in 
support of this claim. More importantly, the fact that he makes it reveals a 
misunderstanding of the very nature of Hegel’s effort in the PhG as well as with Hegel’s 
philosophy at large. In order to show this more clearly it would be helpful to advert to a 
crucial point Hegel makes in the Introduction to the LHP. 
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 Hegel is addressing the issue of what it takes to properly interpret the history of 
philosophy. It is worth quoting Hegel at length in this context since he makes a series of 
crucial but interlocking points: 
 [T]he study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself, for, 
indeed, it can be nothing else. Whoever studies the history of sciences such as 
physics and mathematics, makes himself acquainted with physics and 
mathematics themselves. But in order to objtain a knowledge of its progress as 
development of the Idea in the empirical, external form in which philosophy 
appears in history, a corresponding knowledge of the Idea is absolutely essential, 
just as in judging of human affairs one must have a conception of that which is 
right and fitting. Else, indeed, as in so many histories of philosophy there is 
presented to the vision devoid of idea, only a disarranged collection of opinions. 
To make you acquainted with this Idea, and consequently to explain the 
manifestations, is the business of the history of philosophy […] Since the 
observer must bring with him the concept of the subject in order to see it in its 
phenomenal aspect and in order to expose the object faithfully to view, we need 
not wonder at there being so many dull histories of philosophy in which the 
succession of its systems are represented simply as a number of opinions, error 
and freaks of thought. They are freaks of thought which, indeed, have been 
devised with a great pretension of acuteness and of mental exertion, and with 
everything else which can be said in admiration of what is merely formal. But, 
considering the absence of philosophic mind in such historians as these, how 
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should they be able to comprehend and represent the content, which is reasoned 
thought? (LHP I 30-1) 
Here we have perhaps the first expression of the Hermeneutic Circle of doing history of 
philosophy and, indeed, doing philosophy itself. For, according to Hegel, one must know 
one’s mind in order to understand the history of philosophy, but one must study the 
history of philosophy in order to know one’s mind. Stated differently, if one does not 
know one’s mind as a self-developing organic system, then one will be unable to 
recognize the various historical philosophies as successive expressions of the moments of 
that system. Yet, it is only through studying the history of philosophy that one comes to 
recognize that the mind is a self-developing system whose various moments are 
expressed in the various philosophies. Stated differently, again, one must possess the Idea 
of philosophy in order to profitably study the history of philosophy (i.e. not dismiss it as a 
haphazard succession of freaks), and the Idea of philosophy is grasped only insofar as the 
mind grasps itself as a self-developing organic system. Yet, recognizing that the mind is a 
self-developing organic system requires profitably studying the history of philosophy.  
 Needless to say, the Hermeneutic Circle of learning philosophy very closely 
approximates to the previously discussed Paradox of Learning in the Meno. For, it would 
seem that one must already know what philosophy is if one is to learn what philosophy is, 
thus making learning philosophy impossible. Also needless to say, just like the Paradox 
of Learning, the Hermeneutic Circle of philosophy is insoluble from the viewpoint of 
Representation. While space does not permit providing a detailed account of Hegel’s 
response to the Hermeneutic Circle in this precise context, suffice it to say that, in a very 
real sense, the PhG just is Hegel’s response. This comes out in Hegel’s famous 
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discussion of the Problem of the Criterion in the Introduction in which he specifies that 
learning is a self-mediating and thus self-correcting process in which the criterion is 
immanent to the mind itself (PhG 52-56).287 Hence, in Hegel’s phenomenology of 
Perception, for example, in which the problem of error is treated, Hegel is keen to 
emphasize that, in the case of error, it is the mind itself which convicts itself of error. In 
other words, the mind discovers the very problem of error, not by finding that its 
“representations” fail to correspond to their putative objects, but rather insofar as the 
object fails to correspond to the immanent rational criterion of absoluteness that just is 
the mind itself (PhG 70ff.).288 
This Hermeneutic Circle, which affects the very core of studying the history of 
philosophy and philosophy itself, along with Hegel’s explicit awareness of it, helps to 
show, furthermore, the misguidedness of Forster’s argument as to why there are 
apparently so few explicit historical references in the Consciousness through Reason 
chapters. For, far from seriously interfering with any effort on the part of Hegel to reveal 
the preservation of earlier forms of the mind within the modern mind, making explicit 
historical references to the philosophies which express the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, 
for example, could only aid in the quest for self-knowledge (or knowledge of the strata of 
the modern mind) which the PhG is intended to mediate within the reader. For, in order 
                                                          
287 Cf. Hegel: “This spiritual movement which, in its simple undifferentiatedness, gives itself its own 
determinateness and in its determinateness is equality with itself, which therefore is the immanent 
development of the Concept, this movement is the absolute method of knowing and that the same time is 
the immanent soul of the content itself. I maintain that it is this self-construing method alone which enables 
philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. It is in this way that I have tried to expound 
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit” (SL 28). 
288 Cf. Aquinas, that other great student of Aristotle, according to whom the mind unto itself, insofar as it is 
a potens omnia facere et fieri, and not the mind’s “representations”, is the measure of all things: “The term 
mind (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare) […] So, the word mind is applied to the soul in 
the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it 
were, according to its own principles” (De Ver. Q. 10, a. 1, rep.). 
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properly to understand the strata or moments of one’s mind, one must understand how 
these strata or moments, when explicitly expressed, give rise to determinate historical 
philosophical positions. In other words, Forster’s argument in this instance suggests that 
the effort to understand the history of philosophy and the effort to understand the strata or 
moments of one’s mind are opposed and that engaging in one risks interfering with 
engaging in the other, when, for Hegel, these two activities are complementary and, in 
fact, ultimately identical. 
Thus, it can be further noticed that Forster’s attempted clarification of the relation 
between the history of philosophy and the PhG actually serves to obscure an important 
fact which is that all references to viewpoints or philosophies referenced in the PhG that 
are not ultimately Hegel’s are “historical” in the sense that Forster uses the term in 
contrast to the supposedly “ahistorical” strata of the modern mind. In other words, no 
viewpoint or philosophy discussed in the PhG other than Hegel’s own, which comes at 
the very end, preserves the viewpoints or philosophies that went before it in the manner 
in which they are preserved within the strata of the modern mind. 
To illustrate this point, take the example provided by Forster regarding the 
relation between Greek rationalism and Newtonian science supposedly indicated in the 
Force and Understanding chapter. According to Forster, in terms of its chronology, Force 
and Understanding corresponds to Greek rationalism which, for Forster, culminates in 
Plato. Thus, on Forster’s reading, the copious clear references to Newtonian science in 
the Force and Understanding chapter are inserted there merely to illuminate for the 
modern reader the way in which the Greek rationalist/Platonic viewpoint has been 
preserved, albeit in modified or sublated form, in the modern mind.  
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Yet, for Hegel, the Newtonian viewpoint is itself no more preserved in the 
modern mind, which is to say, the mind that has reached Hegel’s viewpoint, in an 
unmodified or unsublated form than the Greek rationalist viewpoint. This is precisely the 
point of the sections of Force and Understanding that move beyond Newtonian 
mechanism to an organicist viewpoint. For Hegel, his own Idealist philosophy of nature 
has already sublated the Newtonian viewpoint by the time the PhG is written. In other 
words, both Greek rationalism and Newtonian science have been sublated into the 
modern – Hegelian – mind. It is thus highly misleading to suggest that the reference to 
Plato in the Force and Understanding chapter are “historical” while the references to 
Newton are not.  
 There are actually further problems with Forster’s discussion of the relation 
between Greek rationalism and Newtoianism in Force and Understanding as well as with 
his larger discussion of the relation of the PhG to the history of philosophy. In order to 
address these problems, however, it will first be necessary to address an even deeper 
problem with Forster’s understanding of certain basic elements of Hegel’s effort in the 
PhG. 
3.3.2 Forster’s Neglect of Both Basic Elements of Hegel’s Dialectic of Development 
and Their Relation to the History of Philosophy 
 In order to begin addressing this deeper problem with Forster’s overall 
understanding of Hegel’s effort in the PhG, it will be helpful first to show how and why 
Forster establishes some of the chronological order which he purports to find within the 
PhG. Thus, to take the first chronological instance, Forster claims that the historical 
reference of Sense-certainty is to ancient Persian religion. The sole piece of evidence that 
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he cites in favor of his interpretation is Hegel’s reference to Sense-certainty in the part of 
the Religion chapter in which Hegel is discussing ancient Persian religion. Thus, Forster 
states, 
[I]n the Religion chapter, which is generally recognized to be chronologically 
historical in design, he explicitly associates Sense-certainty with the historically 
first and most primitive of religion, God as Light. He associates this form of 
religion with the Zoroastrian tradition of ancient Persia. It is therefore reasonable 
to infer that his considered view of Sense-certainty is that it too has its source in 
ancient Persia. (Hegel’s Idea 305) 
There are multiple problems with Forster’s interpretation in this context. 
 In order best to clarify the problems with Forster’s interpretation, it will be helpful 
to recall certain of the basic principles which govern the entire dialectal development of 
the mind as delineated in the PhG. To begin with, it should be recalled that the mind will 
determine itself, its object and its relation to its object according to the level of 
development it has reached. Next, it should be recalled that the development of the mind 
is also dialectical, and part of that dialectic involves the mind’s repeated forgetting of its 
own development and its reversion to lower viewpoints.  
Thus, it may happen that in the course of its development, the mind posits a 
highly developed object but nevertheless forgets the very development in and through 
which it was posited and consequently reverts to a lower viewpoint. Insofar as the mind 
reverts to a lower viewpoint it will determine its relation to its object on the basis of that 
lower viewpoint despite the fact that the object itself corresponds to a higher viewpoint. 
For example, as has been repeatedly discussed, the object posited by the Kantian 
393 
 
 
viewpoint is the object of Reason, which is to say, the ‘I’ or self-consciousness itself qua 
category. Yet, within the Kantian philosophy one also detects a reversion to the 
viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Thus, despite the fact that the object 
determined by Kantian philosophy – the category – is highly developed and mediated, in 
the Kantian philosophy the relation between the mind and its object is determined by the 
mind to be one of sensuous immediacy or intuition.  
Precisely the same phenomenon as this unfolds in Hegel’s treatment of the God of 
Light to which Forster appeals in order to make his case regarding the historical reference 
of Sense-certainty. In the case of the God of Light section, the PhG has moved past 
Reason into Spirit or mind. Thus, the object of this form of the mind is even more 
developed than that of Kantian philosophy, for example. As Hegel states, the object of 
the viewpoint of the God of Light is “filled with Spirit [or mind]” (PhG 419). Still, the 
God of Light viewpoint has reverted to the viewpoint of immediate consciousness, or 
Sense-certainty, in terms of its relation to its object. Interestingly, the God of Light 
viewpoint has also reverted to the viewpoint of immediate self-consciousness, or 
Lordship and Bondage, in its relation to its object.289 As a result of its thus having 
reverted to these lower viewpoints in terms of its relation to its object, the object of the 
God of Light viewpoint, that is to say, the object filled not just with Reason but with 
Spirit or mind, is experienced by this viewpoint as an uncanny or sublime, but still 
sensuous, spectacle of light and dark which lords over it. As Hegel states, for the 
viewpoint of God of Light, its object is “torrents of light [and] streams of fire destructive 
                                                          
289 This is interesting not least because, in an important sense, Kant’s philosophy, too, reverts to the 
viewpoint of Lordship and Bondage. Thus, in its relation to a higher object, the God of Light nevertheless 
recapitulates elements that were manifested in the Kantian viewpoint. 
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of [all] form” from which the mind slavishly “retreats” rather than identifies with and 
recognizes as itself (PhG 419). 
The larger point to be noted here with respect to Forster’s effort to establish 
Persian religion as the historical reference of Sense-certainty, and, indeed, with his entire 
effort to establish the chronological order of the PhG, is that the mind repeatedly reverts 
back to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty throughout the course of PhG. Thus, the fact that 
mind does this at a stage in which the object corresponds to that present in “prehistoric” 
Persian religion bears no especial significance for the putative chronological order of the 
viewpoints meant to be exemplified in the Consciousness chapter or beyond. Indeed, on 
the basis of Forster’s argument one could just as easily say that the chronological 
reference of Sense-certainty is to Kantian philosophy or early modern science (i.e. the 
viewpoint of Observing Reason), both of which also revert to the viewpoint of Sense-
certainty.  
In fact, the only place in the history of philosophy in which we see the viewpoint 
of Sense-certainty expressed, as it were, in its purity is the positive side of Schulze’s 
skepticism discussed in Chapter Two. For, not only does Schulze determine the mind to 
relate to its object in terms of immediate sensuousness, the object itself lacks all spiritual 
or mental determinations or mediations; it just is. By contrast, the object for the God of 
Light viewpoint is at least spirit or mind-filled. Thus, in the strictest sense, the God of 
Light viewpoint is more advanced than the viewpoint expressed in Schulze and, as such, 
cannot be considered the prime historical reference of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. 
For, as far as Hegel informs us, the only historical philosophy which has expressed that 
viewpoint in its purity would be the positive side of Schulze’s skepticism. 
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It should be noted further that this kind of reversion of the mind to a lower 
viewpoint in terms of the manner in which it determines itself relation to its object just is 
the “atavism” of the mind to which Forster provided only the most fleeting reference but 
which is, in fact, central to the entire dialectic of the mind’s development. It will be 
recalled, of course, that Forster restricted the total possible ways in which the mind can 
determine its relation to its object to a single one, namely, representation. This fact 
would, in part, explain his highly misleading treatment of the relation between Sense-
certainty and the God of Light viewpoint since the notion that the mind might determine 
its relation to its object in multiple ways is peremptorily ruled out by Forster’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the structure of the mind. 
Another example of Forster’s problematic rendition of the chronological order of 
the PhG concerns the previously mentioned instance regarding the putative relation 
between Greek rationalism and Newton in the Force and Understanding chapter. It will 
be recalled that, according to Forster, the point of the copious references to Newton in 
Force and Understanding is to alert the reader to the manner in which the viewpoint of 
Greek rationalism, which is the true historical reference of Force and Understanding, has 
been preserved – albeit in modified or sublated form – among the strata of the modern 
mind. Even a cursory inspection of Hegel’s relative estimation of the viewpoint of Greek 
rationalism, culminating as it does in Plato, compared to that of Newton, however, shows 
that this is decidedly not what Hegel is up to in Force and Understanding. 
To begin with, it is clear that, for Hegel, the value of Plato’s philosophy lies in the 
fact of “its elevation of consciousness into the realm of Spirit” and that mind itself is 
grasped as relating to its object primarily through thought (LHP II 2ff.). Thus, for Hegel, 
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Plato succeeds in determining the mind to relate to its object through thought, or Noesis, 
and this kind of relation would ultimately correspond to the viewpoint of Spirit. By 
contrast, Hegel ruthlessly criticizes Newton for determining the mind to relate to its 
object according to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. As Hegel states, “Newton treated 
concepts like sensuous things, and dealt with them just as men deal with wood and stone” 
(LHP III 325). 
In the Force and Understanding section Hegel shows that he, of course, 
recognizes that the object developed and posited by Newtonian science was, in many 
respects, much more advanced than the object of Plato’s philosophy. Indeed, as Hegel 
states, “The philosophical culture of Plato, like the general culture of his time, was not 
yet ripe for truly scientific work” (LHP II 17). Still the manner in which Plato determines 
the mind’s relation to its object is decidedly not preserved in the Newtonian viewpoint.290 
Thus, it is highly misleading to say that the point of the references to the Newtonian 
viewpoint in Force and Understanding is merely to show how the Platonic viewpoint has 
been preserved among the strata of the modern mind. For, the object of the Newtonian 
viewpoint which is analyzed in Force and Understanding is qualitatively more advanced 
than anything in Plato’s science; yet, the manner in which the Newtonian viewpoint 
determines its relation to its object is, in fact, significantly impoverished compared to 
that of Plato. Also, as previously noted, if there is any historical reference in terms of 
actual chronology in Force and Understanding, it is to that of the transition of Newtonian 
mechanics to the German Idealist philosophy of nature. 
                                                          
290 Cf. Hegel: “[W]e must regard it as an infinite step forward that the forms of thought have been freed 
from the material in which they are submerged in self-conscious intuition [and] figurate conception […] 
and that these universalities have been brought into prominence for their own sake and made objects of 
contemplation as was done by Plato and after him especially by Aristotle” (SL 33). 
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 Thus, there are myriad problems with Forster’s attempt to relate the supposed 
historical references to the putative strata of modern mind, and these problems 
themselves are grounded in still further problems with Forster’s basic understanding of 
central elements of Hegel’s effort in the PhG. It is now time to turn to showing how the 
overall argument of the present dissertation provides the means for a better response to 
the set of problematics which Forster attempts to address. 
4. A Better Way to Approach the Relation between the PhG and the History of 
Philosophy and Philosophical Multiplicity and Conflict 
According to the basic argument of this dissertatin, the PhG provides an account of 
the structure of mind in its development from potency to act. Thus, forms of the mind 
analyzed earlier in the PhG correspond to forms of the mind which are not yet fully 
actualized or whose actualization is not yet adequate to the concept of the mind as such. 
Recognizing that the PhG provides an idealized or phenomenologically purified account 
of the development of the mind from potency to act is crucial to understanding the 
relation between the PhG and the history of philosophy, including, of course, the history 
of philosophical conflict. 
In order to clarify this point further, it is first necessary to recognize that different 
individual minds can be differently actualized. Thus, in most general terms, insofar as 
two individuals have attained to different degrees of actualization of their respective 
minds, they are liable to fall into fundamental philosophical disagreement. Moreover, 
different individual minds can be less actualized even though they come historically later. 
Thus, modern minds might find themselves in disagreement with Aristotle, not because 
they have superseded his viewpoint, but because they have fallen short of it. Indeed, 
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Hegel famously maintains that Aristotle’s theory of rational Nous far surpasses that of the 
so-called “rational psychology” or “empirical psychology” of Hegel’s time.291 
 Still, there are conditions for the emergence and actualization of any given 
individual mind and, therefore, of all minds of any given epoch. As we have seen, Hegel 
maintains that previous achievement is necessary in order to make the time ripe for still 
further advancement.292 This phenomenon is generically accounted for in the notion of 
“vertical teleology” discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation. There it was pointed 
out that, for Hegel, previous actualizations and objectifications of the mind provide the 
proximate potency for a subsequent stage of actualization. Thus, even though later 
individuals can fall beneath the level of previous viewpoint insofar as they fail adequately 
to actualize their minds, certain higher types of actualization are simply impossible for 
individuals within earlier periods.293 Thus, as we have seen, even the actualization of the 
mind of Plato himself was restricted by the lack of previous actualizations of the mind.294 
 The larger point is that insofar as one recognizes that the history of philosophy 
and, indeed, of all culture is the self-actualization of the mind, one can thereby 
                                                          
291 Cf. Hegel: “Aristotle’s books on the soul, along his essays on particular aspects and states of the soul, 
are […] still the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic” (POM 
4); “Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking that is current today” (SL 45). 
292 Cf. Hegel: “As a matter of fact, the need to occupy oneself with pure thought presupposes that the 
human spirit must already have travelled a long road” (SL 34). Schelling had already made a similar point 
in the System of Transcendental Idealism: “[N]o individual consciousness could be posited, with all the 
determinations it is posited with, and which necessarily belong to it, unless the whole of history had gone 
before […] This particular individuality presupposes this particular period, of such and such a character, 
such and such a degree of culture, etc.” (201). 
293 Cf. Hegel: “This […] is no mere pride in the philosophy of our time, because it is in the nature of the 
whole process that the more developed philosophy of a later time is really the result of previous operations 
of the thinking mind; and that it, pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier standpoints, has not grown 
up on its own account or in a state of isolation” (LHP I 42). 
294 Cf. Hegel: “The individual is the offspring of his people, of his world, whose constitution and attributes 
are alone manifested in his form” (LHP I 45); “[S]eeing that difference in culture on the whole depends on 
difference in the thought determinations which are manifested, this must be so still more with respect to 
philosophies” (LHP I 44). 
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understand the source of the multiplicity of philosophies along with their various 
conflicts. Thus, in the case of Sense-certainty, insofar as one grasps this viewpoint as a 
stage in the mind’s development, one can grasp why the philosophy of Schulze emerged 
even at the relatively late date that it did. For, Schulze’s philosophy simply expresses a 
form of the mind at a very primitive stage of development. Yet, insofar as Schulze is 
operating at a viewpoint which is less developed than, say, Fichte, who, for Hegel, clearly 
inhabits a higher viewpoint given that his philosophy has at least moved to the viewpoint 
of Self-consciousness, then it becomes explicable – as opposed to merely haphazard – as 
to why Schulze and Fichte would have fallen into the disagreement which they famously 
did.295 
 There is thus no reason to insist upon any kind of strict chronological order to the 
PhG. There will be a rough correlation between the succession of viewpoints in the PhG 
and the succession of historical philosophy since certain higher forms of the mind simply 
could not emerge until previous historical philosophies, and the minds which expressed 
them, were actualized. Thus, in the history of philosophy, higher viewpoints tend to come 
historically later.  
Yet, the development of the mind is dialectical, with various advancements but 
also various forgettings of advancements and consequent reversions to lower viewpoints, 
both on an individual and historically epochal level. Thus, Hegel maintains that there is a 
degree of contingency operative within the history of philosophy which is not present in 
the ideal structure of the mind’s development delineated in the PhG. As Hegel notes, 
there is a distinction to be drawn between the “sequence in time of history [of 
                                                          
295 For an introduction to this dispute between Schulze and Fichte, Cf. Between Hegel and Kant pp. 104-57. 
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philosophy] and […] the […] succession in the order of ideas”, the former of which is 
beset by a certain contingency - although, ultimately, the history of philosophy, too, is 
governed by the necessary, in the sense of ineluctable, providential direction of the mind 
itself (LHP I 30ff.).296 
 As has been noted, the order of viewpoints delineated in the PhG corresponds to a 
certain ideal order of the development of the mind. For, the overall goal of the PhG as 
such is not to articulate a strict chronological order of viewpoints in the history of 
philosophy. Rather, the goal is to mediate the development of self-knowledge in the 
reader which will in turn permit the reader to be able to discern the intelligible unity 
governing the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. For, that intelligible unity turns out 
to be identical to the intelligible unity governing the mind itself. 
5. Recovering an Aspect of Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Truth 
 As a final point of discussion, despite its misguidedness, it may still be possible to 
recover a certain useful insight in Forster’s argument that Hegel adopts an “enduring 
communal consensus” conception of truth. For, as has been noted, higher actualizations 
of the mind presuppose previous actualizations which serve as their proximate potency. 
Thus, the actualization of any individual mind presupposes the actualization of other 
minds. This point can perhaps be further exploited with respect to the later parts of the 
                                                          
296 Cf. Hegel: “In the peculiar shape of external history, the coming to be of philosophy and its 
development is represented as the history of this science. This shape gives the form of contingent 
succession to the stages of the Idea’s development, and it gives a kind of mere diversity to the principles 
and their exposition in the various philosophies of these stages. But the master workman of this labour of 
thousands of years is the One living Spirit whose thinking nature is to bring to consciousness what it is; and 
when what it is has become object in this way, it is at once raised above this, and it is inwardly a higher 
stage” (EL 37-8). 
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PhG in which Hegel begins more explicitly referring to the spiritual, or mental, 
community.  
For, it would seem that, for Hegel, the truly full actualization of any mind requires 
the full actualization of all minds and that the full actualization of all minds would 
produce universal philosophical agreement, or “enduring communal consensus”, among 
all minds. As Hegel states in the Preface to the PhG “it is the nature of humanity to press 
onward to agreement with other; human nature only really exists in an achieved 
community of minds” (PhG 43). The human mind is only ever fully achieved or 
actualized in a community of other fully actualized minds, and this full actualization 
produces full agreement. Thus, the overcoming of philosophical disagreement requires 
the universal actualization of the mind. 
 Still, this does not entail that Hegel views truth itself is a matter of enduring 
communal consensus, as if mere agreement were enough to generate truth. For, there may 
be communities in which agreement is achieved but yet the minds in those communities 
are not fully actualized. Rather, truth, for Hegel, is only achieved when existence is 
adequate to concept, or object corresponds to mind. The point would be that, only in a 
universal community of fully actualized, and thus agreeing, individual minds would there 
be an existence that is indeed adequate to or corresponds to the concept of mind itself. 
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